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Abstract
Freebird is a space-based orbital transfer vehicle designed to repair and deorbit orbital assets. Freebird is based at
International Space Station Alpha (ISSA) at an inclination of 51.6 ° and is capable of three types of missions: crewed and
teleoperated LEO missions, and extended robotic missions. In a crewed local configuration, the vehicle can visit
inclinations between 30.8 +and 72.4* at altitudes close to 390kin. Adding extra fuel tanks extends this range of inclinations
up to 84.9 +and down to 18.3+. Furthermore, removing the crew module, using the vehicle in a teleoperated manner, and
operating with extra fuel tanks allows missions to polar and geosynchronous orbits.
To allow for mission flexibility, the vehicle was designed in a semi-modular configuration. The major system components
include a crew module, a "smartbox" (which contains command, communications, guidance and navigation equipment), a
propulsion pack, extra fuel tanks, and a Vehicle Storage Facility (VSF) for storage purposes.
To minimize risk as well as development time and cost, the vehicle was designed using only proven technology or
technology which is expected to be flight-qualified in time for the intended launch date of 2002. And, because Freebird
carries crew and operates near the Space Station, it must meet or exceed the NASA reliability standard of 0.994, as well as
other standard requirements for such vehicles. The Freebird program was conceived and designed as a way to provide
important and currently unavailable satellite repair and replacement services of a value equal to or exceeding operational
COSTS.
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Introduction
Freebird was conceived as a space-based orbital transfer
vehicle whose primary function is the repair and/or
deorbiting of orbital assets and whose missions are all
performed with the International Space Station Alpha,
ISSA, as a base at an inclination of 51.6 °.
On-Orbit Needs
A vehicle based at International Space Station Alpha
(ISSA) could serve a variety of mission scenarios. The
nature of the mission scenarios and the mission objectives
that were established for Freebird depended heavily upon
the apparent needs of the current United States and world
space programs. Three needs of today's space programs
were determined to be: the need to tend existing assets in
space, the need for exploration, and the need to retrieve
and rescue stranded astronauts from other space platforms.
The need to tend existing assets is clear because of the
large number of assets in orbit which are either obsolete or
unserviceable by existing space vehicles. In particular,
there are assets in LEO (Low Earth Orbit) between the
altitudes of 200 km and 1000 km and assets as far away as
GEO (geosynchronous orbit) at 36 000 km in altitude.
Several of the assets in orbit--including communications,
observation, and tracking satellites launched by various
nations--contribute to the growing dilemma of orbital
debris. Once a satellite becomes obsolete, it most likely
remains in orbit, interfering with other orbital operations
and occupying space where new satellites could be
deployed and used effectively. Freebird, if designed to be
capable of tending orbital assets (that is, repairing existing
assets and reboosting or deorbiting obsolete equipment),
would extend the lifetime of equipment in orbit and
provide a cost-effective method of extending the current
world space program.
There are currently hundreds of satellites in orbit which
could potentially be serviced to extend their lifetimes or to
enable them to recover from mission failures. The Space
Shuttle, however, the only vehicle currently capable of
such service missions, is limited to low earth orbits and
inclinations below 40 °, (although it can reach slightly
higher inclinations with a sacrifice of payload mass). This
leaves a large number of satellites that cannot be reached
by today's capabilities. A vehicle such as Freebird, which
can not only reach more of these assets, but also perform
tending missions more cheaply, would help ensure that
this vital task could be continued in the future.
In addition to the primary need for tending assets, the need
for exploration can be fulfilled by Freebird as well. Based
at ISSA, Freebird has the potential to reach Lagrangian
points or to orbit the moon.
Certainly, the rescue of stranded astronauts from other
space platforms is a valuable capability that would
augment the public's faith in the world space program. In
general, rescue capability would add an additional level of
safety for crewed missions in space.
Mission Objectives
The mission objectives of the Freebird system were
derived from the on-orbit needs discussed above. The two
primary objectives for Freebird are:
1. The vehicle shall be capable of tending assets in
LEO, between the inclinations of 13.2 ° and 90 °.
2. The vehicle shall be capable of tending assets in
GEO, at equatorial inclinations.
These primary objectives establish what the system
capabilities must be. Moreover, the vehicle was designed
for tending assets at various altitudes and inclinations,
where tending refers to the repairing, reboosting, and
deorbiting of assets, and not the deploying of assets--an
activity" which is already adequately performed by existing
space vehicles and which is unnecessary in the light of the
fact that Freebird is based at the ISSA (and boosting
satellites into orbit after they have been launched to the
inclination of 51.6 ° is not a particularly advantageous or
fuel-efficient maneuver).
Because of the primary mission objectives, Freebird will
have both teleoperated and crewed capabilities. In some
cases, astronauts may prove to be more effective than
robots in conducting repairs. Non-crewed capabilities are
reserved for missions on which the potential for radiation
damage to an astronaut performing an EVA (Extra
Vehicular Activity) would be greater than safety standards
perm it.
In addition to the two primary objectives, two secondary
objectives were designed for:
1. The vehicle shall be capable of rescuing stranded
crews from other crewed orbital missions.
2. The vehicle shall be capable of ferrying cargoes
between orbits.
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3Despite the added complexity of incorporating rescue
capability into the Freebird design, the benefits of having
such a capability are worthwhile.
These four mission objectives were significant design
drivers of the Freebird system.
Mission Scenarios
Three basic mission scenarios were developed on the basis
of the established objectives: 1. LEO missions, 2. GEO
missions, and 3. Rescue operations.
A mission in LEO is the repair of a recently deployed
satellite at a 28.5 ° inclination. This mission allows
astronauts to work for 3 days on repairs using remote
manipulator arms for grappling with the satellite. In
addition, the astronauts will perform EVA with the
satellite.
A simpler LEO mission is to perform repair as in the
above scenario without astronauts. Instead, in a
teleoperated scenario, repairs will be performed by the
remote manipulator arms which will be controlled from
ISSA or the ground.
A GEO mission would be teleoperated since it would not
be practical to expose astronauts to the harsh radiation
environment of GEO. A typical GEO mission is the repair
or removal of a non-operational satellite.
A rescue mission could be something as simple as getting
a Soyuz capsule that missed its target orbit into its desired
orbit, or as complicated as evacuating a crew of seven
from a vehicle similar to the Space Shuttle.
System Level Requirements
The primary and secondary mission objectives established
not only the types of missions that Freebird would be
likely to accomplish, but also the system level
requirements that would be necessary for the operation of
Freebird. The system level requirements were set to
provide a framework for the design of the Freebird system.
The requirements are subdivided into four top level system
requirements. The system level requirements state that the
vehicle must:
I. Support the required number of humans and any
cargo for the duration of the mission.
• Be capable of supporting a crew of 3 for a 4 day
mission.
• Be capable of supporting EVA's.
,,Be capable of supporting a crew of 8 for a 24 hour
mission.
2. Be capable of reaching its destination and returning
safely.
,,Be capable of carrying 500 kg of cargo to a polar
inclination at an altitude of 210 kin.
• Be capable of carrying 500 kg of cargo to an equa-
torial inclination at an altitude of 36 000 km.
• Be capable of carrying the crew module within
LEO between inclinations of 28.5 ° and 74.7 ° .
• Be controllable remotely.
• Be controllable by on board astronauts when the
crew module is attached.
• Be capable of retrieving astronauts from another
platform in LEO within 24 hours.
3. Safely interact with its environment.
• Safely maneuver around, rendezvous, and dock
with ISSA, Space Shuttle, Soyuz and satellites.
• Survive radiation, debris, atmospheric, and thermal
environments between altitudes of 210 km and
36 000 km.
• Be capable of communicating with ISSA, Space
Shuttle, Soyuz, and ground stations
4. Be reusable.
*Have a vehicle lifetime equal to that of ISSA.
,,Be ready for launch by the time ISSA is opera-
tional.
Vehicle Concept
After assessing various design concept options, trades
were made. The system level trades of modularity,
expandablilty, propulsion system, and launch vehicle were
considered in the process of concept selection. A
semimodular vehicle which consists of a crew module,
smartbox, propulsion pack, extra fuel tanks, and the VSF
(Vehicle Storage Facility) for storage purposes was finally
designed (see Figure I ).
The crew module is a shielded pressure vessel that
contains all necessary life support equipment and human
interfaces. It has sufficient space for 3 people to move
comfortably about, as shown on Figure 2. The "smartbox"
is a mechanical link between the crew module and the
propulsion pack and contains the power subsystems. It
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FIGURE 1. Freebird concept.
also provides a mounting point for the antennas and two
remote manipulators. The propulsion pack consists of
cryogenic hydrogen and oxygen fuel tanks and four 92.5
kN vectored thrust engines. Extra fuel tanks can be
attached to the propulsion pack to provide the vehicle with
a greater range. The VSF is a simple structure near the
space station where the vehicle (or sections of the vehicle)
will be stored when not in use. The purpose of the VSF is
to extend the life of the vehicle by reducing
micrometeorite and radiation damage to the primary
structure while reducing the shielding weight on the
vehicle itself. Titan IV was chosen as the launch vehicle
for Freebird after considering cost, mass, and geometrical
constraints, with later fuel launches to be conducted with
the less expensive Model C Proton.
The vehicle was designed to be assembled for each
mission according to the specific scenario to be
accomplished. For example, for a crewed mission to LEO,
a crew module, which includes all the necessary life
support equipment and human interfaces, will be mated to
the base unit. If extra fuel tanks are required/'or extended
missions, they are mated to the propulsion pack.
Operation
Launch
The vehicle will be launched in two separate sections: the
crew module in a Proton C and the base in a Titan IV. The
!i!iiili
FIGURE 2. Cabin layout of Freebird+
base will not be fully fueled since the total wet mass of the
fully fueled vehicle exceeds the maximum lifting weight
of the Titan IV. The fuel required for the Freebird will be
launched in the Proton C. The Proton C launch vehicle
was chosen primarily because of its large lift capacity and
relatively low cost per launch.
Ground Support
All missions will be controlled and monitored from the
Johnson Space Center (JSC), where the combined Space
Shuttle and ISSA control center is located. Although this
is the primary control center, there might be teleoperated
missions where direct control by JSC would not be
desirable due to the relatively long lag time that is required
for signals to travel from Freebird to JSC and back. In this
case, a temporary control console would be established
under the geostationary asset.
Maintenance
Preventive maintenance for each module will be
performed on orbit at regularly scheduled intervals. The
most consuming and most costly maintenance activity will
be the replacement of the propulsion pack after every 100
engine starts. With a nominal number of 8 missions per
year, this activity will be required approximately once
every three years. Other maintenance includes the visual
inspection of the structural interfaces, diagnostics of the
onboard computer and replacement of the EMU batteries.
The crew module also has. its own tool box in which are
carried spare parts such as spare batteries, extra
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replenishables for the crew module, and an interface repair
kit.
Storage
While the Freebird is not in use it will be stored in the VSF
with an adequate amount of fuel to perform a rescue. The
VSF will provide radiation and micrometeorite shielding
to extend the lifetime of the vehicle to 10 years. It will also
provide power necessary for the operation of system such
as the thermal venting system, the computer (which
monitors all vehicle systems), and the thermal unit (which
will maintain critical instruments at an acceptable
temperature).
Cost and Producibility
The design of Freebird has implemented cost
minimization practices while maximizing efficiency and
reliability. The total cost of Freebird delivered to the ISSA
is estimated to be $1.5 billion. This figure reflects a 36 to
40 month period of design finalization, testing, and
manufacturing. A combination of top down and bottom up
estimation was used. The primary cost model used is an
Orbital Transfer Vehicle (OTV) cost model provided by
Lockheed. The total yearly prorated operating cost of the
vehicle is estimated at $834 million.
Limitations
At this step in the design process, Freebird has inherent
limitations to vehicle and mission performance. Safety
considerations, the available technology, the space
environment, and orbital dynamics are among the issues
that impose restrictions on the design. Vehicle restrictions
and a range of missions which is more narrow than that
implied by the primary mission objectives are the result of
these issues.
Clearly, various missions cannot be accomplished within
the operating envelope established for the primary mission
objectives. The destination location, rescue mission
considerations, the life support system design, and the
potential for radiation damage act to restrict the range of
missions that Freebird is anticipated to accomplish. The
destination location affects the Av required, which in turn
affects the fuel required and the types of missions that can
be completed. Particularly, extended missions, missions to
retrograde orbits, and equatorial missions in low earth
orbit are generally not feasible. Rescue mission
considerations, such as mass ratio considerations and
availability of the vehicle, restrict the spatial and temporal
range that rescue missions may cover. Missions which are
crewed have additional implications. The life support
system design limit of sustaining 3 astronauts for 4 days in
a non-rescue situation simply restricts the possible
duration of crewed missions. The potential for radiation
damage to an astronaut performing an EVA on repair
missions is another issue which prohibits Freebird from
EVA operations in geosynchronous orbit and at polar
inclinations in low earth orbit.
Those restrictions which apply to the vehicle itself include
the amount of payload that Freebird can carry, the
protection that Freebird requires from radiation and
micrometeorite debris when not on a mission, and the
system lifetime. The amount of payload that Freebird can
carry is obviously limited by the altitude and inclination of
the desired orbit. The protection of the vehicle, the VSF
(Vehicle Storage Facility) is a significant element of the
system which requires further design detail and
development. The system was designed for a 10-year
survival time--a length of time which would drop to 2
years without the protection of the VSE
The next level of design iterations should be performed to
minimize or overcome limitations. For many of the
limitations discussed above, alternative options exist but
have other implications which complicate the design. The
future growth of Freebird, however, depends upon
modifying or extending the current design to preclude
these limitations without sacrificing efficiency and
effectiveness in performance.
An Orbital Transfer Vehicle
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Mission Prioritization
Freebird is a space based, reusable orbital transfer vehicle based at International Space Station Alpha (ISSA).
It can be crewed, but can also be teleoperable and thus capable of completing missions autonomously. A vehi-
cle like Freebird greatly increases the capability of the space program for both the United States and the world.
There are a great many missions that such a vehicle could fulfill. In order to properly determine what specific
capabilities Freebird should be designed for, the various needs for a space based orbital transfer vehicle were
examined. Once the particular needs were evaluated, the mission objectives for Freebird were established and
the vehicle was designed to fulfill them.
1.1 Need Identification
A vehicle based at ISSA could be designed for a variety of different missions. The following missions were
considered for Freebird.
1.1.1 Tending Existing Assets
Currently, there are assets in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) at altitudes between 200 km and 1000 km. There are also
assets as far away as geosynchronous orbit (GEO) at an altitude of 36 000 km. These assets include many sat-
ellites launched by various nations to perform a variety of roles, such as communications, observation, and
tracking. Figure 1. I shows a graphic representation of all operational satellites that have been launched since
1984 by all nations. The radius of the orbits is represented in the radial dimension. The units are Earth radii.
The inclination of the orbits is represented in the angular direction and is measured in degrees. Each satellite's
orbit is represented by a square for its perigee and a circle for its apogee. There is a need to tend these assets.
Tending includes: repair of existing assets, reboosting assets, deorbiting obsolete equipment, and conceivably
deploying new assets from ISSA. Many satellites require an upper stage to be carried from their launch vehicle
to their target orbit. In some cases, a reusable, space based upper stage is more efficient for this operation than
an expended upper stage that must be designed for the constraints of the launch vehicle [1]. A variety of fail-
ures can occur throughout the lifetime of a satellite on orbit. A vehicle that can travel to these satellites and
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FIGURE 1.1 Altitude and Inclination of Satellites Launched Since 1984.
pertorm repairs could save the space program money by extending the lifetime of equipment on orbit, rather
than requiring an entire new system to be built and launched. Once a satellite has become obsolete, it remains
in orbit, contributing to the debris that is already causing a problem for orbital operations. Having a vehicle
that could deorbit this "junk" would not only help cut down on this problem, but would also free up valuable
space in popular orbits so that new satellites could be deployed.
Currently, the space shuttle can tend some of the existing satellites. However, its envelope of operation is con-
fined to LEO and it cannot reach higher inclinations (above approximately 40 °) without the mission becoming
prohibitively expensive. That leaves a large number of satellites that cannot be reached by today's methods. In
particular, there are large groupings of satellites in GEO equitorial and LEO polar orbits that cannot be tended.
In addition, the space shuttle is aging and expensive to launch. It is possible that it will be phased out in the
near future. Having a newer vehicle that can perform tending missions more cheaply, will help ensure that this
vital task can be continued in the future.
1.1.2 Exploration
The vehicle could be designed with the capability to reach Lagrangian points or to orbit the moon. While there
are currently no assets in either of these locations, having a vehicle that can reach them is the logical first step
to making use of them.
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1.1.3 Rescue and Retrieval
Rescue of stranded astronauts from other space platforms is another possible mission. The existence of a space
station and a vehicle that can reach the orbits of other crewed spacecraft from it provides an additional level of
safety for crewed missions in space. Should the Shuttle or Soyuz fail for some reason, the crew could be trans-
ferred to the Space Station to be returned to Earth later. In addition to this, Freebird could conceivably assist in
the proximity of ISSA by retrieving errant objects and equipment. It could also assist with modifications and
repair of ISSA.
1.2 Mission Prioritization
The difficulty and expected interest in the possible missions allows them to be prioritized. Some of these mis-
sions could be performed by an uncrewed vehicle in either a remote or autonomous configuration. Others, such
as complex repair missions would be best performed with astronauts on site.
1.2.1 Mission Complexity
Sending a vehicle on a round trip to GEO can be a very difficult task. There are a variety of reasons for this.
First of all, the environment at GEO is more detrimental than at LEO (see Section 1.4.2 on page 29). In addi-
tion, communication, navigation, and tracking are more difficult in GEO than at LEO.
LEO missions are comparatively easy to design for, as they are where experience is greatest. In addition, they
tend to use less fuel than missions to GEO. Polar orbits however, require the most fuel of any orbital mission
considered.
Building a vehicle that could reach Lagrangian points or the moon would be at least as difficult as GEO. The
missions would require more fuel, higher vehicle complexity, and infrastructure for navigation, communica-
tion, and tracking.
Providing rescue for astronauts who become stranded does provide some complications to the design. Con-
struction of a system that is capable of rescuing a crew of astronauts from every crewed platform, for any con-
ceivable failure, at all times, would put serious limitations on its capabilities. It requires the vehicle to be able
to perform a variety of missions with little or no advance warning. It requires the vehicle to fulfill these mis-
sions with little or no preparation time. Finally, and most important, a dedicated rescue vehicle must be avail-
able for rescue at all times. This means that the system would not be able to perform any other mission during
the times that it was standing by for a rescue.
1.2.2 Cost of Missions
Examination of the total cost of satellites launched between 1986 and 1990 reveals that a significant asset
investment exists in both LEO and GEO orbits. A breakdown of satellite system costs by location in FY90 dol-
lars is shown in Figure 1.2 (LEO) and Figure 1.3 (GEO). The horizontal axis on these graphs is the cost in mil-
lions of dollars. The vertical axes represent the number satellites of that value in each location. The mean value
for LEO assets is approximately $100 million and for GEO, approximately $300 million. These values include
the satellite construction cost, launch cost, and insurance costs. It is perceived that satellite owners would be
willing to spend at least 50%, and perhaps as much as 70%, of these costs in the repair of these assets. The
risks of launching a new system coupled with the loss in revenue to the satellite owners is a powerful incentive
to repair existing assets. Based on this operational income to the Freebird project, various mission scenarios
and constraints can be calculated.
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1.2.3 Selected Mission Prioritization
After considering the various trades, Freebird's missions were chosen and prioritized as follows.
I. Tending assets in LEO
2. Tending assets in GEO
3. Rescue astronauts from other crewed platforms
Tending assets in LEO is the vehicle's most important mission. Next is tending assets in GEO. While the desire
for GEO missions is greater, the added complexity caused them to be placed slightly lower than those in LEO
in importance. Following this was the capability to rescue astronauts. This was considered less important
because a rescue mission is very different to design for than the tending missions. In addition, a system that
spends large portions of its time performing tending missions away from the space station simply can not oper-
ate as a dedicated rescue vehicle. Missions beyond GEO to Lagrangian points or the moon were not designed
for because there are currently no assets in these locations. Further, politics suggests that there is not going to
be any demand for increased traffic in these regions in the foreseeable future.
1.3 Mission Objectives
The prioritized needs led to two primary and two secondary mission objectives. These missions define the
vehicle design.
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1.3.1 Primary Mission Objectives
The primary objectives are those for which the vehicle was specifically designed. They initially establish what
the system capabilities must be. The primary objectives for Freebird are
1. The vehicle is capable of tending assets in LEO, between inclinations of 13.2 ° and 90 °.
2. The vehicle is capable of tending assets in GEO, at equatorial inclinations.
Tending includes repair, reboosting, and deorbiting. It does not include deployment. This is because it is not
fuel efficient to launch assets to an inclination of 51.6 ° and then boost them to GEO at equitorial inclinations.
In addition to this, using Freebird to deploy assets will lessen its availability for repair and deorbit. Deploy-
ment is a mission already adequately performed by existing vehicles, whereas repair and deborbiting are not.
In some cases, especially repair missions, these objectives can be fulfilled more efficiently with humans on
board. As a result, the vehicle will be designed to carry humans. However, it is unfeasible to send humans to
GEO or polar orbits, as they can not perform ExtraVehicular Activities (EVA's) there (see Part II: Section 9.8.4
on page 187). Thus, the vehicle is capable of operating without astronauts on board as well.
1.3.2 Secondary Mission Objectives
Once the primary objectives were established, the following secondary objectives were added to the vehicle's
capabilities.
1. The vehicre can rescue stranded crews from crewed orbital missions.
2. The vehicle can ferry cargoes between orbits.
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They were included because their desirability outweighs the increase in complexity and cost of the design.
The ability to rescue does impose significant added complexity to the design (see Section 1.2.1 on page 11).
Launching a vehicle that does not have this capability does not make sense. If it were required, even once, dur-
ing the lifetime of the system, it would be well worth the effort that went into the design. However, due to the
constraints imposed by the primary objectives, Freebird's rescue capabilities will be limited in scope. It will
not be a dedicated rescue platform, but rather, will be capable of performing an evacuation of either the shuttle,
Soyuz within 24 hours of a declared emergency. In addition, it will not be capable of performing rescues while
it is fulfilling its primary mission objectives. Any astronauts rescued will be brought back to ISSA tbr later
return to earth.
Requiring the vehicle to be capable of carrying cargo between orbits adds little to the complexity of the vehi-
cle. This is because tending assets already requires the vehicle to carry cargo between orbits.
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2
Mission Scenarios
The established mission objectives allow for the definition of specific mission scenarios. These scenarios
define the missions that Freebird will be able to perform and how it will perform them.
The concept for the Freebird design is detailed in Section 2.3.2 on page 44. Freebird is a semi-modular vehicle
which consists of a crew module, a "smartbox" (which contains the electronics and fuel cells), and a detach-
able propulsion pack. Figure 2.5 on page 44 details these modules.
Freebird is capable of three basic missions. These include crewed and uncrewed missions to LEO, uncrewed
missions to GEO, and rescue missions. In addition, scenarios for storing the vehicle at ISSA and resupplying it
at the end of each mission are presented.
2.1 Tending Assets in LEO
Freebird's chief area of operation will be LEO (Low Earth Orbit) which is defined to be between the altitudes
of 200 km and 1000 km and between the inclinations of 28.5 ° and 90 °. This area includes a majority of the
assets in LEO, as seen in Figure 1.1 on page 10. Freebird's primary function is to tend these assets.
2.1.1 Uncrewed LEO Missions
An uncrewed repair of a satellite in LEO is the primary mission for which Freebird is designed. In this mode of
operation, the crew module will be disconnected from the base unit and left at ISSA (International Space Sta-
tion Alpha), while the vehicle is deployed. Once on location, it will effect any repairs by teleoperation of its
RMS (Remote Manipulation System), and then return back to ISSA for resupply and storage.
Orbital maneuvers will be accomplished via a simple plane change, or if an altitude change is required, by per-
forming a combined plane change and Hohmann transfer. These maneuvers allow for fuel efficiency while still
allowing the vehicle to complete the maneuvers in a matter of hours rather than days or months [1]. Once the
orbital transfer is complete, the vehicle will rendezvous with the target asset. The vehicle is capable of orbital
transfer and rendezvous by autonomous control (with the use of on-board computers) or by teleoperation (by
Part h Mission Definition
18 Mission Scenarios
ground based human controllers or computers). Rendezvous is expected to take approximately 6 hours to com-
plete.
Once Freebird has matched orbits with the target satellite, it must grapple and repair it. This will be done by
teleoperation of the RMS by ground based human controllers through a video downlink from cameras
mounted on the vehicle's superstructure and the RMS. The RMS consists of two arms mounted on the sides of
the vehicle which will facilitate the grappling of the satellite with one arm while effecting repairs with the
other.
The types of repairs that Freebird will be able to perform in this mode depends on the specific asset to be
repaired. For a satellite that was designed to be repaired in the manner described above, Freebird could be used
to replace any of a variety of different modules, such as thruster fuel, batteries, or solar arrays. Many satellites,
however, will not be repairable in this manner. An alternative option for such satellites is for Freebird to attach
a booster to them tbr return to ISSA. Freebird could also grapple the satellite with a mission specific berthing
adaptor and transfer the satellite back to ISSA. Once at ISSA, the satellite can either be repaired or returned to
Earth. Another option is to send Freebird in a crewed configuration so that astronauts can perform an EVA
(ExtraVehicular Activity) in cooperation with Freebird's RMS, to conduct a more extensive operation. As a
last resort, then Freebird can deorbit the satellite by altering its orbit (either with a booster, or by grappling it)
so that it decays into the atmosphere.
The length of time that Freebird can spend on location in this mode is determined by the amount of RCS
(Reaction Control System) fuel and the amount of fuel for the electrical power system that is carried on board.
Freebird can conceivably spend several weeks at the target satellite, effecting repairs 24 hours a day (with the
ground controllers operating in shifts), before it needs to return for resupply and storage.
2.1.2 Crewed Configuration
Freebird can operate with a crew of 3 astronauts in LEO in inclinations between 28.5 ° and 74.7 °. The astro-
nauts can be sustained for missions up to 4 days in length. Calculations show that the orbital transfer will take
two hours each way, that it will take 6 hours to rendezvous with the satellite, and 6 hours to dock with ISSA.
This allows the astronauts to spend 3 days on location performing repairs, with a contingency. The vehicle will
be resupplied remotely, once the astronauts have been returned to ISSA.
The capabilities of the vehicle in the crewed configuration are the same as in the uncrewed configuration. In
addition, with astronauts on site, more complex repairs can be performed. The astronauts can work in conjunc-
tion with the RMS to capture and repair the satellite. In the crewed configuration, the RMS will be operated by
an on board astronaut while the other two astronauts perform EVA. Astronauts, however, cannot pertbrm
EVA's at higher inclinations due to radiation (see Section 9.8.4 on page 187). Thus, the crew module is not
required above inclinations of 75 °.
Astronauts will embark from ISSA for Freebird missions and return to ISSA upon completion. Because taking
astronauts from ISSA will significantly drain its resources, crewed missions will be scheduled to coincide with
Shuttle resupply missions. The Shuttle is scheduled to arrive for resupply 4 to 5 times a year. At these times,
there will be 1 ! astronauts available (as opposed to the 6 normally present). Thus, Freebird can pertorm up to 5
crewed missions every year.
2.2 Expandability
Without crew or cargo, Freebird weighs 5000 kg and can carry 20 000 kg of fuel. Thus, it has a MF (Mass
Fraction) of approximately 5 which allows it to travel between inclinations of 28 ° and 75 ° (see Section 1.4.1 on
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page 29). With the crew module, the vehicle weighs 8000 kg which lowers the MF to 3.5 and allows up to 17°
of inclination change within LEO.
To travel beyond these limits or to carry additional cargo, many strategies may be employed. One possible
strategy is the addition of 2 external fuel tanks (launched by Proton) which each hold 18 000 kg of fuel and
thereby increase the MF to approximately 11 without the crew module and up to 6.6 with it. In this case, the
base unit would rendezvous and dock with the tanks prior to departing for a mission. This easily allows a trip
to 90 = with only the base unit and allows the vehicle to perform the required 23. I° of plane change with the
crew module attached.
Another, more fuel efficient, strategy for extending Freebird's capabilities is to launch the fuel necessary for
the return trip to the Freebird's initial destination prior to Freebird's departure from ISSA, carry enough fuel
aboard Freebird for a one-way trip, and refuel for the return trip on orbit. The rocket equation specifies
AV
Mi - e Is/' "_ (Equation 2.1)
Mr
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where -- is the ME AV is the necessary change in velocity, Isp is the specific impulse of the fuel and g is the
Mf
acceleration due to the earth's gravity at sea level [! ]. This equation states that doubling AV squares the ME
Therefore, if Freebird only carries enough fuel for a one way trip, then the AV required is halved, reducing the
MF to the square root of its original value. The fuel that is saved with strategy can be quantified by the expres-
sion
E '1FL* = 2 (Fc* + I) _ - 1 (Equation 2.2)
where F_ is the total fuel per kilogram of vehicle weight that is required when the fuel for the return trip is
received at the destination and Fc* is the fuel per kilogram of vehicle weight that is required for a round trip
without refueling. This is not an immediately intuitive expression. Consider the example of a transit to polar
orbit of the base unit, which has a mass of 5000 kg. The MF for one way trip to polar at 390 km is 3.139, which
means that the fuel required for the mission without refueling during the mission is 44 255 kg (requiring 3 Pro-
ton launches to the station). On the other hand, by launching fuel to polar orbit for the return trip means that
only 21386kg of fuel is required (which can easily be done in 2 Proton launches, one to polar and one to
ISSA). The logistics of refueling should be no more complex anywhere else than they are at ISSA, as Freebird
refuels autonomous of the station in any case. In addition, rendezvous with the fuel tank will be no more diffi-
cult than rendezvous with a satellite in the same orbit. For these reasons, this is the preferred option for
increasing Freebird's range.
The external fuel tanks will be the same design as the propulsion module, without the main engines. The fuel
tanks may have a minimal RCS system to allow them to maintain attitude while Freebird is performing a ren-
dezvous. Once the fuel has been used, the tanks will be deorbited.
2.3 Tending Missions in GEO
Freebird's base unit can only reach GEO by expanding its fuel supply as discussed in Section 2.2. Because
launching 10 000 kg of fuel to GEO for a return trip is prohibitively expensive (only the Titan IV and Energia
are currently capable of lilting this much mass to GEO), the external tanks will be used. Freebird will use a
combined Hohmann transfer and plane change to reach the target asset, placing it in GEO in approximately 6
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hours. An additional 6 hours will be required for rendezvous. Freebird will be limited to uncrewed operations
in GEO. As in LEO (see Section 2.1.1 on page 17), it can effect repairs with the RMS by teleoperation and can
deorbit irreparable satellites. Freebird will return to ISSA with another combined Hohmann transfer and plane
change.
2.4 Rescue Missions
As mentioned in Section 1.3 on page 12, Freebird is not a dedicated rescue vehicle. Instead, it is capable of
performing a limited role as a rescue craft when it is not being used for its primary tending operations. To facil-
itate this, Freebird will be maintained in a fueled, stand-by state, from which it can be powered and operational
within 2 hours. Freebird could be used to rescue astronauts from either the Space Shuttle or Soyuz within 24
hours of a declared emergency if they were close enough to the station (within 17° of inclination). Astronauts
rescued by Freebird will be returned to ISSA for later return to Earth.
As the Shuttle normally operates at an inclination of 28.5 °, it is possible that the rescue of Shuttle astronauts
will not be an option. Freebird's base unit, however, could be deployed with a cargo of food, air, power, and
other needed supplies to extend the Shuttle's stay time on orbit. Once this has been done, a more permanent
solution could be implemented, depending on the nature of the emergency: either enough fuel could be
launched to orbit to allow Freebird to rescue the astronauts, another shuttle could be launched to rescue the
crew, or the crew could effect repairs using the extra supplies brought by Freebird. If the astronauts need to
evacuate the Shuttle for some reason, Freebird could instead transport up to 2 Soyuz ACRV's (Assured Crew
Rescue Vehicle) to the Shuttle which could be used to board the Shuttle astronauts and return them to the
ground. Another option that may be feasible in some situations is to maneuver Freebird to the Shuttle with its
crew module. The astronauts could then board it for use as a safe haven for up to 24 hours. This option is not
very useful, however, because Freebird would not have the fuel to carry the astronauts back to ISSA and it is
not capable of a reentry. However, if fuel were deliverable in the interim, Freebird could refuel and then carry
the astronauts back to ISSA.
Obviously, Freebird cannot save astronauts from any life critical failures that require an extremely rapid
response, such as a hull breach. However, it can be relied on to alleviate many mission critical and certain life
critical failures, such as Soyuz launching too far from ISSA to rendezvous, or the Shuttle doors being unclose-
able for reentry.
2.5 Storage
Because Freebird will be based at ISSA, there must be adequate facilities to store and maintain it while it is not
in use. Protecting a vehicle against debris impacts for 10 years would require a prohibitively massive structure
(see Section 4.4 on page 279). To alleviate this problem, the VSF (Vehicle Storage Facility) was conceptual-
ized. The VSF is not part of the Freebird design, but it is a necessary piece of infrastructure in order for Free-
bird to operate successfully for its specified vehicle lifetime.
The VSF is a structural enclosure that is attached to ISSA which contains the base unit and crew module when
they are not being used to protect them from micrometeorite damage. In addition, it has a passive thermal con-
trol system.which is required because Freebird's own thermal control system will not be sufficient while
enclosed within the VSE The VSF must allow Freebird to enter, dock, and exit as easily as possible as well as
allow the crew to ingress and egress from the crew module. Finally, because Freebird will require a small
amount of power, the VSF must be able to support this. The VSF could draw this power from ISSA or from
solar panels.
Freebird Final Report
Servicing 21
2.6 Servicing
Freebird will need certain supplies after every mission it completes and must be maintained in a regular fash-
ion to keep it operating normally.
2.6.1 Resupply
To be ready to perform its rescue mission, Freebird must be replenished at the conclusion of each of its mis-
sions. It will need up to 20 000 kg of main propulsion fuel in addition to RCS fuel and fuel for the fuel cells. If
the crew module was used, air, food, and water will have to be replenished as well. The various fuels will be
launched to a coplanar orbit with ISSA by Proton. Proton can launch 15 000 kg of main propulsion fuel as well
as up to 800 kgof RCS fuel and 200 kg of fuel for Freebird's electrical power system. These fuels will all be
contained in various cells within a common fuel tank. Upon return from a mission, Freebird will rendezvous
with the fuel tank and grapple it. The fuel tank will interface with the vehicle and fuel will be pumped aboard.
Because the fuel will be transferred to Freebird, it will not be in the launch tank i-or a long period of time which
means that only minimal insulation is required on the tanks and helps maximize the amount of fuel that can be
carried in a single launch. Refueling will be performed via teleoperation, so that it does not require valuable
astronaut EVA time. The vehicle's capability to refuel remotely is what allows it to refuel at its destination as
well as at ISSA. Once a launch tank has been emptied, Freebird will deorbit it.
Expendables for the crew module will be drawn from ISSA. Food, air, and water, as well as the astronauts
themselves, will be brought to the station by the Shuttle. From ISSA, they will be loaded to the crew module
for the mission.
2.6.2 Maintenance
To ensure that Freebird has a vehicle life of 10 years, it will have to be maintained on orbit. In particular, the
engines selected (see Section 5.2.4 on page 91), will need replaced approximately every 3 years. To facilitate
this, the section of the vehicle that contains the main engines as well as the fuel tanks and RCS thrusters is
detachable. This allows a new propulsion module to be launched to orbit and put in place with a minimum of
effort. In addition to this, the components of the "smart box" are constructed and mounted in modules, which
can be easily removed from the exterior of the vehicle by astronauts in EVA. Thus, should one component fail,
it can be replaced. A complete preventive maintenance schedule will be developed for Freebird to ensure that
nothing fails during a mission (see Chapter 4.2 on page 276).
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Design Approach and Constraints
Beyond the technical considerations, the design of this vehicle was predominantly determined by several fac-
tors: the imposed class structure, the amount of time that was available to the class and the knowledge and
experience of the students.
1.1 Class Structure and Program breakdown
The students that undertook this project were enrolled in a required single term senior system design class at
MIT entitled "Space System Engineering." The purpose of the course is to give students a chance to work on a
large group project and to gain some experience in the design process associated with large systems. The fac-
ulty associated with the course consists of both a senior and junior instructor in addition to a teaching assistant
-- usually a recent graduate student who previously took part in the course. The prerequisites for the class
essentially consist of the undergraduate Aerospace Engineering curriculum. This year, the class consisted of
torty students.
The class was broken down into nine different groups. The groups consisted of:
1. Systems
2. Structures
3. Power and Propulsion
4. Environmental Control and Life Support Systems (ECLSS)
5. Communication, Command, Control and Telemetry (C3T)
6. Guidance, Navigation and Control (GNC)
7. Thermal
8. Verification and Validation
9. Cost and Producibility
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Most of the groups had the obvious responsibilities associated with their discipline. Systems also included
some project management duties. Verification and Validation worked with each of the groups to determine
required test plans as well as the design reliability of the vehicle. Cost and Producibility worked with groups to
create a working budget for the project and to maintain a semblance of realism with respect to manufacturing
and availability concerns.
In addition to the groups above, a Project Steering Committee (PSC) was created to act as a small decision-
making body and to direct interaction between various groups. A member of each group (two from Systems)
was assigned the responsibility of PSC representative.
1.1.1 Time Constraints
The class met three times a week in two hour sessions and lasted for fourteen weeks, of which ten were spent
working on the group project. Most students were also enrolled in a full course complement and attending to
job and graduate school concerns.
This ten week period was further constrained by presentations required to take place during class time to pro-
mote lull attendance.
1.1.2 Student Knowledge and Experience
The analytical and theoretical knowledge brought to this class by the students is significant, however experi-
ence with the design of complex systems is limited. As mentioned earlier, the course requirements for "Space
Systems Engineering" consist of the entire undergraduate curriculum at MIT. This curriculum is largely theo-
retical and deals with most disciplines in an isolated manner. In addition to course work, many students
brought knowledge from summer jobs and internships to the class.
For situations where the library facilities were insufficient or outdated, contacts were created in industry to
help the project. For up to date information and pricing, hardware suppliers were consulted. Through faculty
contacts, NASA engineers were consulted regarding specific issues.
1.2 Design Methodology
The design methodology used for this vehicle initially consisted of determining a set of needs for the vehicle to
satisfy. A graph of the mission envelope of a spacecraft with varying mass ratios was overlaid on the satellite
distribution chart to determine the basic fuel requirements of these missions, as shown in Figure 1.1. The bulk
of missions that would be profitable were determined to be low earth orbit (LEO) repair missions in varying
inclinations up to a polar orbit (90 ° inclination) and geosynchronous orbit (GEO) orbits at an inclination of 0°.
These two missions were determined to be the design drivers.
A pictorial representation of the design process that shows the iterative nature of the process and corresponds
to the description below is shown in Figure 1.2.
The next step was to ascertain the hard requirements that could be derived from these missions. In particular,
the AVs or mass ratios required for each mission were recognized as an aspect of the mission that would
greatly influence vehicle design.
The class then brainstormed, in subsystem groups, individually and collectively, for ideas to satisfy that which
were recognized as the difficult problems in the preliminary vehicle design. The ideas grouped themselves into
several categories including the level of modularity of the vehicle, the propulsion system to use for various
missions and those missions for which the crew was required.
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The groups most closely associated with each problem then made recommendations based on first level
research. The recommendations were based on application of an implicit trade methodology (detailed in the
next section).
The Project Steering Committee made many of the major final decisions based on the system recommenda-
tions. Decision making consisted of the relevant subsystem group member discussing the issues that were of
obvious concern, followed by the other groups determining how this decision would impact their systems. For
example, when the Thermal group made a recommendation to use a passive cooling system for the crew mod-
ule, the Structures group was concerned about the added mass and impact on the debris shielding layers, Power
was concerned about the energy savings of passive versus active, and GNC was concerned about whether the
vehicle would have additional attitude requirements.
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Once the decision was made, it was considered a baseline for design. When circumstances required, major and
minor decisions were held up to scrutiny and reevaluated as necessary.
1.3 Trade Methodology
Trades were performed on several criteria. The most important of these dealt with the availability, maturity,
price and ultimately the feasibility of the technologies required for a specific approach.
When a recommendation was made to PSC regarding a specific technology for the vehicle, it was usually
based on available literature garnered from companies, faculty, and library sources. In each case, the scheduled
production and lead time was noted and taken into account.
The maturity consideration of a technology was largely handled by Verification and Validation. In situations
where the technology was not considered mature enough to fly "off-the-shelf", a test plan was put together. In
a few cases, notably the RLI0A - 4 engines, the technology had been used for many years but not in the man-
ner -- extended restarts and burns -- around which Freebird was designed. Test plans were put together in these
situations as well.
The Cost and Producibility group worked with other groups to determine if performance goals could be met
with less expensive hardware. In many cases, the expense associated with a product was tied into the testing
required to validate the part for crewed missions.
Finally, the overall feasibility of a technology was based on a combination of the factors above.
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1.4 Desig n Constrai nts
The design of Freebird was driven by many factors. The primary design drivers were cost, environment, and
operating envelope. The costs associated with Freebird are covered in Chapter 12 on page 227 and Chapter 7
on page 285. The constraints imposed on the vehicle design imposed by the desired operational envelope are
presented here.
1.4.1 Fuel Requirements
A summary of necessary AV's and Mass Ratios for the various missions is provided in Table I. 1. In this table,
TABLE 1.1 Summary of AV's and Mass Ratios.
Target Altitude Target Inclination AV one way Mass Ratio Mass Ratio
[km] [o] [km/s] one way round trip
36 000 0.0 4.825 2.985 8.908
200 90.0 5.193 3.244 10.523
160 28.5 3.207 2.069 4.279
all AV's and Mass Ratios are calculated from an initial position in a :ircular orbit at 300 km and an inclination
of 51.6 °, the planned orbit for International Space Station Alpha. The target altitudes and inclinations listed are
the limiting cases for the mission scenarios presented. GEO assets are all located at 36 000 km and 0° to a close
approximation. The limiting factor for orbital transfer in LEO is inclination change. For these changes, lower
altitudes also require more fuel than higher ones. The LEO assets that require the greatest propulsive mass are
located at polar inclinations. Assets in altitudes less than 200 km are not of high enough value for it to be
worthwhile for Freebird to tend them. This established the limit of Freebird's envelope in this direction at 200
km and 90 °. In order to meet rescue needs, Freebird will need to travel to the shuttle's orbit at 28.5 ° at an alti-
tude as low as 160 km in order to rendezvous with it.
1.4.2 Environmental Issues
The space environment can be largely characterized by six major categories [1 ]:
1. Vacuum environment
2. Neutral environment
3. Plasma environment
4. Thermal environment
5. Radiation environment
6. Micrometeorite/debris environment
Table 1.2 summarizes the environments and their effects on spacecraft.
The primary design-limiting environments are the thermal, radiation, and micrometeorite/debris environments,
and are summarized in the following pages. Of somewhat secondary importance in the initial design phase are
the vacuum, neutral, and plasma environments.
Protecting against vacuum effects is difficult, but much of these effects can be mitigated by outgassing neces-
sary components on Earth. Of all the neutral environment effects, atomic oxygen degradation is usually the
most serious. Carbon composites and polymers must be adequately shielded, usually with Multi-Layer Insula-
tion (MLI), although visible degradation of Kapton, often used in MLI, has been observed [1]. Interaction
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TABLE 1.2 Space Environments and Effects [ I ]
Environment Effects
Vacuum UV Degradation
Outgassing
Neutral Aerodynamic Drag
Physical Sputtering
Atomic Oxygen Reaction
Spacecraft Glow
Plasma Spacecraft Charging
Arc Discharging
Thermal Spacecraft Heating
Radiation Single Event Upsets
Solar Array Degradation
Micrometeorite/Debris Impact Damage
between a spacecraft and the plasma environment is primarily governed by the spacecraft's magnetic field and
surface electric properties. Arcing between surfaces can occur when potentials differ by anywhere from 150
Volts to 500 Volts. Properly grounding a spacecraft considerably reduces arcing problems. Few difficulties
have been encountered with vehicles whose power systems operate at a voltage less than approximately 30
Volts.
Thermal Heat Flux Environment
The external environment provides the spacecraft with three major sources of thermal radiation: direct solar
flux, the Earth's albedo, and the Earth's infrared emissions. See Figure 1.3
Solar Flux
The solar flux is a measure of the amount of the sun's energy per unit area received at a given distance from the
sun. In the case of Freebird, this distance is assumed to be equal to the distance of the Earth from the sun tbr
two reasons. One, since Freebird is orbiting Earth, it is on average at the Earth's distance from the sun. Sec-
ondly, the difference between LEO and GEO is insignificant compared to the distance between Earth and sun.
The value of the solar flux is called the Solar Constant and has been determined to have an average value of
1358 W/m2[2l.
Earth's Albedo
Approximately one third of the solar flux that reaches the Earth is reflected back into space [2]. This albedo
factor is mostly due to the Earth's atmosphere. The amount of albedo energy that reaches Freebird varies
inversely with the square of the distance from the center of the Earth.
Earth's IR Radiation
The earth also radiates energy at infrared wavelengths. The amount of radiation reaching Freebird again
depends inversely on the square of the distance from the center of the Earth. The flux radiated at the Earth's
surface is 273 W/m 2 [2].
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FIGURE 1.3 External Heat Fluxes Affecting Freebird.[3].
Radiation Environment
During its missions, Freebird will encounter the harsh space radiation environment, in which there are three
primary components of space radiation: trapped particles in the Van Allen Belts, solar flare protons, and galac-
tic cosmic rays (GCR). Figure 1.4 depicts the active space radiation environment, characterizing the flux and
energy relationships for the various types of space radiation.
Of the types of space radiation, Van Allen Belt trapped radiation is the most hazardous, due to its proximity to
Freebird's anticipated orbital altitudes. The belts are rings of protons (inner belt) and electrons (outer belt)
trapped near Earth due to the Earth's magnetic fields. They lie in the region 30 ° above and below the equator,
from approximately 200 km to up to 10 Earth radii. The proton-rich inner belt peaks in intensity near 3 and 5
Earth radii, while the electron-rich outer belt peaks near 2 and 8 Earth radii[3]. Figure 1.5 is a semi-quantita-
tive view of the proton and electron distributions in the inner and outer belts, respectively.
Another type of hazardous space radiation comes from solar flares. Several times per year, the sun emits a
flare, or an increase in the flux of high-energy (1-103 MeV) particles emitted. These solar flares can last from
several hours to several days, and have the potential to damage vehicles in space. Because solar flares are quite
unpredictable, vehicles must be prepared to tolerate a sudden increase in high energy particles. Such particles
have the ability to penetrate space vehicle outer surfaces, degrading the structural integrity of the surface and/
or reaching vulnerable components inside the vehicle, and therefore must be considered when shielding a vehi-
cle from the space radiation environment [5].
The third type of space radiation, Galactic Cosmic Rays, becomes important at higher orbital altitudes, outside
of the realm of the Van Allen Belts. They consist of bare, very high-energy (I 0 2-1013 MeV) nuclei emitted at a
relatively low flux (-4 particles/cm2-sec). While bombardment is not a problem here as it is with solar flares,
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FIGURE 1.4 The Space Radiation Environment [4].
GCR's are still a small threat because of the high energy of the particles. A single particle has the potential to
damage an electronic component and cause it to malfunction [3]. Although the high-energy particles also pose
a threat to other areas of a space vehicle, it is the electronics that are most vulnerable to GCR's.
Vehicles in space must be adequately shielded against all of the types of space radiation they are anticipated to
encounter. For all missions, but particularly for deep space and GEO missions, the amount of total radiation
encountered depends on the time spent traversing the Van Allen Belts, the current level of solar activity, and
the duration of the entire mission. Based on the cyclical nature of solar activity and past data concerning Van
Allen Belt radiation and GCR's, it is possible to get a rough approximation of the space environment for a par-
ticular mission time frame and therefore an idea of the shielding necessary for that mission.
Based on the space radiation profile detailed above, along with Freebird's mission scenarios presented in
Chapter 2 on page 17, it is possible to design a radiation protection scheme for Freebird; the scheme is detailed
in Section 3.4.2 on page 70.
Micrometeorite and Debris Environment
The natural micrometeoroid environment has always been a driver for space vehicle structural designs. How-
ever, since the orbits have become more populated by satellites, it has also become increasingly populated with
larger, man-made debris. Thus, there are two types of micrometeoroid debris that must be protected against:
smaller, faster natural debris and larger, slower man-made debris [3]. The smaller (less than 1 cm), natural
debris travels at an average relative impact velocity of 20 km/s. The requirements which must be met to with-
stand impacts from these particles is negligible compared to the required shielding for the man-made debris.
Impact from debris greater than 10 cm diameter can be tracked on radar, and thus avoided by maneuvering the
spacecraft. Therefore, the micr0meteoroid debris that Freebird must be protected against consists of man-made
Freebird Final Report
Design Constraints 33
Inner (proton) Belt
(protons/cm _-sec)
I I I I I I I
7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Outer (electron) Belt
(electrons/cm 2-sec)
I I I I I I I I I I I
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Earth Radii
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(usually aluminum) bits between one and ten centimeters in diameter. The average relative velocity of these
projectiles is 10 km/s.
Mathematical models have been developed to predict the probability of an impact with micrometeoroid debris
and to extract the critical projectile diameter against which to design. Wertz and Larson [3] discuss some of
these models in more detail than will be discussed here. Figure 1.6 on page 34 is a reconstruction of a graph
showing the distribution of objects at various altitudes [6]. From it an approximate average number of objects
was extrapolated. This average is approximately 50 objects, which corresponds to 500 km. According to a
model cited in Wertz and Larson, the collision probability of a one centimeter diameter particle with a space-
craft of cross sectional area between 50 and 200 m 2 in a 500 km orbit is 0.001.
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2
Systems Engineering
2.1
2.1.1
Systems Engineering was responsible for system wide integration and issues that fell on the borders and out-
side the domains of other groups. Much of the management, organization, and final document integration for
the class was also handled. Systems created templates and guidelines for all groups to follow when document-
ing their portion of the project. A timeline for the class to follow was also under their purview.
In addition to these management issues, Systems Engineering created and kept track of the overall require-
ments. This involved due consideration of the various options that were suggested and a thorough analysis of
which trade-offs were being made at each stage. The final concept selection was a joint effort of each of the
subsystems, via a Project Steering Committee meeting.
System Level Requirements
The following system level needs were established for Freebird. They flow down from the established primary
and secondary mission objectives (see Section 1.3 on page 12).
• The vehicle must support the required number of humans and any and any cargo for the duration of the
mission.
• The vehicle must be capable of reaching its destination and returning safely.
• The vehicle must safely interact with its environment.
• The vehicle must be reusable.
Support of Astronauts
The following top level requirements flow down from the first system need. The vehicle must:
1. Be capable of supporting a crew of 3 for a 4 day mission.
2. Be capable of supporting EVA's.
3. Be capable of supporting a crew of 8 for a 24 hour mission.
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The longest manned mission the vehicle will perform will be a repair mission. Experience with the shuttle
shows that an extensive repair mission can run as much as 3 days in length. It also generally requires 3 astro-
nauts. Adding an additional 24 hours for travel time and contingency, totals to 3 astronauts for 4 days. The rea-
son for having astronauts on site during repair missions is so that they can perform EVA's to assist the robotic
systems of the vehicle with the repair. For this reason, the vehicle must be capable of supporting EVA's.
Supporting 8 astronauts for 24 hours is a requirement for rescuing astronauts from another platform. The larg-
est number of astronauts that will need rescued at any one time is currently a full shuttle crew of 7. Provision
was made to allow an astronaut from Freebird to be on scene for the rescue, requiring room for an additional
person. The 24 hour time allows for a 2 hour power up of Freebird, orbital transfer to and from the shuttle,
docking, and 2 hours to transfer the astronauts from the shuttle to Freebird.
Freebird was designed with a removable crew module (See Section 2.3 on page 40). This allows it to be
removed during missions in which it is not carrying astronauts, eliminating excess mass and reduces the
amount of fuel that Freebird needs to complete its mission.
2.1.2 Operational Envelope
From the second basic need, flow several system requirements. The vehicle must:
1. Be capable of carrying 500 kg of cargo to a polar inclination at an altitude of 210 km.
2. Be capable of carrying 500 kg of cargo to an equatorial inclination at an altitude of 36 000kin.
3. Be capable of carrying the crew module within LEO between inclinations of 28.5 ° and 74.7 °.
4. Be controllable remotely.
5. Be controllable by on board astronauts when the crew module is attached.
6. Be capable of retrieving astronauts from another platform in LEO within 24 hours.
The vehicle was designed so that it can travel to a polar orbit with 500 kg of cargo without the crew module.
This is the limiting cases of the vehicle's operational envelope, as noted in Section 2.1.2 on page 18. It must
also be capable of carrying this cargo to GEO. The rescue mission establishes additional requirements on the
vehicle with crew module. It must be capable of rescuing astronauts within 24 hours of an emergency being
declared and it must be capable of carrying the crew module to 28.5 °. Freebird must be controllable remotely
because it will perform many of its missions without a manned crew. In order to make full use of its abilities
with a crew, it must be controllable by on board astronauts as well.
2.1.3 Environmental Interactions
The need for the vehicle to safely interact with the environment established the following top level require-
ments. The vehicle must:
I. Safely maneuver around, rendezvous, and dock with _ Station, Space Shuttle, Soyuz and satellites.
2. Survive radiation, debris, atmospheric, and thermal environments between altitudes of 210 and
36 000km.
3. Be capable of communicating with _ Station, Space Shuttle, Soyuz, and ground stations
The vehicle must be capable of withstanding all external environmental elements that it will encounter within
its operating envelope, as noted in Section 2.1.3 on page 38. In addition, it must be capable of docking with ct
Station and other space platforms to allow ingress and egress of astronauts and to provide rescue capability.
Docking with satellites is required for completion of tending missions.
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2.1.4 Reusability
The need for the vehicle to be reusable provides 2 final top level requirements. The vehicle must:
1. Have a vehicle lifetime equal to that of ISSA.
2. Be ready of launch by the time ISSA is operational.
In order to receive the maximum use from Freebird, it is necessary to have it operational tot as long as possi-
ble. For this reason, there is a requirement that the vehicle be ready for launch by the time ISSA is operational.
In addition, it must be operable as long as ISSA. At this time, the date that ISSA is expected to be operational
is 2002 and the designed lifetime is ten years.
2.2
TABLE 2.1
System Functionality
In order for Freebird to accomplish the given missions as intended, it must perforrn certain tasks. These tasks,
or functions, are divided into subgroups which define the responsibilities of the subsystems. Table 2. I on
page 39 lists the top level functions of each subsystem, from which the lower level functionality of each is
derived.
Subsystem Top-Level Functions
Subsystem
Structures, Materials
& Mechanisms
Power
Propulsion
Thermal Control
Guidance,
Navigation & Control
Command,
Communication,
Control & Telemetry
Environmental Control
& Life Support
Function
Provide Environmental Protection
Maintain Physical Integrity
Provide Mechanical Interfaces
Generate Power
Control & Distribute Power
Generate Thrust
Manage Fuel/Refueling
Monitor Temperature
Supply Heat
Reject Heat
Determine Attitude & Position
Control Attitude & Position
Computation & Control
Command & Telemetry
Communication
Monitor Conditions
Control Atmosphere
Provide Sustenance
Manage Waste
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These functions are represented graphically in Figure 2.1 on page 40, along with relevant internal and external
interfaces. Mechanical interfaces are depicted with solid lines, communication/data interfaces with dotted
lines, and power interfaces with dashed lines. Some lines are broken, indicating an impermanent interface, or
one required for only certain kinds of missions. External interfaces are examined in more detail in Chapter 14.
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FIGURE 2.1 System Functional Block Diagram.
2.3 Vehicle Design Concepts
In the process of designing this vehicle, many different ideas were discussed. Outlined here is a shortened list
of leading concepts as well as the basis that was used to select between these options. Finally, an overview of
the selected design is presented.
2.3.1 Options
The major concepts that were proposed differed primarily in levels of system modularity, in the range of
intended missions and in the type of propulsion used. In addition, the launch vehicle that was to be used con-
strained the vehicle geometry and had an impact on other _ssues such as the design of retractable antennas and
the amount of fuel that could be lifted into orbit.
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Modularity
The primary decision for this vehicle was whether it should be a modular system, consisting of several inter-
changeable parts, or whether it should consist of a single, integrated design.
A modular design is one that consists of a number of semi-functional units which are assembled into a specific
configuration dependent on the required mission, The idea was to have a payload module on the front of the
vehicle which was mated via an interface module (a "smart box" consisting of GNC and C3T electronics as
well as mechanical interfaces) to a propulsion module as shown in Figure 2.2. On a mission specific basis, a
configuration of payload and propulsion modules could be fitted to a interface module. For instance, a non-
time-critical autonomous GEO mission to deorbit a satellite might have an electric propulsion system attached
to the interface module and some sort of simple grapple to attach to the satellite. On the other hand, a nearby
crewed mission would require a higher thrust propulsion system (perhaps cryogenic) and a pressurized crew
module as payload.
Crew
I propulsion
/ \
FIGURE 2.2 Modular Design Concept Representation.
The other extreme is a single vehicle, as shown in, Figure 2.3, designed to do all of these tasks. This vehicle
would consist of a high thrust engine and a crew module as well as autonomous capability. All of the necessary
payload modules would be integrated onto the single vehicle.
Expandability
Closely tied to the options on the level of modularity of the vehicle were the options regarding expandability. It
was recognized that the large difference in fuel required to get to GEO made the ability to add additional thrust
or fuel a necessity, in all but the most fully integrated (nonmodular) systems. The options presented consisted
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FIGURE 2.3 Integrated Design Concept Representation.
of extra fuel tanks that could be added to the system or having entire boosters (fuel tanks and engines) that
would attach to the base vehicles, see Figure 2.4.
_5 /'
FIGURE 2.4 Fuel Tanks Concept Versus Booster Packs Concept.
Propulsion System
The decision on propulsion system had several aspects. The first was whether to consider liquid, solid, hybrid
or electric propulsion. Throttleability was a requirement of the vehicle (to allow accurate attitude and location
control), so solids were unusable. Electric engines did not have a high enough thrust for any manned missions
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-- the travel times would be on the order of months. Hybrids have not yet been flight tested in any systems, and
are not intended to be tested in the near future. Based on this short listing, the propulsion system choice
became a decision between different liquid propellants: hypergolic fuels (such as SOME HYPERGOLIC
FUEL) and cryogenic fuels (such at liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen).
Launch Vehicle
Finally, the choice of launch vehicle affected the design of the system considerably. Not only at stake were the
geometry and mass limitation, but also the ability to use EVAs to help assemble or deploy the vehicle. The size
of the fuel tanks was the primary design driver in the choice of launch vehicle -- most simply would not fit the
tanks. The second major driver was the cost of the launch and the requirement of having a backup American
launch vehicle (if a foreign vehicle was the primary choice). Shown in Table 2.3 on page 47 is the summary of
launch vehicle considerations and how the leading candidates compared.
Trades
The basis for determining the concept to design included three major factors: efficiency/low cost, safety of the
system and the maturity of the technology required for the design. Note that there was an implicit assumption
of forced technology maturation - if a less than mature technology was chosen, it could be tested a verified
explicitly for this vehicle at a significant additional cost. In the paragraphs below, each of the options is dis-
cussed with particular emphasis on the basis by which the decision was made.
Modularity
The trade-off at stake with a modular design is that system reliability and complexity increases with modular-
ity, as does the intrinsic efficiency of the system. A highly modular design creates a situation where a vehicle
can be assembled highly optimized for a specific mission, causing a minimization of fuel wasted in transport-
ing under- or non-utilized components. Transporting a crew module is completely unnecessary for autonomous
missions. However, the introduction of additional levels of complexity in the vehicle -- fuel, power, mechani-
cal interfaces -- decreases the reliability of the vehicle. In addition, requiring assembly in orbit either requires
considerable investment in robust autonomous operation assets, or astronaut EVA. Both of these options are
expensive.
Expandability
As mentioned earlier, extra fuel or thrust is required to get to GEO. The usage of fuel tanks allows a minimum
extra dry mass to be added to the vehicle for these extended missions. However, adding only fuel tanks
requires a propellent (liquid) interface on the vehicle (to supply the fuel to the existing engines). Adding
booster packs does not require a propellent interface -- the fuel can be used exclusively by the booster engines.
Booster packs also have an advantage in that they distribute the thrust required for the mission over more
engines. This leads to longer intervals between engine replacement.
Propulsion System
The choice between propellants was quickly reduced (by minimum thrust requirements on manned missions)
to a choice between two liquid technologies: cryogenic and hypergolic. The reason for choosing cryogenic lies
in the greater specific impulse (Isp). A higher Isp creates a larger mission envelope. However, since one of the
secondary objectives of the vehicle is to provide rescue capability, long term storage of cryogenic fuels was a
major issue. Since the fuels must be kept at extremely low temperatures, additional insulation and other con-
cerns needed to be addressed. Hypergolic propellants are a much more mature technology, but suffer from a
lower Isp. In addition, hypergolic fuels are more corrosive and dangerous. However, long term storage of
hypergolics is less of a concern.
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Launch Vehicle
The trade-offs for the launch vehicles consisted of very pragmatic concerns and included some that were intan-
gible, or at least difficult to quantify. Given that cost was the major driver, the choice of the Proton (if the Free-
bird fit into the payload envelope) seemed logical. However, the uncertain state of the Russian space industry
was a major concern as further explored in Chapter 8 on page 289. Other foreign launch vehicles were consid-
ered to be suitable backup vehicles, namely the Ariane series. Political considerations also required that the
Freebird fit in an American launch vehicle. The Shuttle was originally rejected, due to the cost under-utiliza-
tion of its capabilities and the problem of launching cryogenic fuel on a manned vehicle. However, it was reex-
amined tbr the additional flexibility of having human intervention available for problems in vehicle assembly.
2.3.2 Concept selection
The concept that was finally selected is that of a semimodular vehicle. The major sections consist of a crew
module, a "smartbox", a propulsion pack, extra fuel tanks and a barn for storage purposes. An exploded view
of the crew module, the smartbox and the propulsion tank is shown in Figure 2.5.
//
FIGURE 2.5 Selected Freebird Concept.
Some of the smaller pieces of hardware have been left off of this figure for simplicity.
The axis system used on this vehicle is shown in the Figure 2.6.
The crew module consists of a pressure vessel that contains all of the necessary life support equipment and
human interfaces. The smartbox is a mechanical link between the crew module and the propulsion pack and
consists of the required C3T and GNC components. It provides a mounting point for all of the antennas, guid-
ance instrumentation and thrusters (including thruster fuel tanks) as well as two remote manipulators. The use
Freebird Final Report
Vehicle Design Concepts 45
+Y
+Z
FIGURE 2.6 CAD drawing showing Freebird coordinate system.
of two manipulators allows one to hold a satellite and the other to be used as an attach point for astronauts or to
manipulate objects for repair purposes. The propulsion pack consists of a set of fuel tanks and four RLI0-A4
cryogenic engines. Extra fuel tanks can be attached to the propulsion pack to provide the system a further
range. The VSF is a simple structure nearby the space station that will provide storage for the vehicle (or sec-
tions of the vehicle) when it is in not use. The rationale behind the VSF is to extend the life of the vehicle by
reducing the micrometeorite and radiation damage to the primary structure while reducing the shielding weight
that is necessary on the vehicle. A view of each of the components -- crew module, "smartbox", propulsion
pack, and extra fuel tanks -- are shown in Figure 2.7.
The will be four basic configurations used in the operation of the vehicle:
1. nearby remote (Mass Ratio up to 5)
2. nearby crewed (Mass Ratio up to 3.5)
3. distant remote (Mass Ratio up to 8)
4. distant crewed (Mass Ratio up to 6.1)
The derivation of these preliminary mass ratios is covered in Chapter 2: Mission Scenarios. Also located there
are the operational manner in which these missions will be completed.
The simplest mission will involve a nearby remote mission: the base unit (consisting of the smart box and the
propulsion pack) will travel to the satellite and affect the repair. If a crew is required, the crew module will be
mated to the base unit. If more fuel is required (for distant missions), extra fuel tanks will be mated to the pro-
pulsion pack.
For autonomous missions, the crew module will be removed and stored at the International Space Station
Alpha (in the VSF). When a crew is required, the base unit will remotely mate to the crew module using the
remote manipulators attached to the smart box.
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FIGURE 2.7 Individual Modules in Freebird Design.
Refueling consists of tilling the propulsion pack tank from launched tanks of propellent. Refueling the base
tank requires a fluid propellent interface, so no more complexity is introduced by using the same interface for
feeding the fuel from extra tanks to the engines. For this reason, extra fuel tanks were chosen as the Expand-
ability option.
As mentioned earlier, the selected propellent was cryogenic, to allow for more efficient orbital transfer. After
more research, it was clear that the concerns regarding the on orbit lifetime of the fuel could be satisfied via
venting and passive thermal management. The Reaction Control System (RCS) thrusters use an independent
hypergolic propellent system. The choice was based on the ease of use of hypergolic propellants in RCS situa-
tions, the maturity of the technology and the ability to use empirical evidence from the Shuttle, which has a
similar design.
2.4
2.4.1
Vehicle Design Constraints
Several hard constraints were set on the vehicle design by various agencies, in addition to those set by internal
agents. The constraints fell into five different categories: safety, launch vehicle, technology maturity, cost and
mass. These constraints significantly influenced the design of Freebird.
Safety
Freebird is a crewed vehicle and therefore must comply with NASA's reliability requirement of 0.9944. The
Verification and Validation group performed an analysis of technology reliability and assigned reliabilities to
each subsystem on that basis, as shown in Table 2.2 on page 47. The life support system was assigned the high-
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est reliability in order to assure crew safety. For a more detailed examination of the reliability issue, see Chap-
ter I 1.
TABLE 2.2 Subsystem Reliability Allocations
Subsystem
Structures, Materials & Mechanisms
Reliability
Allocation
.999
Thermal Control .999
Power & Propulsion .999
Environmental Control & Life Support .9994
Guidance, Navigation & Control .999
Command, Communications, Control & Telemetry .999
System Reliability .9944
Since Freebird will be docking with and operating in the vicinity of the space station, certain maneuvering pre-
cision requirements apply, as well as limitations on thruster emissions to avoid contamination of the local envi-
ronment. These restrictions will be discussed further in Chapter 5 (Propulsion) and Chapter 7 (GNC).
2.4.2 Launch Vehicle
Launch vehicle lift capabilities and payload fairings limited the overall size, the mass and the physical config-
uration of the vehicle, thus affecting the functionality of the vehicle when it reaches orbit Since the capabilities
and geometries of launch vehicles are effectively set, the Freebird design was constrained by the launch vehi-
cles currently available. The Titan IV will be used to launch the base unit, consisting of the "smartbox" and the
propulsion pack. The crew module will be launched on the Model C Proton, with the Titan III as a backup.
Future fuel launches will be conducted on the Model C Proton, and future propulsion pack launches will use
the Ariane V. These launch vehicles were selected because they were the cheapest vehicles which could pro-
vide sufficient lift capability to get the vehicle to the desired orbit. Table 2.3 on page 47 shows the relevant
characteristics of the 4 launch vehicles designated for use by the Freebird program, and Figure 2.8 on page 48
shows the payload fairings of these vehicles.
TABLE 2.3 Launch Vehicle Characteristics
Launch
Vehicle
Ariane V
Launch Use
Base Unit
Mass to
Orbit [kg] a
22,000
Fairing Volume
[m3] b
197
Titan IV Base Unit 20,000 208 250-300
Backup
Proton C Crew Module/Fuel Supply 20,000 58 35
Titan III Crew Module/Fuel Supply 14,000 68 130-160
Backup
Cost Per
Launch [$M]
90-100
a. Circular orbit at 390km, 51.6" inclination.
b, Primary cylindrical volume only.
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FIGURE 2.8 Launch Vehicle Payload Fairings.
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2.4.3
2.4.4
2.4.5
Maturity of technology
Since this vehicle is intended to be in use soon after the year 2000, another major constraint was the require-
ment that the design use proven technology, or technology which is expected to he flight-qualified in time for a
technology freeze date one year before launch. Nuclear propulsion, for example, was discarded due to its
highly experimental status.
Cost
In order to maintain economic viability, it was decided that Freebird's development and production costs
should be limited to $1 billion, including hardware and integration, but not the costly system verification and
validation testing. Decisions on the launch vehicle, technology maturity and levels of redundancy were par-
tially driven by this consideration. The vehicle was designed so that operating costs for a repair mission would
be considerably less than replacement costs for that satellite.
Mass
As with any space system, mass was a major driver in the design of Freebird. In order to keep launch and oper-
ating costs at acceptable levels, it was determined that the base unit should have a mass no greater than
4,000kg and the crew unit should be limited to 3,000kg. These numbers were derived by looking at the average
Based on comparisons to other vehicles and an analysis of Freebird's specific situation, these masses were allo-
cated as shown in Table 2.4 on page 49. These numbers include a contingency factor of approximately 15% to
allow for uncertainty and growth, as well as 200kg of satellite repair cargo to be carried in the crew module.
TABLE 2.4 Subsystem Mass Allocations
Base Unit Crew Module
Subsystem Allocation [kg] Allocation [kg]
Structures, Materials & Mechanisms 1,850 1,500
Thermal Control 50 75
Power 600 ---
Propulsion 1,300 ---
Environmental Control & Life Support --- 1,425
Guidance, Navigation & Control 100 ---
Command, Communications, Control & Telemetry 100 ---
Total Allocation 4,000 3,000
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3
Structures, Materials, and Mechanisms
System
3.1
This chapter discusses the design and analysis of all structural aspects of Freebird. In addition, issues of the
space environment, such as debris and radiation are addressed. Mechanisms, such as the Remote Manipulation
System (RMS) and various adapters, are also explained in this chapter.
Structures, Materials, and Mechanisms Requirements
In order to meet the overall mission requirements, Freebird's structure must:
• provide a pressurized volume for eight crewmembers.
• withstand all loads during launch, ascent, and on-orbit maneuvers.
• provide adequate protection to crew and components from orbital debris and radiation.
• provide adequate interfaces with International Space Station Alpha (ISSA), the Shuttle, and each
module-specific launch vehicle,
• meet launch vehicle volumetric and mass constraints.
• include simple and effective interfaces between modules.
• be equipped to capture satellites and stranded astronauts.
• accommodate attachments and volume for anticipated cargo and other equipment.
• provide a Common Berthing Adapter and extravehicular activity capability.
• achieve a reliability of 0.9990.
3.2 Interfaces
Freebird comes into contact with many different types of objects: its launch vehicle, the International Space
Station Alpha, the Shuttle, the target satellite, as well as its various modules. Thus, in addition to the
conventional system interfaces, there are many specialized mechanical interfaces to consider.
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3.2.1 System Interfaces
A subsystem functional block diagram illustrates the components of the subsystem and how they interact with
both each other and the overall system (See Figure 3.1.). In the diagram, the solid lines represent mechanical
interfaces, the dashed lines power connections, and the shaded lines interfaces with the vehicle computer
system. As structural aspects of a system are relatively autonomous, the diagram is not very complex.
f
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FIGURE 3.1 Structures, Materials, and Mechanisms System Functional Block Diagram.
3.2.2 Launch Vehicle Interfaces
All of Freebird's launch vehicles (LVs) use a cantilevered adapter ring for the attachment of cargo. As earlier
stated, the possible launch vehicles include the Arianne 5, the Proton Model C, and the Titan III and IV. The
LV adapter for the base unit and propulsion pack replacements must be able to fit the appropriate launch
vehicle cargo adapters. Because the base unit must be launched "right-side-up" (+x direction toward the nose
of the LV), an adapter was designed to transfer the launch loads from the LV adapter to the load-bearing
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structure of the propulsion pack, around the engines. In order to carry the extreme launch loads the propulsion
pack experiences, it will be launched with additional longitudinal struts, attached at various places along the
propulsion pack, to bear the bulk of the launch loads. These struts will be joined to the LV adapter, so that the
launch loads carried by the propulsion pack itself will be minimal. The adapter consists of a plate which is
mated to the LV cargo attachment. To this plate are attached struts which come out at an angle, avoiding the
engine nozzles, then connecting to each other via additional members which form an octagon slightly larger
than the propulsion pack itself. The joints of this octagon attach to the longitudinal struts which support the
rest of the vehicle. Also joined to the additional longitudinal struts are weaves which assist in supporting the
fuel tanks during launch. This adapter connects to the propulsion pack via explosive bolts, which are detonated
upon reaching orbit.
The mating of the crew module to its launch vehicle adapter is accomplished by a simple connection between
the cargo adapter ring and the intermodular interface already present on the crew module. This connection will
be released after achieving orbit.
3.2.3 Other Vehicle Interfaces
So that it may dock with the International Space Station Alpha and the Shuttle, Freebird must be equipped with
a Common Berthing Adapter (CBA) (see Figure 3.2). Lockheed is currently under contract to design the CBA.
It is also used on the Vehicle Storage Facility (VSF). The capture latches and the alignment guides serve to
assist in the docking procedure. The active half has powered bolts to secure the connection and is included on
Freebird. (The passive half is planned for the ISSA U.S. Node.) The CBA has an outer diameter of 2m with a
20.32cm diameter window in its center [ 1].
The CBA will be located on the crew module, at the rear of the capsule, on the negative z side (the top of the
vehicle). This configuration minimizes the loads associated with being docked.
3.2.4 Intermodular Interfaces
The modular design of Freebird requires interfaces between each module. These interfaces must transfer all
mechanical loads without failure as well as accommodate power and data transmission. Several load bearing
interfaces were researched, from launch vehicle cargo adapter rings to berthing mechanisms. Because the
Freebird concept requires modules that can be removed and replaced easily several times during the vehicle
lifetime, a mechanism similar to the berthing mechanisms of both Hermes and the ISSA U.S. Node was
chosen.
Two interfaces are required on Freebird, one to connect the crew module to the "smartbox" and one from the
Smartbox to the propulsion module. As with berthing adapters, each interface will have an active and passive
halt'. The active half has several features which will be described later, but several of the mechanisms require
power. Since the "smartbox" houses all fuel cells, the active half of each interface was mounted to the
"smartbox", while a passive half was placed one each on the crew module and propulsion pack.
A schematic of a typical interface is pictured in Figure 3.3. Noteworthy features include:
• axial load path structural ring,
• guide and attenuation assembly (not shown),
• capture latch mechanism,
• powered bolt latching assembly.
The axial load path structural ring is the solid Aluminum 7075 ring on which all other interface mechanisms
reside or to which they connect in the case of a passive half structural ring. Its serves to distribute axial
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FIGURE 3.2 The Common Berthing Adapter.
Powered Bolt Latching Assembly
Capture Latch Mechanism
FIGURE 3.3 lntermodular Interface Schematic.
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compressive loads to the primary structure of each module. The crew module/"smartbox" interface has an
outer diameter of 3.3 meters, while the "smartbox"/propulsion pack interface has an outer diameter of 3.9
meters. These dimensions were chosen to best transfer the loads to the primary structure of each separate
module.
The guide and attenuation assembly (not shown) provides exactly what its name implies. The assembly guides
two mating interfaces into proper alignment while reducing the relative velocity to sufficiently low levels
where no damage will be incurred and mating and latching can take place properly. The assembly is also
capable of providing an impulse to aid in separation.
Eight capture latch mechanisms are spaced equally around the structural ring on the active portion of each
interface. These latches act to secure the interfaces while the powered bolts make the final mechanical
connection. They also compress the attenuation system as the two interface rings are drawn together. During
module separation, the latches allow for a controlled separation of the interface rings as the attenuation system
pushes the rings apart via spring loading. Figure 3.4 illustrates a typical capture latch mechanism.
Passive Berthing Mechanism
...."S..i
; Capture Arm
I
..-'_ Gear Box
D,t_ DriveArm
_J _ Drive Arm
1"1 7"/7__i/Idler Arm
tk
.t i
, _ _ Universal Joint
/
Active Berthing Mechanism
Capture Latch Fitting
FIGURE 3.4 Typical Capture Latch Mechanism.
Powered bolts provide the necessary compressive force to fully mate the active and passive interfaces as well
as the means for carrying shear and tensile "pullout" loads throughout the lifetime of the vehicle. In order to
determine the number of bolts and their shear and pullout requirements, the interface load environment was
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characterized. A factor of safety of 1.4 was applied. Table 3.1 summarizes bolt shear requirements and drivers,
assuming 24 powered bolts. These shear loads are very low for common bolts, with some bolts capable of
handling shear loads near 15kN.
TABLE 3.1 Powered Bolt Shear Capacity and Drivers
Interface Bolt Shear Driver Shear Capacity Required [kN]
Crew Module/"Smartbox" RCS thrusters causing roll !.4 •
"Smartbox"/Propulsion Pack laterally applied launch loads 2.3
The "pullout" requirements were the drivers behind the actual number of bolts. The drivers for the "pullout"
requirements are summarized in Table 3.2. Bolt pullout limits can typically range from around 15kN to
42.2kN. [2] The use of 24 bolts achieved the optimal balance of weight and margin of safety. Because the
"smartbox" and propulsion tank truss structures use eigfit axial struts in a regular octagonal fashion (see
Section 3.3 on page 57), 8 pairs of powered bolts are placed in an octagon matching the truss members, and
eight individual bolts are spaced equally between pairs. The placement of the eight latching mechanisms is the
same as the placement of the 8 individual bolts (See Figure 3.3.).
TABLE 3.2 Powered Bolt Pullout Capacity and Drivers.
Interface Bolt Pullout Driver Pullout Capacity Required [kN]
Crew Module/"Smartbox" dual off-axis main engine firing 22.9
"Smartbox"/Propulsion Pack dual off-axis main engine firing 22.9
The bolts are tapered at the ends to compensate for some misalignment or flexure of the structural rings. Each
powered bolt actuator can provide typically 101.7N.m of torque to drive the bolt into the passive bolt hole on
the opposite interface [2]. A powered bolt is pictured in Figure 3.5.
Passive Berthing Mechanism
i................ _ Retaming Ring
e ................. .
'. Boll
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i I
f '"1'-_ Bushing
_ Coupling
Active Berthing Mechanism
FIGURE 3.5 Typical Powered Bolt.
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A means for connecting power and data lines was not explicitly designed. However, once the powered bolts
have locked in place, and telemetry has verified the connection, some connectors will be mated, transferring
power and data.
3.2.5 Target Satellite Interface
In order to perform its primary objectives of tending and repairing satellites, Freebird must have the ability to
grapple the target satellite. For this purpose, a Remote Manipulation System (RMS) must be included on the
vehicle. For the details on the RMS, refer to Section 3.6.1 on page 73.
In the teleoperated configuration, Freebird must also have the ability to physically connect to the adapter ring
interface on the target satellite when it is advantageous to take the satellite to the ISSA for repairs. For this
operation, the RMS must be either programmed or controlled remotely to stabilize the satellite, then attach it to
the "smartbox." Because the intermodular interface is larger than standard cargo adapter interlaces, the
costumer must provide an adapter, to be fitted to Freebird prior to mission, to connect the asset to Freebird.
3.3
3.3.1
Primary (Load Bearing) Structure
The primary structure of Freebird is comprised of all load-bearing components. It must carry all loads applied
to Freebird during its entire lifetime. This structure is also responsible for macroscopic physical integrity.
Material
Since the main functions of the primary structure are to bear most of the loads that Freebird undergoes and to
serve as the final layer of debris/micrometeorite shielding, strength and ductility were the principal drivers in
material selection. In addition, since the primary structure comprises a significant part of the vehicle, weight
and cost were also of major concern. In consideration of all these factors, aluminum was the clear choice from
among the most commonly used aerospace, materials such as steel and titanium. Some of the attributes that
make aluminum so attractive are its relatively high strength to weight ratio, ductility, availability, and ease of
fabrication. Steel and titanium each have higher strengths, but each suffer from disadvantages such as higher
density, lower fracture toughness, and more complicated manufacturability.
Although aluminum's extensive use was a large influence in the selection process, other materials, not as
commonly used, were also investigated. For instance, composites, such as graphite/epoxy, have very high
specific strength and stiffness. Also, advances in their development have helped to bring them more into
mainstream use. Therefore, Graphite Epoxy T300/E [_+45°/O°4]s was chosen for the truss members of the base
unit.
Even in taking aluminum as the choice material for the crew module, however, many alloys and tempers must
be considered. Recent developments in aluminum-lithium alloys have produced very promising results: 8-10%
less density and approximately 10% higher stiffness [3]. However, shortcomings of their ductility, fracture
toughness, and stress corrosion resistance weigh heavily against them. Table 3.3 lists several aluminum alloys
and their structural properties. For this specific load-bearing application, where strength is of high importance,
experience shows the aluminum alloy 7075-T6 to have the appropriate characteristics of high strength as well
as high structural efficiency, E/p.
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TABLE 3.3 Structural Properties of Aluminum Alloys
Aluminum
Alloy
2024-T3
Tensile Yield
Strength
[10 6 N/m 2]
Compressive
Yield Strength
[10 6 N/m 2-1
Young's
Modulus
[10 9 N/m 2]
Density
[10 3 kg/m 3]
2.8310 255 72
2219-T87 365 365 72 2.9 24.8
6061-T6 262 255 68 2.7 25.1
7075-T6 496 489 71 2.8 25.4
393393 798090-T851
(AI-Li)
2.6
E/p.
[10 6 m2ls 2]
25.7
30.4
3.3.2 Construction
There were four methods of construction considered: monocoque, semi-monocoque, sandwich, and truss.
These are illustrated in Figure 3.6.
• A monocoque design consists of a single skin of a certain thickness without longitudinal stiffeners or
circumferential stringers. It is the least efficient design option because of its low stiffness-to-weight
ratio. It also tends to buckle at relatively small compressive loads if it is long with a thin skin.
• A semi-monocoque design incorporates stiffeners with a skin, resulting in a more efficient design. The
stiffeners and stringers help to prevent buckling as well as to maintain the cross-sectional shape. The
stiffeners primarily carry the loads due to axial forces and bending moments, while the skin takes on
more of the shear stresses due to shear loading and torsion.
• A cylinder comprised of a sandwich construction can achieve very high stiffness-to-weight ratios. The
components include the outer and inner facings and the core. A sandwich panel is similar to an I-beam
with the facings corresponding to the flanges and the core analogous to the web. The facings carry axial
stresses while the core sustains shear stresses. A sandwich construction would have been ideal from a
stiffness and weight standpoint. However, because of manufacturing difficulties, it was not chosen [I ].
• A truss structure is a collection of members, such as beams, forming a rigid, open framework. Here,
composites can be used as the truss members because of the significant savings in weight, but this also
results in an increase in cost. To provide for debris and radiation protection, panels can be placed in the
open area between truss members. These body panels can be removable so to allow access to the
interior of the structure. A truss design is flexible in that the design can be modified to accommodate all
types of loading.
Since the crew module is pressurized, a semi-monocoque design has been selected. This design does not have
any longitudinal stiffeners but it does have circumferential stringers to provide additional torsional support.
The primary material used is Aluminum 7075. The stringers are also Aluminum 7075. For the "smartbox" and
propulsion pack, the primary structure consists of Graphite/Epoxy composite truss members with removable
Aluminum 7075 panels. The composite truss members need to be outgassed on Earth in order to prevent on-
orbit outgassing. The members are also surrounded by Multi-Layer Insulation (MLI) to prevent the composite
members from interacting with atomic oxygen. The panels are bolted at each truss node to allow an EVA
astronaut to easily repair and/or replace a component within the primary truss structure. The "smartbox" is
completely encased by this truss/panel structure while the propulsion pack only has certain sections of its truss
structure surrounded by panels. These paneled sections exist in order to provide additional torsional rigidity to
the propulsion pack's primary structure and additional radiation and debris shielding to the fuel tanks within
the primary structure.
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FIGURE 3,6 Construction Method Examples.
3.3.3 Analysis
In order to properly size Freebird's primary structure, its load environment was first quantified. Table 3.4
shows the maximum load factors associated with launch.
TABLE 3.4 Launch Vehicle Load Environment.
Launch Vehicle
Proton C
Titan III
Ariane V
Titan IV
Launch Loads [g's]
Axial Lateral
+6 +3
+2.5/-5.0 1.7
+4.5 0.2
+3.3/-6.5 +1.5
The maximum loads that the structure will experience during its ten years of normal operation were quantified
and subsequently used as the design-limiting case. Two different factors of safety (FOS) were applied: 1.4 for
all crew-critical loads and 1.25 for all others. Because designing for launch vehicle loads resulted in an
enormously heavy propulsion pack, that module was sized to meet lifetime loads only, with the understanding
that it would have to be reinforced during launch. Table 3.5 summarizes the actual load design drivers. The
basic design philosophy followed was to define the ultimate load environment and design the vehicle to yield
at that load. Thus, the dominant factor governing the mass of the vehicle is the specific strength, cdp, of the
materials chosen.
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TABLE 3.5 Summary of Design Drivers for Each Module
Crew Module
Rolling Moment
main engine-induced
roll
Pitch/Yaw Moment
lateral launch load
induced moments
Axial Load
4 main engines firing
simultaneously
"Smartbox" main engine-induced dual off-axis engine 4 main engines firing
roll firing simultaneously
Propulsion Module main engine-induced dual off-axis engine 4 main engines firing
roll firing simultaneously
Crew Module
The crew module was first modeled as a pressure vessel. The simple pressure vessel equation was used to
calculate a thickness by setting the meridianal stress equal to the yield stress of the material.
t - pR (Equation 3.1)
2_
yield
where t is the thickness, p the internal pressure, R the radius of the vessel, and (Yyield the yield strength of the
material. Next, the vessel was sized for strength. The effective ultimate axial load was calculated using the
following equation:
Peff = EPaxial+ _ FOS (Equation 3.2)
where M is the applied moment, and Paxial the applied axial force. Equating the compressive yield stress with
the effective load, Pet),; divided by the area of the cylinder cross-section allows for a calculation of the wall
thickness required to withstand the maximum compressive stress.
The pressure vessel was then checked for buckling stability using design rules found in for the theoretical
cylinder buckling stress, _cr
acr = 0.6¥ R (Equation 3.3)
where y = 1.0 - 0.901 ( 1.0 - e-O) , (Equation 3.4)
/-do1
4_ (Equation 3.5)
_=T_ '
and E is the Young's Modulus of the material[4]. Equating the buckling stress with the stress associated with
Equation 3.2 allows one to solve for the required thickness. For each of several materials examined, the
strength required proved the most stringent requirement, although ultimately, the thickness required for
radiation protection proved to be the design driver.
In order to save weight, the debris shielding walls are also used to carry loads, thus reducing the required
thickness of the pressure vessel wall. In order to transmit torsional loads, five circumferential stringers are
spaced equally up the length of the vehicle. These stringers connect the debris bumper segments together as
well as connect the pressure vessel wall to the bumper (see Figure 3.8). To size the thickness of these stringers,
the maximum torsional load was divided by an average radius to obtain a force. This force was then equated
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with product of the yield stress and the cross-sectional area to obtain a minimal thickness. Minimum gauge
(-Imm) sheets of Aluminum 7075 proved to be one order of magnitude too thick, providing a very large
margin of safety.
"Smartbox"
The primary structure of the "smartbox" is a truss. A vessel construction similar to the crew module is
inappropriate, due to the proliferation of equipment that must extend beyond the vessel wall. An octagonal
truss was chosen to allow maximum strength while preserving a large open surface area through which
equipment may pass. The truss work connecting the upper and lower interfaces is a Warren truss with eight
verticals/axials. To strengthen the truss against shear loads, some additional reinforcements were added. For a
detailed description, see Section 3.3.4 on page 62.
The preliminary sizing of the struts was done by observing that the greatest stress in a strut will be:
Groat _ __MmaxZm"x+ M"axYtna--"+ --P""' (Equation 3.6)
FOS Imi n Imi n A
where A is the area of one strut, M,ruoc is the maximum moment about the y and z axes, Pmax is the maximum
axial force, Ym,_ and znutr the largest y and z coordinates of all truss members, and Imm is simply the area
moment of inertia, equal to 4AR 2 for an octagon. This equation is easily solved for cross-sectional area, which
can be calculated by equating armax to (Yconlpressive yield" The cross-sectional shape was assumed to be a circular
tube, a typical space truss cross-section. The outer diameter was set at 3 inches or 7.62cm, based on a
preliminary design of Space Station Freedom's truss structure. [5] This choice allows a simple calculation of
the thickness required, which then yields an area moment of inertia for the struts. Once a material is chosen, it
is easy to calculate the maximum length a strut can be before it buckles:
I = I ""' (Equation 3.7)
Pefl _
where Pqb' is the effective axial load. No strut is allowed to be longer than this critical length without
reinforcements. For simplicity, all struts in the truss structure were preliminarily sized to be exactly the same
as the axial struts, thus providing a conservative estimate of the mass.
Propulsion Pack
To minimize weight, the propulsion pack was chosen to be an open truss instead of a continuous vessel. For
continuity, a scaled version of the octagonal structure of the "smartbox" was chosen. All structural elements
were again assigned the same dimensions as those of the axial struts, using the maximum moments and loads
appropriate to the propulsion pack. To provide torsional rigidity, debris shielding, and radiation shielding, two
Aluminum 7075 cylinders, each three meters long and one millimeter thick, were placed around the main fuel
tanks.
As mentioned above, the propulsion pack was designed to withstand all loads encountered in its mission
environment. This required the design of some launch reinforcement struts. Using the same sizing technique as
above, inserting launch loads where appropriate, an extra 350kg of struts were designed. This additional
structure must also carry the vibrational loads during launch.
A detailed thermal, fatigue, and frequency analysis was not performed because these effects are secondary in
an initial design l_hase. The majority of the structure is covered with Multi-Layer Insulation (MLI), so thermal
issues are not critical. The largest stress fatigue occurs during launch, after which the loads are much lower.
There are also a low number of load cycles during launch, compared to the number needed to fatigue most
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materials. The frequency vibrations are carried by the extra reinforcements on launch, and therefore do not
seriously impact the propulsion pack design.
3.3.4 Design
Freebird's modules were each designed to withstand the module-specific expected loads, as analyzed in
Section 3.3.3 on page 59.
Crew Module
The crew module consists of an aluminum semi-monocoque pressure vessel of radius 1.64 m, surrounded by
thermal, radiation, and debris protection layers. The pressure vessel is cylindrical in shape, with a 60 ° cap, and
has the shape and cross-sectional wall profile shown in Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.8, respectively.
J
FIGURE 3.7 Crew Module Outer View.
In order to support the maximum internal cabin pressure of 14.7psi required for the crew, the pressure vessel
walls consist of a 0.14mm thick Aluminum 7075 skin with five aluminum circumferential stringers of cross-
sectional area 3cm 2. Surrounding the cabin walls is a 2cm thick open region through which heat pipes, electric
wiring, and data cables run. The final layers, components of a Mesh Double Bumper, act primarily as a barrier
to the potentially hazardous space debris environment and secondarily as radiation shielding. The Mesh
Double Bumper, described in greater detail in Section 3.4.1 on page 66, is a four-layer system designed to
protect the vehicle from orbital debris. The innermost of the four layers is a solid aluminum rear wall, 2.25mm
in thickness. After a 4cm space is a 1.79mm-thick layer of Kevlar fabric, followed by another void,
approximately 22cm in thickness. This void is partially filled with Multi-Layer Insulation (MLI), and is used
for thermal protection, as described in greater detail in Part II,Section 6.4.1 on page 107. The next layer is
another continuous aluminum wall, 0.93mm in thickness, and the final, outermost layer is a 0.71mm-thick later
of aluminum mesh. Summing the thicknesses of the various aluminum layers in the crew module cross section
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FIGURE 3.8 Crew Module Wall Profile.
gives a net aluminum thickness of approximately 4.03mm, which is not quite thick enough for acceptable crew
radiation protection. In order to alleviate this problem, the pressure vessel wall is thickened by 3.25mm, to
3.39mm, for a total of 7.28mm of aluminum. This supplementary aluminum also acts as structural
reinforcement. For a more detailed description of the radiation environment and vehicular radiation protection
schemes, refer to Part II, Section 1.4.2 on page 29 and Section 3.4.2 on page 70, respectively. With the overall
configuration outlined above, the crew module adequately supports Freebird's crew and keeps them safe from
the harsh space environment.
"Smartbox"
The "smartbox," shown in Figure 3.9, is a short cylindrical truss configuration, surrounded by debris shielding,
discussed in Section 3.4.1 on page 66, designed to hold the vehicle's C3T, GNC, and Power hardware. The
trusswork is 2.0m in length and 3.9m in diameter, tapering to a diameter of 3.3m at the "smartbox"/crew
module interface. The "smartbox" truss is constructed of T300/E [+45 °/0°4]s Graphite/Epoxy struts. This
configuration of graphite/epoxy was selected due to its high specific strength (o-/9=5.2 x 105 m2/s 2) [6]. The
cylindrical truss consists of two parallel octagonal planes supported by eight vertical stringers, connected with
diagonal members for torsional support. There is one full-length axial strut as well as two sets of "shear stars"
within the octagonal framework for additional support. The shear stars are sets of eight radial struts designed to
help bear the torsional and shear loads.
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FIGURE 3.9 "Smartbox" Truss Configuration.
Propulsion Pack
The propulsion pack is a cylindrical truss structure with internal supporting members, designed to support one
2. lm radius spherical Liquid Hydrogen (LH2) tank and one 1.5m radius spherical Liquid Oxygen (LOX) tank.
The structure additionally supports the four main engines and 28 RCS thrusters. The module is 9.98m in length
from the interface to the tip of the engines and is 4.5m in diameter. The truss configuration, pictured in detail in
Figure 3.10, consists of an octagonal cylinder with eight vertical stringers and two circumferential skins for
torsional and shear support. The LH 2 tank is supported further by two sets of four truss members in a square
orientation, also shown in Figure 3.10. Similarly, the LOX tank is supported by two circular configurations,
each with four struts to distribute the load to the primary structure. A circular orientation was chosen for this
tank because its smaller size prohibits effective use of the square support. A final strut set for engine
reinforcement is placed around the main engines and RCS thrusters, in order to facilitate engine load
distribution to the vertical stringers. All truss members are again made of T300/E [ +45°/0°4] s Graphite/
Epoxy, for the same reasons as in the smart box. Additionally, the truss member cross-section is the same as
that of the smart box truss members, except that the inner diameter is slightly smaller. Refer to Table 3.6 for a
summary of truss dimensions for the "smartbox" and propulsion pack. Finally, in order to successfully support
the propulsion equipment during launch, 8 extra Graphite/Epoxy struts are added for structural reinforcement.
These struts have the same outer diameter and material choice as all of the primary truss members, but are
slightly thicker. Again, for exact dimensions, refer to Table 3.6.
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TABLE 3.6 Truss Member Dimensions for the "Smart Box" and Propulsion Pack
Truss Member
Location
Smart Box
Propulsion Pack
(primary truss)
Propulsion Pack
(Launch Reinforcement
Struts)
Outer Diameter
[cm]
7.62
7.62
Inner Diameter
[cm]
7.48
7.46
7.62 5.99
Thickness
[cm]
0.14
0.16
1.63
FIGURE 3.10 Propulsion Pack Truss Configuration.
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3.4 Environmental Protection
In order to maintain vehicle integrity and ensure a useful lifetime, Freebird's essential components must be
protected from the mission environment.
3.4.1 Debris/Micrometeorite Impact
In order to insure the integrity of Freebird during its lifetime and to meet the specified performance reliability
of 0.9990, Freebird has an impact protection layer. This layer is outside of the primary structure, and is
designed to withstand the micrometeoroid environment as described in Section 1.4.2 on page 29. By designing
to withstand impacts from Icm objects at a counterorbital velocity of 10m/s, Freebird's debris shielding has a
reliability of 0.9996.
Three different debris impact protection designs where investigated: the Whipple Bumper Shield (WBS), the
Multi Shock Shield (MSS), and the Mesh Double Bumper (MDB). All three designs incorporate the same
general philosophy, shown in Figure 3.11. The shields consist of two or more layers of material, separated by a
certain distance. The first layer takes the brunt of the impact, slowing and breaking the particle into smaller,
less damaging pieces. The last layer's purpose is to survive perforation from the fragments and impulse
loading[7]. Any intermediate layers that may exist serve to further slow and vaporize the particle.
r_e_ ! Possible Additional
Bumper(s)
Bu "_'---'-_ i
Projectile _ :_ _:"
I oe0Lood
_.._
Rear Wall
FIGURE 3.11 General Debris Shield Configuration.
The Whipple Bumper is the only design currently in use. It is the simplest design, consisting solely of two
aluminum layers spaced a certain distance apart. These layers often have some Multi-Layer Insulation (MLI)
between them, both to help absorb the shock and to assist in thermal insulation. The WBS configuration is
identical to that of Figure 3.11, without the optional additional bumpers.
The Mesh Double Bumper was designed to be an improvement on the Whipple[8]. It begins with the same
basic design, two aluminum layers, but then adds two more layers. This is depicted in Figure 3.12. The first
addition is an aluminum mesh which goes in front of the first layer. This dense mesh is designed to break up
the debris particles in much the same way a continuous plate would, but without the additional mass. A
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problem with the original Whipple is that in breaking up the particle, the first aluminum bumper itself is
broken up, and sometimes this secondary debris can be more damaging than the original particle. The mesh
layer diminishes these occurrences. The mesh used is dense enough that the particles that go through
unhindered are easily defeated by the next bumper, the continuous aluminum. The second additional layer is
between the two continuous aluminum plates. It is a layer of high-strength fabric, such as Kevlar or Spectra,
which serves to decrease the impulsive loading on the rear wall of aluminum.
/
Projectile
/--"
Aluminum
Mesh
Intermediate
Fabric ' _ii_
(Kevl .... Spectra) ! :i_:;!.iiii
Continuous _+!_
Bumper _
(Alumunim)
Rear Wall
Aluminum
FIGURE 3.12 The Configuration of a Mesh Double Bumper Debris Shield.
Instead of an aluminum outer shell, the Multi-Shock Shield utilizes several layers of Nextel, a ceramic fabric.
As stated previously, one of the main disadvantages of using an aluminum outer bumper is the spall ejected
due to the perforation of the aluminum. The Nextel fabric produces non-damaging ejecta, which allows for a
thinner rear wall. The MSS is configured with a number of ultra-thin, spaced sheets of Nextel before a rear
wall, again of aluminum[9]. Figure 3.13 shows the geometric configuration. The successive shocks raise the
thermal state of the projectile and often cause it to vaporize[8]. A further advantage to this type of shield is that
it is easier to fit to a form because it is made primarily out of a fabric.
The shielding masses necessary to protect against a l cm aluminum projectile at 10km/s were compared for the
different configurations to find the optimum shield. The bumper and rear wall thicknesses necessary for a
Whipple Bumper can be calculated by using the following equations:
tb - chmp - cbdpp (Equation 3.8)
Ph Ph
tw=Cw_. _ 3,f-M. Vn. _ (Equation3.9)
where tb and tw are the bum[_er and rear wall thicknesses (cm), respectively, % is defined as 0.25 for our case,
cw is defined as 0.16cm2.s/g2/3-km, mp is the areal density of the expected projectile (g/cm2), Pt_ is the bumper
density (g/cm3), pp is the projectile density (g/cm3), d is the expected projectile diameter (cm), S is the spacing
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FIGURE 3.13 The Configuration of a Multi Shock Shield.
between bumpers (cm), M is the expected projectile mass, Vn is the expected projectile velocity (km/s), and cr
is yield stress of the rear wall (ksi). [8] For the Mesh Double Bumper Shield, the following equations
characterize the necessary thicknesses[ I 0]:
t .... h - c ..... hdPl, (Equation 3.10)
Pme,_h
t b - cbdpp (Equation 3.11)
Ph
tt - cjdpp (Equation 3.12)
Pr
4E6
9M. Vn • S-3/Z^l-- _
tw = '" (Equation 3.13)
Pw
In these equations, tmesh, tb, and tt-are the thicknesses of the mesh outer bumper, the aluminum continuous
bumper, and the fabric layer, respectively; Cmesh, c b, and cj are constants defined as 0.057, 0.093, and 0.064,
respectively; p[ is the density of the Kevlar fabric.
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For the Multi Shock Shield, the wall thicknesses were calculated by the following formulas[8]:
0.19dpp
tN - (Equation 3.14)
PN
41.7M. V..
tw = (Equation 3.15)
Pw
In these equations, the variables stand for the same quantities as in the previous equations, with the subscript N
standing for the Nextel bumpers. The thickness calculated for the Nextel bumpers with this formula is equally
distributed over the four bumpers.
In these calculations, the material properties of the walls and the bumpers are those of Aluminum 7075. The
projectile diameter and velocity used were 1.0cm and 10.0km/s as explained in Section 1.4.2 on page 29. After
a number of iterations, it was found that the most efficient configurations for MDB and MSS were both
achieved with a total spacing of 30cm. The calculated masses are in Table 3.7. The masses calculated here are
preliminary masses, used only to make a design choice.
TABLE 3.7 Preliminary Shielding Thicknesses and Resulting Masses
Attribute
Rear Wall Thickness [mm]
Bumper Thicknesses [mm]]
Crew Module Shield Mass [kg]
"Smartbox" Shield Mass [kg]
Total Shielding Mass [kg]
Whipple Bumper
Shield
6.3
2.5
1500
1400
2900
Mesh Double
Bumper
2.25
tb = 1.0
tmesh = 0.8
t,[= 1.8
750
700
1450
Multi Shock Shield
2.0
1.8 over 4 bumpers
or
0.45 per bumper
650
625
1275
These calculations suggest that the MSS is the most mass efficient design, and should be utilized for Freebird.
However, mass is not the only consideration for the design. MSS is a new concept and would therefore have
increased development costs compared to a WBS. Also, aluminum is much less expensive than Nextel ceramic
cloth. Although these are valid arguments against using the MSS, the chief reason for not choosing it is in its
basic design. The cloth nature of the Nextel outer layers would make it difficult to secure Freebird's many
external attachments, such as handles, cameras, and antennae. Therefore, the MDB configuration was chosen.
Although MDB also has development costs associated with it, the fact that the shielding mass is approximately
halved overcomes any hesitation to choose this new technology. Thus, the debris shielding for Freebird will be
of the Mesh Double Bumper configuration with the following bumper thicknesses:
• trear wall = 2.3mm
• IAl bumper = 0.93mm
• tAI mesh = 0.72mm
• tKevlar = 1.8mm
Part Ih Vehicle Design
70 Structures, Materials, and Mechanisms System
Based on the above thicknesses, the final debris shield masses are 668kg for the crew module and 186kg for
the "smartbox." The bumpers are held together by the stringers, or, in the case of the "smartbox," by the truss
members of the primary structure. The debris bumper configuration for Freebird is depicted in Figure 3.8.
3.4.2
TABLE
Radiation Shielding
Because each module contains items that have different radiation damage threshold levels, Freebird's radiation
shielding is module-specific. Table 3.8 offers radiation damage threshold levels for the main classes of
components found on the vehicle; each module is therefore shielded to protect the most vulnerable component
contained in it.
3.8 Radiation Damage Thresholds [11]
Radiation Damage
Component Class Threshold [Rad]
Sensitive Human Organs -50
Electronics I0 I_ 103
Ceramics and Glasses 106-108
Lubricants and Hydraulic fluids 105-107
Polymers 107-109
Structural Metals and Alloys 109-1011
Several shielding materials were considered for their radiation absorption capability, atomic weight, density,
cost and availability, seen in Figure 3.14 and Table 3.9. Figure 3.14 shows the amount of radiation allowed
through four different materials to BFO's (Blood Forming Organs) during a 1989 solar proton event. It is given
not tot its numerical content, but to comparatively show the radiation shielding properties of several materials
considered for Freebird's radiation protection program. While aluminum has been widely used on space
vehicles in the past, further research points to lithium hydride (LiH) as a better choice than aluminum to
supplement structural materials that are not thick enough to provide adequate radiation protection. LiH has a
very high hydrogen content and a low atomic weight, and therefore has greater proton stopping ability and less
generation of secondary nucleons than heavier, lower hydrogen-content materials[12]. Water, with virtually the
same radiation stopping capability as LiH, is also a good material for radiation shielding, but is obviously not
applicable for Freebird's mission scenarios because it is a liquid.
TABLE 3.9 Properties of Various Radiation Shielding Materials
Atomic Weight
Material [g/moll Density [g/cm 3] Cost Availability
Lead 207.2 11.35 mid good
Aluminum 26.98 2.8 mid good
Lithium Hydride 8.96 0.82 mid average to good
Water 18.02 i .0 low very good
The crew module's radiation protection is designed to limit the astronauts' exposure to under 25 rem/mission
(the NASA exposure limit), or, for the design-limiting four-day mission, 6.25 rem/day. In LEO a rem is
approximately equal to a rad. Summing the individual wall thicknesses needed for structural support and
debris protection in the crew module design yields a net aluminum thickness of 4.03mm. However, since
0.71 mm of this is dense aluminum mesh, a net thickness of 3.91mm is used to determine radiation shielding
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FIGURE 3.14 Blood Forming Organ Dose Equivalent Versus Depth Functions for Sum of 1989 Flare Fluences for
Various Materials [12].
TABLE
requirements. In order to facilitate comparison between shielding materials, radiation stopping capabilities are
usually given in units of g/cm 2, as such units, when multiplied by the material's density, give equal masses for
given allowable dose amounts. Freebird's net aluminum thickness of 3.91mm, multiplied by the density of
aluminum, 2.Sg/cm 3, yields a mass/surface area number of 1.01g/cm 2. A total thickness of 2.0g/cm 2, or
7.14mm, of aluminum is required to protect astronauts in LEO missions[13]. 3.25mm of aluminum are
therefore added to the pressure vessel wall thickness to insure that Freeebird's astronauts do not exceed their
radiation exposure limits. Aluminum is used as the supplementary radiation protection material rather than
Lithium Hydride because it offers a greater ease of manufacture, as the shielding and the pressure vessel can be
manufactured simultaneously. Furthermore, as seen in Table 3.10 [ I I ], for the worst case scenario of a 600km
equatorial orbit, the 2.0g/cm 2 provides a more than adequate margin of safety for radiation absorption doses.
3.10 Radiation Dose Rates at a 600 km Orbit for Aluminum Shielding [11]
Equivalent Shielding
Thickness [g/cm 2]
Polar Orbit
Polar Orbit
Radiation Dose Rate
[rein/day]
0.1
1.0 1.3
10.0 0.4
3x 10 3
Equatorial Orbit
Equatorial Orbit
10 4
6.5
2.0
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Due to the nature of the structure of the "smartbox,", it is impossible to provide a simple layer of radiation
shielding for the entire module. Each component on the "smartbox" has its own radiation shielding, either on
the component itself, or in the form of an aluminum container thick enough to provide adequate radiation
protection. All electronics used on Freebird are radiation hardened, and can therefore withstand 103-105 rads
before being damaged. With the anticipated 12 missions/year, 4 days/mission, and 10-year expected vehicle
lifetime, the electronics can receive 10-'-105 rads over 500 days, or 2-2000 rads per day. This dose allowance
would require the aluminum box wall thicknesses to be 3.57cm thick for the most sensitive components if they
had no individual shielding. Due to volume and mass constraints on the "smartbox," this box thickness is
unacceptable. In order to alleviate this conflict, the components are placed in aluminum boxes with varying
wall thicknesses up to 1.5 cm, individually evaluated for radiation protection necessity and component-based
shielding, and placed accordingly in the "smartbox." The more sensitive components are placed toward the
interior of the "smartbox," utilizing the surrounding boxes for shielding. Furthermore, it should be noted that
the vast majority of Freebird's electronic components are closer to the upper limit for radiation tolerance, and
only a small percentage require the special interior placement in the "smartbox."
The propulsion pack contains liquid hydrogen, liquid oxygen, and hydraulics, all of which can withstand 105-
107 fads before damage. The tanks holding these fuels are of ample thickness, and therefore need no further
shielding.
3.5 Internal Structure
The internal structure of the vehicle serves to maintain component configuration and transmit all loads from
internal components to the primary, load bearing structure.
3.5.1 Crew Module
The structural members in the cabin are designed to support the cabin layout specified by the Environmental
Control and Life Support System (ECLSS). As this is where the astronauts spend most of their time, the crew
module is configured to aid the astronaut during their mission. (For more details see Section 9.4 on page 173)
These components include: a floor to give the cabin orientation, windows to aid in docking and EVA, a dual
storage bay for parts and tools, EVA and docking capability and hard points for the attachment and placement
of chairs, restraints, computer consoles, RMS control units, etc. For more information see Section 9.8.3 on
page 187. The mass of the internal crew module structure is approximated to be 10% of the mass of the
components it is supporting. This approximation leads to an internal structural mass of 159kg. This number
was reduced by performing a first cut analysis in which brackets or straps are used to attach other system
components directly to the pressure vessel wall as opposed to creating other support structures for said
components. For the remaining components that could not be attached to the pressure vessel wall, the 10%
approximation was used to determine the mass of the necessary support structure. Thus, the total mass of the
internal structure is 125kg, a savings of 34kg compared to the previous design based solely on the 10%
approximation.
EVA and docking capability will be attained through the Common Berthing Adapter. For further information
see Section 3.2.3 on page 53 and Section 9.8.1 on page 184. Also, see Figure 3.2 on page 54.
3.5.2 "Smartbox"
The structural members in the "smartbox" serve to secure the internal components in place. As a rough
estimate, the mass of these supporting members is approximated to be about 10% of the mass that they need to
support. According to this calculation, the mass of the structural members should come out to be
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3.5.3
approximately 77kg. However, the mass of the primary truss structure of the "smartbox" is 93.5kg, about 20%
greater than the estimated mass required of the internal structure. Moreover, the interior truss structure was
sized to withstand the loads applied to the "smartbox" and its components. Therefore, the primary structure
itself can also serve as the supporting structure for the internal and external components. With an additional
10kg for miscellaneous bolts and brackets, the components are thus attached directly to the primary truss
structure.
A potential problem with the scenario just described, however, was the number of truss members available for
components to be attached to. However, as designed, the internal components take up only 8.3% of the
available volume inside the "smartbox." So, not only is there more than sufficient area for attachment points,
there is also plenty of room for the aluminum radiation protection boxes as described in Section 3.4.2 on
page 70, and for the retraction of external components, such as the antennae.
Propulsion Pack
The internal structure of the propulsion pack consists of additional truss structures: one to which the engines
will be attached, one to support the fuel tanks and pumps, and one to attach the additional fuel packs to the
main truss structure. Each of these trusses is constructed of the same materials as the primary propulsion pack
truss.
There are four engine and four Reaction Control System (RCS) mounts on the base of the propulsion pack
structure. They are held in place by a truss structure which is pictured in Figure 3.15. Within this structure are
cross beams which hold the pumps and other equipment necessary to operate the engines and RCS.
Surrounding this structure (not shown in the figure) is a layer of debris shielding. This shielding is simply an
aluminum shell.
The hydrogen fuel tank is supported by cross-beams oriented in squares above and below it. The orientation of
the squares are rotated t/4 turn with respect to each other. The liquid oxygen tank is similarly supported,
however the tank is too small to be supported by the square trusses as described above. Therefore, it is
supported by circular trusses which are attached to the primary trusses by four members, each. Both of these
support systems are described further in Section 3.3.4 on page 62.
The trusses which attach the additional fuel tanks are designed as miniature versions of the main propulsion
pack. They are 5.3m long and 3.6m in diameter, in order to fit into the Proton for launch. They are attached to
the main propulsion pack by powered bolts on the _ axes.
3.6
3.6.1
External Vehicle Equipment
A variety of equipment needs to operate beyond the confines of the "smartbox.'" These components must often
extend, retract, and gimble. Structural reinforcement and operating mechanisms are provided. The location of
all external "smartbox" equipment is shown in Figure 3.16.
Remote Manipulation System
Based on Space Shuttle experience it was determined that at least one Remote Manipulation System (RMS)
should be present on Freebird. Two arms were chosen, one to grapple the target satellite and one to maneuver
working astronauts when Freebird operates in a crewed configuration. For maximum functionality, both arms
are capable of being remotely operated for Freebird operations in the teleoperated configuration.
Each robotic arm is essentially a modified version of the Space Shuttle RMS, using some newer technology
developed for the Space Station Freedom RMS. Each arm weighs approximately 275kg and has seven degrees
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FIGURE 3.15 Engine Supports on the Aft End of the Propulsion Pack.
of freedom: three at both the shoulder and the wrist, and one at the elbow. Closed Circuit Television cameras
(CCTVs) are located strategically along the length of each arm: one at the shoulder, two at the elbow, and one
located on the end effector. In addition, some of the CCTVs are mounted on Pan and Tilt Units (PTUs), and
lights are present as well. Each arm is comprised of two segments, each 7m in length, for a total reach of 14m.
Each segment is specified to be approximately 15cm in diameter. One arm is capable of moving 20,000kg at an
approximate end-point applied force of 80N. Thus, a large payload could be moved at roughly 0.063 radians
per second[ 14].
In order for the arms to have maximum range for all their specific operations, they are placed 180 ° apart, on the
+y axes on the "smartbox." In order to have maximum reach, but still stow inside the launch vehicle, each arm
rests in a folded position, recessed into the shielding of the "smartbox." During periods of acceleration, each
arm tolds into its rest position allowing the end effector to attach to the End Effector Retainer (EER). The EER
provides a hard point for the effector to hold and restrain the arm during acceleration when the risk of losing
control of the arm is greatest.
3.6.2 Antennae
Two 1.25m diameter parabolic antennae are required by the C3T and GNC systems in order to meet Freebird's
communications and navigations requirements. In order to insure a clear pointing path to the Earth at all times
and possible vehicular orientations, both antennae are gimbaled in two axes. In addition, two pairs of
omnidirectional antennae, each 50cm in length and 5cm in diameter, are necessary. One pair, used for
communication during EVA's, is located on the crew module. The second pair, used for telemetry purposes, is
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FIGURE 3.16 "Smartbox" External Equipment Mounting.
located on the "smartbox." Each of these antennae protrude perpendicularly from the side of the vehicle when
in use, and remain embedded in the shielding when passive.
3.6.3 Remote Viewing Devices
To allow Freebird's crew visual access to all areas surrounding the vehicle, several remote viewing devices are
strategically placed on the exterior of the vehicle. Two supplementary color video cameras are attached to the
vehicle's exterior at hard points, one on each side of the "smartbox." Such placement allows visual access
during docking, EVA's, grappling of target satellites, and other orbital maneuvers. In addition, two cameras are
attached to each RMS for close-up views of target satellites and EVA activities.
3.6.4 Reaction Control System
Attachments are provided on the propulsion module truss for the reaction control system (RCS). The exact
placement and angles of these thrusters are pinpointed in Section 7.7 on page 143.
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3.7 Failure Modes and Risk Assessment
The majority of structural failures are, by nature, life-threatening or mission critical. Moreover, the criticality
of failure of certain components is dependent on Freebird's configuration at the time. In the teleoperated
configuration, a structural failure can only be, at worst, mission critical. In the crewed configuration, however,
the same types of failures can be life-threatening. A component level breakdown of the structural failure
modes is given in Table 3.1 !. The criticality of a failure mode is determined by assessing the greatest risk that
the failure poses.
TABLE :3.11 Failure Modes
Component
Primary
Structure
Failure Mode
Excessive deformation
Effect
Damage to
internal structure &
components
Prevention or
Response
Factor of safety
Criticality
Crewed
Config. Teleop.
2
Secondary Puncture Loss of atmosphere Redundancy of I N/A
Structure bumpers
Excessive deformation Harm to crew Factor of safety 1 N/A
Excessive degradation
RMS malfunction
Internal
Structure Damage to
other components
Component
restraints
compromised
Excessive heat or
radiation; Damage
to primary
structure
Arm inoperable/
uncontrollable
Payload delivery
failed; Possible
damage to payload
Shielding
Factor of safety
Factor of safety
May be repaired on
orbit by EVA
Freebird is
equipped with 2
RMS's
Redundant release
mechanism
Remote
Manipulator
System
Launch
Vehicle
Adapter
2
Payload unable to
detach
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TABLE 3.11 Failure Modes
Component
Intermodular
Interfaces
Failure Mode
Capture hook
malfunction
Powered-bolts
malfunction
Bolt(s) shear-off/pull-
out; hook integrity
failure
Effect
Module
attachment/
detachment
impossible
Module
attachment/
detachment
impossible
Intermodular
connection
compromised or
destroyed
Prevention or
Response
Internal
Redundancies
Redundant release
mechanism
Redundancy
Criticality
Crewed
Config. Teleop.
Common Seal leakage Deterioration of Internal I N/A
Berthing atmosphere Redundancy
Adapter Capture hook Docking/De- Internal 1 N/A
malfunction docking impossible Redundancies
Hatch malfunction Docking/De- Internal 1 N/A
docking impossible Redundancies
Criticality Key:
1 = life threatening
2 = mission critical
3 = non-mission critical
4 = telemetry critical
3.8 Summary Budgets
See Table 3. ! 2 for a summary of the mass, power, and cost budgets and for each module of this subsystem and
Table 3.13 for telemetry information.
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TABLE 3.12 Summary Budgets
Crew
Module
Smartbox
Propulsion
Module
Component
Pressure Vessel
#
1
Internal Structure !
Radiation/Debris Shielding 1
Common Berthing Adaptor 1
Primary/Truss Structure 1
Internal Structure 1
Radiation/Debris Shielding I
Intermodular Interface 2
Remote Manipulator Sys 2
Primary/Truss Structure 1
Radiation/Debris Shielding 1
Total ---
Avg. Peak Hardware
Mass Power Power Cost
[kg] [Watts] [Watts] [$K]
480.0 0.0 0.0 7,619
125.0 0.0 0.0 1,653
10.0
218.3
200.0
11,294711.5 0.0 0.0
130.0 12 200 3,439
93.5 0.0 0.0 989
0.0 0.0 106
0.0 0.0 2,310
24.0 400.0 6,349
550.0 1920.0 2400.0 75,000
216.0 0.0 0.0 2,286
222.0 0.0 0.0 2,349
2956.3 1936.0 --- 113,395
TABLE 3.13 Telemetry
Component
InterModular Interfaces (x2)
CBA
# of Freq. Analog/
Telemetry lines [Hz] Digital
Capture Latch 8 10 A
Powered Bolts 24 10 A
Attenuators 4 10 A
Capture Latch 8 10 A
Powered Bolts 24 l 0 A
Attenuators 4 i 0 A
Motor Position 7 100 D
Motor Torque 7 100 D
End Effector Position 3 100 D
End Effector Force 4 I0 A
End Effector.Moment 4 10 A
3 10 D
1 .1 A
Equipment Position 6 .1 A
RMS (x2)
Para. Antenna Gimbals (x2) Motor Position
Omni Antenna Actuator(x4) Antenna Position
GNC Actuators (x6)
Command
Latch/Unlatch
Forward/Reverse
Retract/Extend
Latch/Unlatch
Forward/Re verse
Retract/Extend
Commanded Torque
Commanded Torque
Commanded Position
Commanded Position
Commanded Position
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Chapter
4
Electrical Power System
4.1 EPS Requirements
The functional requirements of the Electrical Power System (EPS) were derived from the overall system
requirements. They are outlined as follows:
• Supply a continuous source of electrical power to all subsystems during the mission life
• Support peak and average loads for all components
• Provide a regulated power bus and converters for all necessary DC voltages
• Protect Freebird from failures and irregularities within the EPS
• Provide command and telemetry for EPS health and status
• Have a reliability of 0.9995
4.2 EPS Interfaces
The interfaces involved in the EPS are:
• Internal
• loads via the power bus
• Telemetry
• Power between the modules
The EPS consists of the power source, a power distribution system, and power regulation devices. The func-
tional block diagram is shown in Figure 4.1. It details the interfaces within the system.
There are also interfaces between the "smartbox" and other modules, to provide power as necessary. When the
crew or propulsion module is being attached to the "smartbox", a power junction is established.
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4.1 Electrical Power System Functional Block Diagram.
Power Source
Three major power sources were considered for Project Freebird: batteries, solar cells, and fuel cells• Nuclear
power was eliminated because of developmental dangers, high initial costs and qualification difficulties.
Batteries
Batteries fall into two categories, primary and secondary. Primary batteries are single use batteries that may
last up to a few months. Since the vehicle will be operating for several years, this option was discarded. Sec-
ondary batteries have recharging capability and could last the duration of Freebird's lifetime, however they are
very bulky (3-5 times heavier than fuel cells) [!].
Solar Cells
Solar cells generate power in a variety of ways. Photovoltaic solar arrays convert sunlight directly to energy,
while dynamic solar arrays use sunlight to power thermodynamic cycles such as Rankine or Brayton cycles.
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These arrays are either panel-mounted or body-mounted. In the panel mounted configuration, solar cells are
attached to a metallic support structure and insulated with a polyimide. This array is commonly used on three-
axis stabilized systems which maneuver the panels to achieve optimum solar incidence. Body mounted arrays
are generally used on spin stabilized systems that have their spinning axis perpendicular to the incident light.
Panel arrays were discarded for Freebird because of the g-loads associated with orbital transfers and inclina-
tion changes. Unlike satellites who deploy their arrays once, Freebird would have to store the array before
every engine burn. Additionally, the arrays would increase the complexity of EVA's and docking maneuvers.
Body mounted arrays were discarded because of their severely limited power output. Since the spacecraft is
not spin stabilized, solar cells attached to the body do not see consistent sunlight. As a result, there is not
enough available surface area on the spacecraft for the necessary number of cells [2].
Fuel Cells
Fuel cells combine gaseous oxygen and hydrogen to generate electrical power, potable water, and heat. Fuel
cell powerplants (FCPs) were developed by United Technologies Corporation in the early 1970's and are the
Space Shuttle's sole power source. The benefit of the FCP is that it requires no additional power storage. A
given load leads to a release of hydrogen and oxygen from the storage tanks. In this way power can be varied
between 2kW and 12kW nominally and up to a maximum of 16kW. FCPs have flight proven reliability and are
qualified for the 100 mission lifetime of the Space Shuttle. Lifetime is limited by electrode wear, currently
1200 hours. Present technology has demonstrated test cells that have lasted 20,000 hours and are projected to
last 40,000 hours. If qualified for this, the fuel cells will outlast the spacecraft and will not need to be replaced
[11[31.
Power Source Selection
Our mission type and duration encourages the use of fuel cells. Freebird has a maximum power demand of
4500W, so the fuel cells will be scaled down versions of the Space Shuttle FCPs, providing 1 to 6kW of power
nominally. Table 4. ! details the Space Shuttle FCPs. One FCP will provide enough power for any mission with
a second FCP providing redundancy in the case of failure. The fuel cell propellant tanks are detailed in
Table 4.2.
TABLE 4.1 Space Shuttle Orbiter FCP Parameters[3]
Parameter
Power output
Voltage regulation
Mass
Max heat rejection
Max water production
Value
I to 6kW
27.5 to 32.5 V D.C.
77.1 kg
0.7 kW @ 1-kW output, 3.7 kW @ 6-kW output
0.1 g/s @ 1-kW output,0.6 g/s @ 6-kW output
TABLE 4.2 Fuel Cell Propellant Tank Parameters [3]
Parameter LOX LH 2
Geometry Spherical Spherical
Volume 0.16m 3 0.3m 3
Max fill quantity 150 kg 25 kg
Mass 31.8 kg 34 kg
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Future Power Technology
Regenerative fuel cells (RFCs) are a possibility for a future power source. RFCs are similar to regular fuel
cells except they have an electrolyzer which breaks water back into hydrogen and oxygen so it may be reused.
The power for the electrolyzer could come from a source in the Vehicle Storage Facility that Freebird from
when not in service.
4.4 Regulation
Techniques for controlling bus voltage are classified into three categories: Unregulated, quasi-regulated, and
fully regulated.
Regulation Configuration
An unregulated power bus connects the spacecraft loads directly to the voltage being generated by the fuel
cells. This voltage is not constant and requires regulators at each load interface. This method is not mass effi-
cient, requires more parts that may possibly fail and therefore was eliminated from consideration. Quasi-regu-
lated systems are related to battery-powered vehicles. Thus, a regulated power bus was chosen for Freebird [2].
EPS Architecture
The regulated EPS is depicted in Figure 4.2. External redundancy is found in the primary components: fuel
cells, the power control unit (PCU), and the power bus. Shunt resistors serve to vent excess power and make
the system simpler and more efficient. The PCU is the main component for regulation, control, and telemetry
of the EPS.
4.5 Distribution
The distribution aspect of the EPS involves several key functions: providing a wire harness that will bring
power to all the electrical applications, converting the common bus voltage to the required level for each appli-
cation, shielding the electrical cables from sensitive components, and detecting and isolating any faults that
might occur in the entire system.
4.5.1 Wire Harness
The wire harness consists primarily of cabling between the elements of the EPS: the fuel cells, the power con-
trol unit, and the main power bus. At the location of every load there is an outlet from each of the redundant
power busses that interfaces with the voltage converter, if necessary. This scheme can be seen in Figure 4.2.
Although the wire harness is kept as short as possible to avoid power losses and voltage drops, it still consti-
tutes approximately 15% of the EPS mass, or about 100kg.
4.5.2 Voltage Conversion
The FCP provides power in a voltage range of 26.5 V to 32 V De. As a function of the PCU, the common bus
voltage is regulated to be 28V DC the current standard for low-power spacecraft system components. Those
components operating on a different voltage require a simple voltage converter or inverter which is located
between the power bus outlet and the application itself. These converters also function to filter out any exces-
sive noise found on the power bus for more sensitive load components. This arrangement indicates a central-
ized power distribution system which allows for increased modularity and future modifications to the EPS [5].
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FIGURE 4.2 Electrical Power System Architecture.
4.5.3 Fault Detection and Isolation
Faults in the EPS include failed loads (short circuits), arcs, and EPS component failure. A system of resetable
fuses is incorporated into the positive power line between the power bus and the loads in order to isolate a
failed load and thereby protect the remainder of the EPS. A well-isolated ground cable serves to suppress any
potential arcing due to voltage differential. This method is superior to grounding via structure because it elim-
inates the need for high continuity between structural elements. Finally, in the case of failure of EPS compo-
nents themselves, all primary elements of the system have redundancy. Telemetry of the EPS is extensive, and
all faults are detected and reacted to immediately [5].
TABLE 4.3 Failure Modes
Component
Fuel Cell
(FCP)
Failure Mode
Primary FCP failure
Backup FCP failure
Effect
Loss of FCP
redundancy
Loss of vehicle
power
Prevention or
Response
Switch to backup
FCP
None
Criticality
Crewed
Config. Teleop.
1 2
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TABLE 4.3 Failure Modes
Component
FCP fueling
system
Power
Control
Unit (PCU)
Power Bus
Failure Mode
Fuel line blockage
Primary PCU failure
Backup PCU failure
Primary bus failure
Backup bus failure
Effect
Loss of vehicle
power
Loss of PCU
redundancy
Loss of voltage
regulation and
telemetry
Loss of bus
redundancy
Loss of vehicle
power
Prevention or
Response
High reliability
Switch to backup
PCU
High reliability
Abort mission
Switch to backup
power bus
None
Criticality
Crewed
Config. Teleop.
2
4.6 Power Demands
The power required by Freebird's systems varies immensely throughout an average mission. The actual mis-
sion scenario and its duration are the primary drivers of the total required fuel for FCP usage. Basically, any
Freebird mission can be split into several distinct regions of operation: stand-by, orbital alignment and separa-
tion, cruise, service, re-alignment and cruise, and docking.
4.6.1 Stand-by
While docked near ISSA, Freebird will not draw any electrical power from it except in emergency situations.
This is mandated so as to not encumber the design and implementation of ISSA with any unexpected require-
ments.
4.6.2 Mission Power Allocation
The two primary missions that Freebird accomplishes are service and tending flights to LEO and to GEO.
While the LEO missions require much less propulsion and time, the fact that they are manned means a great
deal of electrical power is required for ECLSS activities. However, the most power-intensive functions of
Freebird will be performed separately so as to avoid overdriving and possibly damaging the FCPs.
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4.7 Summary Budgets
The most massive part of the power system is the fuel cells and their associated fuel tanks, being about 210kg.
Trades were made between cost and efficiency of power supply and storage components. The mass and power
budget is shown in Table 4.4.
TABLE 4.4 Summary Budgets
Avg. Power Peak Power Hardware Cost
Component # Mass [kg] [Watts] [Watts] [kS]
Fuel Cell Powerplant 2 154.2 0.0 0.0 4900
Power Conditioner 2 50.0 0.0 0.0 1590
EPS Wire Harness 2 100.0 0.0 0.0 920
Fuel Cell Hydrogen Tank I 34.0 0.0 210 330
FCP Hydrogen 1 14.6 0.0 0.0 variable
Fuel Cell Oxygen Tank 1 31.8 0.0 1000 308
FCP Oxygen 1 ! 22.3 0.0 0.0 variable
Total -- 507.0 0.0 --- 8098
The telemetry of this system is outlined in Table 4.5
TABLE 4.5 Telemetry
Component
Fuel Cells (x2)
Telemetry
LOX Tank Density
LOX Temperature
LH2 Tank Density
LOX Temperature
Heater Status
Coolant Pump Status
Coolant Temperature
H2 Pump Status
Power Load
# of lines
1
1
1
1
I
I
I
1
1
Freq. [Hz]
1
1
1
1
1
I
1
I
1
Analog/
Digital
A
A
A
A
D
D
A
D
A
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Propulsion
This section will detail the propulsion system requirements, interfaces, option trades and selections, propellant
storage issues, and the reaction control system.
5.1 Propulsion System Requirements
The requirements for this system were determined from the overall vehicle requirements.
• The main engines must provide a worst case AV of 10,386 m/s.
• The main engines must be throttleable and refuelable.
• The vehicle must not exceed 3g of acceleration.
• The system must last over Freebird's 10 year lifetime.
• The main engines must be maintainable and replaceable.
• The reaction control system (RCS) must provide maneuverability and attitude control for Freebird.
• The system must meet NASA crewed and uncrewed safety and reliability requirements.
5.2
5.2.1
Propulsion Interfaces
The primary components of the propulsion system are the main engines, propellant storage, and RCS. The
interfaces, both between components and subsystems, are shown in Figure 5.1, the functional block diagram.
Propulsion Trade-offs
The primary propulsion system is responsible for providing the thrust for orbit transfers and inclination
changes. Several different types of engines, using a variety of fuels were investigated. The mission require-
ments necessitated an engine with restart capabilities, high specific impulse and a thrust level on the order of
Part I1: Vehicle Design
90 Propulsion
100kN. These engine capabilities assure a minimum trip time and maximum engine lifetime. Solid propulsion
was not used due to its inability to be restarted, and electric propulsion was not used because of its low thrust
levels.
IPropellant Plumbinc EnginesTanks
I
_ Tanks
l Thermal
Venting "........ Power
System Valve,,
I
C3T
RCS
Legend INTERFACES
........ ,_j_.
Power
Redundant
_llP-
Command/Telemetr
Internally Redundant Mechanical j
I_ Partially Redundant
FIGURE 5.1 Propulsion System Functional Block Diagram.
5.2.2 Hypergolic Fuel
Hypergolic fuel consists of two inert liquids which ignite spontaneously when combined. It is safe to handle
and can be stored in space for long periods of time. The one common type of hypergolic fuel is nitrogen tetrox-
ide and Monomethyl hydrazine which has a specific impulse of approximately 340 seconds [1 ].
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5.2.3 Cryogenic Fuel
Cryogenic fuel refers to liquid hydrogen (LH2) and its oxidizer, liquid oxygen (LOX). This type of fuel has the
benefits of a very high specific impulse (-450 Isp), but is dangerous to handle and rapidly boils off in space
without insulation. Because of its short lifetime, cryogenic fuel is primarily used on launch vehicles. However,
with insulation and a sophisticated venting system (see "Propellant Storage" on page 91), it may be stored for
several months. Because this length of time is acceptable for Project Freebird and because it has a significantly
higher specific impulse than hypergolic fuel, cryogenic fuel was chosen for the main propellant.
5.2.4 Engine Selection
Most cryogenic engines are high thrust boosters, and are typically started only once. The KUD-7.5 Russian
engines are qualified for six starts, the second highest number of starts of all cryogenic engines, and have a
thrust level within the necessary specifications. These engines could be used for one or two missions. How-
ever, since Freebird will need to make many missions between engine replacements, they are not satisfactory
to use in the Freebird design.
The RLIOA-4 engines by Pratt and Whitney are qualified for 20 starts and 3000 seconds and have a thrust level
of 92kN. With further testing, Pratt and Whitney believes these engines can be qualified for 100 starts and 5.25
hours. This qualification will extend the engine's lifetime to approximately two years. Thus, with the current
rated thrust and the new lifetime qualifications, these engines were chosen for the Freebird design. [2,3]
5.2.5 Engine Placement
The design driver for engine number and placement is minimum burn time given a 3g envelope; this maxi-
mizes engine lifetime and minimizes trip time. The propulsion pack contains four engines, arranged in a box
configuration. This design provides a 0.5-1.5g initial acceleration, depending on the mission, which is well
within the 3g limit. This acceleration will increase, however, as fuel is burned, but two of the engines may be
turned off once the acceleration reaches the limit. The highest acceleration with 2 engines is 1.9g.
The four engine design also allows redundancy in design. If one of the engines were to fail, then its opposing
engine could be shut off and the vehicle could operate with the two remaining engines, increasing the mission
time but insuring completion
5.3 Propellant Storage
Freebird's main propellant storage tanks are capable of storing LH 2 and LOX in orbit for extended durations
with a loss rate of only 2-5% per month. The system also provides necessary pressurization and stratification
controls to provide continuous propellant flow to the turbopumps of the RLI0A-4 engines during firing.
5.3.1 Tank Geometry
The main propellant tank layout for Freebird includes two spherical tanks, one for LH2 and one for LOX. The
larger LH2 tank is located directly in front of the LOX tank to maximize safety and storability and minimize
volume requirements. The main factors in tank geometry determination were launch vehicle dimensional and
volumetric constraints and the remote manipulation system (RMS) zones of operation.
A propellant mass ratio of 5 for the base unit requires the main tanks to contain 20 000 kg of propellant. The
RL10A-4 engines function on an oxidizer-to-fuel ratio of 5.5. This defines the propellant volume demands as
seen in Table 5.1 and Figure 5.2.
Part I1: Vehicle Design
92 Propulsion
TABLE 5.1 Main Propellant Tank Parameters.
Parameter LH 2 LOX
Geometry Spherical Spherical
Propellant Mass [kg] 3076.9 16923. I
Density[kg/m 3] 75.8 1226.3
Volume [m3] 40.59 13.80
Radius [m] 2.132 1.49
In addition to the main tanks, add-on propellant tanks are used to extend the range of Freebird to polar and
geosynchronous orbit (GEO) missions. Two pairs of LH2 and LOX tanks with fuel line interfaces attach to
opposite sides of the propulsion unit. The Extended Mission Propellant Tanks (EMPTs) are launched into Free-
bird's stand-by orbit a few days to a week before the intended mission. Freebird then retrieves and attaches the
tanks at the beginning of the extended mission. As a result, the extended tanks are not insulated for long term,
in-orbit storage of more than a week or two. Additionally, the EMPTs are not refuelable, and are jettisoned
after propellant is consumed and mission orbit is achieved. The parameters for the extended mission tanks are
generated the same as for the main tanks with the goal of a mass fraction of 10. See Table 5.2.
TABLE 5.2 Extended Mission Propellant Tank Parameters.
Parameter LH 2
Geometry Spherical
Propellant Mass [kg] 2307.7
Density[kg/m 3] 75.8
Volume [m 31 30.44
Radius [m] 1.937
LOX
Spherical
12692.3
1226.3
10.35
1.352
5.3.2 Tank Construction
Based on size and shape requirements, the construction material and design must be chosen that will withstand
propellant pressure levels, inertial loads, and the demands of cryogenic propellants. Maximum pressure loads
using a factor of safety (FOS) of 1.4 are determined using
Ptotal = 1.4( Ppressurized + Pinertial) (Equation 5.1)
Pinertial = 12pgr (Equation 5.2)
where Ptotal is the total pressure load, Ppressurize is the pressure load due to the gas, Pmertial is the pressure
loads induced by acceleration, p is density, g is the acceleration due to gravity, and r is the radius of the tank.
The pressure for LH2 and LOX are listed in Table 5.3.
With the pressure loads known, the thickness and mass of the tanks can be easily calculated once a construc-
tion material is chosen. Materials were compared on the basis of tensile strength, density, and fracture strength.
As seen below in Table 5.4, T50/E composite was chosen. In addition to the above criteria, suitability for con-
taining cryogenic liquids was a concern. AI-6061, AISI-301, and composite liner are acceptable. Due to the
strength and mass qualities, composite materials[9] with a 1 mil titanium liner was chosen. Although slightly
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FIGURE 5.2
TABLE 5.3
Main Propellant Tank Dimensions.
Main Tank Pressure Load.
Parameter LH 2 LOX
Ppressurized[Pal 187900 187900
Pinertial [Pal 38000 510100
Ptotal [Pa] 316200 689000
heavier than other potential liners, titanium was chosen for its resistance to oxidation[10]. With a material cho-
sen, thickness and tank mass can be calculated with
t = rPtotal[20 (Equation 5.3)
mtank = 1.5(p/o)PtotalVtank (Equation 5.4)
where t is the tank wall thickness, (3"is the critical stress of the material, mta,1k is the mass of the tank, and Vm, k
is the volume of the tank. Table 5.5 lists the resulting thicknesses and tank masses.
TABLE 5.4 Tank Wall Construction Material Options -from Mil-Std Handbook and Lockheed.
Parameter
Description
p [kg/m 31
7075-T6 6061
Aluminum Aluminum
2796
c_ [MPa] 496.4
17-7PH AISI-301 T50/E
Steel Stainless Steel Composite
2713 7640
241.3 1151.4
7917 1578
979.1 303.4
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TABLE 5.4 Tank Wall Construction Material Options -from Mil-Std Handbook and Lockheed.
Parameter 7075-T6
p/(_ [kg/Pam 3] 5.63x 10 -6
Fracture
Strength
6O61
1.12x10 -5
17-7PH
6.63x 10 -6
AISI-301
8.09x 10 -6
T50/E
II I I
5.20xi0 -6
low high low high very high
5.3.3 Tank Pressure Control
Pressure control of the main tanks is vital to Freebird's propulsion systems. Excess pressure can result in tank
failure and rupture, and lack of pressure can restrict propellant flow during firing. Excess pressure is released
via a venting system. While firing, a small amount of propellant is heated and used to pressurize the tanks.
TABLE 5.5 Main Tanks Wall Thickness and Mass.
Parameter LH 2
t [ml .0011
LOX
.0017
mtank [kg] 107 79
Pressurization
A small amount of regeneratively heated H2 and 0 2 from the RL10 engines is returned via a regulated system
into the propellant tanks. This maintains operating pressures throughout firing.
Venting
LH2 and LOX are stored at approximately 20K and 70K, respectively. Since ambient temperatures are signifi-
cantly higher, heat energy enters the propellant tanks. As the cryogenic propellants warm up, more propellant
becomes gaseous and tank pressure rises. The excess gaseous propellant must be vented to control pressure
and prevent tank failure.
However, Freebird was designed to remain in orbit, fueled and ready to go, for extended periods of time on the
order of months. In order to accomplish this, Freebird uses a Thermal Venting System (TVS)[4] which mini-
mizes the amount of propellant vented and maximizes the amount of heat energy expelled.
The TVS works by cycling some of propellant through a heat exchanger and injecting it into the tank with a
spray bar. As Figure 5.3 shows the warm propellant is pumped out of the tank and into the heat exchanger
located inside of the spray bar. Some of the warm propellant is expanded, thereby cooled, and the rest flows up
the core of the heat exchanger. As both propellants travel up the heat exchanger, heat is transferred and concen-
trated in the expanded flow. After the warm propellant is cooled, it enters the spray bar and is injected radially
back into the tank. The expanded and heated gas is retained until the maximum desired pressure level is
reached and then vented.
Advantages of this system in addition to venting:
• The spray bar injection system thermally destratifies the bulk propellant preventing hotspots and mak-
ing propellant level easily determined.
• The pumping system doubles as the refueling pump system reducing weight demands.
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FIGURE 5.3 Thermal Venting System (TVS) Operational Diagram.
5.3.4 Propellant Feed System
The RLI0 engines use turbopumps which require a low constant pressure, gas free flow of propellant. One of
the complications of on orbitstorage and operation of liquid propellant systems is the lack of gravitational
force to separate the liquid and gas ullage in the propellant tanks. The presence of gaseous propellant in the
turbopumps during the operation can both damage the turbopumps and cause the engines to sputter. Since both
results seriously endanger a mission, it is absolutely necessary to guarantee uninterrupted, gas free propellant
flOW.
The primary method of ensuring continuous flow is the use of Propellant Management Devices(PMD)[6],[7]
shown in Figure 5.4. In zero-g the affects of surface tension in a liquid become dominant. By taking advantage
of capillary forces created by the surface tension, a combination of vanes, galleries, and screens can be used to
retain the liquids and funnel the propellant into the feed lines (see Figure 5.5). Since this method conveys only
fluids, it separates the fluid from ullage gas and prevents gas from entering the feed lines. In addition to the
PMDs, the acceleration forces will force the propellant to the bottom of the tanks providing continuous flow
throughout burntime.
PMDs have been commonly constructed from titanium, stainless steel, and aluminum elements. Employing
recent developments in titanium screen manufacturing [5], Freebird will use a completely titanium PMD sys-
tem making it resistant to corrosion by cryogenic propellants and compatible with the titanium liner.
The PMD will also serve the secondary purpose of reducing sloshing. The normal damping effects that result
from gravity are severely reduced, and as a result it becomes necessary to induce damping. Careful design of
the PMD can improve liquid damping and reduce the affects of sloshing.
5.3.5 Plumbing
A complicated system of pipes and valves transfer the propellant from the tanks to the engines' turbopumps. In
addition to the components of the TVS, fuel lines for the main and extended mission tanks, refueling lines, and
emergency pressure relief valves are all necessary.
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FIGURE 5.4 Typical Propellant Management Device (PMD) Design.
Although not a major volume consideration, these elements add mass and thermal considerations. Mass is min-
imized using low weight/high strength materials like stainless steel and limiting total length of lines. However,
every penetration through the insulation and tank wall allows heat to pass into the cryogenic propellants and
results in an increase in boil-off rate rates.
___|_xtended Propellant
Interface Tank Interface
[--] RL I 0 Turbopump
Valve
Q TVS Pump
-'V Pressure Relief Valve
_,, Pipe
(_) Regulator
FIGURE 5.5 Plumbing Block Diagram.
The major factor in reliability and lifetime of the plumbing system is valves. Since the interruption of propel-
lant flow can be mission critical, the valves controlling the propellant flow must be reliable. As a result, all
essential valves will be redundant to improve reliability.
5.3.6 Refueling and Extended Mission Propellant Tanks Interfaces
Since Freebird is a multi-mission, reusable spacecraft, the propellant storage has an interface to allow refueling
in orbit. After rendezvousing with the launched fuel, Freebird can initiate a propellant transfer by grabbing the
free floating propellant tanks and connecting the fill lines to the refueling interface[8]. See Figure 5.6.
The refueling tanks are single use, relatively uninsulated stainless steel tanks with an inflatable bladder for
pressurization. These tanks will most likely be launched on a Proton Launch Vehicle.
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5.3.7
On opposite sides of the propulsion module, two Extended Mission Propellant Tank interfaces can be found.
These interfaces based on the same connecting technology as the refueling lines will integrate the additional
LH 2 and LOX tanks with the original propellant feed system. In addition, the interface will include separation
springs to allow ejection of the extended mission tanks after they have been emptied.
Attitude Control and Maneuverability
Attitude control and maneuverability for Freebird is supplied by a system of reaction control thrusters located
on the propulsion module. The thrusters will be replaced with the propulsion module. The configuration of
these thrusters can be seen in Section 7.7 on page 143. The system consists of two sizes of thrusters, two
orbital maneuvering thrusters and twenty-six reaction control thrusters.
Interfaces
• Electrical
Propellant
Power Bolt
FIGURE 5.6 Propulsion Module Interface Design.
5.3.8 RCS Thrusters
When choosing thrusters the important considerations are thrust, Isp, lifetime, mass, safety and contamination.
There are three main types of thrusters used for reaction control. First are cold gas thrusters. These are safe,
reliable, and cheap. However they are heavy, and the thrust provided is extremely small. Monopropellant
thrusters are also simple, reliable and low-cost. These are also fairly low thrust, low Isp, and heavier than the
third option, bipropellant thrusters. The bipropellant thrusters most commonly used in RCS applications are
nitrogen tetroxide and monomethyl hydrazine (N204 and MMH). These fuels are storable and the thrusters
provide good performance, but they are somewhat complicated.
It has been demonstrated that plume loads are a more important concern than exhaust contamination. There-
fore, contamination need not be an issue in choosing a system. However, this stipulates that the thrusters on the
order of magnitude required for Freebird cannot be fired within about 20m of an asset [ 12].
Because of Freebird's size, the demands put on the orbital maneuvering thrusters require a bipropellant system.
The specifications of the thrusters chosen are shown in Table 5.6.
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TABLE 5.6 Reaction Control Thrusters
Orbital Maneuvering Thrusters [2] Reaction Control Thrusters [1 I]
Thrust [N] 3870 490
Isp [s] 281 311
Mass [kg] 10.25 3.7
Approximate size 51.8 x 26.7 61.0 x 30.5
[cmx cm]
Burn time [s] 15,000 50,000
5.3.9 RCS Fuel Storage
The RCS system operates off two sets of tanks, one half of the thrusters running off" each tank in normal usage.
In case of a problem with one of the tanks, the thrusters are connected to both tanks. This ensures that all
thrusters can be used, albeit in a limited manner because of the limited fuel.
The RCS tanks are made of stainless steel because of the highly reactive nature of the propellants. They are
pressurized via a regulated cold gas system. This gas must be replenished when the RCS is fueled.
The rendezvous requirements on Freebird require a large amount of RCS fuel. This stipulates that for a mission
to GEO, RCS fuel must be provided on the extended mission fuel tanks.
5.4 Failure Modes
The failure modes for the propulsion components are defined in Table 5.7
TABLE 5.7 Failure Modes
Component
LOX Propellant Tank
Failure
Mode
Rupture
LH2 Propellant Tank Rupture
Effect
Loss of
Primary
oxidizer
Loss of primary
propellant
Prevention
and/or
Response
High
reliability,
backup relief
valve
High
reliability,
backup relief
valve
Criticality
Crewed
Config. Teleop.
I 2
1 2
Valves Disrupt Loss of fuel Redundancy 1 2
fluid flow feed
PMD Structural Unpredictable High 2 2
failure engine starts reliability,
Return to
ISSA
Freebird Final Report
Summary Budgets 99
TABLE 5.7 Failure Modes
5.5
Component
TVS
Failure
Mode
Pump
failure
Interfaces Structural
failure
RL! 0A-4 Engine
RCS Tanks
Failure of
one pair of
engines
Failure of
all four
engines
Rupture
Rupture of
both sets
RCS valves Disrupt
fluid flow
Orbital Maneuvering Mechanical
Thrusters failure
RCS Thrusters Mechanical
failure
Effect
Loss of thermal
control over
propellants
Prevention
and/or
Response
Redundant
Pump
Refueling High
capability lost reliability
RedundancyDecreased
thrust
Loss of main
propulsion
capability
High
reliability
Return to
ISSA
Loss of fuel --
maneuverability
limited
Criticality
Loss of Return to
maneuverability ISSA
Loss of RCS Redundancy,
fuel feed return to ISSA
Reduced Utilize RCS
maneuverability thrusters, may
necessitate
return to ISSA
Reduced Redundancy
maneuverability
Crewed
Config. Teleop.
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Summary Budgets
The budgets for this system are itemized by component in Table 5.8
TABLE 5.8 SummatT Budgets
Component
TVS
Valves and
Pipes
Totals
# Mass [kg]
60.0
230.0
2064.6
Avg. Power
[Watts]
N/A
N/A
Peak Power
[Watts]
N/A
N/A
Hardware Cost
[$K]
2,540
3,347
29,525
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TABLE 5.8
Component
LH 2
Propellant tank
LOX
propellant tank
Summary Budgets
# Mass [kg]
107.0
79.0
Avg. Power
[Watts]
N/A
N/A
Peak Power
[Watts]
N/A
N/A
Hardware Cost
[$K1
1,698
1,254
PMD 2 40.0 N/A N/A 582
Interfaces 2 60.0 N/A N/A 2,328
RL 10A-4 4 672.0 N/A
Engines
Orbital 2 20.4 N/A
Maneuvering
Thrusters
RCS Thrusters 26 96.2 N/A
RCS Tanks, I 150.0 N/A
valves and
pipes
RCS Fuel I 550.0 N/A
Totals --- 2064.6
N/A 12,000
N/A 758
N/A 3,563
N/A 1,455
N/A ---
29,525
The telemetry data required by the propulsion system is shown in Table 5.9
TABLE 5.9 Telemetry
Component
Main Engines (x4)
Main Engine Tanks
Telemetry
Temperature
Pressure
Status
Valve Status
LOX Tank Pressure
LOX Tank Temp.
LH2 Tank Pressure
LH2 Tank Temp.
Freq.
# of lines [Hz] Analog/Digital
2 100 A
2 100 A
I 100 D
4 100 D
2 10 A
2 10 A
2 10 A
2 10 A
Command
On/Off
Open/Close
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TABLE 5.9 Telemetry
Component
RCS Engines (x28)
RCS Fuel Tanks (x2)
Telemetry
Temperature
Pressure
Status
Valve Status
MMH Pressure
MMH Temperature
N204 Pressure
N204 Temperature
# of lines
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
Freq.
[Hz]
I00
I00
I00
I00
I0
I0
I0
I0
Analog/Digital
A
A
D
D
A
A
A
A
Command
On/Off
Open/Close
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Thermal Control System
The Thermal subsystem is charged with maintaining all equipment and crew members under desired tempera-
ture ranges during all mission phases throughout the lifetime of Freebird.
6.1 Thermal Control System Requirements
The thermal system must provide thermal control in order to maintain all components within their thermal
operating ranges in all environmental conditions, and maintain the crew in a comfortable temperature range.
Electronics and structure are important in each module. In addition, the crew module must provide a habitable
environment for the crew. Also, the smart box must provide thermal control for the fuel cells. Finally, the pro-
pulsion pack must provide temperature control for the Reaction Control System (RCS) propellant and insula-
tion tor the cryogenic tanks.
To meet the thermal control requirements, the following options were analyzed and their best solution deter-
mined.
• Thermal sources and sinks
• Operating ranges of vehicle components
• Thermal control components and their configuration
° Thermal paths
6.2 Thermal Control System Interfaces
Figure 6.1 represents the functional block diagram of the thermal subsystem. The thermal system interfaces
with the Command, Communication, Control and Telemetry (C3T) system by providing data and receiving
instructions. The thermometers send their readouts to C3T, which in turn sends control signals to the relevant
components of the thermal subsystem, as shown in Figure 6.1. Also, several thermal components requiring
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FIGURE 6.1 Thermal Control System Functional Block Diagram.
power during some phases of a mission depend on that system to provide it. All other interfaces are physical.
That is, the thermal system is responsible for maintaining the other systems within their operating temperature
ranges. Therefore, all other interactions are in the form of heat dissipation. The thermal system design was
affected by other systems' requirements during the design phase.
6.3 Environment
Freebird's thermal control system works to combine heat fluxes from two separate thermal environments: the
external heat flux from the sun and the earth, and the internal heat flux from hardware and crew. The thermal
control system described in Section 6.4 on page 107 works to combine these fluxes and to use or reject the heat
as efficiently as possible.
6.3.1 External Environment
The external environment provides the spacecraft with three major sources of thermal radiation: direct solar
flux, the Earth's albedo, and the Earth's infrared (IR) emissions (see Section !.4.2 on page 29 for a more
detailed description).
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• Direct solar flux is the single largest source of external heat flux to Freebird. As long as Freebird is not
in Earth's shadow, some part of the vehicle will be exposed to this flux. The amount of direct solar flux
absorbed by Freebird is determined by Equation 6. I.
Q_,, = G ,.Ao_ (Equation 6.1)
where G s = solar constant = 1358 +/- 5 W/m 2, A = exposed surface area, and _ = solar absorptivity
=.248.
• Like the direct solar flux, the albedo has no effect on Freebird while it is in shadow. This is the smallest
external source of thermal flux. The amount of solar flux reflected from the Earth and absorbed by Free-
bird is determined by Equation 6.2.
QA = G _aA c_K . sin 2p (Equation 6.2)
where a = albedo = 30% +/- 5% of G s, Ka = a factor which accounts tbr the reflection of collimated
incoming solar energy off a spherical Earth and is defined in Equation 6.3, p = angular radius of Earth,
sinp = RE/(H+RE), R E = radius of Earth = 6378 km, and H = altitude of orbit.
K. = 0.664 + 0.521P - 0.20392
• The flux due to IR radiation absorbed by Freebird is determined by Equation 6.4.
(Equation 6.3)
qt,, = qtsin 2pA c (Equation 6.4)
where qt = Earth's IR emission = 237 W/m 2 and e = IR emissivity =.924.
Table 6.1 gives the values of the external heat fluxes radiated at the positions of the orbits and the amounts
actually absorbed by Freebird, based on the solar absorptivity and IR emissivity of the white epoxy surface
coating (See Section 6.4.1 on page 107).
TABLE 6.1 External Heat Fluxes.
LEO Earthside
(390km) Sunside
GEO
Direct Solar Flux Earth's Albedo Flux Earth Infrared
[W/m 2] [W/m 2] [W/m 2]
available
0
1358
absorbed
0
337
available
360
0
5.19
absorbed
89.5
1.28
available
2 [0
0
4.10
absorbed
194
Ea_hside 0
Sunside 1358 337 0 0 0 0
3.79
From the values in Table 6.1, the worst case hot and cold scenarios are determined. The side of Freebird facing
away from Earth while the vehicle is in shadow could reach 4 K. However, this will not occur due to the tran-
sient effects of orbiting. The side facing the sun out of shadow could get as warm as 283 K, which is cooler
than the room temperature maintained inside the crew module. The greatest temperature differential will prob-
ably be in geosynchronous orbit (GEO) outside of Earth's shadow, where the side facing the Earth would reach
a steady state temperature of 99 K.It is proposed that Freebird periodically rotate to keep the temperatures
more equal.
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6.3.2 Internal Environment
Freebird's internal environment deals with heat flux originating from crew members and various hardware,
including electronics and propellant. The amount of heat flux due to hardware will vary between each of the
three craft modules: propulsion pack, "smartbox", and crew module. This is due to the fact that each module
requires the implementation of different components.
Heat flux resulting from insulation leaks must also be taken into account for each module. The insulation being
used on Freebird is Multi-Layer Insulation (MLI) composed of Aluminized Mylar and Kapton layers (see
Section 6.4.1 on page ! 07). The primary mode of heat transfer through MLI is radiation. Thus, the thermal per-
formance of MLI is described by effective emissivity rather than conductivity. The amount of insulation leak-
age for each of the three modules can be approximated from the following equation:
q = (_ty (_ - T_,,) (Equation 6.5)
where q is the amount of heat transfer through the MLI blanket per square meter, (_ is the Stefan-Boltzmann
constant, _,_ is the effective blanket emissivity, T_ is the absolute temperature of the inside surface in Kelvin,
and T, is the absolute temperature of the outside surface in Kelvin.
The value of the effective emissivity, e,e, is directly related to surface area. Therefore, the effectiveness of MLI
is highly dependent upon the size of the insulated object. Because heat transfer is a function of the inside and
outside temperature differential, the efficiency of MLI will also vary depending on the orientation of the space-
craft (i.e., how much of the surface area is in direct sunlight as opposed to shade). Other factors having an
effect on quantity of insulation leakage are edges, seams, joints, and penetrations such as electrical wires and
structural supports.
One of the predominant sources of heat flux in the internal environment of Freebird's crew module is its crew
members. Each of the three crew members emits heat into the internal environment at all times. The quantity
of this heat flux will vary somewhat depending upon each crew members' level of activity. The amount of heat
flux will range from a minimum of 85 W when a crew member is at a low level of activity, to a maximum of
250 W when he or she is at a high level of activity. This heat flux variation is summarized in Table 6.2. Heat
contributed to the internal environment from crew members will be greatest when Freebird is involved in a res-
cue mission. In this worst case scenario, heat will be dissipated by eight crew members for a probable maxi-
mum total of 1140 Watts.
TABLE 6.2 Human Heat Flux Variation. [2]
Activity Power [Watts]
Sleep 85Minimum
Maximum Exercise 250
Average Light Work 120
Table 6.3 summarizes the heat flux in the crew module due to hardware, crew, and insulation leakage. The total
average amount of power radiated by hardware and three crew members in this module is 526 Watts. The aver-
age heat flux due to insulation leakage from the inside of the crew module towards space, is approximately
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83W as determined by the application of Equation 6.5, with an effective emissivity value based on module
dimensions equal to 0.0042.
TABLE 6.3 Cabin Module Heat Flux
Maximum Heat Flux Average Heat Flux Minimum Heat Flux
[Watts] [Watts] [Watts]
Hardware 56 36 36
Crew 1140 490 120
Insulation -83 -83 -83
Total I 113 443 73
The amount of heat flux in the "smartbox" is determined solely by its hardware and insulation leakage.
Table 6.4 summarizes these values for the base module. The total average heat flux from hardware is 200
Watts. The amount of heat that is rejected due to insulation leakage through the MLI blanket has been deter-
mined from Equation 6.5. Based on structural surface area, the effective emissivity of the base module is
approximately equal to 0.0034. Thus, the average amount of insulation leakage from the base module towards
space is 30 Watts.
TABLE 6.4 Base Module Heat Flux Contributors.
Maximum Heat Flux Average Heat Flux Minimum Heat Flux
[Watts] [Watts] [Watts]
Hardware 798 200 190
Insulation -30 -30 -30
Total 768 170 160
No equipment in Freebird's propulsion module requires heat dissipation. The propulsion system provides its
own cooling. However, the thermal system does provide thermal protection from the external environment in
the form of surface coating and insulation for the entire propulsion pack, including the cryogenic tanks.
6.4 Thermal Control System
The thermal control system is charged with maintaining the spacecraft, its components, and its crew within a
desired temperature range. This is accomplished through the use of a passive system, an active system, or a
combination of both. Passive components include items such as surface coating, insulation, cold plates, and
heat pipes. Active components include heaters, pumped cooling systems, air recycling units, louvres, and vent-
ing systems. Table 6.5 shows acceptable temperature ranges for the different spacecraft components and the
crew.
6.4.1 Passive Thermal Systems
The "smartbox" and propulsion pack will consist mostly of a passive thermal system. Part of the thermal con-
trol system for the crew module and the cryogenic tanks will also be passive.
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TABLE 6.5 Temperature Ranges for Spacecraft Components and Crew[3].
Components
Electronics
Temperature range, °C
0 to 40
Propellant, RCS 7 to 35
Solar Arrays -100 to +100
Structures -45 to +65
Crew 18 to 22
Surface Coating
Surface coating is an essential component of passive thermal control. Using an appropriate coating minimizes
the heat rejection needed. In all instances, surface coatings are picked so that their equilibrium temperature
under exposure to the sun is minimized. Other factors include minimizing weight and cost, and maximizing
durability. Table 6.6 lists different common surface materials, along with their steady state temperature when
exposed to the sun in an orbit around Earth. The external heat flux value used is 1358W/m 2. Even though a
material's absorptivity and emissivity are the same at a single frequency, the solar absorptivity (Ors) and infra-
red emissivity (Eir) can be substantially different since the radiation frequencies are not the same in this case.
Therefore, the lower a material's a s to Eir ratio is, the lower the equilibrium temperature becomes.
TABLE 6.6 Radiation Properties of Various Materials[3].
Material
Aluminum
Solar
Absorptivity
.2
Infrared
Emissivity
.034
Absorptivity to
Emissivity Ratio
5.88
Equilibrium
Temperature (°K)
613
Steel .357 .135 2.64 503
Titanium .766 .513 1.49 435
Gold .299 .023 13.00 747
Black Paint .975 .874 1. i 2 404
White Epoxy .248 .924 .27 283
Aluminized Teflon .163 .8 .20 264
OSR .077 .79 .10 220
The three materials considered were White Epoxy, Aluminized Teflon, and Optical Solar Reflectors (OSR) due
to their low steady state temperatures. Aluminized Teflon was discarded due to its mass and OSR was found to
be fragile and costly. Therefore, White Epoxy was chosen as the coating material for the spacecraft. The equi-
librium temperature of White Epoxy is close to the room temperature that will be maintained inside the crew
module. Therefore, the small temperature differential combined with the Multi-Layer Insulation (MLI) will
result in minimal heat transfer across the spacecraft walls (See Section 6.3.2 on page 106). It is important to
note that this analysis assumes steady state exposure to the maximum external heat flux. During times in an
orbit when the Sun is eclipsed by the Earth, the surface temperature of the spacecraft can be significantly less
than the room temperature found on the inside wall. Insulation is very effective, but some heat leakage out of
the vehicle will nonetheless be present. In order to compensate, the radiators will provide for less heat rejection
by use of active devices called louvres. This design to be an easier design to cold-bias the spacecraft in this
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manner, than to provide for extra heat rejection methods during periods in the orbit when the vehicle is
exposed to the sun.
Multi-Layer Insulation
Multi-layer blankets are another essential component of a passive thermal system. As previously discussed,
during nocturnal periods of the orbit. The spacecraft's insulation will minimize the heat loss from the inside of
the vehicle to the colder outside wall. Also, when the spacecraft is exposed to the Sun there will undoubtedly
be non-uniform temperature surface areas on the outside wall. Insulation will prevent the same temperature
differentials from existing on the inner walls. If insulation were not present, an astronaut could lean against the
inside wall and be burned Only a few feet away the inside wall temperature would have been equal to the room
temperature. Similar problems can cause electronic equipment mounted on the inside wall to Jail.
Two commonly used MLI's are Aluminized Mylar layers and Kapton layers. In both cases, the layers are sepa-
rated by a thin net, usually made of nylon bridal veil. This net prevents thermal conduction, leaving thermal
radiation as the only method to transfer heat through the insulation. The Aluminized Mylar is a stronger mate-
rial than Kapton, but is more dense. Since the structural strength needed for the vehicle has been achieved
through other means, the Kapton MLI was chosen due to its lower density, resulting in a lower total mass. The
particular Kapton MLI being used on all modules is available from the Sheldahl Corporation, and a diagram of
it is provided on Figure 6.2. The Teflon coated glass cloth layer is placed towards the outside of the spacecraft.
Teflon coated glass cloth
3 mil. aluminized
Kapton with
acrylic overcoat
0.3 mil. double _///_'_'//_//Z_ Nylon netting
aluminized Kapton _ (10 layers)
with acrylic overcoat _.
(9 lay ers) _ _JJJJJJJJfJJJJJJfJ_//_
Nomex reinforced double "---'-'!_ "_
aluminized 0.5 mil. Kapton
with acrylic overcoat
FIGURE 6.2 Kapton Multi-Layer Insulation from the Sheldahl Corporation[6].
The same MLI is being used for the crew module, "smartbox", propulsion pack, a:nd cryogenic tanks. Since
MLI also has advantages in non-thermal related fields, the thickness of the MLI was determined in conjunction
with the structures system based upon both the amount needed for debris shielding and thermal insulation. For
this design, the thickness required by the structures system exceeds that required by the thermal system, and
therefore the limiting thickness is not discussed here. The exceptions to this are the cryogenic tanks, which
require more extensive thermal insulation, since the propellant temperatures must be kept low. No active cool-
ing system will be provided in addition to the venting system. The goal of this design has been to prevent vent-
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ing of more than 5% of the liquid propellant during on-orbit storage of up to ninety days. Figure 6.3 shows a
plot of percentage boiloff as a function of the MLI thickness. The experimental data shown can be extrapolated
to reach the conclusion that at least 10 cm of MLI will be needed for the cryogenic tanks.
Total Percent Boiloff vs. Stay Time
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FIGURI:: 6.3 Total Percent Boiloff Versus Stay Time[5].
Another use for MLI is to isolate the fuel cells due to their sensitive thermal nature. While most electrical
equipment can have its heat passively dissipated, fuel cells require more careful monitoring, and therefore are
cold-biased and insulated.
Phase Change Devices
Heat rejection from electrical components is achieved by the use of phase change devices, cold plates, heat
pipes, and radiators. This applies to all modules, except for the crew module, where an active thermal system
will also be implemented.
A phase change device is used for equipment that has short bursts of high power. Phase change devices absorb
thermal energy through a solid/liquid phase change, and then slowly solidify again, transferring their heat onto
a cold plate. Phase change devices are not used for all electrical components, but rather those having erratic
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power behaviors, in an attempt to keep a constant heat flux flowing towards the radiator. Therefore phase
change devices are usually required for only a few components.
Cold Plates
A cold plate can be manufactured for use with either passive or active thermal systems. In the passive case, the
cold plate is a highly heat conductive mounting plate for electrical components such that they easily dissipate
their heat onto the plate. From there, the heat travels through heat pipes to the radiator, where it is radiated into
space. In the case of electrical devices with erratic heat output, the phase change devices serve as the mounting
platform and are attached to the cold plate at the opposite end (See Figure 6.4). From there, the heat pipes carry
the heat to the radiator as before.
Heat Pipe
I Cold Plate I
Phase Change
Device
Radiator
Electrical JEquipment
Louvres
FIGURE 6.4 Passive Thermal System Configuration for Heat Dissipation of an Electrical Component[3].
In the active thermal control case the cold plate functions in the same manner as in the passive case, but is con-
figured with fluid passages. Fluid is circulated through the cold plate and transports the waste heat to the radia-
tor. This active system does not make use of heat pipes (See Section 6.4.2 on page 112).
Heat Pipes
Heat pipes are devices with very high thermal conductivities. In the longitudinal direction, they are made up of
an evaporator section and a condenser section. A further adiabatic section can be included to separate the evap-
orator and condenser section, if the length of the heat pipe must be increased. The cross-section of the heat
pipe consists of a container wall, a wick structure, and the vapor space (see Figure 6.5).
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FIGURE 6.5 The Mahl Regions of a Heat Pipel4].
The substance inside the heat pipe is transformed into a gas in the evaporator. This gas, carrying the newly
acquired heat, flows down the middle of the heat pipe to the opposite end, where the heat is transferred from
the pipe to the radiator. This condensation stage occurs in the wicking material. Capillary forces then draw the
fluid from the condenser end to the evaporator end of the heat pipe, and the process begins again.
The heat pipes being used are available from Hughes Aircraft Corporation, Space and Missile Group. They
have diameters of 1.27 cm and can transfer heat at 5080 Watt*cm (e.g., the heat pipes can transfer 508 Watts
over a distance of 10 cm). Therefore, multiplying the heat dissipation needed by a component times the length
of a heat pipe needed to reach the radiator helps determine the number of heat pipes needed per component.
Table 6.7 lists the number of phase change devices, cold plates, and centimeters of heat pipe needed for the
crew module and base unit.
TABLE 6.7 Heat Transfer Devices
Module # of Phase Change Devices
none
# of Cold Plates
7Crew Module
Base Unit 1 11 1,800
Length of Piping (Cm)
0
6.4.2 Active Thermal Systems
Active Thermal Systems are used in situations that require precise temperature control (small temperature
variations). A prime example of this is the crew module. Humans do not take well to temperature variations of
more than a few degrees centigrade. However, most electrical equipment can withstand variations of up to
40°C. Also, humans have greater heat dissipation than most equipment. As stated in Section 6.3.2 on page 106,
a nominal crew of three will put out 490 Watts, whereas all the equipment within the crew pod will only put
out 36 Watts under average conditions. The number of heat pipes necessary to carry so much heat flux can be
extensive. An active system can carry such heat loads with much greater efficiency. These two factors were the
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drivers for using an active system for the crew module where more power dissipation is required. This active
system consists of a pumped coolant heat transfer device and an air recycling unit.
Other active components include heaters, louvres, and thermal venting systems. Heaters are found in all mod-
ules, and are used in RCS tanks and line heating, and radiator heating, all of which have stricter thermal oper-
ating ranges than the average electrical component. Louvres are mechanical devices used to maximize or
minimize the efficiency of the radiator as appropriate. The thermal venting system is used for cryogenic tanks,
keeping the pressure at appropriate levels for the propellant to remain in its liquid state (see Section 5.3.3 on
page 94).
Heaters
The radiators will each need a thermostat and a heater. The radiator heater must provide 45 Watts in a worst
case scenario in the crew module (See Section 6.4.3 on page 116). There will be two such heaters for each
crew module radiator, one of which is for redundancy. The base unit will have a single heater on each radiator,
but they will not be used during nominal missions. The louvres, discussed later in this section, are sufficient to
maintain the radiators within their operating temperatures at all times for the base unit. A heater is nonetheless
placed on each base unit radiator as a redundancy procedure for two reasons. First if Freebird must operate at
very low powers, so that the minimum heat dissipated is even less than shown on Table 6.4 on page 107, the
louvres may no longer be sufficient to maintain the radiators within their operational range, and heaters will be
needed. Another possible emergency, such as a failure of the louvre mechanical system, might cause the lou-
vres to become stuck in the open position, and therefore heaters would again be needed. Second, while Free-
bird is in the Vehicle Storage Facility (VSF) and is on stand-by mode, the heat dissipated will again be less
than that shown on Table 6.4 on page 107. Heaters will receive power directly from the VSF to prevent Free-
bird from reaching low temperatures.
During mission operation, the thermometers will trigger C3T to command the heaters to turn on and off so that
the radiator is maintained at the appropriate temperature.
Pumped Coolant Heat Transfer Mechanism
Three conduction mechanisms have been considered to carry heat from equipment and the crew cabin to the
radiators. The first are heat pipes. As discussed previously, this is a passive thermal component that is limited
in two ways. Heat pipes cannot be used to accurately maintain a desired temperature within a small variation
range, and they are limited as to the amount of heat rejection they can put out due to the restrictions on pipe
length. The longer the heat pipe is, the smaller is the amount of heat that can be dissipated. In many instances,
the equipment that requires heat dissipation cannot be placed near a radiator. The amount of heat piping then
required increases rapidly due to having longer heat pipes that carry less power. Active pumped systems have
no such constraints on length.
There are two active pumped systems that were considered. The first is a single phase active heat transport sys-
tem. This system requires a pump, which is relatively unreliable as compared to a passive system using heat
pipes. Unfortunately, this is unavoidable, considering that all active systems will require pumps. In an active
system, the piping of the pumped fluids runs through the mounted cold plates to increase the performance of
the cooling system. Another disadvantage in a single phase fluid active system is that a large temperature dif-
ferential is required to accomplish a substantial heat transfer between the equipment and the pumped fluid.
Since the radiator temperature needs to be even lower than the pumped fluid temperature, a large radiator will
be needed for such a system. The heat flux is the same, but from Equation 6.6 it becomes evident that for a
constant heat flux, as the radiator temperature goes down, the radiator area must increase. Considering the
competition for surface area space among the subsystems, reducing radiator area by using another thermal con-
trol system becomes very desirable.
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The two phase heat transport system acts much like a heat pipe, but since it is an actively pumped system, it
does not have all of the restrictions in pipe length or broad temperature control ranges found in heat pipes.
Also, since the pumped fluid has two phases, no large temperature differential is needed. The result is a near
isothermal (thus allowing a smaller radiator), lower mass flow, and lower specific weight thermal control sys-
tem. This system incorporates the best of both previously discussed options. The only disadvantages are the
requirement of having a pump, which is unavoidable, and the fact that a two phase heat transport system is a
relatively new technology. However, the technology necessary is not complicated, nor does it incorporate any
new principles. This is the heat transport device that has been chosen for Freebird.
The two phase heat transport system, much like the single phase one, runs its piping directly through the cold
plates onto which heat dissipating equipment is mounted. Also, piping is run through a heat exchanger that col-
lects waste heat from the air recycling unit (The air recycling unit is discussed later in this section). At each
such junction, the pipes are selected such that the mass flow through them is the necessary amount to change
phase due to the particular heat dissipated by the component in the path. Not every component has a constant
output of heat. However, the mass flow though the pipes must be sufficient to handle the worst case (highest
heat dissipation needed) for any component on its path. If a component is extremely erratic in its heat output
pattern, it is attached to a phase change device that smooths out the power dissipation as a function of tirne
(Section 6.4. I on page 107). After acquiring heat from the cabin and equipment, the fluid has been evaporated.
It travels to a condenser, where the fluid is forced into another phase change, returning it to a liquid by remov-
ing the waste heat. The fluid then passes through a subcooler which ensures that the fluid has been completely
condensed. Both the condenser and the subcooler are connected to the radiator, which radiates the waste heat
into space. The coolant fluid being used is Freon. The two phase heat transport process is illustrated in
Figure 6.6.
Cabin Thermal System [7]
The cabin thermal control system consists of an air recycling unit, whose components include fans, ducts, a
heat exchanger, and an atmosphere control subsystem. There are two fans which circulate the air through the
ducts. One is always in stand-by mode for redundancy purposes.
The recirculated cabin air goes through a heat exchanger where its heat is dissipated. From the heat exchanger,
waste heat is transferred to the active thermal control system via the pumped fluid, which is then transferred to
the radiator,
The heat exchanger is a dual purpose device. In addition to cooling the recycled air, humidity is reduced. The
resulting condensed moisture is transported by diverting a portion of the air flow through holes in the con-
denser (which acts like a vacuum cleaner) to a rotary water separator where it is removed. The cooled air is
returned to the cabin and the condensed water is stored in a waste water tank.
The atmosphere control subsystem does not regulate the temperature ranges of any component on board Free-
bird, and therefore is not a thermal system. Nonetheless, the subsystem is part of the air recycling unit, and
therefore is included in this section. It includes a debris trap that removes objects, such as pieces of thread, bits
of paper, spilled liquid, or food waste. It also includes lithium hydroxide canisters that absorb carbon dioxide,
and charcoal canisters that remove odors. The entire air flow passes through the debris trap, but only 10% is
deflected through the canisters.
Louvres
Louvres are positioned above the radiator surface. They can vary in angle from normal to parallel with respect
to the radiator surface. When parallel, the louvres are said to be closed. The louvres resemble Venetian blinds,
and when closed, they greatly lower the effective emissivity of the radiators. They are used in nighttime condi-
tions, when full radiator emissions are not necessary. When the spacecraft is hidden from the Sun behind the
Earth, the only external heat flux is due to the Earth's infrared emissions. Under these conditions, it becomes
necessary to warm the radiators with heaters in order to prevent the radiator temperature from dropping below
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FIGURE 6.6 Two Phase Heat Transport System [3].
the lower limit levels. With the louvres closed, the radiator will emit less heat, and therefore, the temperature
will not drop as much. Louvres can greatly reduce the thermal power consumption by lowering the power out-
put needed from radiator heaters. The spacecraft has a set of louvres over each radiator. The louvre configura-
tion can be seen on Figure 6.6.
In order for louvres to be effective, they need to have low emissivities. This way, when the spacecraft finds
itself in the shade, the temperature of the louvres will not decrease dramatically. On the other hand, while the
spacecraft is in full view of the sun, if the louvres are accidently exposed to by the sun, the resulting tempera-
tures can be very large. These large louvre temperatures can cause structural damage to the louvres themselves
through thermal expansion, and also reduce the emissivity of the radiator when it needs it most, in the day side
of the orbit.
A solution to this problem that has been used in the past involves coating the louvres with white epoxy. The
result is that the temperature of the louvres does not exceed the equilibrium temperature of white epoxy under
solar heat flux conditions (Table 6.6 on page 108). However, when the spacecraft finds itself in the shadow side
of the orbit, and the white epoxy is used, the emissivity that results by closing the louvres is not much lower
than that if no louvres were present at all.
The proposed solution for Freebird is to use an innovative concept for a louvre. The idea is to design a double
louvre with two thin plates of Aluminum on top of each other, sandwiching Alumized Kapton MLI in the mid-
dle. In addition, one of the sides of the louvres would be coated with white epoxy. The concept is that the white
epoxy would prevent large temperatures from occurring during daylight portions of the orbit. However, when
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Freebird reaches the nocturnal portions of the orbit, the closed louvres would not retain the large emissivity
due to the protective multi-layer insulation.
Aluminum louvres have shown a reduction in thermal emissivity of up to two thirds of the radiator's nominal
capacity. When coated with white epoxy, the louvres achieve a reduction in thermal emissivity of only 20%.
Using a MLI double plated louvre is estimated to reduce the emissivity by 56%. Since the nominal emissivity
of Aluminized Teflon, the radiator material of Freebird, is 0.8, the emissivity with the louvres closed will
become 0.35.
The louvres are moved by mechanical motors. Two such motors will be present at each radiator for redundancy
purposes. The motor on stand-by mode will be slightly more powerful than the nominal operations one. The
purpose for this is to prevent the first motor from failing while at the same time inhibiting the second one from
taking over the function.
6.4.3
TABLE 6.8
Radiators
The radiators are the only means for the spacecraft to dissipate heat. Three considerations go into material
selection for a radiator. The radiators must have high thermal conductivity, such that heat will be quickly trans-
ferred from the heat pipes. The radiators must also have low absorptivities, such that the heat flux from the Sun
or Earth to the radiators will be minimized. Finally, radiators must have high emissivities, such tbat heat can be
quickly radiated into space. Some materials, such as white epoxy, have low absorptivities and high emissivi-
ties, but do not conduct heat well. Other materials, such as most metals, conduct heat very well, but have very
poor emissivity to absorptivity ratios. Aluminized Teflon is a popular and good material selection candidate. It
meets the above three constraints and therefore has been chosen as the radiator material. Radiation properties
for Aluminized Teflon can be found on Table 6.6 on page 108.
The crew module and base unit will each have two radiators. The total radiator area must be such that it is
capable of dissipating the maximum amount of heat required. Table 6.8 shows a step by step analysis detailing
how the radiator size was determined for the crew module. Table 6.9 does the same for the base unit. The fol-
lowing steps were followed:
Crew Module Radiator Sizing
No.
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
Item Value
Maximum Power Dissipation 1113 Watts
Minimum Power Dissipation 73 Watts
Radiator Temperature 285 K
Combined Radiator Area 9.12 m 2
t of Radiators with Louvres Closed 0.35
Low End Radiator Temperature 282 K
Heater Power to Radiators 45 Watts
I. The maximum power dissipation which the radiator must provide is shown (See Section 6.3.2 on
page 106).
2. The minimum power dissipation needed is shown (See Section 6.3.2 on page 106).
3. The radiator temperature is the temperature at which the radiator must be maintained such that it can
take heat from the components that require heat dissipation while maintaining the equipment within its
operating range (See Table 6.5 on page 108). This temperature must be lower than the equipment tern-
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TABLE 6.9
No.
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
Base Unit Radiator Sizing
Item
Maximum Power Dissipation
Minimum Power Dissipation
Radiator Temperature
Combined Radiator Area
E of Radiators with Louvres Closed
Low End Radiator Temperature
Heater Power to Radiators
Value
768 Watts
160 Watts
285 K
6.30 m 2
0.35
292 K
None
4.
perature in order for heat to be transferred to the radiator. On the other hand, if the radiator temperature
is too low, the equipment runs the risk of going below its minimum temperature limit. Therefore, the
radiator temperature was picked such that it is 5°C above the minimum acceptable temperature of the
component having the highest minimum temperature. Therefore, the radiators will be maintained at
12°C since the highest minimum temperature is that required by the RCS propellant, 7°C. The crew is
not considered amongst the components for which the radiator must be at least 5°C above the minimum
operating temperature, because the crew has its own temperature control through the use of the air recy-
cling unit. This unit can be simply shut off, and therefore the crew does not at any time run the risk of
having the cabin drop temperature to undesirable levels.
The radiator area is obtained based on worst case hot conditions. It assumes that the radiator is facing
Earth in LEO with its louvres fully opened. The external heat flux to the radiator is the sum of the
Earth's albedo and the Earth's infrared emissions. The internal heat flux is the maximum power dissipa-
tion that the radiator must provide for, obtained from Part 1. Using the radiator temperature (T), the
above heat fluxes (both internal and external), and Table 6.6 on page 108 to obtain values for the solar
absorptivity ((z s) and infra-red emissivity (£ir) of Aluminized Teflon, solving Equation 6.6 gives a
value for the radiator area (A r) for a given internal heat flux to be dissipated (Q). In this case, Q is the
maximum heat flux that the radiator will need to dissipate. The first two terms of the equation on the left
hand side can be traced back to Equation 6.4 and Equation 6.2 of Section 6.3.1 on page 104. o" is the
Stefan-Boltzmann constant, 5.67 X 10-8 Wm2K 4.
qtsin2pArEi, + G,aA,oc sin2p + Q = cyeirA T4 (Equation 6.6)
5. The radiator's emissivity changes depending on the louvres' position. When minimum heat dissipation
is required and the spacecraft is in nighttime conditions, the radiator temperature can drop substantially.
Therefore, louvres are used to minimize the radiator's emissivity and raise its temperature. The radia-
tor's emissivity with the louvres closed is 0.35 (See Section 6.4.2 on page 112).
6. Solving Equation 6.6 with Q as the minimum power dissipation value and G s equal to zero gives the
resulting temperature that would occur if no heater was used to maintain the radiator at its minimum
acceptable temperature during nighttime conditions. The emissivity used was that calculated in Part 5.
7. Heater power input to radiator needed to raise the temperature from the value found in Part 6 to the one
determined in Part 3 is determined.
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6.5 Failure Modes
TABLE 6.10 Failure Modes
Component
Coolant
Pump
Failure Mode
Mechanical failure
Effect
Complete failure of
crew module
thermal system
Prevention or
Response
Full redundancy
Criticality
Air recycling
unit
Heaters
Heat Pipes
Mechanical failure
Mechanical failure or
power loss
Excessive deformation
Loss of heat
rejection from
crew cabin
Loss of
temperature
control on RCS
propellant
Failure to maintain
radiator at
minimum
allowable
temperature
Possible failure of
a critical
component
Partial redundancy
Full redundancy
Full redundancy
Full heat
dissipation
redundancy for all
critical
components
Crewed
Config. Teleop.
1 N/A
1 N/A
1 2
! 2
1 2
The thermal control system failure modes are listed in Table 6.10. All critical components are listed with their
major failure modes, the effect of failure, the risk associated with each failure, and the measures taken to pre-
vent such a failure. For a crewed configuration, all system failures are vehicle and crew critical (criticality rat-
ing of I ). In response, all critical components are fully redundant, except for the air recycling unit, which has
internal redundancies on its less reliable parts. In teleoperated configuration failure of the coolant pump and air
recycling unit are not relevant since the crew module isn't part of a teleoperated mission. All other failures in
this configuration are vehicle critical (criticality rating of 2), so full redundancy is required for teleoperation as
well.
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6.6 Summary Budgets
TABLE 6.11 Summary Budgets - Crew Module
Component #
Radiator 2
Insulation 40%
Cold plates 7
Coolant pump 2
Coolant piping 100%
Air recycling unit 1
Radiator heaters 4
Louvres 20
Louvre mechanical system 4
Thermometers 12
Thermal System Total
TABLE 6.12 Summary Budgets- Base Unit
Component
Radiator
Insulation
Cold plates
Phase change devices
Heat pipes
Radiator heaters
RCS propellant heaters
Louvres
Louvre mechanical system
Thermometers
Thermal System Total
#
2
60%
11
I
100%
2
64
20
4
18
Mass
[kg]
Avg. Power
[Watts]
Peak Power
[Watts]
Mass
[kg]
0 0 0
2.2 0 0
3.75 0 0
4 35 50
10 0 0
35 50 75
.4 0 45
2 0 0
8 0 10
0 0 0
65.35 85 180
3.3
5.75
15
.2
6.4
2
42.65
Cost
[$1
0
42,000
54,000
78,000
194,000
679,000
5,000
39,000
155,000
1,000
1,247,000
Avg. Power
[Watts]
0
0
0
0
0
0
32
0
0
0
48
10
Peak Power
[Watts]
Cost
[$]
0
63,000
83,000
29,000
218,000
3,000
85,000
39,000
155,000
1,500
32 58 676,500
6.6.1 Mass Budget
The thermal system mass budget is itemized in Table 6.11 for the crew module and in Table 6.12 for the base
unit. The total system mass is broken down according to components. The mass budget drivers are the air recy-
cling unit for the crew module, and the heat pipes for the base unit. The radiators would be expected to be a
mass driver, but the actual radiator mass is accounted for in the structures system budget. The only mass asso-
ciated with the radiators accounted for by the thermal system is the mass of the surface coating on them, which
is negligible. The total mass of the thermal system of all modules is 108 kg.
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TABLE
Power Budget
The thermal system power budget is itemized in Table 6.11 for the crew module and in Table 6.12 for the base
unit. The thermal system power requirements are broken down by component, and average and peak power
requirements are given for each. At average and peak power the coolant pump and air recycling unit are the
power drivers, accounting for 100% of average power and 69% of peak power consumption. Aside from occa-
sional use of the louvre mechanical system, the RCS propellant heaters are the only power consuming compo-
nents in the base unit, since all others are either passive, or have only been placed there for redundancy
purposes. An example of such a redundancy are the radiator heaters in the base unit, which are back-ups for the
louvre mechanical system. The louvre mechanical system is used intermittently tot small adjustments and
requires little power even at peak power.
Cost Budget
The thermal system cost budget is itemized in Table 6.11 for the crew module and in Table 6.12 for the base
unit. It details the quantity of each component used by the system and the total cost of each set of components.
These costs are hardware costs only. The major cost drivers for the crew module are the louvre mechanical sys-
tem and air recycling unit, which together account for 54% of the total module cost. The major cost drivers for
the base unit are the louvre mechanical systems and the heat pipes, which account for 55% of the base unit
cost. Also, important cost consideration must be given to the louvres which will involve some research costs
due to their new design presented earlier. Research costs are not reflected in the numbers given on the tables.
Finally, it is interesting to note that the radiator cost is also negligeable. Just as in the mass budget section, the
cost of the radiator is included in the structures system's budget. The extent of the radiator's cost as relevant to
the thermal system is simply the cost of the surface coating (Aluminized Teflon). Due to relatively small radia-
tor areas, the cost of the coating becomes insignificant. The total cost of the thermal system of all modules is
$1,923,500.
Telemetry Budget
The thermal system telemetry budget is shown in Table 6.13. The larger amount of telemetry data is in the
tbrm of temperature readings. The only commands provided are to louvre mechanical systems to orient the
louvre angles, and to heaters to turn them on and off. The air recycling unit pump has a commanded rate of
mass flow that it allows to pass through. This is determined by the crew cabin astronauts who set the thermo-
stat at whichever value they wish.
6.13 Telemetry
Component Telemetry
Smart Box Thermometers Temperature
Smart Box Louvres Louvre Angle
Smart Box Radiator Heaters Status
RCS Heaters Status
Thermometers Temperature
Louvres Louvre Angle
Radiator Heaters Status
Thermostat Temperature
# of Freq.
lines [Hz]
18 1
4 1
2 I
64 I
12 1
4 1
4 1
I 1
Analog/
Digital Command
A
A Commanded Angle
D On/Off
D On/Off
A
A Commanded Angle
D On/Off
A
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TABLE 6.13 Telemetry
Component
Air Recycling Unit Pump
Telemetry
Mass Flow
Status
Freon Coolant Temperature
Active Coolant System Status
Pump
# of Freq. Analog/
lines [Hz] Digital
2 I A
1 I D
2 1 A
2 1 D
Command
Commanded Rate
Freebird operates in an environment of great temperature extremes. To effectively maintain operating tempera-
tures of all Freebird systems, the thermal control system utilizes several key technologies. White epoxy surface
coating is used on all exposed vehicle surfaces to maintain an appropriate surface temperature. Multi-layer
Aluminum Kapton insulation is used to insulate all vehicle modules. An active thermal system is used to main-
tain the crew module operating environment. Passive thermal systems and components are used in the other
modules. A louvre system is used to regulate the radiators' emissivities.
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Guidance, Navigation, and Control System
The tbllowing is an explanation of the terminology used for Project Freebird with respect to the Guidance,
Navigation, and Control (GNC) system. Attitude determination and navigation have been treated as two sepa-
rate components of GNC, although the two are highly coupled. Attitude determination means, just as its name
implies, the determination of the vehicle's attitude and navigation is used to mean orbit determination. Guid-
ance is used to mean orbit control and control is used as a shortened form of attitude control system.
In further detail, the attitude determination and control system (ADCS) stabilizes the vehicle and orients it in
the desired directions during the mission despite disturbance torques acting on it. In order to do this the vehicle
must determine its attitude using sensors and control it using actuators. Navigation refers to the collection of
data and its reduction to determine the current orbital position and velocity of the vehicle. Lastly, guidance
refers to the action of adjusting the vehicle's orbit to meet some predetermined conditions. [1]
7.1 GNC Requirements
The GNC system requirements were determined from the overall system requirements and accuracies were
specified in order to quantify these requirements. These requirements and accuracies provided the basis for this
design study and were used to make informed trade studies and appropriate hardware choices tbr the system.
For Freebird to achieve its overall mission objectives, the GNC system must:
• Determine absolute position to within lkm in LEO and 50km in GEO
• Determine relative position to within 0.005m
• Control relative position to within 0.01m
• Determine velocity to within 0.003m/s
• Control velocity to within 0.01m/s
• Determine attitude to within 0.1 *
• Control attitude to within 0.5 °
• Provide a system reliability of 0.999
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The absolute position requirements are given as the accuracies achievable by ground station tracking. With full
autonomous capability, Freebird should be able to determine its position with an accuracy at least as good as
ground tracking or better. The relative position accuracies come from NASA docking requirements with ISSA,
and are thus used to dictate the accuracies required for Freebird to rendezvous and dock with any asset. The
vehicle velocity accuracies are derived from the Space Shuttle maneuverability numbers. Lastly, the attitude
accuracies are dictated by the requirements for pointing purposes, such as antenna and thermal pointing
maneuvers.
7.2 GNC Interfaces
The following is a discussion of the internal and external interfaces of the GNC system.
7.2.1 Functional Block Diagram
The internal interfaces are shown in Figure 7. I. The Dual Cone Scanners (DES) gather information on attitude
and altitude of the vehicle and the Miniature Inertial Measurement Unit (MIMU) gathers information on the
rotation and translation of the vehicle. This information is utilized by the Microcosm Autonomous Navigation
System (MANS) to determine the orbital position and velocity of the vehicle. This information is passed to the
control algorithms, which then compare the current state vector to the desired state vector given by C3T and
computes the necessary control steps to achieve the desired one. This information is then passed on to the pro-
pulsion system, either the Reaction Control System (RCS) or the main engines, through the C3T command
subsystem.
Information is also obtained by components during the rendezvous, docking, and proximity operations phases.
These components include a Rendezvous Radar, a Laser Navigation Sensor (LNS), and a star tracker which
gather navigation information to be utilized by the Microcosm Autonomous Planning System (MAPS) and the
control software. The same process as described above is carried out to issue control commands.
The reasons for the choices of components listed above and how they work will be discussed in further detail
in the following sections.
7.2.2 External Interfaces
Since the GNC system is critical for every mission, it comprises part of the "smartbox". Due to the nature of
the system, there are many interfaces with other systems. Figure 7.1 also diagrams these external interfaces.
One of the more important interfaces is with the C3T system. C3T handles all the commands of the vehicle and
therefore either originates or relays commands for the GNC system. For example, for a piloted mission, the
pilot becomes part of the control loop and issues the command to do a maneuver. This command routes
through C3T and is then passed on to the GNC system. This is an example of an indirect interface with the
ECLSS system which provides the human interface for the pilot. Another instance would be with the Thermal
system. It may need to rotate the vehicle for thermal purposes and thus sends the command to C3T which is
then passed on to GNC as a command to maneuver. Other issues involved with C3T involve antenna pointing
and rendezvous maneuvers.
The interlace with the Power and Propulsion system is twofold. The power portion does just that, provide
power to the GNC system. The propulsion system implements the control needed for the vehicle, as deter-
mined by GNC, using both RCS and the main engines.
The direct interface with the Thermal system involves only the physical dissipation of heat produced by the
GNC system.
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FIGURE 7.1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Functional Block Diagram.
The interface with the Structures system involves the physical aspect of having the system attached to the
structure of the vehicle itself. There is also an interface with the mechanisms involving the Remote Manipula-
tor System (RMS) and the Common Berthing Adaptor (CBA). These interfaces are somewhat indirect in that
in order for the implementation of these mechanisms to occur the orientation of the vehicle must be known and
communicated to the Structures system.
7.3 Design Considerations
Several preliminary trade studies were made before approaching the design of the GNC system. It was deter-
mined that the following guidelines would be followed for the design phase of the system:
• use components available over entire mission envelope (including GEO)
° maximize autonomy
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• minimize contamination and thruster plume loads
• be reconfigurable / adaptable
• maximize degrees of freedom
Component Availability Over Entire Mission Envelope
The issue of availability of components over the entire mission envelope was first and foremost to be
addressed. Since one of the mission objectives of the vehicle involves operating in GEO, it was decided that
usability in GEO was a major selection criterion for all GNC components in order to simplify the system and
to avoid carrying deadweight. This for example, eliminated the use of the Global Positioning System (GPS) as
a navigation tool, due its unavailability in GEO. [1]
Level of Autonomy
The desired level of autonomy of the GNC subsystem was another major design driver. Currently, it is com-
mon to have an autonomous ADCS. However, navigation and guidance are typically ground based with few
available autonomous navigation or guidance systems. Autonomous navigation refers to the ability to deter-
mine position and velocity on-board the spacecraft, independent of ground stations. Navigation, attitude deter-
mination and attitude control are computation intensive and make up much of the ground support processing
work load. Thus if the spacecraft had the capability to be autonomous, it would reduce the manpower and work
load of the ground station operators, which reduces the operations costs considerably. Also, considering the
vehicle will carry out missions both with crew and remotely for a lifetime of ten years, it would be ideal to
have the capabilities of an autonomous vehicle. Therefore it was determined to maximize autonomy, while
maintaining the capability to communicate with ground stations. [2]
Another aspect of autonomy deals with the level of reliance on humans in the loop. The issue of automatic or
manual control is a very important one. With manual control, the pilot becomes part of the control loop, where
the human eye is the primary "sensor" and the human brain is the primary "processor." The advantages of
using manual control involve a shorter development time for secondary sensors and processors and certifica-
tion, the flexibility and excellence of the human brain to react to anomalous situations, and the simplicity of
this type of system. The disadvantage of a manual system is that it limits the general capabilities of the GNC
system. While the human brain is flexible, it is not as accurate and not as timely as an autonomous system.
Another limitation exists in the timing of maneuvers, i.e. a human pilot often requires daylight to do maneu-
vers and thus limits many aspects of the missions.
An autonomous control system has the advantages of being able to accurately predict orbital motion, being
fully capable at any point during the mission without any down time, and being able to operate without
humans on board. However, the development time involved with this type of system may be longer than a
manual system, as well as possibly weighing, costing, and being larger than the manual system. Again since a
mission scenario for the vehicle is to operate without a crew, it is preferable to have as fully autonomous a sys-
tem as possible in order to reduce necessary teleoperating. However, for the manned missions, the capability
exists to include the pilot in the control loop and override the system if necessary. [3]
Contamination and Thruster Plume Load Issues
The issues of contamination and plume loads from the control thrusters and main engines was also of primary
importance to the design of the system. The effects of plume impingement loading and contamination of sensi-
tive equipment and hardware on satellites and ISSA, and impingement on astronauts both out on EVA and in
the crew module were looked at. It was discovered that the driving factor for proximity operations was the
plume load issue and not the contamination, although the contamination still had an effect when dealing with
the astronauts on EVA. Since the plume load issue was a major one it was decided to minimize the contamina-
tion and loads due to the thrusters. This decision affected the placement of the reaction control thrusters, which
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is discussed in Section 7.7.2 on page 143, as well as the proximity operations strategies discussed further in
Section 7.4.5 on page 131.
ReconfigurabilitylAdaptability
Freebird is quite an extensive vehicle in terms of missions and functions. Therefore, the vehicle system level
decision to use a modular design poses many challenges with respect to the GNC system. A certain level of
reliability is of course a primary requirement and in order to meet this requirement, a subsystem should be
reconfigurable in the event of a failure. A robust GNC system would adapt to failures by reconfiguring the con-
trol algorithms to account for the failed systems by optimizing the command functions for the remaining actu-
ators. In this report, reconfigurable involves reacting to changes within the control system, whereas adaptable
means reacting to changes outside the control system, such as mass configurations. An adaptable system esti-
mates vehicle parameters from data given by sensors, as opposed to a system which is given these parameters
from an outside database. These parameters include inertial properties, such as center of mass location and
moments of inertia. This adds to the robustness of the system and allows for a level of autonomy when the
vehicle configuration is changed, such as when carrying a satellite or adding additional fuel tanks. It was
decided that Freebird be both reconfigurable and adaptable due to the varied nature of its missions and config-
uration.
Degrees of Freedom
A further effect of the robust nature of Freebird and its wide range of missions is that it must have the ability to
maneuver in an accurate and flexible manner. Rendezvous and docking with an object, as well as proximity
operations require a system with as many degrees of freedom (DOF) as possible to allow for ease of these
maneuvers. Therefore, it was decided that Freebird would have a 6-DOF control system. This allows for yaw,
pitch, and roll rotation and x, y, and z translation.
7.4
7.4.1
Control Modes
In designing the vehicle control system, the first step was to define the different control modes that will be car-
ried out during the lifetime of Freebird. Considerations that went into designing control modes were the mis-
sion requirements, mission profile, and type of insertion for the launch vehicle. From these considerations,
requirements and constraints for the GNC system were also defined. For Project Freebird, the following non-
mutually exclusive control modes were defined.
Acquisition
Definition
Acquisition refers to the initial determination of the vehicle's attitude and position, stabilization of the vehicle,
calibration and initialization of sensors, and testing of GNC systems. Acquisition will be done during all vehi-
cle start-ups and after system resets.
Strategy
Upon entering acquisition mode, the spacecraft will inhibit thruster firing while the sensors are calibrated and
initialized so that position and attitude may be determined. Once position and attitude are known, the vehicle
will be stabilized using the reaction control system.
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7.4.2 Stationkeeping
Definition
The default mode when Freebird is not maneuvering or docked will be stationkeeping. Stationkeeping is used
to maintain Freebird at a desired relative position, attitude, and attitude rate with respect to a target. [4]
Strategy
Freebird will primarily employ V-bar stationkeeping, i.e., maintain a position on the velocity vector of the tar-
get as illustrated in Figure 7.2, to minimize fuel use. V-bar stationkeeping uses the minimum amount of fuel
since it is the only completely stable position, i.e., no thrusting is required to maintain the position. [4] There-
tore, other positions will be used only if required for a specific operation.
Target
+V-bar -V-bar
FIGURE
7.4.3
7.2 V-bar Stationkeeping.
Slew Maneuvers
Definition
Slew maneuvers reorient the vehicle attitude. This could be required during any phase of a mission, such as
thermal pointing during an orbital transfer.
Strategy
Freebird will use its RCS system to perform slew maneuvers.
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7.4.4 Orbital Transfer/Rendezvous
Definition
Orbital transfer and rendezvous encompass all the operations that take Freebird from its initial position to
within a few hundred meters of its destination.
LEO Strategy
Freebird's LEO rendezvous maneuvers are modelled after the strategy currently used by the Space Shuttle. Ini-
tially, Freebird will make an inclination change with its main engines. Once Freebird is in the same inclination
as the target, it will commence with primary phasing. This requires insertion into an elliptical orbit with either
the perigee or apogee at the same altitude as the target spacecraft. This allows Freebird to adjust its phase to
match that of the target vehicle.
The primary phasing should place Freebird approximately 75km behind the target vehicle before the next
phase of rendezvous is initiated. Figure 7.3 is a relative motion plot of a Freebird rendezvous from this point
on. It shows Freebird in a lower energy orbit, approaching the target from below and behind. If Freebird is
coming from a higher energy orbit (i.e. ISSA is located in a higher altitude orbit than the target vehicle), the
rendezvous is reversed, and Freebird approaches the target from above and ahead. This can be imagined by
turning Figure 7.3 upside down. Once Freebird reaches apogee (perigee if Freebird is approaching from above)
of its primary phasing, it initiates its secondary phasing maneuver, slowing down its rate of angular approach.
Unadjusted, it should now take three orbits for Freebird to pass the target vehicle.
The purpose of the secondary phasing is to allow Freebird to collect data on the position of the target vehicle.
For a target spacecraft in LEO, ground tracking is accurate only to a few kilometers. Freebird uses both star-
tracker and radar data to improve this accuracy. The secondary phasing of Freebird should be timed so that the
target will be illuminated by the sun as Freebird drops from apogee to perigee. During this time, Freebird's
onboard startracker will track the target vehicle, providing accurate angular data from Freebird to the target. As
Freebird approaches the target, radar data also becomes available. Beyond about 40km, star tracker data is still
far more accurate, but as Freebird gets closer, radar resolution improves. Freebird radar also provides data on
target range and range rate. Corrective burns may be made as the target positional data is improved.
Following two secondary phasing orbits, knowledge of target position should be accurate enough for terminal
phase initiation. After one orbit of the terminal phasing, Freebird should be within several hundred meters in
front of the target vehicle. The target should now be within range of Freebird's Laser Navigation Sensor
(LNS). At this point, Freebird's orbit is circularized, and Freebird moves into its proximity operations mode.
GEO Strategy
The major challenge posed by a rendezvous to a spacecraft in GEO is the low positional accuracy of both Free-
bird and the target vehicle. Ground station tracking provides positional data on the target vehicle only to within
50km in GEO[1 ]. The Freebird navigation sensors are slightly better, providing orbital position data of Free-
bird to within 35km in GEO. Another problem posed in GEO is the lengthy 24hour orbit. This rules out the
rendezvous technique used in LEO, which requires at least three orbits.
Freebird will use a Hohmann transfer to maneuver to GEO altitude. The apogee of this transfer orbit needs to
be approximately at the position of the target vehicle at the time of Freebird arrival. This necessitates phasing
maneuvers in LEO, to align the perigee of the transfer orbit. Once Freebird is at GEO altitude, it will need to
circularize its orbit, as well as perform an inclination change from 51.6 ° to an equatorial orbit. This means that
Freebird must be crossing the equator at the time of perigee thruster burn, constraining the possible transfer
orbits.
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FIGURE 7.3 Low Earth Orbit Rendezvous.
The possible transfer orbits are further constrained due to lighting considerations. Because Freebird will not be
able to acquire positional data of the target vehicle from multiple orbits, as it does in a LEO rendezvous, it will
need to acquire this data as it approaches the target during orbital transfer. Freebird will be able to collect this
data using its startrackers from up to 600km away if the lighting is right. Ideally, Freebird would be directly
between the sun and target, as illustrated in Figure 7.4. This will certainly almost never be the case, meaning
Freebird will need to be closer than 600km to the target before it will be able to detect the target. As Freebird is
provided with more accurate positional data on the target, it will be able to make corrective burns.
At some times during the year, proper illumination of the target may be impossible during approach. This
problem is still a critical issue for Freebird. The GEO rendezvous strategy is not fully defined yet, and as the
Freebird mission is further developed, and a more rigorous analysis on rendezvous in GEO will have to be per-
formed. GEO rendezvous may eventually require that Freebird make at least one complete orbit at GEO alti-
tude, or it may require the consumption of more RCS fuel. This problem will have to wait until adequate
research on rendezvous in GEO is made.
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FIGURE 7.4 Geosynchronous Orbit Rendezvous.
7.4.5 Proximity Operations
Definition
Any maneuvers taking place within lkm of an asset are considered proximity operations (PROX OPS). This
may include transition to specified offset positions, stationkeeping, approach, docking, flyarounds, and finally,
after all mission objectives are satisfied, the separation of Freebird to a stand-off position. [4]
Strategy
The primary considerations for designing PROX OPS strategies are plume impingement, RCS fuel conserva-
tion, braking techniques, and maneuver targeting. [4] The general maneuverability requirements of Freebird
enable most proximity strategies to be used without requiring any additional hardware. Therefore, exact strate-
gies for most PROX OPS are beyond the scope of this project. However, the fact that Freebird will be flying a
number of unmanned missions is an important system design driver which requires a high level of autonomy,
including autonomous docking. Since this requires specific Freebird hardware and target configurations, auton-
omous docking will be discussed.
In addition to general considerations, ISSA has specific requirements for all spacecraft operating in its vicinity.
The ISSA docking requirements specify that vehicles must control their attitude to within 3 °, relative position
to within Icm, and relative velocity to within Icm/s. In addition, primary RCS thrusters may not be fired in the
direction of ISSA anywhere within 30m.
The on-board rendezvous radar provides navigation performance for rendezvous, but cannot support the final
proximity operations phase at ranges less than 30m from the target because of hardware limitations. Histori-
cally, most docking has been done manually. In fact, both rendezvous and docking operations have required
crew and ground involvement in the operation of integrated guidance, navigation, and control. Freebird, as
mentioned before, will need autonomous or teleoperated docking capability for uncrewed missions. Tradition-
ally, manual intervention has been required to mode the guidance, navigation, and flight control subsytems;
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evaluate the navigation filter operation and measurement incorporation; initiate on-board maneuver targeting
programs; and execute the maneuvers. During the final phase of rendezvous and docking, the pilot operations
take precedence over nearly all of the on-board guidance, navigation, and targeting functions. The approach is
flown manually using visual cues and raw radar data to determine the relative attitude and relative position of
the target and the chaser spacecraft. The Freebird top-level requirement to perform uncrewed missions make
mandatory on-board manual intervention into GNC system operations impractical.
To provide a high-accuracy sensor that can be used at close ranges, Johnson Space Center initiated the devel-
opment of a PROX OPS relative laser navigation sensor (LNS). This sensor can accurately provide the relative
range, range-rate, angles, and angle rates to the target at ranges typical of the end of a rendezvous mission
phase all the way to docking. This sensor will be used both to enhance current manual proximity operations
and to provide the improved navigation required for future uncrewed rendezvous and docking missions. In
order for LNS to provide autonomous rendezvous capability, the target must have an isosceles triangular
arrangements of reflectors on its surface, as shown in Figure 7.5. The LNS can use these reflectors to deter-
mine the target vehicle's relative attitude. It is reasonable to assume that some assets will not have the reflec-
tors necessary for automatic rendezvous. In this case, the uncrewed mission will have to be teleoperated, and
the docking camera will be responsible for determining the target vehicle's attitude. The docking cameras will
also serve as a backup for the LNS.
FIGURE 7.5 Cube Corner Reflector Configuration for Laser Navigation Sensor Target Attitude Determination.
When Freebird cannot dock with an asset, grappling techniques will be used. The closed circuit television
(CCT) on the wrist of the RMS will give a visual image of the pin orientation of the grappling fixture on the
target (see Figure 7.6). A central raised pin can be compared in distance to the other pins to judge the relative
attitude of the grappling fixture. This image can then be analyzed by a human operator, as on the Space Shuttle,
or via computer image processing for autonomous grappling, to line up the RMS with the grappling fixture.
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FIGURE 7.6 Pin Configuration for Closed Loop Vision System on Remote Manipulation System.
7.5 Attitude Determination and Navigation Hardware
The trade studies and eventual decisions on Freebird attitude determination and navigation are discussed in the
following section.
7.5.1 Viable Attitude Determination Hardware
The sensors available to determine Freebird attitude are presented in Table 7. I. They consist of:
• Inertial-Measurement Units (IMUs)
]MUs consist of gyros and accelerometers, and provide accurate measurements of rotation and transla-
tion. The drawback is that they are subject to gyro drift, and must be periodically updated.
• Sun/Moon sensors
Sun/Moon sensors are accurate and lightweight. However, they do not provide full three-axis attitude
determination. Frequent obstruction of the Sun or the Moon, especially in low-Earth orbit, can lead to
data loss.
• Star Sensors
Star sensors are high accuracy, but are expensive and bulky. They require an extensive star map data
base for'attitude determination.
• Earth sensors
Earth sensors, also known as horizon sensors, detect the Earth's horizon using infrared devices. They
only provide direction to nadir, and not full three-axis attitude determination. Their accuracy is rela-
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TABLE 7.1
tively low, but can be improved using multiple Earth sensors. The Dual Cone Scanner (DCS), a type of
Earth sensor, also provides altitude information by measuring the apparent diameter of the Earth.
• Microcosm Autonomous Planning System (MAPS)
The MAPS software operates in conjunction with MANS (discussed in Section 7.5.2) to provide direc-
tion to any specified ground station or spacecraft. MAPS is not fully developed, and has never been
flight tested.
Viable Attitude Determination Hardware
Hardware
IMU
Advantages
Completely internal
High accuracy
Disadvantages
Gyro drift (0.003°/hr to l°/hr)
Sun/Moon sensors Accurate (0.005 ° to 3 °) Sun/Moon not always in field of view
Star sensors High accuracy (0.0003 ° to 0.01 °) Expensive
Requires extensive star map data
Earth sensors Inexpensive Low accuracy (0. I ° to 1°)
MAPS Provides directions to and orbits of Not fully developed
assets Requires MANS
7.5.2 Viable Navigation Options
The options ztvailable to provide navigation information are listed in Table 7.2. They consist of:
• Ground-station tracking
This is the standard method used for spacecraft navigation, and would not be difficult to implement.
However, it requires costly operational ground support, and its accuracies range from a few kilometers
in LEO to 50km in GEO.
• Microcosm Autonomous Navigation System (MANS)
MANS uses information provided by Earth sensors and Sun/Moon sensors to determine orbital position
and attitude, providing 3_ accuracies of 100m to 1.5km. It can be used in LEO and GEO, and can also
use data from gyros, accelerometers, star sensors, and GPS. It has only recently been flight tested.
• Space Sextant
The Space Sextant, developed by Martin Marietta, was flight tested in the late 1970s, but is no longer
being marketed. It measures the angle between a star and the Moon to provide navigation data, and
requires heavy telescopic instruments. It can be used in LEO and GEO. "
• Inertial-Measurement Units (IMU)
The rotational and translational data provided by the IMU can be numerically integrated to provide
accurate navigation data. However, drift problems mean that the navigation data requires frequent
updating. The Space Shuttle currently uses IMUs, updated using a star tracker.
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TABLE 7.2 Viable Navigation Hardware
Options
Ground-station tracking
Advantages
Most widely used
method of navigation
Disadvantages
Operations costs higher than autonomous navigation
Low accuracy (3_3 accuracy about 50kin in GEO)
MANS Accurate Only recently flight tested
Autonomous
Space Sextant Accurate Heavy compared with other systems
Autonomous
IMU Accurate translational Needs to be updated by another system due to drift
information
7.5.3 Viable Rendezvous Hardware
The available rendezvous sensors are listed in Table 7.2. They consist of:
• Star Tracker
A Star tracker provides very accurate angular data from chaser to target vehicles. It can operate at
ranges much further than radar, provided that the target is properly illuminated. There is a minimum
range at which a star tracker can operate, about where the target begins to consume more than a few pix-
els on the star tracker charge coupled device (CCD).
• Rendezvous Radar
Radar provides target vehicle angular, range and range rate data. However, the accuracy decreases sig-
nificantly as the range increases.
• Laser Navigation Sensor (LNS)
The LNS is currently being developed at Draper Laboratories for autonomous rendezvous and capture
of satellites. As well as angular, range and range rate information, it can give attitude information on the
target vehicle, which makes it attractive for automatic rendezvous. It is much more accurate than radar,
but because of its limited range, it is limited to proximity operations.
• Docking cameras
Docking cameras can be used to provide a low resolution angular, range, and range rate data for proxim-
ity operations. They are useful for manual rendezvous as well as teleoperated rendezvous.
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TABLE 7.3 Viable Rendezvous Hardware
Options
Star Tracker
Rendezvous Radar
LNS
Advantages
High accuracy (0.0003 ° to 0.01 °)
Usable at large ranges
Determines range and range rate up
to 50km
High accuracy
Provides attitude information tor
target vehicle
Disadvantages
Requires sunlit target vehicle
No range or range rate data
Not useful at close ranges
Resolution poorer than star tracker and LNS
No attitude information for target vehicle
Needs further development
Docking Cameras Can be used for teleoperated Useful only at close ranges
rendezvous Poor resolution compared to other sensors
7.5.4 Selected Freebird Attitude Determination and Navigation Hardware
As was discussed in Section 7.3 on page 125, an autonomous navigation system was shown to be preferable
over the standard ground tracking approach, due to the lower operational costs. Leaving aside those systems
which do not function in GEO, the options for Freebird's navigation system are limited to MANS and Martin
Marietta's Space Sextant. MANS was ultimately chosen for the Freebird design, because it is the cheapest,
lightest, most accurate, and most technologically advanced option currently available. In addition, the MAPS
software was also chosen because of its compatibility with the MANS software, and usefulness for the Free-
bird mission. Various other sensors were chosen based on their applicability to the Freebird mission and com-
patibility with MANS. The particular rationales behind the types and number of sensors chosen for Freebird
are discussed below. Freebird's rendezvous strategy was modelled after the Space Shuttle's current strategy, so
similar sensors were selected. A star tracker was selected for long range target detection, and a radar was
selected for closer ranges. A Laser Navigation Sensor was selected for proximity operations, especially useful
for automatic rendezvous and docking. Docking cameras were also selected for close ranges, which are useful
for manual docking and necessary for teleoperated docking.
Microcosm Autonomous Navigation System (MANS)
Microcosm currently offers an accurate, low cost navigation software package that is applicable to all of the
required orbits for Freebird. The Air Force Phillip's Laboratory's Technology for Autonomous Operational
Survivability (TAOS) mission, launched March 13, 1994, is currently flying the first flight test of the MANS
software, used in conjunction with two Dual Cone Scanners with Sun/Moon fans. [5] The Freebird navigation
system was modelled after the navigation system on the TAOS mission, using the MANS software as well as
tbur Dual Cone Scanners with Sun/Moon fans.
Freebird simultaneously runs three MANS programs for redundancy. Each MANS acquires data provided by
Freebird's Dual Cone Scanners. With information on altitude, direction to nadir, and directions to the Sun and
Moon, MANS is able to determine an orbit for Freebird. [6] With subsequent data coming in, MANS uses a
Kalman filter to better extrapolate Freebird's orbit. In simulations of MANS using two DCSs with both the Sun
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and Moon present, the 30" positional accuracy was determined to be 150m at LEO. GEO accuracies are 35km,
due to increasing errors in altitude determination with increasing altitude.
Of course, the Sun and Moon will not always lie within the field of view of the DCSs. The Sun/Moon fans will
lose coverage when the Sun or Moon are: 1) eclipsed by the Earth, 2) blocked by Freebird, 3) outside the fan
limits, or 4) too close to the Earth horizon. The most significant of these will be the time which Freebird spends
in the Earth's shadow, which represents about 40% of the time in LEO. When only the Sun or the Moon is
within the DCS field of view, the positional accuracy of MANS drops down to 1kin. Without data from either
the Sun or the Moon, MANS is not able to model any changes in Freebird's orbit, so the accuracy becomes sig-
nificantly poorer with increasing time. For this reason, the MANS on Freebird also uses the data provided by
the two IMUs. The drift rate of the IMU is low enough to keep MANS updated and accurate for whatever
length of time Sun and Moon data are not available. The IMU will also be able to immediately update MANS
whenever the RCS or OMS thrusters are fired and Freebird's orbit is changed.
Microcosm Autonomous Planning System (MAPS)
MAPS is an extension of MANS. It is a software system which uses the navigation and attitude information
provided by MANS to provide the direction to any ground station or spacecraft. [2] It requires a database con-
taining the locations of ground stations, as well as the orbits of other spacecraft that Freebird will need knowl-
edge on. MAPS will be useful in determining antennae pointing directions. It will be especially useful in
determining the orbits of target spacecraft, which is necessary for rendezvous targeting. MAPS has yet to be
developed, so at this point, its functionality is rather flexible. For the Freebird mission, MAPS will be
expanded to accept rendezvous sensor data, in order to improve the accuracy of its target orbit determination.
MAPS will also provide data on the time and duration of eclipses.
Dual Cone Scanner with Sun and Moon Fans
The rational for selecting the Dual Cone Scanner (DCS) with Sun and Moon Fans is explained in the MANS
section. It is the same sensor used aboard the current TAOS mission.
The Dual Cone Scanner (DCS), manufactured by Barnes Engineering Division of the EDO Corporation, is a
modified version of the Conical Earth Sensor (CES). [7] The CES is a standard scanning Earth sensor which
provides accurate nadir determination. By using two conical scans of the Earth rather than one, the DCS has
the advantage over the CES of added redundancy, increased accuracy, and the ability to determine spacecraft
altitude by measuring Earth radius. In addition, the DCS does not experience the sun-on-horizon errors com-
mon to the CES, because it utilizes two scanning cones set at different angles. For the Freebird mission, the
DCS has been further enhanced by the addition of two fan sensors. Alone, DCS attitude determination is lim-
ited to pitch and roll. With the addition of Sun and Moon sensors, the DCS provides full attitude determination.
Figure 7.7 illustrates the mechanical layout of the modified DCS.
The DCS consists of two optical scanning paths which rotate around a central axis set at different angles with
respect to the rotation axis. The fields of view of these scanning paths are illustrated in Figure 7.9. The incom-
ing light from the two paths is directed onto a pyroelectric detector. The angles chosen for the optical scanning
paths are 60 ° and 72 °, optimized for Earth width sensing during orbital transfer from LEO to GEO. The two
scanning paths provide two Earth scans, or four horizon crossings, per rotation. Roll and pitch can be deter-
mined by measuring the changes sensed in the Earth pulse lengths. Apparent Earth radius, which can be con-
verted to spacecraft altitude, can be determined by comparing the Earth pulse lengths provided by each
scanning path.
Sun and Moon attitude are determined by two fans which rotate around the spin axis, and direct visual light
onto a silicon photodiode. These fans are also shown in Figure 7.9. The fans are tilted 15 ° with respect to the
spin axis, and are separated from each other by 5° at the equator. They each have a 70 ° field of view.
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FIGURE 7.7 Mechanical Layout of the Dual Cone Scanner with Sun and Moon Fans [6].
Freebird has two pairs of Dual Cone Scanners mounted around the perimeter of the Smart Box. The DCS
mounting configuration is illustrated in Figure 7.8. Each DCS is oriented 120 ° from the other DCS it is paired
with. Nadir should be pointed directly between the DCS pair for optimal Earth horizon sensing in both LEO
and GEO. The second DCS pair exists for redundancy, and is placed 180 ° from the first pair. Use of two DCSs
at the same time provides increased accuracy over the use of only one sensor. For LEO, the 1 second time aver-
age accuracies (3cy) achieved by a DCS pair are 0.05 ° for attitude and 300m for altitude. These accuracies are
achieved for almost 100% of spacecraft orientations. In GEO, altitude and attitude can be determined for 63%
of spacecraft orientations, and the 3(_ accuracies are 0.02 ° for attitude and 35km for altitude.
The specifications of the DCS are listed in Figure 7.4.
TABLE 7.4 DCS Specifications[8].
Parameter Characteristic
Size [cml 10.4 dia × 20.1 long
Mass [kg] 4.54
Power [W] 10
Operating Temperature [°C] -20 to +60
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FIGURE 7.8 Dual Cone Scanner Mounting Configuration.
Miniature Inertial Measurement Unit (MIMU)
An Inertial Measurement Unit was selected for the Freebird mission for the reasons given in the MANS sec-
tion. Freebird uses Honeywell's MIMU for accurate translational and rotational data. The MIMU was selected
because it is a relatively lightweight, inexpensive, and accurate IMU. The MIMU consists of three Honeywell
GGI320 Ring Laser Gyros (RLGs), which measure changes in angular rotation, and three Allied Signal
QA2000 Q-Flex accelerometers, which measure changes in linear motion[9]. The MIMU also includes Honey-
well's radiation hardened RH-1750 processor for internal processing. Two MIMUs are used in Freebird for
redundancy. Specifications for the MIMU are listed in Table 7.5.
CT-611 Space Shuttle Star Tracker
Ball Aerospace's CT-611 Space Shuttle Star Tracker has been selected for the Freebird design. Its specifica-
tions are listed in Table 7.6. The star tracker will be used strictly for orbital rendezvous, as described in
Section 7.4.4 on page 129. The star tracker will acquire and track a sun illuminated target of stellar magnitude
as dim as 3.9, meaning that a properly sunlit spacecraft may be detected up to 600km away. The CT-611 has
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TABLE 7.5 MIMU Specifications [9]
Parameter Characteristic
Size [cm 3] 2260
Mass [kg] 1.92
Power [W] 18
Maximum Angular Acceleration [rad/s 2] 1,000
Angular Drift Rate [rad/hr] 0.01
Maximum Acceleration [g] 25
Operating Temperature [°C] -30 to 70
Radiation [Krad] 100
the capability of identifying the target within its i0 ° x 10° field of view. Freebird's target search technique will
be similar to the method used aboard the Space Shuttle. [4] Initially, navigation will send the coordinates of the
target to the star tracker, and the star tracker will search these coordinates for the target within a 1° x 1° square
for up to four seconds. If the target is not found due to navigation errors, the star tracker will search its entire
field of view for 20s before aborting. The Freebird design calls for two star trackers for redundancy. They are
each located on the smart box 180 ° apart. Star tracker locations are illustrated on Figure 3.16 on page 75.
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Each star tracker will be mounted on a Ball Aerospace LCI060 Control Gimbal. Specifications are listed in
Table 7.7.
TABLE 7.6 CT-611 Space Shuttle Star Tracker Specifications [10]
Parameter Characteristic
Field of View [°] 10 x 10
Sensitivity Range [M] -7 to +3.9
Accuracy [arc s] 15
Update Rate [Hz] 10
Dimensions [cm] 21.2 x 16.8 x 28.58
Mass [kg] 6.79
Power [W] 12.5
Operating Temperature [°C] +10 to +60
Radiation [Krad] 100
TABLE 7.7 LC Control Gimbal Specifications [11]
Parameter Characteristic
Yoke Diameter [cm] 0.17
Weight [kg] 9.7
Elevation Travel Range [°] 60
Azimuth Travel Range [°] 180
Accuracy [I.trad] 96
Operating Temperature [°C] - 13 to +35
Rendezvous Radar
A rendezvous radar is needed to supplement the star tracker's angular data with range and range rate data in
addition to providing angular data when the star tracker cannot be used, such as when the target is too big in
the field of view, too bright, or too dim. The large position uncertainties in GEO make it desirable to have a
long range radar, i.e., able to pick up a lm 2 target at a range of 100km, for performing rendezvous in GEO.
Weight considerations indicate that it would be more efficient for the rendezvous radar to use Freebird's com-
munications parabolic antennas rather than have its own radar dish. The Space Shuttle currently uses this
method in its Integrated Radar And Communications System. The drawback of using the same antennas is the
loss of the use of one of the antenna for communications during radar operation. Communications currently
uses S-band, which is inadequate for the type of range needed from the rendezvous radar. The rendezvous
radar would require its own transponder operating in at least Ka band. Preliminary calculations indicate that a
long range space based radar is feasible, although such systems have yet to be built since space missions have
not previously required this kind of range for rendezvous radar. Rough calculations of the rendezvous radar
parameters required for Freebird are listed in Table 7.8. These parameters were calculated using equations in
Hughes Aircrafts' Introduction to Airborne Radar [12].
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TABLE 7.8 Rendezvous Radar Parameters
Parameter Characteristic
Band Ka
Frequency [GHz] 40
Bandwidth [kHzl 15
Transmitter Power Output [W] 150
Antenna Diameter [m] 1.2
Range [km] 100
Laser Navigation Sensor (LNS)
The Laser Navigation Sensor is part of an effort by NASA to replace its current reliance on manual docking
and rendezvous. [13] LNS provides accurate range and range rate data from Ikm all the way to docking. LNS
also provides target attitude information when Freebird is within 55m of the target and the target vehicle has
been outfitted with three cube corner reflectors. The reflectors must be mounted on the satellite at the corners
of an isosceles triangle a few feet in size, with the long edge of the triangle around 1.5 feet longer than the
other two legs. LNS tracks the set of reflectors on the satellite, and by comparing their measured orientations to
the known configuration of the reflectors, LNS can calculate the attitude of the target spacecraft. Current spec-
ifications of the LNS are listed in Table 7.9.
Freebird has two LNSs for redundancy. The LNS layout is illustrated on Figure 7.5 on page 132.
TABLE 7.9 Laser Navigation Sensor Specifications [3]
Parameter Range of Operations Laser Accuracies (1_)
Range (R) [km] 0 to 1 0.001 R
Range Rate [m/s] 0.9 0.001 R
Attitude [°l 28 0.3
Attitude Rate [°/s] 1 0.0002
Docking cameras
Teleoperated docking and satellite capture will require a video downlink from a docking camera aboard Free-
bird. When Freebird is within lkm of the target, ground controllers will be able to use docking camera data to
estimate range to about 3%. This is accomplished by overlaying a calibrated ranging ruler on the camera data,
which is a technique used by the Space Shuttle through its Closed Circuit Television. [4] In addition to teleop-
erated missions, the docking cameras will be useful on crewed missions, as well as serve as a backup for the
LNS. Freebird has two docking cameras for redundancy. Camera mounting is illustrated on Figure 3.16 on
page 75.
7.6 Guidance
The guidance system is responsible for controlling the position of the vehicle center of mass. The main engines
will only be used for major orbital transfers, due to the limited number of starts available. Therefore, the RCS
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system will have two 4000N secondary thrusters for small to medium size orbital transfers in addition to a set
of smaller primary thrusters for small perturbation translational control. In order to meet the docking velocity
control requirement of lcm/s, the primary RCS system must have a minimum impulse of no greater than 50Ns
in any one direction (assuming a minimum vehicle mass of 5000kg). A complete discussion of the RCS system
design will be delayed until the attitude control requirements for the RCS system are discussed in
Section 7.7.2.
7.7 Attitude Control
The attitude control system is responsible for stabilizing and controlling the attitude of Freebird. When the
main engines are in use, they will be gimballed to correct for thrust imbalances and to control the attitude of
Freebird. At all other times, the main attitude control system will provide 3-DOF rotational control.
7.7.1
TABLE
Hardware Trade Study
The large vehicle mass combined with the maneuverability requirements of Freebird restricted the choice of
attitude control actuators to those that are capable of high torque levels, namely control moment gyros
(CMG's) and thrusters. Their advantages and disadvantages are summarized inTable 7.10. The main advantage
of using CMG's would be realized by using one CMG to replace the four thrusters, and their fuel, that would
otherwise need to be added to the translational thrusters to provide control about the roll axis. Since the thrust-
ers necessary for translational control are also adequate tbr pitch and yaw control, the main additional savings
from using CMG's for control of theses axes would be fuel savings and extended thruster life. In addition, the
use of CMG's instead of thrusters reduces the contamination due to thruster plumes. The main disadvantages
of CMG's are their large mass, 150kg each or 600kg for a complete set of four, and their relatively limited con-
trol authority, about 4000Nm of torque each.
7.10 Attitude Control Hardware
Hardware
Control
moment
gyro
(CMG)
Thruster
Advantages
No contamination
Completely internal
Immune to vehicle configuration
No fuel consumption
High torque levels
Pitch and yaw controllable by
translation thrusters
Disadvantages
-4000Nm maximum torque each
Minimum of 1 per axis plus a total of 1 backup
- 150kg mass each
Roll control requires 4 additional thrusters
Consumes fuel
Plume impingement on vehicle and assets
Location complicated by modular vehicle
configuration
Less controllability
7.7.2 Selected Control Hardware
The hardware for the attitude control system was chosen primarily on a minimum mass basis. Since the bulk of
the RCS fuel will be used for small to medium orbital maneuvers during rendezvous, i.e., attitude control
requires relatively small amounts of fuel (-50kg between refuelings), using CMG's would result in a net mass
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FIGURE 7.10 Approximate Reaction Control System Thruster Orientations and Locations.
increase. Therefore Freebird will use only RCS for its attitude control. There will be twenty-six primary 490N
RCS thrusters and, as previously mentioned, there will be two secondary 4000N RCS thrusters. See
Figure 7. I0 for the approximate location and orientation of the RCS thrusters. Note that twenty of the twenty-
eight thrusters are located in the aft section of Freebird. This uneven distribution of thrusters was the result of
efforts to minimize thruster plumes around the forward section of the vehicle which comprises the "smartbox",
crew module, and payload. Each of the four thruster sets in the forward end of the propulsion pack consist of
singly redundant pairs. The y-axis and z-axis thrusters in the aft section are arrayed in sets of three: one on the
roll axis and one to either side as in Figure 7.11. This configuration enables roll control by the off axis pairs
and also allows firing of y-axis and z-axis thrusters in single fore-and-aft pairs for precision control or double
pairs for high authority control. The x-axis thrusters are redundant in four pairs symmetrically arrayed about
the x-axis for several reasons. First, the x-axis thrusters will be more heavily used than the y-axis and z-axis
thrusters. The x-axis thrusters will do most of the orbital correction burns, although they won't be used for atti-
tude control. The higher work load on the x-axis thrusters makes it necessary to use multiple thrusters to
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spread out the burn time so that the x-axis thrusters don't wear out faster than the other thrusters. Second, hav-
ing redundant pairs of thrusters allows for efficient torqueless translational control even if one of the thrusters
fails. In addition, the retro-rockets thrusting in the +x direction will be angled off axis by 45 ° and thus will only
have about 70% of their maximum thrust aligned along the x-axis, increasing the work load for a given desired
change in velocity. Lastly, it will be desirable at times to lock out the use of one of the pairs of retro-rockets if
an RMS is in one of the plume cones for that pair. Thus having redundant pairs allows the control system to
avoid damaging either RMS while not sacrificing controllability of the vehicle. See Chapter 5 on page 89 for
more information on the RCS thruster system.
off +x-axis
490N
___y _I Primary RCS
_ 4000NSecondary RCS
92.5kN
Main Engines
FIGURE 7.11 Aft End Thruster and Main Engines Layout.
7.8 Computational Requirements
All GNC software will run on the main computer system supplied by C3T. The MANS software system
requires a throughput of 1 MIPS and all other GNC software requires approximately 10 MIPS. The control
system will run at 100Hz to achieve the desired minimum impulses from the RCS thrusters.
7.9 Failure Modes
The failure modes for the GNC system are listed in Table 7.11. It can be seen that there are no failure modes
that are life-threatening and only two that are mission critical. This is due to the high level of redundancy and
the level of autonomy of the GNC system. This level of redundancy of each component and also the redun-
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dancy achievable by the use of other components to perform the failed function leads to a very high reliability.
In many cases, operation or information from ground can bring the criticality level down to only a telemetry
critical level and thus makes the mission possible.
TABLE 7.11 Failure Modes
Component
DCS
MIMU
MANS
MAPS
Control
Software
Star Tracker
Failure Mode
Single failure
Effect
Loss of one backup
Prevention or
Response
Switch to backup
Criticality
Crewed
Config.
3
Double failure Loss of both Switch to backup 3 3
backups
Triple failure Loss of accuracy 3 3
and altitude data
Complete failure
Single failure
Double failure
Software failure
Software failure
Loss of high
precision updates
to MIMUs
Loss of accuracy
and backup
Accuracy
degradation
Loss of accurate
navigation data
Loss of accurate
target vehicle data
Loss of ability to
control vehicle
Loss of backup
Loss of accurate
target vehicle data
Software failure
Use ground
tracking for
altitude data
Use star tracker
and ground
tracking data to
update MIMUs
N/A
Rely on DCS, star
tracker and ground
tracking for data
Rely on ground
tracking for
navigation
Rely on ground
tracking for data
Uplink backup
software from
ground
Switch to backup
Rely on ground
tracking data
Single failure
Double failure in LEO
Double failure in GEO Loss of star Rely on target to 3 3
with active target tracker data provide data
Return to ISSA 2 2Double failure in GEO
with passive target
Loss of accurate
target vehicle data
Teleop.
3
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TABLE 7.11 Failure Modes
Component
Rendezvous
Radar
Transponder
LNS
Docking
Camera
Failure Mode
Single failure
Double failure in LEO
Double failure in GEO
Single failure
Double failure
Single failure
Double failure
Effect
Loss of backup
Loss of rendezvous
radar data
Loss of ability to
rendezvous with
satellite
Loss of backup
Loss of LNS data
for docking
Loss of backup
Loss of visual
docking ability
Prevention or
Response
Switch to backup
Rely on ground
tracking data to
rendezvous
Return to ISSA
Switch to backup
Dock using
docking cameras
Switch to backup
Rely on LNS to
dock
Criticality
Crewed
Config. Teleop.
3 3
3 3
2 2
3 3
3 3
3 3
3 3
A complete failure of all DCS units would be telemetry critical. It would result in the loss of accurate attitude
and altitude information which is normally used to provide accurate data to MANS. The MIMUs, which suffer
drift, provide rotational and translational information to MANS, and thus when used alone tend to provide
inaccurate updates to MAN& In response to the DCS failure, the combination of information from the star
tracker and ground tracking can update the data fed to MANS and thus increase the accuracy level acceptably
to complete the mission.
If both MIMUs happened to fail this too would be only telemetry critical. The DCS would be able to provide
attitude and altitude information, but could not update MANS as to rotational and translational movement of
the vehicle. The DCS are also not useful if the sun and moon are out of the field of view. Thus ground tracking
and star tracker data must also be used to recover from the failure and complete the mission.
A software failure of either MANS or MAPS would again be telemetry critical. Such a failure would only be
likely to occur if there was a bug in the software, assuming that the computers they run on are functional. In
this case, ground tracking data could be used for navigation and target vehicle data.
If the control software had a bug in it and failed, the vehicle would no longer be controllable autonomously,
but could be controlled from the ground. A more optimal solution would be to have ground control uplink a
backup control software package, thus allowing the vehicle to be autonomous once again and complete the
mission.
There are several different failure modes possible resulting from the loss of both star trackers. If the loss were
to occur in LEO, then ground tracking data would be accurate enough to allow rendezvous with the asset. This
information would get the vehicle within range of the asset to be able to switch over to the rendezvous radar
and complete the mission. If the failure were to occur in GEO when trying to rendezvous with an active target,
the mission could still be completed by using the target vehicle to provide accurate data on it's position,
through the use of a radar signal. However, in GEO when trying to rendezvous with a passive target there
would not be accurate enough target position information to rendezvous with it and would result in abort of the
mission.
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Loss of both rendezvous radar transponders, also results in two possible failure modes. Loss in LEO, would
not affect the mission, since ground tracking data could provide accurate information within the range of the
LNS to take over and perform the necessary proximity operations. Loss of star tracker data in GEO would
however result in abort of the mission, once again due to the lack of accurate target position information.
Lastly, a failure in either the LNS or the docking cameras does not affect the mission and docking is still possi-
ble since the other can be used. In the case of an LNS failure docking can be performed visually by the crew or
by a teleoperator. If the docking cameras were to fail the LNS has the capability to dock autonomously.
7.10 Summary Budgets
A summary of the components comprising the GNC system are listed in Table 7.12 along with mass, power.
and cost budgets.
TABLE 7.12 Summary Budgets
Component
DCS
MIMU
MANS
MAPS
Star Tracker
Rendezvous Radar
Transponder
LNS
Docking Camera
Totals
2
2
20
Total
Mass [kg]
4 20
2 10
3 0
3 0
Avg. Power
[Watts]
2O
40
Peak Power Hardware Cost
[Watts]
20
40
0
[Ski
$2 396
$1 238
$7 800
$10400
50 2 15 $6 190
20 60 60 $2 866
40 40 110 $5 961
10 50 100 $423
150 $37 103
The GNC telemetry requirements are listed in Table 7.13.
TABLE 7.13 Telemetry
Component
DCS (x4)
Telemetry
Vehicle State
Status
Rotation Rate
MIMU (x2) Vehicle State
Star Tracker Target Vector
# of
lines
1
1
i
I
1
Freq.
[Hz]
4
1
4
10
10
Analog/
Digital
D-16 bit
D
A
D-16 bit
D-16 bit
Command
Sensor Utilized
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TABLE 7.13 Telemetry
Component
Rendezvous Radar
Transponder (x2)
Telemetry
Signal Strength
Loop Stress
In-Lock
Power out
Temperature
LNS (x2) Target State
Docking Camera (x2) Status
# of
lines
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
Freq.
[Hz]
I
I
I
I
I
I0
I
Analog/
Digital
A
A
BiLevel
A
A
Command
Coherent Mode
Enable Stand-by
PRN ON/OFF
Subcarrier ON/OFF
D-16 bit
D Camera Selection
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8
Command, Communication, Control and
Telemetry
8.1 C3T Requirements
The Command, Communication, Control and Telemetry (C3T) system is responsible for processing all com-
mands and communications, as well as monitoring vehicle health with a certain reliability.
• The command subsystem must receive or generate and process all commands.
• The command subsystem must process or store all required data.
• The telemetry subsystem must monitor all health and status signals generated by Freebird.
• The telemetry subsystem must react appropriately to all monitored faults.
• The telemetry subsystem must forward all health and status data to the communications subsystem for
downlink.
• The communications subsystem must support communications with external sources, astronauts
engaged in Extra Vehicular Activity (EVA) and astronauts inside the vehicle.
• The communications subsystem must be capable of receiving voice and command transmission through
uplink, and transmitting voice, telemetry and video through downlink.
• Provide a system reliability of 0.999.
8.2 C3T Interfaces
The C3T system must interact both with the other systems on Freebird and systems external to the spacecraft.
Figure 8.1 shows the functional block diagram for the overall C3T system. Each system of the craft will be
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interfaced with the C3T system for command and telemetry data. Additionally, Freebird will engage in voice
and data transmission to/from ground, and downlink video to groundstations when under teleoperated control.
Video
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CPU
Data Handling
Unit Decoder
j ,
T ;
InternalComm.
V ',
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Antenna
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FIGURE 8.1 Command, Communication, Control and Telemetry Functional Block Diagram.
8.2.1 Command Subsystem
The Command subsystem receives and processes commands from several sources. It responds by generating
new commands which can be sent to other systems for control, or direct some subsystem internal process such
as self-testing, re-programming, shutdown, etc. On Freebird, the command system is implemented in the cen-
tral computers. Two major aspects of the command subsystem are the command decoder and the data handling
unit. These are shown apart from the central processing unit (CPU) in the functional block diagram for the
sake of clarity. The command decoder receives all incoming command messages and performs all necessary
processing on them before sending them to the data bus. The data handling unit is responsible for routing data
on the bus and for transferring telemetry data to the central computers.
The command and control subsystem must interface with other systems on Freebird in order to receive com-
mands and control the craft. The interfaces can be grouped into two categories; command-source and com-
mand-output. The functional block diagram shows that command-source interfaces are with the
communication subsystem and comparators. Interface with the communication subsystem is to receive com-
mands from sources external to Freebird. Another major source of commands is astronauts onboard Freebird
during a crewed mission. They interface with the command subsystem through keyboards, joysticks and termi-
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8.2.2
8.2.3
rials; all of which are connected to the central computers. Astronauts can also interrupt the command sub-
system directly using a hard-wired self-test mechanism.
Command-output interfaces are with all other systems in the craft using a linear data bus. Command signals on
the bus are routed to and picked up by the targeted system which interface with the vehicle at the component
level.
All command subsystem components have redundancy in the vehicle.
Telemetry Subsystem
The telemetry subsystem reads all health data from the various systems. The subsystem will consist of the
hardware necessary to read the many telemetry signals generated by Freebird. Monitoring is done in the tbl-
lowing manner: if the signal is analog, it is converted to digital; the CPU then compares the value to its
accepted range, and performs any necessary actions; and the telemetry data is sent to the communications sub-
system for downlink.
Additionally, if the mission is crewed, important telemetry data will be continuously sent to the crew's moni-
tors. If there is a malfunction in any component, that component's data will also be displayed.
Communications Subsystem
Freebird must communicate with various external sources, as well as providing for internal communications.
The communications subsystem interfaces with International Space Station Alpha (ISSA) for docking pur-
poses, as well as a communication link. Rendezvous with the Space Shuttle requires compatible communica-
tion capabilities. In Low Earth Orbit (LEO), the vehicle will utilize the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite
System (TDRSS) tbr communication. In geosynchronous orbit (GEO), the vehicle will communicate through
the Deep Space Network (DSN). Astronauts engaged in EVA outside Freebird will communicate through a
separate system. Internally, the vehicle supports communications between crew members.
The communication bands that Freebird utilizes correspond to those supported by ISSA and TDRSS as well as
the Space Shuttle. The primary frequency used for communication is S-band, which corresponds to 2.025-
2.120 GHz for uplink and 2.2-2.3 GHz for downlink. DSN operates on S- and X-band frequencies, and Free-
bird communicates with DSN through S-band while operating in GEO. The EVA suits utilize two UHF fre-
quencies, 296.8 MHz and 259.7 MHz [I].
For internal communications, the astronauts have headsets which allow them to talk with each other and
receive information from external sources during maneuvers.
The communications subsystem consists of the transmit/receive system and various links within Freebird. The
communications subsystem receives inputs routed through the command and data handling system, or directly
from the data storage system. The signal is then routed through one of the redundant transponders, out to the
transmit RF switch, and then to one of the antennas. All of the components in the subsystem have been
designed with redundant back-ups.
8.3 Command
The command subsystem processes all received or generated commands and data. Data that cannot be pro-
cessed when received is stored until processor time is available. The subsystem also monitors the validity of
the commands received or generated. After verifying a command, the subsystem takes the appropriate actions.
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8.3.1
8.3.2
8.3.3
Command Architecture
The central processing unit receives information from, and outputs commands to, a variety of sources. In order
to accommodate all of the inputs and outputs, the system could have a variety of architectures. With project
Freebird, the vehicle design was a driver in selection of the computer architecture. Several possibilities were
examined, including: centralized (star), linear and ring architectures. A centralized structure has lines of com-
munication wired directly to each system. A linear architecture has a common line wired throughout the vehi-
cle, and based on the code placed on a signal, the proper system takes in the command; in the case of telemetry,
the computer analyzes the information and then forwards the signal to an external station. A ring architecture
resembles a linear architecture in that all systems are connected to the computer along a common line. The
ring, however, has all systems connected in series.
The centralized architecture is the simplest setup. In case of a failure of one of the systems, the CPU should not
suffer deleterious consequences as in the ring architecture. A failure of a system link to the CPU in a ring
architecture breaks the link between the CPU and the subsystems, forcing redundancy in pathways and con-
nections. The centralized system requires more wiring harnesses than the ring or linear setups, and extensive
rewiring and modification for the addition of nodes to the vehicle. The linear architecture is very flexible in
terms of adding or deleting nodes, while the difficulty of changing the ring system resembles that of altering
the centralized. The linear system was chosen for Freebird due to its maturity in space applications as well as
its flexibility. The design of Freebird is modular in nature, thus the linear architecture allows ease in the addi-
tion or removal of the propulsion pack or crew module.
Command Sources
Commands to the system fall into three categories. While not in flight, highest priority is given to commands to
pertorm a test of the subsystem. Giving a test command highest priority ensures that the subsystem can be
tested betbre it processes data or commands if the subsystem is suspect. Generally, the test command is given
for pre-flight checks. Second priority is given to commands from an uplink, which includes manual control by
astronauts piloting the vehicle. In the case of an emergency, the uplink from ground would take precedence
over the manual override. The on-board computer system receives lowest precedence, as it should generate
high-level commands only when operating under autonomous control. Low level commands will automati-
cally executed by the CPU.
Command of the vehicle and system comes from several sources. Under remote control, an uplink signal is the
source of instruction. Under autonomous operation, the vehicle responds to outputs from its programming. The
vehicle's sensors serve as inputs to the program. The astronauts input commands directly through the pilot's
interface while flying the craft.
The uplink signal for command is not a system driver for communication links, as it has a low data rate
requirement.
Command Decoding and Validation
The command decoder is software implemented in the central computer. Figure 8.2 gives a simplified func-
tional flow diagram of the command decoding and validation process. Command messages are sent to the cen-
tral computer from different sources as described in the above section. The command arbitrator forwards the
highest priority signal in to the command decoder for processing. Command messages are then validated prior
to any further execution. A command message in standard format consists of a synchronization code, space-
craft address bits, command message bits, and error check bits. The validation process involves the reception
of the synchronization code, check for an exact match of spacecraft address, and check for an exact match of
the command message's length and content using informations in the error check bits.
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Validated commands are deciphered by a decoding and decompression program to convert the content of the
command message into a format used by the rest of the system. The reasons commands are encoded in the first
place are to improve security and to reduce the transferred data size with the use of data compression. The
decoding software also determines the specific command output interface channel and its respective type of
signal. This process also ensures that the intended affect of the command is valid.
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FIGURI:: 8.2 Command Decoding and Validation Flow Diagram.
8.3.4 Command Outputs
The command subsystem outputs three different categories of signals. The subsystem can output a high volt-
age pulse/controller signal for actuators and servo-mechanisms. A low voltage pulse is also a possible output,
a simple digital one or zero. Finally, for communications, the computer can output a stream of data, generally a
voice communication signal.
8.3.5 Command Equipment Specifications
The choice of the central processing unit (CPU) was driven mainly by the processing needs of GNC, which
requires I 1 Million Instructions Per Second (MIPS) throughout for parameter and state identification. Teleop-
erated control of the manipulator arms, which necessitate real-time video image processing and position calcu-
lations, also require large amounts of processor time. The sizing of the CPU was based on the fact that all
computational needs on the vehicle are supplied at one central CPU. Estimates for the computational resource
required by functions on the vehicle are based on typical numbers [2] scaled up to the size and complexity of
Freebird. The total estimate of the required computing power of t5 MIPS was then doubled to allow for future
expansion of software and for worse case situation in the estimates. The final CPU size is therefore 30 MIPS.
This is well satisfied with Honeywell's Advanced Spaceborne Computer Modules (ASCM).[3] These ASCM
features 32-bit RISC multi-processors with 6 MBytes of on-board memory and operation speed of more than
40 MIPS. These modules have a MIL-STD 1553 B serial data bus, which is the data bus standard selected for
Freebird. Three of these ASCM modules are available for double redundancy. During normal operation two
modules will be in full operation while the third will be in stand-by mode. Each module requires very low
nominal and peak power of 1.52 watts and 3.2 watts respectively; and each weights approximately 0.33 kg.
They each have a reliability count of 2.5 failures per million hours of operation. All three modules are housed
in a single Control Processor Module (CPM) which is 360 cubic inches in volume and nominally draws 25.3
watts of power for its functions and for the ASCM modules inside. The CPM itself weighs 9 kilograms.
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8.4 Telemetry
8.4.1
The telemetry subsystem is responsible for monitoring the health and activity of the entire vehicle, which it
does by collecting data points from each subsystem. These data points are detailed in the summary tables
below, and will take one of three forms: analog, digital, or bi-level. The types of measurements taken will
include temperature (cabin, fuel tanks, engines), open/closed (valves and the Common Berthing Adapter), on/
off (electrical equipment) and on/off line (various sensors and backup components).
Telemetry Interfaces
The telemetry data monitored on Freebird is shown in Table 8. l. Data is monitored by the central processing
units, which then forward the data to the communications subsystem and the crew monitors. Due to the high
data rate from the propulsion system during a burn and the Remote Manipulation System (RMS), much of the
telemetry data will be processed on-board, with status data downlinked to ground. See the respective sections
for the full telemetry data for these systems.
TABLE 8.1 Summary of Downlinked Telemetry Data
# of Freq Analog/ Bits/ Data Rate
Component Telemetry lines [Hz] Digital Sample [Bits/Sec]
Structures
InterModular Interfaces
(x2)
Common Berthing Adaptor
(CBA)
RMS (x2)
Para. Antenna Gimbals Motor Position
(x2)
Omni Antenna Actuators Antenna Position
(x4)
GNC Actuators (x6) Equipment Position
Capture Latch Pos. 8 ! A
Powered Bolt Pos. 24 1 A
Attenuators Pos. 4 1 A
Capture Latch Pos. 8 1 A
Powered Bolt Pos. 24 1 A
Attenuator Pos. 4 1 A
Motor Position 7 40 D
End Effector Position 3 40 D
End Effector Force 4 20 A
End Effector Moment 4 20 A
Camera Status 2 1 D
3 10 D
I .! A
! .1 A
8 128
8 192
8 32
8 128
8 192
8 32
12 3360
8 960
8 640
8 640
1 2
12 360
12 1
8 1
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TABLE 8.1 Summary of Downlinked Telemetry Data
Component Telemetry
# of
lines
Power
Fuel Cells (x2) LOX Tank Density
LOX Temperature
LH2 Tank Density
LOX Temperature
Heater Status
Coolant Pump Status
Coolant Temperature
H2 Pump Status
Power Load
Propulsion
Main Engines (x4)
Main Engine Tanks
RCS Engines (x28)
RCS Fuel Tanks (x2)
Temperature
Pressure
Status
Valve Status
LOX Tank Pressure
LOX Tank Temp.
LH2 Tank Pressure
LH2 Tank Temp.
Temperature
Pressure
Status
Valve Status
MMH Pressure
MMH Temperature
NTO Pressure
NTO Temperature
Thermal Control
Smart Box:
Thermometers
Louvres (x2)
Radiator Heaters (x2)
Temperature
Louvre Angle
Status
18
2
1
Freq
[Hz]
20
20
20
20
10
10
10
10
5
5
5
5
1
I
1
1
Analog/ Bits/ Data Rate
Digital Sample [Bits/Sec]
A
A
A
A
D
D
A
D
A
8
8
8
8
]
1
8
I
8
A
A
D
D
A
A
A
A
A
A
D
D
A
A
A
A
1280
1280
80
320
16O
160
160
160
2240
2240
140
280
32
32
32
32
A
A
D
8
8
1
144
32
2
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TABLE 8.1 Summary of Downlinked Telemetry Data
Component Telemetry
RCS:
Thermometers Temperature
Heaters Status
Crew Module:
Thermometers
Thermostat
Air Recycling Pump (x2)
Freon Coolant
Active Cooling Pump (x2)
Louvres (x2)
Radiator Temperature (x2)
Radiator Heaters (x2)
Temperature
Temperature
Mass Flow
Status
Temperature
Status
Louvre Angle
Temperature
Status
# of
lines
Freq
[Hz]
Analog/ Bits/ Data Rate
Digital Sample [Bits/Sec]
GNC
DCS (x4) Vehicle State
Status
Rotation Rate
MIMU (x2) Vehicle State
Star Tracker Target Vector
Rendezvous Radar
Transponder (x2)
Signal Strength
Loop Stress
In-Lock
Power out
Temperature
LNS (x2) Target State
Docking Camera (x2) Status
1
1
1
1
1
i
1
1
I
1
1
1
C3T
TDRSS Transponder (x3) Signal Strength
Loop Stress
In-Lock
Power out
Temperature
64 I A 8 512
64 l D l 64
1 A 8 96
1 A 8 8
1 A 8 32
1 D I 1
I A 8 16
1 D 1 2
I A 8 32
I A 8 16
1 D 1 2
4
I
4
10
10
1
1
1
1
1
10
1
12
I
2
1
2
I
2
1
1
D 16
D 1
A 8
D 16
D 16
A 8
A 8
Bi-level 1
A 8
A 8
D 16
D l
64
I
32
160
160
160
1
A
A
Bi-level
A
A
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TABLE 8.1 Sumn_ry of Downlbtked Telemetry Data
Component
EVA UHF Transponder
(x2)
Telemetry
Signal Strength
Loop Stress
In-Lock
Power out
Temperature
CPU (x3) Agreement
Clock
Status
Parabolic Antenna (x2) Open circuit
Omni Antenna (x2) Open circuit
EVA Omni Antenna (x2) Open circuit
Pressurized Oxygen Tank Temperature
Pressure
Cabin Air Storage System Temperature
Pressure
Compressor Status
Air FlowCabin Fans
Flow Valves Status
Cabin Sensors Atmospheric Param.
Pressure Suit Pressure
Fire Detection Sensors Fire
Cargo Bay Lights Status
Extravehicular Mobility Pressure
Unit Life Signs
Total:
#of
lines
!
I
1
1
1
1
I
!
1
1
1
ECLSS
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
6
1
6
I
I
6
Freq
[Hz]
1
1
l
I
I
2
2
2
1
I
I
Analog/
Digital
A 8
A 8
Bi-level I
A 8
A 8
D 2
D 32
D I
A 8
A 8
A 8
Bits/ Data Rate
Sample [Bits/Sec]
8
8
1
8
8
4
64
2
8
8
8
A 8 8
A 8 8
A 8 8
A 8 8
D 1 1
A 8 8
D 1 2
A 8 48
A 8 8
D 1 6
D 1 1
A 8 8
A 8 48
17190
8.4.2 Telemetry Processing
Telemetry data from the various subsystems is monitored by software in the CPU. The CPU looks at each
telemetry signal and compares it to a given preset range. If that signal is outside the range, the telemetry sub-
system informs the command subsystem of the malfunction and the command subsystem reacts appropriately.
The telemetry data is then sent on to the communication subsystem for downlink to ground stations,
Each telemetry signal is monitored at a specific frequency related to its importance. Due to this, there is a set
order for reading the different signals. This order is set in advance and cycled through repeatedly. The number
of signals, sampling frequency, and bits per sample, determine the telemetry data rate.
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Additionally, the analog signals must be converted to digital form before they are read by the CPU. There are
three types of analog signals: high-level, low-level, and passive. High-level analog signals can be directly con-
verted to digital signals, whereas low-level analog signals must be amplified first. The passive analog signals
provide a voltage drop when supplied with current, which can then be converted to digital form.
8.5 Communications
The communications subsystem supports external and internal communication. The external communications
links allow information exchange between ground sources as well as the Shuttle and the Space Station, facili-
tating rendezvous, docking and tending procedures. The internal and EVA communications links allow com-
munication between astronauts.
8.5.1 Communications Scenarios
There are 5 basic communications scenarios that Freebird accommodates: docked on station, rescue around the
station, rescue elsewhere in LEO, tending in LEO, and tending in GEO.
While docked at Space Station Alpha, Freebird communicates with station personnel and systems through a
link in the common berthing adaptor. This link provides the necessary bandwidth for all telemetry and voice
data. The Space Station can then downlink Freebird's telemetry through its own communication system.
For rescues around Space Station Alpha, Freebird will either communicate directly with the station or through
TDRSS, a set of two satellites in GEO that provide communications services to most of LEO.
For rescues elsewhere in LEO and standard tending missions, Freebird communicates through TDRSS.
For missions to GEO, which are all under teleoperation, Freebird communicates through the DSN, which con-
sists of 3 ground stations around the planet that provide full coverage of all GEO orbits.
While in LEO, there will be periodic blackouts of TDRSS due to the Earth's shadow. In this case, Freebird will
transmit telemetry data to the Indian Ocean Air Force Satellite Control Network Station. If this is not possible,
Freebird will store the telemetry data and forward it to TDRSS when in view again.
8.5.2 Antenna Issues
Frequency Selection
The frequency selection for the communications system was driven by the receive frequency bands of the
external systems that Freebird will communicate with. S-Band (2.025 - 2.3 GHz) was the only band that all of
the major external systems (TDRSS, DSN, and ISSA) have in common. It was decided to go with double
redundancy of the TDRSS S-band transponders, rather installing additional transponders for Ku-band, which
would have given the system a backup in the case of Freebird's S-band transponders failing.
Data Rates
The maximum downlink data rate of the communications system is roughly 6.6 Mbps, which is the maximum
data rate that DSN can receive. DSN has the lowest downlink data rate capability of the external systems we
will be communicating with and so was the design limit. The teleoperated missions to GEO, which would be
linked through DSN, have the highest data rate requirements of all the missions, due to the necessity of a video
link, and so the system was not designed for any higher data rates. The total data rate includes continuous
telemetry data, voice communication, and one channel of video. The voice will require 56 kbps, based on a
sampling frequency of 8000 Hz, and 7 bits for each sample, including 1 control bit, using Delta Pulse Code
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Modulation. The telemetry data from all subsystems comes to 17.2 kpbs (see Table 8.1 on page 156), which
leaves 6.527 Mbps for the video link design. (see Table 8.2)
TABLE 8.2 Communications Data Rates
Information Data Rate [Mbps]
Voice 0.056
Telemetry 0.017
Video 6.527
Total 6.600
Standard video communication requires around 44 Mbps, but by utilizing various compression schemes, 6.527
Mbps satisfies the requirements of teleoperation of Freebird. There will only be one channel of video transmit-
ted while under teleoperator control, despite the fact that Freebird will have a total of four external cameras:
two used for docking and one on the end of each manipulator arm. This decision was driven by data rate con-
straints and because the remote operator will only have a need for one of the cameras at a time, depending on
whether they are docking, or moving one arm or the other. The uplink data rate is around 85 kbps, including
voice data, while in LEO. In GEO, DSN can only uplink at a data rate of 2000 bps. Therefore, only high-level
commands can be transmitted to Freebird while in GEO.
Antenna Placement
Freebird has two sets of antennas positioned on the "smartbox" module: two large parabolic antennas on either
side of the spacecraft, and a pair of omni-directional antennas for S-band communications. Another pair of
omni-directional antennas will be installed on the exterior of the Crew Module, for EVA communications. The
parabolic antennas will be retractable for launch, and gimballed in two axes for pointing. The omni-directional
antennas will be actuated
Link Sizing
The omni antennas are of standard design, roughly 50 cm in length and 5 cm in diameter, weighing about one
kilogram. They have zero gain and broadcast uniformly in space, with the exception of the two imbedded in
the body, which essentially broadcast to a hemisphere. The performance was evaluated for the scenario of rout-
ing the signal through TDRSS, and it was determined that the maximum data rate for the omni system is
around 3300 and 10000 bps for uplink (TDRSS to Freebird) and downlink respectively. The omnis will not be
used with DSN, unless the parabolic antennas experience a failure, because DSN is a single-access link.
The parabolic antennas were sized according to the worst case of the across-orbit TDRSS link, which would be
when Freebird is on one side of the Earth, communicating to the TDRSS satellite on the far side. The calcula-
tions in the link budget (see Table 8.3) assumed a minimum gain at TDRSS of 32.1 dB, which would occur at
the edge of the TDRSS field of view. The parabolic antenna will have a diameter of 1.2 meters, and will be fed
with a power of ! 50 W.
TABLE 8.:3 Worst Case Link Budget for Downlink through TDRSS
Parameter Value Units Comment
Frequency 2.25 GHz S-band
Transponder/Amplifier Power Output 150 Watts
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TABLE 8.3 Worst Case Link Budget for Downlink through TDRSS
Parameter Value Units Comment
Transmit Antenna Diameter 1.2 meters
Transmit Antenna Beamwidth 7.78 deg
Transmit Antenna Efficiency 55 % Standard for parabolic
Transmit Antenna Effective Gain 26.17 dBW
Transmit Antenna Pointing Error .5 degrees
Transmit Pointing Loss -0.05 dB
Effective Isotropic Radiated Power 46.88 dBW (Total power out of antenna)
Range 4.26 x 107 meters LEO to GEO (across orbit)
Space Path Loss - 192.1 dB
Atmos. Mean Physical Temp. 279.2 deg K
Receive Antenna Diameter (TDRSS) ! 8 meters
Receive Antenna Minimum Gain 32.1 dB [4]
System Noise Temperature 1783 deg K deg K
Noise Spectral Density - 196.1 dBW/H
Total Received Power -113.1 dB
Data Rate 6.6 x 106 bps For video downlink
Bit Error Rate Desired 1.00 x 10 -5
Required Eb/No 10 Energy per bit/noise density
Calculated Eb/N o 14.8
Margin 4 dB
8.5.3
Parabolic Antenna Pointing Strategy
The antenna is pointed by a complex hand-shaking scheme with the target communications system, whether it
be TDRSS or ISSA. GNC provides the system with a rough estimate of the position of the target, for example,
TDRSS, from simple trajectory programs for each target system which are stored in memory. A few minutes
before communications are scheduled to start, the target system points at the expected position of Freebird,
(provided by ground stations) and beams a low data rate test signal. Freebird picks up this signal and returns it
immediately, which signals the target to shift to pseudorandom code transmission, and then up to the full car-
rier signal, upon reply of each signal from Freebird. Once Freebird acquires the carrier signal it goes into an
automatic carrier tracking loop, which measures signal strength received by the antenna and corrects the
antenna pointing when the signal weakens.
Equipment Specifications
Freebird has two 1.2 m diameter parabolic center-feed antennas, two S-band omni-directional antennas, and
two VHF antennas.
To enable communication through the antennas, the vehicle has doubly redundant TDRSS-2 transponders from
Motorola[5]. Within the transponder-antenna path are filters and diplexers for signal cleaning and selection.
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The power output of the transponders is only 2.5 or 5 W, depending on the configuration, so there will be a
• Traveling Wave Tube Amplifier (TWTA) between the transponder and the antenna, in order to boost the power
up to the required 150 W. The possibility of utilizing a smaller, more reliable solid state amplifier was investi-
gated, but currently, the TWTA is more efficient at powers above l0 W, and the development of higher power
solid state amplifiers was not expected to be completed in time for utilization in this vehicle.
All of the equipment utilized by the communications subsystem has full operational capability
8.6 Failure Modes
The command, communication, control and telemetry subsystem has sufficient redundancy and reliability to
meet the requirement of 0.999 reliability. Each of communications, command and telemetry meet the reliabil-
ity required by NASA. The telemetry subsystem monitors failures within the vehicle and the CPU directs the
secondary system to take over operations. All C3T failure modes are detailed in Table 8.4.
8.6.1 Communications Failure Modes
There are two types of failures for the communications subsystem. The first is the loss of the communications
link for the parabolic antennas, while the second type is hardware failure.
If the communications link between Freebird and either TDRSS or DSN fails, Freebird will lose voice and
video communications with ground controllers. In the case of DSN, the telemetry link will also be lost due to
the fact that telemetry is also sent over the parabolic antennas. After the loss of the communications lock, Free-
bird will attempt to reestablish contact following the same procedure used in establishing the original link.
The communications subsystem utilizes redundancy in all components, such that it can survive a single failure
in any component. However, a double failure in most components would lead to a failure of the mission. Addi-
tionally, there are three separate internally redundant transponders, so that a double failure of the complete
transponder would not shutdown the communication subsystem. In the case of the failure of a single compo-
nent, the central processing unit would detect the failure in the telemetry data from that area, and route the
communications signal around that component. The loss of the antenna pointing for both of the parabolic
antennas will require Freebird to either point the antenna by reorienting the vehicle or utilizing the omni
antenna as the sole mode of communication. This would reduce the data rate for uplink and downlink through
TDRSS to 3300 and 10000 bps, respectively. The omni is capable of uplink and downlink data rates of and 2
and 250 kbps through DSN.
8.6.2 Command and Control Failure Modes
The Command and Control subsystem assumes a very critical role in a mission of Freebird, and requires a very
high level of reliability to assure successful missions. Since this subsystem is implemented in the central com-
puters, its failure modes can be taken to be those of the computer system. Due to the high level of reliability
required, the computer system is implemented with double redundancy. Each computer module has a tested
reliability of 2.5 failures per million hours of operation. Double redundancy, with the possibility of resetting
any module that crashes improves the reliability to less than 0.8 failure per million hours of operation. During
normal operation all three computer modules will operate concurrently, with the capability of removing one
from the control system if there is problem. The failed computer would then be shutdown, reset, or re-pro-
grammed. With a single failure, ground control can either decide to continue the mission or to abort it and
return to ISSA. With two computers failed there is an absolute need to return to ISSA, and triple failure would
be mission critical and life threatening to any crew on-board.
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TABLE 8.4 Failure Modes
Component
TDRSS
Transponder
and amplifier
EVA
Transponder
and antenna
S-band
antennas
CPU
Failure Mode
single failure
Effect
No visible effect
triple failure
Response
Utilize backup
double failure No visible effect Utilize backup
Return to ISSA
single failure
double failure
single failure
double failure
No Communi-
cations
No visible effect
No Communi-
cations with EVA
Astronauts
No visible effect
Communications
through same
antenna
No visible effectsingle failure
double failure No visible effect
triple failure No control
Utilize backup
Astronauts return
to craft
Astronauts return
to craft
Use other antenna
Return to ISSA
Change voting
scheme
Eliminate voting,
return to ISSA
Criticality
Crewed
Config. Teleop.
2 1
2 N/A
2 2
1 l
Comparator
Data
Recording
Unit
single failure
double failure
single
No visible effect
No visible effect
Can't record data
Use backup
arbitrator
Return to ISSA
using only one
CPU
8.7 Summary Budgets
Table 8.5 gives a summarized version of the mass, power and volume budget for the whole subsystem. The
command, communications, control and telemetry subsystem will cost approximately 6 to 8 million dollars for
hardware, which is well within the allotted budget. The numbers for mass, power, volume, and cost for the var-
ious components either come directly from the manufacturer, or were arrived at by analogy.t6] Table 8.6 gives
a summary of telemetry and command signal generated by components this subsystem.
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TABLE 8.5 Summary Budgets
Component
TDRSS Transponder
(Motorola)
EVA Transponder
Power Amplifier
(Hughes)
Parabolic Antenna
(TRW)
S-Band Omni Antenna
EVA Omni Antenna
Internal
Communication
Network
Harnessing
Processors (Honeywell)
Data Recording Unit
# of Units
3
N/A
Total
Mass [kg]
19
15
10
10
Peak
Power
[wl
135
2O
106
0
0
I0
36
Stand-By
Power
[w]
9
10
0
0
25
Volume
[m31
.0114
0.004
0.0245
0.0019
0.0019
0.0007
0.0017
0.0032
TABLE 8.6 Telemetry and Command
Component
TDRSS Transponder (x3)
EVA UHF Transponder (x2)
Telemetry
Signal Strength
Loop Stress
In -Lock
Power out
Temperature
Signal Strength
Loop Stress
In-Lock
Power out
Temperature
# of
lines
1
1
1
1
!
I
I
1
1
1
Freq.
[Hz]
I
1
l
1
1
I
I
1
1
1
Analog/
Digital
A
A
Bi-Level
A
A
A
A
Bi-Level
A
A
Command
Coherent Mode
Enable Stand-by
PRN ON/OFF
Subcarrier ON/OFF
Coherent Mode
Enable Stand-by
PRN ON/OFF
Subcarrier ON/OFF
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TABLE 8.6 Telemetry and Command
Component Telemetry
CPU (x3) Agreement
Clock
Status
Parabolic Antenna (x2) Open circuit
Extended
Omni Antenna (x2) Open circuit
Extended
EVA Omni Antenna (x2) Open circuit
Extended
Data Recording Unit Status
#of
lines
!
I
i
I
1
1
1
1
1
I
Freq.
[Hz]
2
2
2
I
I
I
I
I
I
I00
Analog/
Digital
D -2 bit
D- 32 bit
D - 2 bit
A
A
A
A
A
A
D
Command
Extend
Extend
Extend
Read/Write
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9
Environmental Control and Life Support
System
The main goal of the Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) is to provide a habitable and
comfortable environment in which the crew of Freebird can function. This environment is contained within the
crew module, a cylindrically shaped pressure vessel that is attached to the front of the base unit in the craft's
crewed configuration (Figure 14.4 on page 247). The ECLSS has been designed to require the minimum mass,
volume, power, and cost while still achieving acceptable safety and reliability values. The ECLSS has been
assigned an overall reliability of 0.9994. Levels of redundancy within life critical and mission critical sub-
systems have helped to achieve this value.
9.1 ECLSS Requirements
Many of the ECLSS design requirements are driven by the Freebird top level system requirements and by
human physiological and psychological tolerances. The primary system level requirements that drive the
ECLSS design are to sustain both a crew of three for a four day satellite repair mission and a crew of eight for
twenty-four hours in an emergency crew rescue mission. The additional ECLSS design requirements are listed
below.
The crew module must:
• provide a cabin atmosphere which is maintainable both within the human comfort range and within the
operating range of cabin equipment.
• provide a waste management system to dispose gaseous, liquid, and solid wastes.
• provide expendables such as oxygen, food, and water.
• safely accommodate crew members during all mission phases.
• provide extravehicular activity (EVA) capability and apparatus.
• provide emergency systems,
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9.2 ECLSS Interfaces
From the responsibilities and requirements previously discussed, six subsystems within the ECLSS have been
created. These groups include atmosphere control, waste management, expendables, cabin layout, emergency
systems, and EVA. The functional block diagram, shown in Figure 9.1, presents an overview of the crew cabin
design, showing the subsystems, the main subsystem components, and external and internal interfaces. The
main external interfaces occur with the structure, power, and thermal systems. Many life critical components
are partially or fully redundant; this redundancy is necessary to meet the high reliability required of a manned
spacecraft.
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FIGURE 9.1 Environmental Control and Life Support System Functional Block Diagram.
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9.3 Human Physiological Tolerances
In order to design the life support systems for Freebird, first it is necessary to understand human tolerances to
the adverse conditions encountered in Earth orbit. Because the safety of the crew is crucial to any successful
mission, the tolerance limits must be avoided when preparing an artificial cabin environment.
9.3.1 Pressure
Sea level pressure of 101.3kPa can be considered the optimum pressure environment for the human body.
Freebird operates in a near-vacuum environment, therefore the effects of low pressures on the human body is
the primary concern. A decrease in total atmospheric pressure may result in decompression sickness, com-
monly known as divers' "bends." The bends may occur when a decrease in pressure surrounding a fluid-filled
cavity (such as the human body) forces gas trapped in the liquid to evolve out of solution. Initial human symp-
toms include pain around body joints, while severe cases of the bends can affect the lungs, heart, and central
nervous system, causing breathing difficulty, shock, and even death. The occurrence of the bends limits the
effectiveness of EVA performed by crew members, and will be discussed further in Section 9.8.2 on page 184.
When the pressure surrounding a volume of liquid is decreased, boiling of that liquid occurs at lower tempera-
tures. At an ambient pressure of 6.3kPa, water vaporizes at human body temperature (37°C). If the cabin pres-
sure falls below 6.3kPa, crew members' body tissues begin to vaporize, resulting in a life-threatening
condition known as ebullism [1].
One final concern with pressure loss involves a condition known as barotrauma. Barotrauma is the destruction
of body tissue due to any rapid change in pressure. Rapid changes in pressure can affect gas-filled body cavi-
ties, such as the lungs, gut, middle-ear, and sinuses. A severe and life-threatening case, such as the rupture of
lung tissue can occur with sudden pressure changes of 10.7kPa and higher [1]. The danger of barotrauma
requires that adjustments in cabin pressure be performed gradually [2].
9.3.2 Temperature
The ideal temperature for a lightly clothed person is between II°C and 27°C [I]. Because temperature
extremes in Earth orbit may range from -113°C to 1100°C, Freebird must be capable of both storing and radiat-
ing heat, depending on its orientation to the Sun. The human body cannot withstand a change in core tempera-
ture of greater than +5°C for an extended period of time. Air temperatures above 37°C (human body
temperature) are not desirable, because the body will cease to radiate heat and will begin to absorb heat, possi-
bly torcing a hazardous elevation in core temperature.
While various layers of clothing can trap body heat and combat the effects of low air temperatures, the effects
of the cold are equally dangerous. Local frostbite, and ultimately gangrene, can occur in tissue that has been
exposed to intense cold. If core temperature falls below 35°C, hypothermia may develop.
While changes in core temperature are certainly undesirable, it is also necessary to understand the narrow
human comfort range. Although air temperature conditions may not be immediately life-threatening, even
mild thermal discomfort has a strong effect on human performance. It has been observed that at least 5% of
any large group will be uncomfortable at any one air temperature. Thus, Freebird's thermal control system
must provide a means of manual temperature control, via clothing choice or local air circulation, in order to
maintain optimum crew comfort and performance [1 ].
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9.3.3 Humidity
Percent relative humidity indicates the percentage content of water vapor in an atmosphere. At high levels of
humidity, condensation occurs and bacteria and fungi growth increases in moist skin folds. The body's thermo-
regulation system can also be affected since high humidity compromises the body's ability to lose heat through
the normal evaporation of perspiration. Low levels of humidity lead to drying of exposed mucous membranes
of the nose and throat, inactivation of the protective cilia of the bronchial tubes (resulting in greater chance of
infection), chapping of the lips, and drying of the eyes. The optimal water vapor pressure for human comfort is
considered to be 1.33kPa. In past U.S. spacecraft, the vapor pressure has been adjustable from 0.8 to 1.9kPa
(30% to 70% relative humidity) [1].
9.3.4 Gas Concentrations
Oxygen
The composition of Earth's atmosphere at sea level is 20.9% oxygen, 78% nitrogen, 0.04% carbon dioxide,
and trace gases. More important than the concentrations are the partial pressures: 21.3kPa oxygen, 79.7kPa
nitrogen, and 40.5Pa carbon dioxide.
Oxygen is certainly the most crucial component in any atmosphere, and hypoxia, the lack of 02, may be the
most serious hazard facing any astronaut. The effects of hypoxia are seen very rapidly, and a lower oxygen par-
tial pressure results in even faster onslaught. At atmospheric oxygen pressures between 21.3kPa and 4.6kPa,
mild hypoxia may occur, causing increasing visual, mental, and motor skills impairment as the pressure is
reduced; however, these low partial pressures are survivable. Extended exposure to partial pressures below
4.6kPa ultimately result in unconsciousness and death within as few as 4 minutes.
Oxygen partial pressures above the normal sea level value can cause oxygen poisoning, or hyperoxia. How-
ever, Apollo astronauts exposed to increased oxygen pressures for up to two weeks demonstrated changes in
blood forming tissue, but no adverse effects. Thus it is generally believed that hyperoxia is not a major concern
on such short missions [2].
Finally, a high concentration of oxygen in a closed environment greatly increases the risk of fire, which cer-
tainly poses a threat to the crew.
Nitrogen
Although nitrogen is the largest component of the Earth's atmosphere, proper function of the human body is
not directly dependent on nitrogen consumption. Therefore high concentrations of nitrogen do not appear to
affect human functions. As evidenced by the early pure oxygen environments of Mercury, Gemini, and ini-
tially Apollo, low concentrations of nitrogen also do not cause adverse effects. In fact, a low nitrogen concen-
tration can actually prevent decompression sickness, since less nitrogen is absorbed into body tissues.
Carbon Dioxide
Unusual levels of carbon dioxide can also affect health. When respiratory frequency is abnormally increased
(hyperventilation), the lungs expire larger amounts of carbon dioxide. Since carbon dioxide in the body com-
bines with water to form carbonic acid, reducing CO 2 levels forces the body chemistry to become alkaline.
Symptoms of this hyperventilation effect include dizziness, anxiety, and muscle spasms.
Carbon dioxide intoxication can occur when levels of CO 2 in the blood rise slightly above the normal pressure
of 5.3kPa. Heightened levels of CO 2 in the atmosphere also affect the acid-base chemistry of the body, causing
symptoms of confusion, breathing difficulty, and rapid heart rate. Although the CO 2 pressure at Earth sea level
is 40.5Pa, previous space missions such as the Shuttle have set a safe upper limit of 101Pa [I].
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9.3.5 Radiation
Since ionizing radiation is capable of dissociating a substance in solution into its constituent ions, overexpo-
sure can be extremely harmful to living tissue. Short-term effects to increasing dosages of ionizing radiation
range from minor blood changes (10 to 50rem) to vomiting, nausea, and bleeding (200 to 350rem) to certain
death (above 600rem). Human tissue response to radiation varies markedly depending upon the rate of active
tissue growth. Fast growth tissue, such as the gonads and bone marrow, are extremely sensitive to radiation,
while slow growth tissue, such as muscle and cartilage, are quite insensitive. Table 9.1 shows NASA radiation
exposure limits for astronauts. These values can be used to determine exposure levels and radiation protection
for the crew of Freebird, using the conversion 1 rem is roughly equal to 1 rad in low earth orbit [2]. Methods of
radiation protection are described in Section 3.4.2 on page 70.
TABLE 9.1 NASA Radiation Exposure Limits for Crew Members [2].
Bone Marrow Skin Ocular Lens Testes
Constraint (rem at 5cm) (rem at 0.1mm) (rem at 3mm) (rem at 3cm)
1-year average daily dose 0.2 0.6 0.3 0. i
30-day maximum 25 75 37 13
Quarterly maximum 34 105 52 18
Yearly maximum 75 225 112 38
Career limit 400 1200 600 200
9.3.6 Acceleration
The zero-g environment has been thoroughly studied, and many long and short term effects on the human body
have been observed. Since Freebird crewmembers originate from the zero-g Space Station environment, it is
assumed that Freebird's crew will already be accustomed to the effects of weightlessness.
However, accelerations exceeding one-g can pose a hazard to a crew member depending upon the intensity,
duration, and axis of placement. The body is most sensitive to g-loading in the +/- Z direction (feet to head)
because abnormal blood pressures result in the brain. The best direction for withstanding g-loading is the X
(chest to back) direction. Figure 9.2 explains how human acceleration tolerances vary with the direction of
acceleration.
9.4 Cabin Layout
The interior cabin layout of Freebird's crew module is designed to allow the astronauts adequate space and
comfort while minimizing the volume, mass, and cost required to achieve this goal. The main trade-off
addressed involved evaluating crew comfort versus cost constraints. Factors that could affect crew psycholog-
ical state and productivity, such as adequate personal space, are also addressed in the design. A value of 2m 3
per person was chosen for minimum volume allowance [4]. Using the rescue configuration as a worst case sce-
nario, in which the cabin must accommodate eight people, a minimum volume requirement of 20m 3 was deter-
mined.
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9.2 Variation of Human Tolerance with Direction of Acceleration [3].
Overall Cabin Layout
A diagram of the crew module's overall layout is shown in Figure 9.3. The crew module is comprised of a
cylindrically shaped pressure vessel with a radius of 2.96m, a length of 4.7m, and a sixty degree cap at the
front end. These dimensions were defined by the launch bay of the primary crew module launch vehicle, the
Proton C. This module is configured to accommodate a three man crew during normal operations. Two pilot's
chairs are positioned at the front end of the craft, near controls and displays necessary for communication and
monitoring and control of Freebird. A third seat is positioned in the center of the craft for the remaining astro-
naut. Windows, displays, and controls, located above the seats, assist the operator of the Remote Manipulator
System (RMS). This orientation provides the best view for the astronaut controlling the RMS because most
EVA and repair operations occur directly above the windows. Towards the aft of the vehicle is the common
berthing adaptor (CBA) under which the Extravehicular Mobility Units (EMU) for EVA are stored. A curtain
can be placed across the aft section to provide space for privacy. An airlock was not chosen in this design for
reasons that are further described in Section 9.8.1 on page 184. The components of the atmospheric control
system are located beneath the cabin floor, and are accessible for maintenance purposes. Storage space for
food, water, clothing, and waste is accessible on the walls around the cabin. Two cargo and EVA tool storage
areas have been placed in the aft section of the craft and are accessible only from outside Freebird. Fire detec-
Freebird Final Report
Cabin Layout 175
RMS Controls
EMU Storage 2BA
Windows Cargo
Bay
Holds
Main
(
Gas Storage
Tanks (located
under floor)
FIGURE 9.3 Diagram of the Crew Module Cabin Layout.
tion sensors and fire extinguishers are positioned throughout the cabin, and an emergency medical and tool kit
is located within the wall cabinets.
9.4.2 Human Interface Environment
In order to properly operate Freebird in the crewed configuration, an interface is required between the crew and
the spacecraft systems. The crew must be able to input information to the craft and receive information in
return. In an enclosed environment and possibly an emergency situation this exchange of commands and infor-
mation must be as accurate and efficient as possible. Controls and displays throughout the cabin allow for
information exchange. In addition, windows near the RMS controls can assist in the control of the RMS during
EVA and repair operations.
Controls
Astronauts aboard Freebird require controls in order to input information, to communicate, to control the
RMS, to adjust the atmosphere control system manually, and to pressurize/depressurize the cabin. The main
input devices are onboard keyboards and joysticks. The RMS controls are placed above the seats. Controls for
positioning the spacecraft are located both near the RMS controls and on the front consoles near the pilots'
chairs. Controls to pressurize/depressurize the cabin are located near the CBA at the back of the cabin. Redun-
dant or manual controls are located in the front portion of the cabin near the pilots' chairs.
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Displays
Displays show the status of essential subsystems aboard Freebird. Computer monitors are placed on the front
console and in addition computer and television monitors are placed near the RMS controls.
Windows
Windows are placed on the ceiling near the RMS controls. In addition to providing the crew with a spectacular
view, windows allow the pilot and the RMS operator a direct view of EVA activities, the RMS, and docking
which may be critical if manual docking becomes necessary in an emergency.
9.4.3 Seating and Restraints
The cabin seats are required to withstand a three-g maximum load along the X axis, to be lightweight, com-
pact, and cost efficient. The two seats chosen for the pilot positions are the standard shuttle commander/pilot
seats, which are compact, light weight, and reliable. For the third seat in the standard configuration and the
additional rescue seats required the standard shuttle specialist seats were chosen, which are light weight, com-
pact, reliable, and stowable (see Figure 9.4).
FIGURE t.4
Rescue Seats
Rescue Seats
Rescue Seat Configuration.
The RMS operator must be securely positioned to reach both the RMS controls and the Freebird attitudinal
controls. A standard foot restraint, such as the variable height work platform that is used in the shuttle aft crew
station will be used to locate the RMS operator on the ceiling [5].
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9.5 Cabin Atmosphere Control
Within the ECLSS, the atmosphere control system must be considered as the most mission critical subsystem.
The exchange of gases between humans and their surroundings is the most immediately critical biological
function; as mentioned earlier, death may occur in minutes during hypoxic emergencies. Thus the responsibil-
ity of the atmospheric control system lies in providing a comfortable and very reliable climate for the crew of
Freebird.
A description of the trade-offs and choices made concerning various aspects of the cabin environment is given
below.
Pressure
In the past, the pressure of spacecraft cabins has been maintained at either Earth sea level (101.3kPa) or lower
pressures.Table 9.2 shows the main trade-offs involved between these two options.After examining the trade-
offs involved, it has been decided that a combination of pressure levels, such as is used aboard the Shuttle,
would best meet the mission needs. Because Freebird must dock with the International Space Station Alpha
(ISSA) prior to embarking on a crewed mission, it is pressurized to 101.3kPa during stand-by and docking pro-
cedures. Cabin pressure is then lowered to 70.3kPa in order to reduce the required EVA pre-breathe time[l][5].
The 70.3kPa pressure level is equivalent to the pressure at 8,500ft altitude on Earth (the altitude of a typical
Rocky Mountain ski resort), which is certainly a habitable pressure, even with normal N 2 and 02 composition
[ 1]. Because of weight constraints, Freebird lacks an airlock; instead, all crew members must don either pres-
sure suits or Extravehicular Mobility Units (EMU) before the cabin is completely depressurized, during which
time two astronauts egress to carry out EVA. Typically the rate of pressure change during such a depressuriza-
tion is limited by specification to 0.7kPa/second [2]. However, Freebird will depressurize in approximately 10
minutes, at a slower rate of 0.012kPa/second due to safety and power concerns. Only after the final EVA is
complete is the cabin pressure again increased to 101.3kPa.
TABLE 9.2 Cabin Pressure Options
Options
Sea Level
Pressure
Lower
Pressure
Advantages
easy to acclimate to natural cabin
atmosphere
compatible to ISSA pressure
less structure required for pressure vessel
less EVA prep time required
Disadvantages
requires 3.5 hour EVA prep time
must increase oxygen concentration to
prevent hypoxia (results in a fire hazard)
incompatible with ISSA pressure
Temperature
The trade-offs involving thermal control of the cabin are discussed in Section 6.4.2 on page 112. The cabin
temperature is maintained by a heat exchanger between 18°C and 22°C. This exchange of heat is monitored by
an automated system with manual control override for individual crew comfort.
Humidity
The problems with humidity in spacecraft cabins almost always concerns excess levels. Humidity aboard Free-
bird is controlled within the active thermal control system, which is discussed in Section 6.4.2 on page 112.
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Gas Composition
In the past, the gas composition of a spacecraft cabin atmosphere has been either pure oxygen or a combination
of oxygen and nitrogen. The various trade-offs concerning these two options are listed in Table 9.3. The pure
oxygen environment has been eliminated primarily because of the severe risk of fire inherent in such an atmo-
sphere. Since the tragic Apollo 1 fire in 1967, NASA spacecraft have utilized O2/N 2 atmospheres as a standard
design. For these reasons, Freebird also utilizes a mixed atmosphere.
Because astronauts must board Freebird from the ISSA, the atmosphere composition is maintained at ISSA
levels of 80% N 2 and 20% 02 during stand-by and docking procedures. During partial depressurization to
70.3kPa, the composition usually remains the same; however, the oxygen level is adjustable in case symptoms
of hypoxia set in at such low pressure.
Supply of Atmospheric Gases
Since nitrogen is not used by the human body in any manner, the oxygen supply system is the main concern
when providing necessary gases to the atmosphere control system. A variety of supply methods have been
used aboard spacecraft in the past. Previous Russian spacecraft, such as Vostok, Voskhod, and Soyuz, have uti-
lized a solid chemical system to supply oxygen to the life support system. In such a system, oxygen is released
when a controlled amount of water is reacted with a solid alkali superoxide. As an additional benefit, the reac-
tant product which results has the ability to absorb carbon dioxide. Although this cycle seems ideal, American
experience with this supply method is limited, and information on the Soviet system is difficult to obtain.
NASA has used either high pressure or cryogenic oxygen supply systems in past American space vehicles.
Very short missions such as the Mercury series used oxygen stored in bottles, while the two-man Gemini cap-
sule carried both pressurized bottles and cryogenic tanks _f oxygen. All of NASA's larger and longer missions
have demanded the use of a cryogenic supply system.
TABLE 9.3 Cabin Gas Composition Options
Options
Pure Oxygen
Advantages
no EVA prep time required
simple, one-component gas system
Disadvantages
EXTREME FIRE HAZARD
not compatible with ISSA
undesirable hyperoxia symptoms
0 2 / N 2 compatible with ISSA requires some EVA prep time
Mixture
more natural breathing environment complex, two-component gas system
The oxygen consumed by a three-person crew for four days amounts to 19.2kg, including a factor of safety of
two because of the extreme importance of adequate oxygen supply to crew survival. A comparison has been
performed between a steel (pressure vessel steel HY-130) high pressure tank and a cryogenic tank, both
designed to store 19.2kg of oxygen. Table 9.4 shows the calculated mass and volume of each tank, including
the trade-offs that have been considered. Because of the reduced power, mass, and complexity, a high pressure
oxygen tank system is used to supply oxygen to Freebird's atmosphere control system. This tank is pressurized
to 22,700kPa (similar to the Shuttle nitrogen gas pressure vessels [5]) and is kept at a temperature of 298°K, so
that no additional heating is required before the gas is introduced into the cabin. Because of the highly critical
nature of this supply system, a redundant oxygen tank filled with 19.2kg of 02 and with completely indepen-
dent piping is used.
Because the crew module of Freebird lacks an airlock, it is necessary to perform a depressurization/repressur-
_zation cycle for each egress and ingress involved with EVA. This amounts to a total of six cycles and results in
an additional 125kg of 02 and N 2 required to repressurize the cabin six times. However, if during depressur-
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ization the cabin atmosphere is stored rather than vented overboard, this 125kg of gas can be saved. Thus Free-
bird carries an additional steel pressure vessel, to store the compressed cabin atmosphere during
depressurization. Such a vessel requires 0.06m 3 in volume and weighs approximately 18kg. In addition a com-
pressor with a mass of approximately 50kg is required to pump the cabin atmosphere into the storage tank.
Assuming 70% efficiency, such a compressor requires a peak power of roughly 5kW if the rate of depressur-
ization is maintained at 0.Ol2kPa/second as mentioned in "Pressure" on page 177.
TABLE 9.4 Comparison of High Pressure and Cryogenic Oxygen Tanks [6][7]
System
High Pressure
Dry
Mass [kg]
17.2
Volume [m 3]
0.07
Remarks
volume varies greatly with tank pressure
mass varies greatly with tank temperature
gas may require heating if tank temperature is low
Cryogenic 23 0.012 additional power required for cooling/heating
Atmospheric Control System Components
The atmosphere control system, shown in Figure 9.5 actually encompasses a variety of subsystems. Cabin air
enters the flow loop through vents in the cabin walls. This flow is circulated through the system by a series of
redundant fans. Within the system lies the scrubbing unit, responsible for removing both carbon dioxide and
trace contaminants from the cabin atmosphere. The atmosphere scrubbing system is further described in
Section 9.7.1 on page 181. The cabin thermal control system is also connected in the flow loop; excess heat
and humidity are removed by a head exchanger. The fully-redundant oxygen supply system, consisting of two
pressurized storage tanks, supplies fresh oxygen to the flow loop. During depressurization, a pressure suit is
also connected to the cabin atmospheric control system, in order to protect the crew member remaining in the
cabin during EVA. The pressure suit, modeled after the original Mercury suit, is pressurized to 55.16kPa,
which alleviates the need to prebreathe prior to entering the suit [8]. Air evacuated from the cabin during each
depressurization is compressed into a storage tank until it is reused during repressurization. Solenoid valves
regulate and direct flow throughout the system. These valves are intended to be adjusted both automatically
and manually via cabin controls.
9.6 Expendables
Because the various Freebird missions are expected to last up to four days, a supply of food and water must be
carried aboard to sustain the crew. Replenishment is crucial to maintaining the crew at optimum performance
levels. The quantity of expendables required aboard Freebird is driven by the four day satellite repair mission
rather than the 24 hour crew rescue mission.
9.6.1 Water
Freebird is powered by fuel cells, which derive energy from the exothermic reaction of hydrogen and oxygen
(refer to Section 4.3 on page 82). Water is a product of this reaction, and can be used for human consumption.
However, this process requires a filtering system and a distribution unit. Because the fuel ceils are located in
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FIGURE 9.5 Schematic Diagram of the Atmospheric Control System.
the "smartbox" of Freebird, forming a connection with the crew module would require a bulky piping system.
Given the short duration of the Freebird mission, stored water is used as the supply.
Hygiene
It has been determined that crew members may last up to four days without concerning themselves with per-
sonal hygiene. In addition, Apollo and Shuttle astronauts have completed two week missions without the use
of a full-body shower; therefore, due to lack of necessity a shower is not included in the Freebird cabin. How-
ever, in case of tissue contamination from feces, urine, or other distasteful substance, Freebird is equipped with
wet, bactericidal, and general utility wipes. These wipes are quite small and may be stored in pockets within
the clothing of the crew. The self-contained hand washing system aboard the shuttle was not chosen because of
the increased mass, volume, and complexity inherent in its design.
Consumption
Although a person at rest requires approximately 2.5L of water per day, this figure is doubled because the
astronauts aboard Freebird will be performing strenuous EVA. Water for consumption is provided in refillable
flexible pouches with a capacity of 2.7L, similar to those used during Project Mercury. In this manner, the
pouches may be refilled by the Space Station water supply system during Freebird's stand-by mode. Ionic sil-
ver is added to this water as a preservative and sterilizing agent, since the taste of water deteriorates within 18
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to 20 hours when stored at room temperatures. In addition, juice pouches may also be carried on board to pro-
vide a variety of beverages for the crew [1]. A total of 60kg of water is required aboard Freebird, which
includes a safety margin of 1.2. Although water and food are considered non-mission critical, a small factor of
safety is added to ensure the comfort and morale of the crew. The water bottles require 0.06m 3 of space within
the cabin.
9.6.2 Food
Although humans can survive without food for many days, nourishment is provided aboard Freebird in order
to maintain the crew's optimum performance levels. The basic energy requirement for a 70kg person at rest is
2,000kcal/day. This value can increase to 4,500kcal/day if strenuous activity such as EVA is undertaken. This
upper caloric requirement roughly translates into Ikg (dry mass) of food per day, a value which depends
strongly on the nutrients within the foodstuff [1] [9].
Because of the short mission, a food preparation system (rehydration, refrigeration, and heating) such as that
aboard the Shuttle is considered too costly from a mass, volume, and complexity point of view. Therefore,
food is provided in thermostabilized, dehydrated, and natural form, and is similar the packaged foods provided
aboard the Shuttle [ I ]. Chemical heat packs may be provided as a simple method of heating certain food items
to desired levels. Including a safety margin of 1.2, a total of 15kg of food is provided, requiring a volume of
approximately 0.03m 3. Because the cabin is depressurized during EVA egress and ingress, the food and water
must be stored in a pressurized container. This food storage container has a mass of approximately l kg, a total
volume of 0. l m 3, and can store up to 0.09m 3 of food and water.
9.7 Waste Management
The human body produces the majority of the waste on Freebird in the form of solids, liquids, and gases. Other
wastes include used lithium hydroxide canisters, food wrappers, and towelettes. The waste management sys-
tem on Freebird disposes of all waste produced on board cleanly and compactly to maintain a pleasant and
healthy living environment.
9.7.1 Gas Waste
Carbon dioxide is the waste product of human respiration. Humans produce approximately ! kg/day of CO 2. To
avoid an accumulation of CO 2 gas in the cabin atmosphere and to comply with NASA regulations (the partial
pressure of CO 2 must not exceed 0.4kPa), Freebird contains a lithium hydroxide CO 2 scrubbing system [1].
Table 9.5 shows the different methods considered for carbon dioxide removal. The molecular sieve, solid
amine, and liquid-sorbent/membrane contactor systems are all recyclable methods for removing CO 2 from the
cabin atmosphere. These systems are appropriate for long-duration missions on a closed-loop environment
spacecraft because they have long lifetimes, and they are able to convert the CO 2 to another usable product.
These systems require more mass and power and are more expensive than a simple lithium hydroxide system.
Because Freebird's missions are limited to four days, the lithium hydroxide system is used.
The LiOH scrubbing system consists of two canisters of lithium hydroxide set up in parallel. Cabin fans circu-
late the air through one of the canisters until it is used. The air is then circulated through the second canister,
and the first is replaced by a new canister. The empty tanks will be stored and disposed of on ISSA. Each can-
ister lasts approximately 24 hours; therefore, each mission will CatTy five new LiOH canisters.
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TABLE 9.5 Methods of Carbon Dioxide Removal
System
Molecular
sieve
Solid amine
Liquid-
sorbent/
membrane-
contactor
Lithium
hydroxide
Mass
Medium
Medium
Low
Low for short-duration
missions
Power
High - requires
heat and vacuum
source
High
Medium
Very low - fan
used to circulate
air through cabin
Method of Use
Beds of zeolite material absorb CO 2 and
water. CO 2 iS then removed by heating
the beds [ 10].
Two beds of solid amine alternately
absorb the CO 2 and then desorb it to
space vacuum. Beds are heated to remove
CO 2 [l].
CO 2 rich air is circulated on one side of a
hollow fiber membrane contactor and
CO 2 is absorbed into the liquid sorbent.
CO 2 is removed using a vacuum
compressor. Sorbent is recycled [ I ! ].
Cabin air is pumped through disposable
LiOH canister. CO 2 combines irreversibly
with the chemical and uncontaminated air
passes back into the cabin [12].
9.7.2 Liquid Waste
The only liquid waste produced on board Freebird is human urine and perspiration. The astronauts produce
approximately 1.4kg/day of urine [1 ]. This waste must be disposed of cleanly and easily both to avoid disease
and to maintain a positive crew attitude. On Freebird, the astronauts use a urine receptacle assembly. The urine
is stored on board to be disposed of when Freebird returns to the ISSA.
Several options were considered for a urine collection system on Freebird. The urine transfer system, used on
Mercury, Gemini, and some Apollo missions, consisted of a rubber cuff connected to a flexible bag [12]. The
waste was either immediately disposed of into the overboard dumping system, or stored in bags for later dis-
posal. The urine receptacle assembly which was used from the Apollo 12 mission onwards, consisted of an
open ended hand held cylindrical container. Urine was held in the container by the capillary action of a hydro-
philic honeycomb screen. The urine was stored in a dump line until it was full, then the urine was disposed of
through a valve open to the space vacuum [12]. The waste management system on the Space Shuttle is a com-
mode/urinal system which resembles the common toilet. The urine is sucked by a fan into a waste water tank
which is vented when full [51.
The factors used to choose the liquid waste collection system for Freebird include mass, volume, cost, power
requirements, and appeal to crew. The waste collection system trade-offs are shown in Table 9.5. The urinal
system is most appealing to the crew because it is clean and easy to use; however, it has a mass of 66kg and
costs approximately $5 million [13]. Both the urine transfer system and the urine receptacle assembly have low
weight, volume, cost, and power requirements.However, the urine receptacle assembly is more appealing
because limited intimate contact is necessary. A system similar to the urine receptacle assembly is used on
Freebird because of its low mass, cost, and power requirements, and its medium appeal to crew.
9.7.3 Solid Waste
Humans produce between 0.1 to 0.2kg of solid waste per day [ 1]. In an enclosed environment such as Freebird,
it is important to dispose of this waste cleanly, efficiently, and easily. The waste must be managed so that odor
Freebird Final Report
Extravehicular Activities (EVA) 183
TABLE 9.6 Liquid Waste Collection Systems
System
Urine
Transfer
System
Urine
Receptacle
Assembly
Mass
Low
Low
Cost
Low
Low
Power
Requirements
Low
Low
Appeal to Crew
Not popular
because requires
intimate contact
Somewhat
unpleasing, but
skin contact can be
avoided
Urinal/ High Millions of dollars High Popular- easy and
Commode clean to use
and bacteria are controlled. Solid waste is disposed of on Freebird using the glove method and plastic bags for
storage. A privacy area is located in the back of the cabin under the common breathing adapter.
Two methods of solid waste management were considered for Freebird. The first was a commode similar to the
one on the Space Shuttle. This commode resembles the common toilet. The solid waste is shredded by rotating
vanes, deposited on the sides of the commode, dried, and stored [13]. The second method considered was the
glove method used on the Apollo missions. A rubber bag which has strength and elasticity is taped to the but-
tocks. The feces are collected in the bag, and the bag is kneaded to mix in a bactericide which decomposes the
waste. The bags are rolled to reduce volume and stored [12].
Table 9.5 shows the trade-offs for the two human fecal waste management systems. The commode is appealing
to the crew because it is clean and easy to use; however, its mass, power, and cost requirements prohibit its use
on Freebird. The glove method has low mass, power and cost requirements, and has been chosen for use
aboard Freebird. In order to ease the burden of using the glove method, the astronauts are fed a diet high in
fiber to ensure firm feces.
TABLE 9.7 Solid Waste Collection Systems
System
Commode
Glove
Mass
High
Low
Cost
High
Low
Power
Requirements
High
Low
Appeal to Crew
Popular because
clean and easy to
use
Unappealing due
to intimate contact
required and time
for use
9.8 Extravehicular Activities (EVA)
Extravehicular activity (EVA) by the crew of Freebird must be performed to accomplish the mission of repair-
ing satellites in LEO and GEO. Additionally, EVA is required for disabled vehicle crew rescue and for Freebird
refueling and repair.
Part Ih Vehicle Design
184 Environmental Control and Life Support System
9.8.1 Ingress and Egress
Ingress and egress of Freebird involves transfer from the 70.3kPa cabin environment to the near vacuum of
LEO or GEO. Transfer can be accomplished by either airlock or depressurization.
An airlock avoids problems associated with exposing the crew cabin to zero pressure and low temperature,
such as providing thermal control for cabin equipment. With an airlock, the cabin can be maintained at room
temperature and normal pressures, allowing work to continue in a shirtsleeve environment. Two disadvantages
of the airlock are the mass and volume penalties. An airlock, such as that aboard the Shuttle, has a mass of
700kg and occupies a volume of 4.22m 3. Although an airlock has many advantages, the overwhelming need to
keep the mass of the vehicle down necessitated removal of the airlock from the design.
Freebird utilizes cabin depressurization for ingress and egress to EVA. The crew members scheduled for EVA
don EMUs (see Section 9.8.2 on page 184). Because the third crewmember does not have to perform EVA
work, he or she dons a pressure suit that is not EVA rated. While the EVA crew prepares for egress near the
hatch, the third member is restrained in a cabin seat. The atmosphere of the cabin is then pumped out and the
exit hatch opened, exposing the cabin to the vacuum and subzero temperatures. All atmospheric pressurization
and depressurization controls are easily operable while wearing the pressurized suit or EMU gloves. After the
EVA crew leaves the cabin through the common berthing adaptor (CBA), the cabin is repressurized. The total
time from start of depressurization to end of repressurization is no more than 30 minutes. The cabin is repres-
surized to allow the remaining crew member to effectively operate the RMS controls without the hinderance of
the pressure suit. The RMS controller dons the pressure suit again prior to the second depressurization for
ingress of the EVA astronauts.
9.8.2 Extravehicular Space Suit
The extravehicular space suit is essentially a self contained spacecraft designed to support an astronaut during
EVA. It also provides mobility in order to allow completion of tasks outside the vehicle. The choice of the suit
used for EVA directly impacts upon the preparation needed for EVA.
Denitrogenation and Prebreathing
When transferring from the higher pressure environment aboard Freebird to the lower pressure of a space suit,
there is the danger of decompression sickness or "bends" ("Pressure" on page 177). For transfer into EVA, the
evolution of nitrogen bubbles in the bloodstream causes the symptoms. If the pressure ratio between the nitro-
gen partial pressure in the blood (pN2) and the suit pressure is less than 1.5 to 1.8, then no decompression sick-
ness occurs. The incidence of bends increases when the ratio is above 1.8. In this case, the pN 2 level in the
astronaut's blood must be lowered prior to EVA. This can be done by nitrogen equilibration and preoxygen-
ation. Nitrogen equilibration involves lowering the cabin atmosphere pressure, and thus the nitrogen partial
pressure, and allowing the crew members to equilibrate to the new nitrogen levels. No special equipment is
required. Several hours are required for the nitrogen levels in the blood to reach equilibrium levels. Preoxygen-
ation, also known as prebreathing, involves breathing pure oxygen through a mask before donning the space
suit in order to displace the nitrogen from the blood. By using one of the methods or a combination of both
methods the final pN 2 to final suit pressure ratio can fall to acceptable levels [2].
Suit Selection
Extravehicular space suits can be divided into two general classes: high pressure suits and low pressure suits.
High pressure suits have an internal atmospheric pressure of at least 57.2kPa. Low pressure suits, such as the
Space Shuttle's Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU), have a pressure lower than 57.2kPa. The EMU operates
at a pressure of 29.6kPa. No prebreathing is required for the high pressure suits when transferring from a sea
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level pressure environment. A combination of nitrogen equilibration and preoxygenation is required for low
pressure suits.
High pressure suits, such as the Mark III Zero Breathe Suit developed by NASA/Johnson Space Center, have
been developed and tested on Earth. They have not yet been tested in space, but would allow EVA without pre-
breathing I14]. The major disadvantage of high pressure suits is articulation in the glove. Currently the high
pressure suit glove does not allow the same flexibility as the EMU glove. Manipulation intensive operations
such as those in satellite repair would take more time and effort or be impossible with a high pressure suit.
Additionally, in 1989 the former Space Station Freedom Program decided to use the Shuttle EMU for EVA at
the Space Station, cancelling the use of high pressure suits[15]. Therefore, although the zero prebreathe time
would greatly decrease the amount of preparation for EVA, a high pressure suit was not chosen because of the
inadequate glove flexibility, untested design, and previous Space Station decisions. However, further develop-
ment of high pressure glove technology may allow for future transition to a high pressure suit.
The Shuttle EMU was chosen as the EVA suit for Freebird (see Figure 9.6) because of its proven technology
and immediate availability. Three EMUs are carried onboard the vehicle, though only two are used at any one
time. The pressure within Freebird's cabin is lowered from 101.3kPa to 70.3kPa after release from the Interna-
tional Space Station Alpha (ISSA). The pressure ratio in this case is only 1.45, and no risk of bends is incurred.
Since the EMUs operate at 29.6kPa, additional prebreathing must be done to avoid the bends (ratio of 70.3kPa
to 29.6kPa equals 2.38). If the body is allowed to equilibrate to 70.3kPa for 24 hours, the prebreathe time is
only 40 minutes. For EVA from a sea level pressure of 101.3kPa, a prebreathe time of 3 hours is necessary.
Since the maximum travel time to a LEO asset is 6 hours, there is not enough time for complete equilibration,
although nitrogen levels do drop during the transit. Therefore, prebreathing of 3 hours is needed betbre the first
EVA. Since the crew cabin is kept at 70.3kPa for the rest of the mission, the remaining EVA's only require 40
minutes of prebreathing each [ 16].
Extravehicular Mobility Unit Components and Related Equipment
The EMU primarily consists of a Space Suit Assembly (SSA), which is the main body of the suit, and a Life
Support System (LSS), which maintains the environment within the suit. The mass of a charged EMU is
127.3kg. The astronaut first dons a liquid cooling and ventilation garment, which resembles long underwear.
This provides temperature control of the astronaut by drawing off heat using tubes with cooling water and sub-
limating the water into space. A urine collection device draws off liquid waste while an in-suit drink bag sup-
plies water for ingestion. The SSA itself is made up of a fiberglass upper torso and a rolling convolute, fabric
joint system. The upper and lower torso is composed of Dacron, nylon, and Teflon fabrics to provide microme-
teoroid and thermal protection. The joint system keeps the internal volume constant through the range of
motion necessary to do EVA work, thus allowing flexibility at all times. A helmet with visor, made of a Lexan-
polycarbonate shell, provides protection from debris and radiation while allowing the normal field of vision
with the head in the normal, face-forward position. The gloves are custom made to each astronaut. The LSS is
located on the back of the SSA. It can function up to eight hours before requiring recharge. This includes 30
minutes for egress, 6.5 hours of useful EVA time, 30 minutes for ingress, and a 30 minute reserve. The 30
minute reserve of oxygen is supplied by the secondary oxygen pack which operates an open loop supply at
reduced suit pressure. The LSS has closed loop ventilation, removing excess carbon dioxide using lithium
hydroxide (LiOH) canisters, which are held in the Contaminant Control Cartridge (CCC). It also holds acti-
vated carbon to clean the air of any contaminants and odors. An internal fan provides ventilation. The display
and control module provides information on all vital systems to the astronaut [ 17].
The power is supplied by a 4.3kg silver-zinc battery. Stored dry, it is activated by filling with electrolyte. After
activation, it has a 90-day shelf life. The battery is designed for 6 discharge/recharge cycles. Recharging of one
battery requires a power of 22.6W and takes 20 hours to complete. A total of 10 batteries are carried on board
the Freebird during a mission. The extra batteries replace the spent batteries, which are recharged during stand-
by mode[ 18].
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FIGURE 9.6 Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) [I 7].
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After each EVA the EMU must be recharged. This includes replacing the battery, refilling the oxygen tanks,
replacing the spent LiOH canisters, removing urine waste, replacing the drinking water, and replacing the
spent cooling water. Oxygen and cooling water connections are located within the Freebird cabin. The battery
and LiOH canisters are removed manually. The total time for recharging is 3 hours [19].
Communication between astronauts in EVA and with Freebird is carried through a two-way communications
carrier assembly. It is made up of a microphone and headset and transmits and receives in the Ultra-High Fre-
quency (UHF) radio range. Its transmission power is 0.25W, enough for a communication range between 70m
and 9km, depending on orientation with Freebird's antennas and blockage from satellite structures [I 7].
Attachments to the EMU to facilitate EVA maneuvering and satellite repair are the EMU lights and the EMU
TV. Batteries to these accessories are nonrechargable and must be replaced after each EVA. An EMU TV
receiver and video processor assembly on board the Freebird receives the video signals from the EMU TV and
conditions them for presentation to Freebird's monitors [ 18].
9.8.3 Exterior Human-Vehicle Interfaces
To perform satellite repair the astronauts need interfaces with the outside of Freebird's crew module. These
include cargo holds, handrails, foot restraints, and lights.
Two cargo holds are located near the rear of the crew module (Figure 9.3 on page 175). The volume of each
cargo hold is approximately 1m 3. One cargo hold contains the tools necessary for satellite repair. The tools are
divided into those for satellite repair, those for Freebird repair, and general purpose tools. EVA power tools use
separate EMU batteries for energy. Additional space is available for specialized tools for specific repair mis-
sions. The second cargo hold contains new modules or components to be installed in the dysfunctional satellite
[18].
Handrails on the side of the vehicle allow movement of the astronauts to the satellite and the cargo holds. As
the astronauts exit the vehicle they attach tethers to the nearest handrail to secure them to the vehicle. The
astronauts are required to have at least one tether connection to the vehicle or the satellite at all times. Thus, to
shift from one handrail to another, a second tether is attached to the second handrail before disconnecting the
first tether. The maximum spacing of the handrails is 60cm to always allow a tether connection. Both handrails
and handholds are available to allow translation near the CBA, to the cargo holds, and to the vicinity of the sat-
ellite. The handholds are designed to a minimum crew-induced zero-g load of 830N [17].
Lighting will be supplied by two floodlights to allow work while traversing Earth's shadow. Since Freebird
spends about 40% of the time in darkness at LEO, the lights are necessary for effective repair and crew safety.
The lights consume 250W of power each during EVA. EMU lights supplement the EVA lights.
9.8.4 Satellite Acquisition and Repair
During a nominal four day mission, three EVA's are performed. Two crewmembers perform the EVA while the
third crewmember remains inside to operate the RMS. In order to prevent fatigue, the crewmembers rotate
EVA shifts, and thus perform a total of 2 EVAs each. Therefore, each crewmember must be able to both per-
form satellite repair in EVA and operate the RMS.
The first step after the satellite is within view is to stabilize it and provide a hard contact between it and Free-
bird. Utilizing the Manned Maneuvering Unit (MMU) for this purpose was considered at the early design
stage. The MMU would provide more safety for the Freebird because only the astronaut in the MMU would
approach the satellite before stabilization. The MMU option has been eliminated because of its prohibitively
high mass and volume. Instead, the Freebird uses its RMS arms to directly stabilize and grapple the satellite.
The satellite is then secured with one of the arms. The two crewmembers scheduled for EVA perform preb-
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reathe as explained previously. Since the pressure suit operates at 55.2kPa, no prebreathing is required for the
third crewmember. After depressurization the outer door is opened, the astronauts attach their tethers to the
appropriate handrail and translate to the cargo holds. The necessary repair tools are removed and stowed upon
EMU. The module cargo hold is also accessed if parts or modules must be replaced.
One astronaut is secured to the RMS by a foot restraint along the mechanical arm. The other astronaut is
secured either to the Freebird outer surface or to the satellite itself. For the most efficiency and least fatigue,
free floating is discouraged while maneuvering modules or using tools [20]. Foot restraints on Freebird or the
satellite provide secure bases to work from. The RMS controller uses the views from the cameras on the arm
and the EVA helmet as well as the RMS window to move the RMS arm and the EVA astronaut to appropriate
locations around the satellite. Loading on the EMU suit is minimized by keeping objects held by an astronaut
within his or her reach envelope. Additionally, metabolic constraints keep the workload within defined limits.
The power output of the astronaut cannot exceed 293W over the entire EVA, 469W in a given hour, or 586W
for 15 minutes. Exceeding these limits may result in overheating of the suit environment. The astronaut also
cannot output less than I17W tor more than 30 minutes or risk hypothermia. Work on the satellite during a
given EVA cannot exceed 7.5 hours because of the oxygen supplies of the EMU. Before ingress, the satellite is
properly configured so should immediate return to ISSA prove necessary, no further EVA's are required. The
tools and any removed modules are stowed before reentry into the vehicle. Maximum EVA work time before
ingress back to the vehicle is 7.5 hours. Following ingress and removal of the EMU suits, refurbishing of the
suits is completed.
The EMU releases oxygen, water vapor, and electromagnetic radiation to the surrounding environment. This
may be of concern for sensitive satellite surfaces that may be contaminated. The EMU discharges oxygen and
sublimates water into the surrounding environment. Any sensitive satellite components must be shielded
should the emission levels prove threatening. Additionally, EVA procedures can be modified to reduce the con-
tamination.
EVAs are limited to LEO only [21 ]. GEO EVAs were ruled out because of the high levels of radiation present
created by high energy electrons bombarding the suit. EVAs in LEO are restricted to altitudes below 600km
because of greatly increasing radiation levels from the Van Allen Belts at higher altitudes. In addition, polar
EVAs are not permitted because of high radiation levels from other sources, including flares and galactic radi-
ation [221.
9.8.5 Disabled Spacecraft Crew Rescue
EVA's can be performed to rescue crewmembers from malfunctioning spacecraft such as the Space Shuttle or
the Russian Soyuz. If the vehicle has a CBA, docked transfer is used. Otherwise, one of Freebird's RMS arms
grapples the other vehicle. Once this hard connection is in place, the crew prepares for egress as described pre-
viously. The EVA astronauts then use the arm to translate across to aid the other crew. The crew of the other
craft is expected to have enough EVA suits or personal rescue enclosures to transfer all members to Freebird.
Once transfer of the crewmembers is complete, the Freebird EVA crew disengages the RMS and reenters the
cabin. The cabin is repressurized and the rescued crew members take their seats for the trip back to ISSA.
9.9 Emergency Systems
Freebird is equipped to handle basic emergencies while in flight. These emergencies include medical prob-
lems, cabin atmosphere variations, and fire.
Freebird Final Report
Emergency Systems 189
9.9.1
9.9.2
9.9,3
Medical Equipment
The cabin contains a medical kit stocked to accommodate two types of medical scenarios: work related inci-
dents and spontaneous medical events. Work related incidents include trauma, exposure to toxic substances
and radiation, burns, and electric shock. Spontaneous medical events range from constipation and diarrhea to
fatigue.
The medical kit contains an emergency pack and a bandages/medications kit. The emergency pack contains
sutures, disposable thermometers, a stethoscope, and injectable medications. All medical emergencies are sta-
bilized on board, and then attended to when the craft returns to the Station. The bandages/medications kit
includes bandages, adhesive tape, gauze bandages, pain killers, decongestants, antibiotics, anti-diarrhoeal
preparation, and eye drops [ 1].
The cabin contains a tool box stocked with simple emergency repair tools to temporarily fix a system which
will be properly fixed when Freebird returns to the ISSA. This tool box contains basic hand held tools and duct
tape.
Atmosphere Regulation
The atmospheric partial pressure of the cabin gases must be monitored on board Freebird. It is also necessary
to be able to detect low levels of toxic substances in the cabin atmosphere. Freebird contains electrochemical
amperometric gas sensors which monitor the partial pressure of carbon dioxide and oxygen, as well as carbon
monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, ammonia, and moisture in the air [23]. The electrochemical amperometric gas
sensors are used because they require little power, have a fast response time, are small in size, and have multi-
gas sensing capability.
To remove trace contaminants from the cabin atmosphere, activated charcoal is located downstream of the lith-
ium hydroxide canisters used for carbon dioxide scrubbing. Within the charcoal, carbon monoxide is converted
to carbon dioxide by an ambient temperature catalytic oxidizer, while filters remove airborne particulates [24].
Fire
Early detection and quick suppression of a fire is essential in a small, closed environment such as Freebird. A
fire can spread quickly and severely contaminate the cabin atmosphere. Early detection of a fire allows a rea-
sonable amount of time for effective fire protection actions, and reduces the amount of contaminants that are
released into the cabin environment. Two fire detection methods have been considered for Freebird: the photo-
electric cell and the ionization chamber. Both detection systems are similarly effective; however, the ionization
chamber is used because it has a faster response time than the photoelectric cell [25]. The ionization fire detec-
tor on Freebird contains a particle separation device upstream of the sensor to prevent non-hazardous aerosols
from setting off a false alarm. Six fire detectors are located around the cabin.
An effective and clean means of fire suppression is necessary for the survival of the crew and the maintenance
of a constant cabin atmosphere. Two fire suppression systems have been considered for Freebird: a carbon
dioxide suppression method and a Halon suppression method. The Halon system is used because it is less toxic
and it requires less volume to suppress a fire than the CO 2 system. Halon 1301 is easily scrubbed from the
cabin. The Halon will decompose into acid gases which are absorbed by the LiOH used in the CO 2 scrubbing
system. The rest of the Halon will be absorbed by the charcoal located in the LiOH system [25]. Freebird con-
tains four portable halon fire extinguishers and a supply tank of Halon 1301.
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9.10 Failure Modes
The major failure modes for ECLSS are shown in Table 9.5.
A structural failure of the crew seats may result in life-threatening injury to crewmembers. To prevent such a
failure, the actual flight hardware is subjected to extensive infant mortality testing to reduce the possibility of
failure.
A failure of the atmospheric control system may involve a fan motor malfunction, halting air circulation
throughout the cabin, and preventing normal operation of the CO 2 removal system and thermal control system.
The chance of such a failure is reduced through redundancy. Another failure involves a defective sensor or
valve, causing fluctuations in cabin pressure, temperature, and gas concentrations. Redundancy, a pressure
suit, additional crew clothing, and a portable 02 supply can alleviate the effects of such a failure.
Rupture or leakage of the 02 tank may result in explosion or loss of oxygen supply. A fully redundant tank in
conjunction with pressure sensors and extensive testing can mitigate the effects of such a malfunction.
A tear or puncture of the pressure suit results in the loss of suit pressure. Immediate repressurization of the
cabin may prevent such a failure from becoming life-threatening.
Failure of the carbon dioxide removal system may occur if the lithium hydroxide crystals become saturated
with CO 2. This may cause an increase in the CO 2 concentration in the cabin. Redundancy can alleviate the
effects of such a failure.
A failure in the fire extinguisher may result in the rapid spreading of a cabin fire. Redundant extinguishers
located throughout the cabin help prevent this failure from becoming a threat to the crew.
Leakage of the portable 02 supply results in the loss of the emergency oxygen supply. This life-threatening
failure is prevented by carrying redundant portable supplies aboard Freebird.
Leakage or failure within the EMU may result in a loss of suit pressure and lack of air circulation. The EMU
Secondary Oxygen Supply provides a partial redundancy as a response to such a life-threatening failure
9.11 Summary Budgets
Table 9.9 shows the mass, power, and cost breakdown of the components of the ECLSS. The summary is given
specifically for the satellite repair mission involving a crew of three astronauts. On a rescue mission, the cabin
accommodates five additional seats, requiring an additional mass of 100kg. Both the satellite repair and crew
rescue mission place similar demands on the ECLSS.
Table 9.10 shows the telemetry requirements for the components of the ECLSS.
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TABLE 9.8 Failure Modes
Component
Human
Interface
Controls
Failure Mode
Control failure
Broken monitor
Effect
loss of
communication
Prevention or
Response
Secondary
monitors / controls
Criticality
Crewed
Config. Teleop.
N/A
Restraints, Structural failure Injury to crew Infant Mortality 1 N/A
Seats members Testing
Atmosphere Fan motor failure No air circulation Redundancy 2 N/A
Control Failure of atmosphere Pressure, Redundancy, i N/A
System sensors or valves temperature, gas pressure suit,
concentration clothing, portable
changes 0 2 supply
0 2 Tank Leakage / Blockage Loss of 0 2 supply Redundancy I N/A
Rupture Explosion, over- Testing, tank 1 N/A
pressurization pressure sensors
Pressure Suit Tear or puncture Loss of suit Testing, I N/A
pressure repressurization
Carbon LiOH saturation Rise in CO 2 Redundancy, 1 N/A
Dioxide concentration replace LiOH
Removal canisters
System
Cabin Air Rupture of storage tank Explosion, Testing, tank 2 N/A
Storage overpressurization pressure sensors
System Compressor motor Unable to Testing 2 NkA
failure depressiarize
Food, Containment leak / Fewer provisions Provision rationing 2 N/A
Water, and spoilage available
Containment
System
Emergency Broken fire fire spreads Redundancy 1 N/A
System extinguisher
Leakage of Portable 0 2 Loss of emergency Testing I N/A
Supply 0 2 Supply Redundancy
EVA Tools Breakage / Unable to finish Alternate tools 2 N/A
Inappropriate sizing repair
Extravehicul Leakage / Pump failure Pressure loss/No Secondary 1 N/A
ar Mobility air circulation Oxygen Supply
Unit (3)
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TABLE 9.9 Summary Budgets [2]13115][6][8]121 ]126][271
Component #
Lighting 4
Human Interface Controls I
Restraints, Seats 3
ATMOSPHERIC
CONTROL SYSTEM
- Pressurized Oxygen Tank 2
- Oxygen in Tanks 2
- Cabin Air Storage System 1
- CO 2 Removal System 2
- LiOH Cannister 5
- Cabin Fans 2
- Flow Valves 11
- Sensors 6
Pressure Suit I
Food, Water, and 1
Containment System
Waste Disposal System 1
EMERGENCY SYSTEM
- Portable 02 System 8
- Fire Detection Sensors 6
- Fire Extinguishers 4
- Medical Kit I
EVA Tool Set 1
Extravehicular Mobility 3
Unit
Extra EMU batteries I 0
EVA Lights 2
Total --
Mass [kg]
5
20
60
Avg. Power Peak Power
[Watts] [Watts]
30 50
100 200
0 0
Hardware
Cost [$K]
423
1,693
1,587
10,00O
35 0
38 0
68 --
10 0
25 0
6 6O
6 0
6 0.5
10 0
8O 0
0
0
500O
0
0
60
5
!
0 847
0 776
5
16
3
16
2
100
380
43
20
954
0 0 423
1,355
200
212
21
100
30,000
1O0
423
50,688
0 0
1.5 2
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 20
-- 500
192 --
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TABLE 9.10 Telemetry
Component Telemetry
Human Inter-
face Controls: Status
Monitors Position
Joysticks Status
RMS Monitors Position
RMS Joysticks
Pressurized Oxygen Tank Temperature
Pressure
Cabin Air Storage System Temperature
Pressure
Compressor Status
Cabin Fans Air Flow
Flow Valves Status
Cabin Sensors Atmospheric Param.
Pressure Suit Pressure
Fire Detection Sensors Fire
Cargo Bay Lights Status
Extravehicular Mobility Pressure
Unit Life Signs
# of
lines
!
6
1
6
Freq.
[Hz]
I
20
1
20
Analog/
Digital
D
A
D
A
A
A
A
A
D
A
D
A
A
D
D
A
A
Command
On/Off
Fan Velocity
Open/Close
Alert Crew
On/Off
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Chapter
10
Verification and Validation
The following chapter is a detailed approach to the verification and validation of Project Freebird. A rigorous
testing methodology is essential to this type of manned aerospace system to ensure adequate reliability. While
such a testing program can be quite costly and time consuming, it allows the system to adhere to its functional
requirements in a variety of mission scenarios.
10.1 General Test Procedures
The overall testing approach will follow many of the recommendations set forth by government standards. In
addition, it will employ advanced testing and management approaches to minimize the cost of testing. The
Project Freebird testing program consists of a series of functional and environmental tests at different levels of
development and integration. Such a program allows for the functional requirements of the system to be met in
the most efficient way possible.
Testing and reliability concerns have already been used in the design process of Project Freebird. The design
was molded through an iterative process into one that allows for ease of testing and a high level of reliability.
Thus, verification and validation issues have already been built into the system.
The goals of the verification and validation program are quite simple, but reaching these goals required careful
planning and teamwork. Overall, the testing program has been designed to reach a reliability of .9944 while
maintaining a certain schedule and minimizing cost. Thus, Project Freebird will use testing methods that will
allow for a high level of efficiency.
10.1.1 Management Philosophy
The use of Total Quality Management (TQM) tools in the testing and production of" Project Freebird will dras-
tically minimize cost and improve efficiency. In some recent development programs, this type of management
has been able to cut testing costs by 25%. Such a program encourages continuous improvement, employee
involvement, and customer satisfaction. The main aspect of this management strategy as applicable to this
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project is feedback. By using test results to improve the production and testing process, Project Freebird will
be able to move away from fault detection and move towards fault prevention. In addition, the testing program
will be flexible to allow for the type of continuous improvement that will generate greater efficiency.
There are two major levels of testing management that such a program must employ. These are the intradepart-
mental and interdepartmental levels. Intradepartmental management will contain working groups that usually
focus on a certain process. Interdepartmental management will govern the interfacing between groups that
focus on different tests or on different production tasks.
Performance Refinement Teams (PRTs) will be organized at the intradepartmental level. These teams will meet
regularly and should consist of all employees from a natural work group. In addition, appropriate support per-
sonnel will be included in these teams. During the meetings, the members will discuss approaches and imple-
ment actions focused on improving day-to-day operations and actions within the group.
Process Improvement Teams (PITs) will be organized at the interdepartmental level and these will also meet
regularly. They will consist of the PRT group leaders from every group in an affected organization. The PITs
will discuss their operations and processes to allow everyone to learn valuable lessons about all stages of pro-
duction and testing. It will also be an appropriate forum for feedback among groups in order to form a better
overall production/testing flow. Before the production and testing of Project Freebird begins, there will be a
TQM steering committee formed in order to implement these programs. In addition, there will be time to train
and orient team leaders so that the teams will be able to work most effectively.
10.1.2 Testing Philosophy
The overall test philosophy of Project Freebird is intended to prove the integrity of the system with the least
financial and schedule risk. Years of industry verification and validation experience have led to several impor-
tant elements of any testing program. The key elements to be used here are:
• Continuous monitoring of all performance parameters during all portions of environmental exposure.
• Testing in a sequence that places the most stressful environments first.
• Conducting functional tests immediately before and after each environmental test.
• Utilizing forced infant mortality.
• Performing qualification and acceptance tests in the same test chamber.
• Allowing tbr protoflight tests whenever possible.
• Utilizing technology risk management in forming a test program.
• Conducting system-level qualification on the flight test article.
Unsatisfactory test results in this program will be dealt with swiftly. Any change in the performance of a test
article that prevents it from meeting all of its requirements will be considered a failure and con'ective action
will be taken immediately. Following this action, the test will be repeated until it results in satisfactory perfor-
mance. However, if the correction affects the certainty of previous tests, then the article will be retested until
the results are acceptable.
Forced infant mortality will allow for greater testing efficiency of Project Freebird. It is the combination of
selectively testing immature technologies more rigorously and applying decreasing environmental levels to all
testable items. The goal of such a program is to learn as quickly as possible which design ideas are bad ones,
and to avoid accumulated value in components, subsystems, or systems that have latent failure modes. By
applying tbrced infant mortality, the project will save money by noticing certain failure modes early in the pro-
gram. The testing sequences have been formed with this concept in mind.
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10.1.3
The protoflight option will be used extensively in this program. Protoflight testing is the qualification testing of
the actual flight articles. This technique eliminates the need for developing a prototype article and decreases
testing redundancy. Protoflight tests usually employ somewhat decreased environmental levels, and almost
always decrease the testing duration. This minimizes the fatigue of the articles while ensuring that they can
handle the appropriate stresses. There is some risk in using protoflight articles however, and they should only
be used in redundant strings of components and subsystems. Also, protoflight testing should be avoided with
those articles which are critical to the safety of the mission. In addition, when an article is technologically
immature, protoflight testing will not be used and a prototype will be built. For the mature technology how-
ever, protoflight testing will be used. At the systems level protoflight testing will be used exclusively to elimi-
nate the need of a full-scale system prototype.
Testing Process
There are several different types of verification methods that will be used throughout the production process.
Testing is the most extreme method, and will be used sparingly. At all other levels of development, the follow-
ing methods will be used to determine the quality of an item:
• Analysis: A technical or empiricalmethod that uses mathematical calculations or computer simulations
to predict actual design operation. It will be used to verify requirements when testing is impractical, but
will only be used when the established techniques are adequate to provide confidence.
• Demonstration: A process where actual crew conduct or use can verify compliance with a requirement.
• Inspection: A visual analysis method which verifies design features, compliance to drawings, workman-
ship, and physical condition. This method will be used after each test to insure that no visible damage
has occurred.
• Similarity: The process of verification that uses prior test data when an article is similar in design and
manufacturing process to another article which has been previously verified to equivalent or more strin-
gent specifications.
Figure 10. I shows the sequence of different tests, all of which are important to the entire verification and vali-
dation process. The development tests are those examinations conducted to obtain information that assists in
the design and manufacturing process. It is only used on those objects with the lowest technological maturity,
and often helps plan for a technological innovation. Its main purpose is to discover problems, or to determine
the type of technology to use. It includes tests of structural and thermal models to confirm environmental crite-
ria.
The qualification tests demonstrate that a component, subsystem, or system performs as required in the simu-
lated environment. These are the most rigorous of tests and measure up to the factor of safety. They only test a
representative sample of the population and are not conducted on actual flight components. The purpose of
these tests is to check the design, manufacturing, and assembly process.
The acceptance tests demonstrate the acceptability of an item for delivery and act as quality control. All of the
actual flight components must undergo these tests. The loads imposed by the tests are kept to a minimum to
decrease added fatigue. If the protoflight option is used on certain articles, then the protoflight tests levels and
durations are used in place of the qualification and acceptance tests.
The integration and systems tests evaluate the functionality of the system during its integration. In addition,
these tests subject the entire system to environmental levels that provide a final system qualification. The inte-
gration tests will also occur on-orbit while the modules are constructed or directly following reconfiguration of
the modules for a certain mission.
The pre-launch tests are the last verification performed on the ground. It is the final check to insure that the
system has not been damaged during shipment to the launch site. In addition, it demonstrates the compatibility
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of the system with the launch vehicle. Once the system reaches orbit, a series of in-flight tests will be con-
ducted which qualify the vehicle for the environment in which it was designed. These tests also ensure that the
launch and ascent environment did not degrade the integrity of the system•
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10.2 Ground Testing
FIGURE 10.
Ground testing is a cost-effective method of ensuring that a system functions properly and safely. The lessons
learned through this type of testing allow problems to be fixed early without the difficulty of an on-orbit repair.
It also allows for a constant refining of the production and design process.
10.2.1 Testing Parameters
There are several environmental and functional tests which Project Freebird will undergo• Definitions of these
tests are as follows:
Acceleration (A): Demonstrates that the system can withstand the acceleration loads imposed on it in the
launch, ascent, and operational stages of its lifetime. Each component that is sensitive to this environment must
undergo +20g's for five minutes in each of the orthogonal axes. If there are no failure modes associated with
this environment then analysis will be used.
Acoustic (AC): Demonstrates the ability of the system to withstand the acoustic and vibrational environments
imposed during launch and ascent. This test depends upon a component's response to the acoustic environ-
ment.
Burn-in (BI): Ensures that the system will be able to handle the thermal environment. It requires 300 hours of
continuous operation (including 18 thermal cycles) with the last 100 hours failure free. It will be conducted in
the same set up as the thermal tests. Previous thermal testing will be counted towards the time (or cycle) goal.
Burst Pressure (P): Verifies the design integrity of the system and its lack of brittleness. All pressurized com-
ponents will undergo this test. Pressurized articles will be proof-pressure tested to 1.5 times the maximum
operating temperature at the critical use temperature for three complete pressure cycles. Burst tests will be con-
ducted at this temperature at 2.0 times the maximum operating pressure. The lines, hoses, and pressure compo-
nents will be tested at 2.0 times the proof pressure and 4.0 times the burst pressure.
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Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC): Verifies that equipment will not be susceptible to EM environments
during operation. It also ensures that the space vehicle has an adequate margin in a simulated launch and
orbital EM environment. This test subjects the system to all possible launch modes in various launch and
orbital configurations. All electrical and electronic components must undergo this test.
Functional (F): Establishes correct performance of hardware and software and proves that no degradation
occurs during the environmental tests. It is conducted before and immediately after each environmental test.
Abbreviated functional tests will occur during the environmental tests to discover intermittent failures.
Leak (L): Verifies leakage rate requirements. It will be conducted on all pressurized components before and
immediately after thermal and random vibration acceptance and qualification tests.
Life Cycle (LC): Verifies the design life performance. It checks the ability of the system to withstand the maxi-
mum duration of cycles that it was designed for without fatigue or failure.
Pyro Shock (PS): Verifies acceptable performance during and after pyro actuated functions. It is required on all
pyro operated devices, deployables, and other equipment capable of imparting a shock impulse to the vehicle.
Random Vibration (RV): Demonstrates the capability of the system to withstand the imposed dynamic loads of
the launch vehicle. The system is tested in three orthogonal axes.
Sine Vibration (SV): Determines the resonant frequencies and the damping coefficient. It also identifies reso-
nant conditions which could result in flight failure. The system is tested in three orthogonal axes.
Thermal Balance (TB): Verifies the adequacy of the thermal control system. These tests will be conducted on
the fully assembled payload while using analytical verification on the lower levels of assembly.
Thermal Cycling (TC): Verifies the operational ability of a design over a complete temperature range. It should
be conducted when an item is not susceptible to a vacuum environment.
Thermal Vacuum (TV): Demonstrates the ability of an item to perform in the thermal vacuum environment of
space. It is required if a unit has a failure mode associated with a vacuum environment.
10.2.2 Test Tolerances
Table 10. I shows the test requirements tbr various testing methods at the component and subsystem level. (dB
represents decibels.) The numbers in parentheses tbllowing any test level or duration describe the minimum
level that must be achieved in that test. When a test is not mentioned, then the values are the same for all levels
of testing. These values are described in the definitions for each test in Section 10.2.1.
All system level testing will be performed on the actual flight vehicle. This testing will adequately qualify the
system without degrading its useful lifetime. Table 10.2 shows the level and duration required for these tests.
10.2.3 Testing Breakdown
Through the course of testing Project Freebird, there will be different tests conducted at different levels of
assembly. Throughout the verification process, depending upon the maturity of the completed system, testing
at the component, subsystem, and system level will be used in order to verify that it has been properly designed
and produced. Such intermediate testing allows problems to be discovered early while at the same time allow-
ing the entire system to be qualified. Table 10.3 and Table 10.4 show the different tests required of specific
components and subsystems. Table 10.3 indicates whether protoflight testing (PF) will be used, in which case
the qualification tests will be conducted at the protoflight levels and there will be no acceptance tests. The
order of these tests is detailed in Section 10.2.4 on page 207.
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TABLE 10.1 Component and Subsystem Testing Levels
Test
Acoustics:
Amplitude
Duration
EMC:
Susceptibility (RF)
Emissions (RF)
Pyro Shock:
Level
Quantity
Random Vibration:
Amplitude
Duration
Sine Vibration:
Amplitude
Sweep Rate
Temperature:
Level
Duration
Qualification
Accept + 6dB (>144dB)
(3.0)*Accept
Fit Predicted + 20dB
For Pyro Cir. > 60dB
(2.0)*Accept
3 Shocks/Axis
(4.0)*Accept
(3.0)*Accept
190% Fit
.5 Oct/Minute
Protoflight
Accept + 6dB (>141dB)
(3.0)*Accept
Fit Predicted + 20dB
For Pyro Cir. > 60dB
(1.5)*Accept
3 Shocks/Axis
(2.0)*Accept
(3.0)*Accept
190% Fit
.5 Oct/Minute
Acceptance
95% Fit (>138dB)
Flt Length (>1 Minute)
None
None
95% Fit
I Shock/Axis
95% Fit
Fit/Axis (>1 Minute/Axis)
None
None
Fit +/- (10 to 21 ° C)
24 Cycles
Flt +/- (5 to 16° C)
4 Cycles
Fit +/- (0 to ! 1° C)
8 Cycles
TABLE 10.2 System Testing Levels
Test
Acoustics:
Amplitude
Duration
EMC:
Susceptibility (RF)
Emissions (RF)
Protoflight Level
95% Fit + 3dB (>141dB)
Flight Length (>1 Minute)
Fit Predicted + 20dB
For Pyro Cir. > 60dB
Pyro Shock: 1 to 3 Device Firings
Temperature:
Level Fit +/- (5 to 16° C)
Duration 4 Cycles with 8 Hours at Each Extreme
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TABLE 10.3 Component and Subsystem Qualification Tests.
+om__n+°+t++  LLI+I+I.vI+v
C3T
TDRSS Transponder X X X + X X
EVA Transponder X X X X X
Power Amplifier X X X
Parabolic Antenna X X X
S-Band Omni Antenna X X X
EVA Omni Antenna X X X
Internal Communication Network X X X
Harness X X X
Processors X X X X
Data Recording Unit X X X X
ECLSS
Oxygen Tank X X X
Extravehicular Mobility Unit X X X
Extra EMU Batteries X X X
CO2 Removal System X X X
Atmosphere Control System X X X X
Cabin Air Storage System X X X
Pressure Suit X X X
Waste Disposal System X X X
Food, Water, and Containment System X X X
LiOH Cannister X X X
Human Interface Controls X X X X
Lighting X X X X X
Restraints, Seats X X X
Cabin Fans X X X
Portable 02 System X X X
Fire Detection System X X X X
Fire Extinguisher X X X
GNC
DCS with Sun Fans X X X X X X
Rendezvous RadarTransponder X X X X
MIMU X X X X X X
MANS System X X
MAPS X X
Star Tracker X X X X X X
LNS X] X X X X X
Docking Camera X X X X X
Power and Propulsion
I A TC t+vlPIEMCI
x x
X X
X X
X
X
X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X X
X
X X
X X X
X X
X X
X
X X
X X
X x
X X
X
x
X X
X X X
X X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X X
X X
X X
LC
X
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TABLE 10.3 Component and Subsystem Qualification Tests.
Components/Subsystems PF F L PS AC RV SV
Propellant Tanks X X X X X
Plumbing - Valves and Pipes X X X
RL I 0A-4 Engine X X X
Thermal Venting System X X X
RCS Tanks X X X
RCS Valves and Pipes X X X
RCS Thrusters X X
Fuel Cell Powerplanl X X X X
Power Conditioner X X X X X
EPS Wire Harness X X
Fuel Cell Tanks X X X
Propellant Management Device X X X
Refueling Interfaces X X
Structures
Pressure Vessel
Internal Structure
Rad/Debns Shield
Common Berthing Adapter
Intermodular Interface
Remote Manipulator System
Pri mary/Truss
Internal
Thermal
Heat Pipes
Radiators
Insulation
Cold Plates
Phase Change Device
Heaters
Louvres
Louvre Mechanical System
Coolant Pump
Coolant Piping
Air Recycling Unit
Thermometer
X X X
X X
X X
X x
X X
X X X X
x x
X X
X X
X
x
X
X
X X X
x
X X
X X X
X ×
X X
X X
A TC TV P EMC
X X
X X
X X
X X
X XI
X X
X X
X X X
X X X
X
X X
X X X
X
X X
X
X
X
X
X X X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
LC
X
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TABLE 10.4
Components/Subsystems
C_T
Component and Subsystem Acceptance Tests.
TDRSS Transponder
EVA Transponder
Power Amplifier
Parabolic Anlenna
S-Band Omni Antenna
EVA Omni Antenna
Internal Communication Network
Harness
Processors
Data Recording Unit
ECLSS
X X X X
TV [ BI[P
X X X X
X X X X
X X X .I X X
X
X
Oxygen Tank X[ X
Extravehicular Mobility Unit X X X X
Extra EMU Batteries
CO2 Removal System X X
Atmosphere Control System X X
Cabin Air Storage System X X
Pre,_sure Suit X X
Waste Disposal System X X
Food, Water, and Containment System X X
Emergency System X X X
Human Interface Controls X X
Lighting
Restraints, Seats
Cabin Fans X
Portable 02 System X X
Fire Detection System X X X
Fire Extinguisher X X
X
X X
X
X X
X
X
X
X X
X
X
X
X
X
X
x X
X
GNC
DCS with Sun Fans
Rendezvous Radar Transponder
MIMU
MANS System
MAPS
Star Tracker
LNS
Docking Camera
X X X
X X X
X
X
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TABLE 10.4
Com ponenls/Subsystems
Power and Propulsion
Component attd Subsystem Acceptance Tests.
Propellant Tanks
Plumbing - Valves and Pipes
RLI(IA-4 Engine
Thermal Venting System
RCS Tanks
RCS Valves and Pipes
X X
X X
X'
X X
X X
X x
X
X X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
RCS Thrusters
Fuel Cell Powerplant
Power Conditioner
EPS Wire Harness
Fuel Cell Tanks
X X X X
X X X X X X
X X X
X X X X
Propellant Management Device
Refueling Interfaces
Structures
Pressure Vessel
Internal Structure
Rad/Debris Shield
Common Berthing Adapter
Intermodular Interface
Remote Manipulator System
Primary/Truss
Internal
Thermal
Heat Pipes
Radiators
Insulation
Cold Plates
Phase Change Devices
Healers
Louvres
Louvre Mechanical System
Coolant Pump
Coolant Piping
Air Recycling Unit
Thermometer
X X X X
X X X
X X
X X X
X X X
X X X
X X X
X X X X
X X X
X X X
X X X X
x x X
X X X
X X X
X X X
X X X
X X X
p
X
X X X X X
X X X X X X
The system tests are limited due to the difficulty of demonstrating the performance of the entire system on the
ground, and due to the risk of decreasing the system lifetime through rigorous testing. Project Freebird will go
through a series of six different environmental tests at the systemlevel. These are pyro shock, acoustic, ther-
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mal vacuum, thermal balance, burst pressure, and electromagnetic compatibility. In addition, it will go through
thorough functional tests at various stages during the integration and environmental acceptance process.
Section 10.2.4 describes the sequences of these tests.
10.2.4 Sequential Testing
Figure 10.2 shows the component and subsystem level qualification and acceptance test sequence. The protof-
light sequence tor a certain component or subsystem will follow the qualification sequence. The tests that each
of the components and subsystems must undergo are shown in Table 10.3 and Table 10.4. The tests not desig-
nated for a specific article will be omitted from the sequence. The test acronyms are described in
Section 10.2.1 on page 200.
Qualification
Test Sequence: F -> L -> F -> PS -> F -> L -> AC or RV -> L -> F -> SV -> F -> A -> F -> L -> TC - -> L
-> F -> L -> TV -> L -> F -> P -> L -> F -> EMC -> F -> LC -> F
Acceptance
Test Sequence: F -> L -> F -> PS -> F -> L -> AC or RV -> L -> F -> L -> TC -> L -> F -> L -> TV - -> L
-> F -> BI -> F -> P -> L -> F
FIGURE 10.2 Component and Subsystem Test Sequence.
The test sequence for the integration and system level tests has been carefully designed. The full sequence of
the environmental tests is shown in Figure 10.3. There are three major phases of functional tests at the integra-
tion and systems level. The first requires functional tests to be conducted on individual components and sub-
systems as they are integrated into the system. All failures at this stage should be corrected and retested before
integrating the article with the entire system.
Next there will be combined system tests which ensure that all of the subsystems function together properly.
The first set of data from these tests will be used to establish a baseline for comparison with all further func-
tional tests. A functional test will occur before and immediately after each environmental test at the integrated
system level.
Following all of the environmental tests and as close to launch as possible will be the integrated systems test.
This verifies the functionality of the integrated system following all of the environmental tests and checks the
operational readiness of the system. All of the operational modes, in addition to subsystem performance, will
be demonstrated during this test.
In addition, there will be a pre-launch system validation. It will be performed at the launch site and will dupli-
cate the system protoflight tests as closely as possible. This verifies that the transportation and handling have
not degraded the vehicle's characteristics and is extremely important due to the large shipping distances this
system will undergo. Finally, there are the pre-launch tests which establish that the interfaces between the sys-
tem and the launch vehicle are compatible and are within specifications.
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Integration and System Level
Environmental Test Sequence: F -> PS -> F -> AC -> F -> TV -> F -> TB -> F -> P -> F -> EMC -> F
FIGURE 10.3 System Environmental Test Sequence.
10.2.5 Verification Facilities
There will be two major facilities used in the Project Freebird test program. The Jet Propulsion Laboratory
(JPL) in Pasadena, California will be used to complete the environmental tests at the component and sub-
system level. The experience of JPL, along with the wide range of environmental testing facilities available
there, make it the best choice for these tests.
The Space Systems Automated Integration and Assembly Facility at the Kennedy Space Center will be used
for integration and system level environmental tests. This facility, designed to integrate and test the space sta-
tion, has the tools necessary to qualify a large manned vehicle. As a back up facility, the Johnson Space Flight
Center will be used.
10.3 In-Flight Testing
Once delivered to orbit, in-flight tests will be conducted to evaluate the vehicle in its performance atmosphere.
As the final stage of testing, in-flight tests are vital as they will test the vehicle's reaction to the space atmo-
sphere. This ensure proper performance during future mission scenarios. All components and subsystems will
be installed and subjected to in-flight testing to ensure that the complete, integrated vehicle will operate safely
and satisfactorily.
In-flight tests differ from ground tests in their scope and intensity. While ground testing is in-depth and repeti-
tive, in-flight testing checks the basic system functions needed for the mission requirement to ensure that the
subsystems are operating properly.
10.3.1 In-Flight Testing Philosophy
In-flight tests are performed to check for damages incurred from launch loads and procedures. All vehicle
components and subsystems must survive in-flight testing to prove their mission-worthiness. In-flight tests also
evaluate the vehicle to assure that all high-level requirements have been achieved during design and produc-
tion. High-level requirements that are not ment may necessitate alternate mission scenarios or, in the worst
case, a return to the design and/or production stages. The final driver behind in-flight testing is the vehicle's
exposure to its mission atmosphere - namely space. These tests will study the vehicle's reaction to its initial
exposure to the space atmosphere and record any complications that were not encountered during ground test-
ing.
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10.3.2 Criteria for Success and Failure
The in-flight test results will be examined and compared to established requirements. These requirements set
the success standards for each subsystem. Different requirements are fixed for each of the different vehicle
subsystems.
Those subsystem test results which lie within their required standards will have passed the in-flight tests and
will be considered successful. These subsystems will then be labeled flight-worthy and mission-ready.
Those subsystem test results which lie outside of their required standards will have failed in-flight testing.
These subsystems must then be modified or repaired at the component level while on-orbit or, in the worst case
scenario, be returned to Earth and to the design and/or production stages.
Once integrated, the vehicle, with all components and subsystems in place, will be tested and subjected to a set
of performance requirements. If the vehicle's test results fall within these requirement standards, the vehicle
will be considered safe and ready for its initial mission. If the results fail to meet these requirements, the vehi-
cle will be modified or repaired until the test results are successful. The worst case would consist of the vehicle
continuing to fail these in-flight tests and, therefore, it would have to be disassembled and return to Earth for
modifications and further ground testing
The success and failure criterion for each subsystem and for the entire vehicle are based upon each unit's criti-
cality to the safety and success of the mission. Subsystems which are vital to the survival of the crew are given
strict test requirements: the subsystem must operate properly the first time it is activated. Subsystems which
are important for the mission objective but whose failure would not be life threatening for the crew are given
two chances to pass the in-flight test.
• Power & Propulsion Systems: Due to the importance of the vehicle's power systems and engines during
all missions scenarios, this subsystem must run successfully on its first testing attempt - the system
power-up and engine firing must work properly the first time they are activated.
• Environmental Control & Life Support Systems: Since this subsystem is responsible for guaranteeing
the lives and safety of the astronauts, it is required to function satisfactorily on the first testing attempt.
If the readings taken during in-flight testing do not meet safety standards, the ECLSS subsystem will not
be given a second chance. It will be repaired or, in the worst case, returned to Earth.
• Command, Communications, Control, & Telemetry Systems: Because many failures of this subsystem
are considered to be life threatening, this subsystem is given one chance to pass its in-flight test. If the
subsystem fails to function properly during its first in-flight run, it is considered un-flight worthy and
must be for repaired and/or replaced.
• Structure System: The vehicle's structural integrity is vital to every possible mission scenario - it's fail-
ure mode presents the most mission critical and life threatening problem for the crew. For this reason,
the structural body of the vehicle must maintain the highest level of safety. The structures subsystem
must pass all first-run inspections before the vehicle will be deemed mission-ready. If the structural
integrity of the vehicle is at all questionable, the vehicle will remain at the Space Station for repair or be
returned to Earth. The Remote Manipulator System (RMS) arms will be given two chances to function
successfully.
• Thermal System: The thermal subsystem must pass it's in-flight test on the first attempt as it is a vital
factor in the survival of the crew. If the readings taken during in-flight tests fail to fall within safe
parameters, the subsystem must be repaired or replaced.
• Guidance, Navigation, & Control Systems: While the GNC subsystem is important to the successful
completion of a mission, it is not considered life-threatening when it enters a failure mode. Therefore,
during in-flight testing, it will be given two attempts to meet it's in-flight testing requirements. If the
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subsystem fails on the first run, it will be given a second chance before it is returned for repair or
replacement.
The in-flight testing requirements for each subsystem are summarized in Table 10.5.
TABLE 10.5 Criteria for Success and Failure.
Subsystem In-Flight Testing Requirements
P&P One engine firing in two attempts; one power-up in one attempt.
ECLSS One nominal life support reading in one attempt.
C3T One communication and telemetry check in one attempt.
STRUCTURES Interface verification and visual inspection; one RMS procedure
in two attempts.
THERMAL One nominal radiation and temperature reading in one attempt.
GNC One attitude adjustment and check in two attempts; one RCS
firing in two attempts.
An in-depth discussion of the in-flight test procedures as well as a schedule tor in-flight testing may be found
in Section 10.3.3.
10.3.3 In-Flight Testing Procedure & Schedule
A testing sequence flow-down and schedule have been developed to ensure that the in-flight tests are con-
ducted efficiently. If closely followed, the schedule will minimize the time and cost of the in-flight tests.
The testing sequence will begin when the vehicle's subsystems are delivered to orbit. Once separated from the
launch vehicle, the first stage of the sequence will begin with the vehicle assembly. Assembly will consist of
connecting the base and crew modules and verifying that their interfaces are secure. Next, the subsystem tests
will be performed and the results evaluated according to the success and failure criteria. The Integrated Vehicle
Test will then be executed which consists of running all of the subsystems concurrently. Once the vehicle has
successfully passed all of these tests it will be considered flight-worthy and mission-ready. Figure 10.4 shows
a diagram of the testing sequence flow-down.
Orbit _t
Delivery
Launch- I-_ Vehicle
Vehicle Assembly
Separation InterfaceVerification
Mission t'_ IntegratedReady VehicleTest
Subsystem
Tests
FIGURE 10.4 Testing Sequence Flow-Down.
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A testing procedure and schedule protocol was developed to ensure that the vehicle will be mission-ready ['or
the delivery date specified in the high-level requirements. Ample time has been allotted for each step of the
testing sequence to allow for unforeseen complications or failures as well as for any subsystem calibrations
that need to be performed. Table 10.6 summarizes the in-flight testing procedures for all of the vehicle's sub-
systems.
The in-flight tests required to ensure the safe and successful operation of each subsystem are explained below.
• Power & Propulsion Systems: The vehicle's systems will be powered-up and the main engines as well
as the RCS thrusters will be fired to verify that this subsystem functions safely and properly.
• Environmental Control and Life Support Systems: Temperature, pressure, and radiation level readings
within the crew cabin will be monitored and evaluated to verify that the subsystem is operating within
safe parameters. Gas mixture readings will also be taken to confirm that the air in the crew module is in
fact breathable. The crew module will then undergo the de-pressurization and re-pressurization protocol
which will be performed during future missions when astronauts exit the vehicle for EVA work. This
aspect of the subsystem's in-flight testing will evaluate its pressurization procedures as well as verify
that all other subsystems can function in the de-pressurized, vacuum-like atmosphere.
• Command, Communications, Control, &Telemetry Systems: The in-flight test of this subsystem con-
sists of an audio, visual, and command communications check with Ground Control and the Space Sta-
tion as well as telemetry verification of all vehicle systems that require monitoring.
• Structure System: The vehicle's structure will be visually inspected during on-orbit assembly to check
for any cracks or breaks that might have been incurred during launch or launch vehicle separation. Dur-
ing actual in-flight testing, the subsystem interfaces will be inspected to verify that they are intact and
fully functioning, and the vehicle will be visually inspected once again to verify it's integrity. The RMS
arms will be activated and required to manipulate a large satellite-like object to verify that they function
properly.
• Thermal System: Temperature and radiation level readings will be taken and evaluated during in-flight
testing to ensure that they are within safe parameters and provide no possible threat to the vehicle's
crew.
• Guidance, Navigation, & Control Systems: An attitude adjustment will be made by the GNC subsystem
and checked to ensure that it was executed successfully. The RCS thrusters will also be fired to test the
vehicle's maneuvering capabilities.
TABLE 10.6 Subsystem hz-Flight Testing Procedures
Subsystem In-Flight Testing Procedure
P&P System power-up; main engine & RCS thruster firings
ECLSS Temperature, pressure, radiation, &gas mix. readings; de-pressurization sequence check
C3T Audio, visual, & command communications check; telemetry check
STRUCTURES Visual inspection; interface verification; RMS manipulation
THERMAL Temperature & radiation level check
GNC Attitude adjustment and check; RCS maneuver and check
Once the individual subsystem in-flight tests have been performed, the Integrated Vehicle Test will be con-
ducted. During most mission scenarios, several, if not all, of the subsystems will be operating at once, thus the
Integrated Vehicle Test ensures that this multi-operational mode is possible and successful.
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TABLE
The in-flight testing schedule begins with on-orbit delivery and launch-vehicle separation. The next stage
involves vehicle assembly - attaching the two modules - and the verification of the interfaces between each of
the subsystems. During this stage, all parts of the vehicle will also be visually inspected to check for structural
integrity and any damage that could have been incurred during launch procedures. The next few steps of the in-
flight testing schedule involve the subsystem tests. The Structures and P&P subsystems will be tested first to
verify the safety of the vehicle for astronaut personnel and to provide the power necessary to test the other sub-
systems. The ECLSS and Thermal subsystems will be tested next to evaluate the safety of the crew module.
Finally, the C3T and GNC subsystems will be tested to check all vehicle command and control functions. A
summary of the in-flight testing schedule may be found in the Table 10.7.
10.7 In-Flight Testing Schedule.
Stage Test/Procedure
Stage 1 On-Orbit Delivery and Launch-vehicle Separation
Stage 2 Vehicle Assembly and Interface Verification
Stage 3 STRUCTURES and P&P Subsystem Tests
Stage 4 ECLSS and THERMAL Subsystem Tests
Stage 5 C3T and GNC Subsystem Tests
Stage 6 Integrated Vehicle Test
Stage 7 System Calibration and Vehicle Storage Facility Docking
i
After the testing sequence and schedule has been completed the vehicle will be ready for its first mission. The
Integrated Vehicle Test should be performed each time the vehicle is preparing to embark on a mission to ver-
ify that all subsystems are up and running properly.
10.4 Verification and Validation Summary
The verification and validation program that is described above has been designed to allow for a reliability of
.9944 for Project Freebird. Through innovative management and testing approaches, the system has achieved a
high level of reliability while keeping the costs to a minimum. Logical testing sequences, rigorous interface
validation, and flexible management are all important elements of this efficient program. Overall, the test pro-
cedures allow the system to meet its ten year lifetime at a low cost while operating through a variety of mission
scenerios.
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Chapter
11
Risk and Reliability
Risk and reliability considerations have been incorporated into the design of Freebird. For any space based
project, a certain amount of risk must be accepted. This chapter contains a basic analysis of Freebird's reliabil-
ity. In addition, the testing program outlined in Part II Chapter 10 has been designed to increase the confidence
and accuracy of this reliability estimate.
11.1 System Reliability
Overall system reliability is the main driver that determines system parameters. Reliability can be significantly
increased by minimizing single point failures. This is most easily done using redundant systems. However,
Freebird needs to have a low mass due to the high fuel to structural mass ratio needed for operation in polar
and geosynchronous (GEO) orbits. For this reason, high component reliability was emphasized. Only the most
critical components have redundant backups. Critical components are those whose failures are either life or
mission critical. Individual component risk levels can be found in Appendix C on page 309.
11.1.1 Recommended System Reliability
The recommendation for overall system reliability was .9944, implying 9944 successful ten year lifetimes out
of 10,000 vehicles built. The NASA standard for crewed missions is .994. While all systems are included in
the calculation of the overall system reliability, launch reliability of the vehicle is not included in this value.
The reliability numbers are based on a ten year vehicle lifetime with twelve missions per year.
Subsystem reliability recommendations were determined by giving equal weight to all subsystems. This pro-
duces a uniform subsystem reliability of .999 by taking the sixth root of .994. However, the Verification and
Validation group determined that Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) should provide a
higher reliability than .999. Therefore, ECLSS was assigned a reliability of .9994. This higher number was
used to take up any inadequate reliability from other groups. The recommended numbers for subsystem reli-
ability are shown in Figure 1I. I .
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.9944
1.9991[.999 1.999 .999 1.999 9994
Structures Thermo GNC C3T P+P ECLSS
FIGURE 11.1 System Reliability Goals.
11.1.2 Actual System Reliability
The actual overall system reliability is .9921, which is the best system reliability achieved in the design pro-
cess. Overall system reliability breakdown is shown in Figure 11.2.
99211
996o199  1t99999991199 9
Structures Thermo GNC C3T P+P
19994]
ECLSS
FIGURE 11.2 Actual System Reliabilit):
11.1.3 Iteration Process
The iterative process for determining overall system reliability involved the calculation of reliability from the
bottom up. This means starting at the component level, using component reliabilities. The calculated number
was then checked against the recommended overall system reliability. If there was a difference between the
two numbers, an effort was made to improve subsystem reliabilities to better meet the goal. Where subsystems
were lacking in reliability, an effort was made to provide redundant systems to increase reliability. A flowdown
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of this iterative process is shown in Figure 11.3. Calculation of reliability is based on the probability of failure.
For systems in series, the reliability numbers of each component are multiplied to achieve final reliability:
R T = RIR2...R n (Equation 11.7)
where RT is total reliability, and R 1,R 2 etc.., are component reliabilities. For parallel systems and redundancy,
the following equation is used:
RT = Rj + R2- RIR 2 (Equation 11.8)
If there are more than two parallel components, the equation is used multiple times. This is for single redun-
dancy when the backup system is not used until the primary system fails. In the cases were the subsystem did
not meet its reliability goal, redundancies were examined. However, as has been prevalent throughout this sec-
tion, vehicle mass turned out to be a greater design driver.
Goal
Subsystem I
Standard
Actual
Subsystem
Reliability
Total
System
Reliability
FIGURE 11.3 Reliability Iteration Process.
11.2
11.2.1
Subsystem Acceptance
Subsystem acceptance was based on how closely the subsystem met its recommended reliability. Acceptance
implies that the subsystem made the best trade possible to achieve the best reliability could. Redundancy was a
focus in cases where the reliability was low or the component was critical.
Subsystem Reliabilities
Subsystem reliabilities were determined from numbers given for factory produced components and numbers
determined by an analogy to similar components. Components for which reliability numbers were not avail-
able were given a reliability of .999. This was done primarily for newer technology. Testing procedures, and
design parameters can be constructed which will give a reliability of .999. This is one of the goals of the testing
period of the project.
Only components with a risk level of I or 2 were used in the calculations. Lower risk components were not
determined to be mission critical, and were not used. Figure I1.4 through Figure I1.10 on page 221 show the
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flowdown of the critical components of the seven subsystems. Where applicable, the components are in func-
tional order from left to right. Shaded blocks imply complete component redundancy. Shaded corners imply
internal redundancy. The reliability number in each of these blocks is the reliability after redundancy calcula-
tions are applied. Blocks in parallel imply functional redundancy. A failure of one of the parallel branches does
not imply mission failure, simply a compromised performance.
Figure 11.4 shows the Thermal reliability flowdown. There are two systems in the Thermal group, one of
which is active, and the other passive. The passive system is highly reliable since it has no moving parts. The
heaters and the pump are both redundant. This was necessary since they both have moving parts. The louvres
have moving parts, but have been found to be highly reliable.
A/C Unit
.9990 Louvers t.999 --
q Heat Pipes I I Radiators.9999 .9999
FIGURE 11.4 Thermal Control System Reliability Flowdown.
Figure 11.5 shows the Structures reliability flowdown. There is no particular functional order to the Structures
flowdown. The "Structure" box represents all the support structure of the vehicle. "Shielding" implies radia-
tion as well as debris shielding. The two arms are not redundant since both are used simultaneously. However,
in the event of a failure of one of the arms, most missions can still be carried out. Therefore, the failure of an
arm is not mission critical.
Structure t.999 Shielding.999 _--
Arm
.999
Arm
.999
Adapter
.999
FIGURE 11.5 Structures, Materials, and Mechanisms System Reliabili b, Flowdown.
Figure 11.6 Shows the Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GNC) reliability flowdown. Most systems in GNC
are redundant due to the fact that they are highly mission critical. Ground tracking is used for the start up of
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missions. This is not likely to fail since it simply supplies location information on the asset to be tended. For
LEO and GEO missions, the star sensor is used for tracking. The ground tracking radar can be used to navigate
back to LEO from GEO in the event that the Star Tracker fails.
DCS
.9999
IMU
.9999
LNS
.9999
.9999
FIGURE 11.6 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Reliability Flowdown.
Figure 11.7 shows the reliability flowdown for the Command Communications Control and Telemetry (C3T)
system. Like the GNC system, all of the systems are highly critical, and complete redundancy is incorporated
into all the critical components. There are three CPU's with each one coming on line in the event of failure of
the previous CPU. This is due to the fact that all functions of the system are directly or indirectly tied to the
CPU. The CPU's reliability is 1.000 due to the fact that the significant figures of it's reliability round to that
value.
BUS
.9999
Decoder CPU
.9999 1.000
.9999
S Antenna
.9999
FIGURE 11.7 Command, Communications, Control and Telemetry System Reliability Flowdown.
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Figure 11.8 shows the flowdown of the Power system. The Power system is linear in nature. Due to this fact,
all components are redundant.
.9999 .9999 .9999 .9999
FIGURE 11.8 Power System Reliability FIowdown.
Figure 11.9 shows the Propulsion flowdown. There are four main engines, but the system can function with
only two engines if necessary. During normal operation all four engines are used. There are two centralized
Reaction Control System (RCS) tank systems. Both are connected to each other, allowing fuel to flow between
the two. In the case of a failed tank, the connection is closed, and the RCS operates off the one remaining tank.
The RCS thrusters are redundant so that if one set fails, there are RCS thrusters in other positions which can
continue to maneuver the craft.
TVS
.9999
Main Engined
--t FuelTanks__ .9896 [ __.999 .9999 r'l i
• I____Main Engined r_
.9896 |
._ acs Tanks t_{.__CS Thrusters
.999 .999
---t RCS Tanks_.999 -t RCS Thrusters.999
FIGURE 11.9 Propulsion System Reliability Flowdown.
Figure 11.10 shows the ECLSS reliability flowdown. The fire suppression system, as well as the atmosphere
control, Extra Vehicular Activity (EVA), and Controls and Display systems are all internally redundant. How-
ever, since they deal with many sensors and controls, they are redundant until all the sensors or controls have
failed. Failure of one of the components decreases the functionality of the overall system, but the system will
still function within acceptable parameters.
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FIGURE 11.10 Environmental Control and Life Support System Reliability Flowdown.
11.2.2 Risk Trades
Risk trades were made at the subsystem level to increase reliability. Emphasis was placed on redundancy tbr
high risk and critical components. Whereverpossible, other systems were configured such that they could per-
form functions of a failed system, though at a compromised level. When making risk trades, a main driver was
the overall cost of the system. Low mass in turn provides low cost, and was the main cost indicator. In most
cases, a trade was made between increasing mass and reliability. When the increase in reliability no longer jus-
tified the increase in weight, the trade was complete. A flow chart of the decision process is below in
Figure I1.11 .
Initial
Reliability
Initial Weight
& Cost
Decreased I_ DecreaseWeight & ReliabilityCost
......... I I Design
__ _/_l_ah_, G p Com_)lete
"-I Reliability C6st I
FIGURE 11.11 Reliability Versus Weight Decision Process (Iteration).
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11.3
11.3.1
TABLE
Technology Risk Management
Technology Risk Management, or TRM, is a method of reducing the risk, cost, and time of technology devel-
opment for Project Freebird. Whenever possible, subsystems are comprised of proven technologies. Undevel-
oped or partially developed technologies must be flight-qualified in time for integration. The procedure for
TRM is to identify immature technologies, plan for alternatives in case the new technology cannot be quali-
fied, and develop an appropriate schedule to meet the delivery date. This schedule must include both the pri-
mary and alternative technologies.
Technology Maturity
The technology maturity level is critical in determining how and when a specific component should be incor-
porated into the Freebird schedule. A more developed technology may be purchased directly from a supplier,
whereas a more immature item may need to be designed, analyzed, and tested early in the vehicle development
stage. The level of technology development can be estimated using Table 11.I. Each subsystem component is
listed in Appendix C on page 309 with its respective technology development level.
11.1 Technology Development Level [I ].
Readiness
Level Definition
Basic principles observed
Risk Level
High
2 Conceptual design formulated High
3 Conceptual design tested analytically or experimentally Moderate
4 Critical function/characteristic demonstrated Moderate
5 Component or breadboard tested in relevant environment Moderate
6 Prototype/engineering model tested in relevant environment Low
7 Engineering model tested in space Low
8 Full operational capability Low
11.3.2 Immature Technology and Alternatives
New technologies with relatively little development or testing must be addressed first. These include any sub-
system components with moderate to high levels of development risk as defined in Table 11. i. Components in
this group must be developed and tested well before integration to allow time to switch to alternatives if neces-
sary. This leaves time for development of backup technologies if a component cannot be completed for some
reason. The critical components of Freebird which must be developed first, the alternative technologies, and
the impact on Freebird are described below.
• The vehicle's propulsion system is designed to include four RLI0-A4 engines, made by Pratt and Whit-
ney, which are flight-qualified for 100 starts and 5.25 hours of burn time. Currently, these engines are
only qualified for only 20 starts and 3000 seconds burn time. By using an advanced engine the number
of necessary engine replacements can be greatly reduced. See Part II Section 5.4.2 for further details.
The advanced qualification process must be completed well before the engines are required for vehicle
integration. The alternative to this technology is to use the proven RL10-A4 engines and accept the risk
and cost of the increased number of replacements.
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• The propulsion system fuel tanks are to be made of a composite material and lined with titanium. This
technology has never been fully tested and flight-qualified. The design was chosen due to the compos-
ite's strength and mass properties, as well as limitations on tank mass. (See Part II Section 5.4.2.) The
alternative to the composite tank material is stainless steel which is more commonly used and fully
tested. The impact on Project Freebird is an increased tank mass.
• The Freebird power system includes fuel cells which are downsized from those used on the Space Shut-
tle (STS). The power requirements for Freebird are much less than those for STS, and thus redesigned
fuel cells will provide significant mass savings (See Part II Section 4.3.4.). The alternative option is the
STS fuel cells, with a reduced amount of fuel appropriate for Freebird's power needs.
• Freebird's radiation and debris shielding is a Mesh Double Bumper (MDB). For a complete discussion
about MDB see Part II Section 3.4.1. This technology needs to be further developed, tested, and flight-
qualified. If the MDB cannot be qualified, Whipple shielding, which is a proven protection method, will
be used. The result of using this more mature technology would be a significant increase in mass.
• Project Freebird includes a Remote Manipulation System (RMS) comprised of two arms. These arms
are a variation of the STS RMS now in use. Part II Section 3.6.1 gives specifications for the RMS. The
alternative technology is the STS RMS. The impact of using this alternative is somewhat reduced mis-
sion performance.
• For Freebird's guidance, navigation, and control (GNC) a new type of control software is needed. Such
a software, Microcosm's Autonomous Planning System (MAPS), is in the first stages of development.
This technology is necessary for the Freebird missions and will be developed by Microcosm under con-
tract, or alternatively, by the GNC system designers and engineers.
• Autonomous docking with Space Station Alpha will be accomplished using a Laser Navigation Sensor
(LNS). This system is currently under development by Draper Laboratory. It is not fully tested or flight-
qualified, but must be in time for subsystem and vehicle integration. If the LNS is not functional, Free-
bird is capable of manual and remote teleoperated docking.
11.3.3 Development Schedule
Once time estimates for each component development have been made, a complete schedule can be formu-
lated. Figure I 1.12 shows an example of a component development schedule employing TRM for the space-
craft RMS and clearly shows how the development times overlap. If the first technology meets its schedule,
development of the alternative is not needed. Some technologies will be developed simultaneously to preserve
the project schedule and to allow the opportunity for the immature technology to be completely developed
within a certain time margin if possible.
Months:
New RMS development
and production
STS RMS production
3 6 9 12 15
FIGURE 11.12 Example Development Schedule.
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11.3.4 Cost implications
Although TRM may require simultaneous component development, ultimately the project schedule will be
preserved and cost minimized. By providing alternative components during the design phase, a clear plan of
action is prescribed when one technology will not meet qualification in time for integration. This saves money
by not delaying delivery or compromising the Freebird objectives.
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Cost and Producibility
Cost and Producibility are important factors for Project Freebird. In addition to setting an initial budget of
approximately $1 billion, an attempt has been made to design the vehicle to maximize its ability to produce
revenue from satellite servicing. It is hoped that much of Freebirds' operating costs can be offset by private
sector utilization of the system.
The project costing was accomplished through two approaches. The first was a top down approach and the sec-
ond was a bottom up component based approach. Both methods were employed to insure a good level of reli-
ability in the cost area.
12.1
12.1.1
Work Breakdown Structure
The Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) can be broken down on the program level and the system level. It is a
tool for identifying the multiple systems and subsystems which are part of Project Freebird. Each group has its
own responsibilities and contributes to both the design and the cost analysis of the system.
Program Level Work Breakdown Structure
The program level WBS describes the structure of the entire design division. It includes Program Management
and Program Support during the Research Design Testing & Evaluation (RDT&E), Production and Operations
phases. The program level WBS for Project Freebird (Figure 12.1 ) contains the Vehicle Design as a system
level subgroup. Very often the cost of the project is not only driven by the vehicle design but by other factors
as well. These factors appear as overhead and can be an appreciable fraction of the final vehicle cost.
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FIGURE 12.1 Program Level Work Breakdown Structure.
Cost analysis on the program level is primarily a function of overall program complexity. Larger, more
involved system designs require a greater level of design support. Additional cost-drivers can be identified for
each system level group (Table 12.1 ). These cost drivers have been identified in an attempt to both monitor
and model the final program cost.
TABLE 12.1 Program Level Cost Drivers.
Project System
Program Management
Cost Drivers
Overall Project Size, Project Structure, & Overhead
Space Vehicle Cost Drivers for Individual Sub-Systems
Launch Segment Space Vehicle Size & Weight, & Launch Vehicle
Ground Segment
Operation & Support
Support Software
Delivery Costs to Orbit, Refueling, & Maintenance
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12.1.2 System Level WBS
The system level WBS includes the subsystems and subsystem elements which comprise the Space Vehicle
itself. The system level WBS for Project Freebird (Figure 12.2 ) breaks the design of the vehicle down into six
major subsystems: Structures and Mechanisms; Thermal control; Environmental Control and Life Support
Systems (ECLSS); Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GNC); Communications, Command, Control, and
Telemetry (C3T); Power and Propulsion (P&P).
I Space Vehicle I
I I ! I !c.,I'cs'llo"c
FIGURE 12.2 System Level Work Breakdown Structure.
Cost Analysis on the system level is primarily accomplished by a combination of top down and bottom up esti-
mation. An analogy or costing model is established which allows a budget estimation. As the design becomes
further refined, the budgeting is also adjusted. With design refinement a large degree of bottom up estimation
becomes applicable. Direct quotes and Off-the-Shelf (OTS) prices are integrated into the overall cost model
and the budgeting estimates are adjusted accordingly. To begin bottom up estimation the subsystem cost driv-
ers were identified (Table 12.2 ).
TABLE 12.2 Space Vehicle Design Cost Drivers.
Vehicle Subsystem Cost Drivers
Structures & Mechanisms Remote Manipulating System & Loading
Thermal Control Active Temperature Control for Cryogenic Fuel
ECLSS Crew Size
GNC Laser Navigation System & Navigation Software
C3T Closed Circuit System for Remote Operation
P & P Main Engine
Part I1: Vehicle Design
230 Cost and Producibility
12.2 Cost Modelling and Determination
Cost modelling for project Freebird is accomplished through a combination of top-down and bottom up cost-
ing models. A top down estimate is produced as a guide based on previous space systems. This allows a budget
cap be placed on the individual vehicle subsystems. For some program level costs (RDT&E, Program Manage-
ment, Ground Operations) the top down estimation is considered highly dependable and remains the primary
source of analysis. See Appendix D paragraph D. 1.1 on page 313 for a more detailed description of top down
estimation and a detailed accounting of the cost estimates produced.
Bottom Up cost modelling was accomplished as the design was refined through the use of direct quotes and a
detailed subsystem level model produced by Lockheed. The Lockheed model uses system weight (or other
variable dependent on the specific subsystem) as an estimate of hardware cost. Hardware cost is then used to
determine design & development and prototype costs. Two alterations were made to this model. Direct quotes
of hardware cost were used as inputs when available. And the practice of protoflighting components was per-
mitted when feasible. Protoflighting components saves approximately 70% of original hardware cost from the
final integrated component cost. See Appendix D paragraph D. 1.2 on page 314 for a more detailed description
of bottom up estimation and a detailed accounting of the cost estimates produced.
12.3 Subsystem Cost Trades
Structures and Mechanisms
The modelling of the structure subsystem costs is primarily accomplished through either direct manufacturer
quotation or by modified analogy. Designer estimates of cost, complexity and newness of the technology have
been combined into a set of ground rules used for costing. All cost figures are in FY94 dollars. Life cycle costs,
maintenance costs, and ground support costs are not included in this section and are accounted for in total
project cost.
The mission limitations impose cost trades in the areas of debris shielding, radiation shielding, overall vehicle
weight, and the RMS system. Vehicle weight concerns are addressed through the use of composite structural
members. These components have essentially been flight tested. Consequently, only a small complexity/new
technology adjustment factor is added to the base estimates of cost. The savings in weight with the composite
design is of such magnitude that considerable cost could have been endured before the choice was eliminated.
A new debris shielding system developed by the military for armored vehicles has been chosen by the Struc-
tures group. Despite the shield system's lack of flight testing, its mechanical simplicity and makeup are such
that conclusions regarding its performance can be easily argued. Consequently, a small adjustment in cost for
newness/complexity seems justified. Again, the weight savings were substantial.
Radiation shielding half thicknesses are determined by crew mission requirements and consequently the actual
trades were determined by a direct material property comparison. Material selection has been reviewed from a
cost approach and a final design utilizing aluminum has been chosen.
The RMS system selection has special problems related to vehicle length, mass/moment stability and mission
requirements. A desire for a newly engineered system that is shorter and more flexible is estimated to be close
to $200 million. Despite the relatively large cost in RMS redevelopment, most of the mission scenarios call for
power and flexibility not currently available in the Shuttle RMS system. Additionally, proposed methods of
vehicle self assembly and maintenance could not be achieved without the attributes of the new RMS specifica-
tions. Consequently, a new small and more powerful version of the RMS will be developed for Freebird.
Despite the relatively large cost, savings in other areas will allow the new RMS system to be utilized without
exceeding the subsystem budget.
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The overall structure subsystems cost, as adjusted for all the discussed design trade-offs, can be found as part
of Appendix D.4 on page 316.
Thermal
For the thermal subsystem little information was available to begin an accurate bottom up cost estimate. There-
fore the cost estimate was based primarily on a bottom up analogous estimation produced by Lockheed for
NASA. The original estimate budgeted about $10 million for hardware, $10 million for subsystem integration,
and $7 million for system RDT&E. This $27 million budget did not include final system integration costs. The
actual total cost for the Thermal subsystem is presented in Appendix D.5 on page 317.
The thermal subsystem does not contain a governing cost driver. The cost is driven by the nature of the heat
distribution the system must satisfy. A significant cost trade involves the choice between active and passive
thermal control. Because of the large cooling requirement of the cryogenic fuel active control is necessary.
Also a new mechanical louver system will be installed in Freebird. Though the technology for this system is
rather new, it utilizes current technology.
ECLSS
The modelling of the ECLSS subsystem cost is primarily accomplished through analogies or estimates given
by experts in industry. A costing model (Appendix D.2 on page 314 ) supplied by Lockheed Corporation has
been used as a guideline in determining the contribution of the ECLSS systems costs for the total project.
ECLSS is one of the most expensive subsystems due primarily to the level of system redundancy and testing.
ECLSS cost drivers were primarily centered on crew size. Both repair and rescue configurations of the crew
module, govern the dimensions of the ECLSS subsystem. The major cost driver is the Atmosphere Control
System. The complexity, redundancy and testing needed for this part of the subsystem significantly outweigh
other aspects of the system. A list of all of ECLSS components and their costs can be found in Appendix D.6
on page 318.
GNC
Cost determinations for the Guidance, Navigation, and Control section is primarily completed through cost
models provided by Lockheed. Few cost trades were made because of limited choices in technology. The alti-
tudes being flown by Freebird and the level of autonomy prescribe much of the technology which is used.
Because of these factors two relatively immature pieces of software were chosen; MANS and MAPS. These
packages were chosen because they are being developed for commercial use, therefore costs are potentially
lower. The costs for these new technologies were governed by the size of the computer code.
The major cost drivers for this subsystem are MAPS and the Laser Navigation System(LNS). The alternative
to the LNS is the Image Processing System(IPS). IPS is still in early development stages and would thereibre
be potentially more expensive than LNS. MAPS software is a cost driver because it is also still in the early
development stages. However, because this software is being developed for commercial applications, much of
the cost may be absorbed by the time it is needed for Freebird. All other components in the GNC system are
OTS technology and thus do not drive the cost for this system. Total component cost breakdown can be found
in Appendix D.7 on page 319.
C3T
The level of technology required by C3T is defined by the high orbits Freebird will be using. This causes diffi-
culty in communication, particularly for video downlinks for autonomous missions. Because of these video
requirements, more powerful transponders are required from that which is commonly used. The transponders
are OTS technology, but they are still the most expensive components for the subsystem. The antennae are the
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only custom made components. Since antenna design is relatively mature, their cost is not expected to be a
major driver for the subsystem. Total component cost breakdown can be found in appendix A, Appendix D.8
on page 319.
Power
Cost determination for the hardware and design of the power production and distribution components was
completed through the use of the costing models mentioned previously. A large portion of the hardware costs
were obtained by using OTS prices. Primary cost trades pertaining to power hardware include means of power
production (Solar vs. Fuel Cell) and power storage (Battery Type). Fuel Cells were chosen to satisfy mission
goals at a cost of $5 million including RDT&E. Satisfaction of mission requirements and design cost consider-
ations outweigh the initial cost of these systems due to the relatively small component costs relative to design
costs. Final hardware costs are estimated to total approximately $10 million including RDT&E. Detailed cost
estimates on the component level can be found in Appendix D on page 313.
Further integration costs were obtained through analogy to previous NASA cost studies and labor consider-
ations. A significant integration cost driver is the modular nature of Project Freebird; each module must inter-
face with the vehicle's main power distribution network in a similar manner to the C3T interfaces. Subsystem
integration costs were estimated at $5 million. This number is based on component complexity, expected labor
hours, and parametric estimation of integration costs.
Propulsion
Cost determination for the propulsion systems hardware was completed primarily through an approximate cost
quote directly from Pratt and Whitney, the manufacturer of the RL10-A4. Additional propulsion system costs
included fuel tanks and the Reaction Control System (RCS). These costs are determined through a combina-
tion of OTS prices and bottom up estimation. The primary cost trade for the propulsion system hardware is
engine choice. This affects both delivery cost and operations and maintenance cost. An optimal engine satisfies
mission parameters while being long-lived. Lifetime is more important than initial hardware cost due to the
large cost of integration and delivery to orbit. To maximize engine lifetime, the engines must be requalified
with an additional cost of approximately $40 million. This will extend engine lifetime to 100 starts, a 333%
improvement. Total component costs for Propulsion are estimated at $95 million including RDT&E. Detailed
cost estimates on the component level can be found in Appendix D on page 313.
Subsystem integration costs for the engines are small due to the self contained nature of the engines upon
delivery by the manufacturer. Integration costs for the rest of the subsystem are modeled to total approximately
$10 million.
12.4
12.4.1
Design and Production Cost
Total design and production costs are estimated using analogy, primarily the OTV estimate from Lockheed
(Appendix D.2 on page 314 ). These costs are a percentage of hardware costs, with contingency for complex
systems. Contingency is also added for immature technology.
Total Hardware and Production Cost
Each subsystem component must be integrated into the vehicle upon delivery. These integration costs are quite
high, often comprising approximately one half of the final hardware cost. Integration costs become a signifi-
cant cost driver and must be considered during the design process. Therefore these costs are an important fac-
tor when attempting to model or determine the cost of a system.
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12.4.2
12.4.3
TABLE
Each subsystem must be considered separately since each has characteristics which make it unique. Some sub-
systems include system integration costs as part of their subsystem integration (eg. power, thermal, ECLSS).
Other subsystems contain large, extremely heavy components which must be aligned very precisely (eg. pro-
pulsion, structure).
Cost models including estimation by analogy, complexity factors and labor considerations are applied to deter-
mine the approximate production and integration costs. System level integration costs are estimated to total
$130 million including integration design.
RDT&E Support Cost
Support costs for RDT&E are the costs for verification and validation(V&V) of components and of systems,
and the costs for rese_irch for immature technology. Past space projects have required an additional 40% of
hardware costs for final verification and validation. V&V costs for Freebird are divided into three sections:
component testing, integration testing, and final vehicle testing. To minimize cost, Freebird components are
protoflighted when possible. Prototyping is only used when safety dictates.
Additional research costs are required for immature technology. Several subsystems have components which
need further research. Qualification costs are required for the RLI0-A4 engines. Qualifying the engines will
prevent the need for frequent replacement of the engines and thus save on overall cost. Development costs are
also a major factor for the redesign of the fuel cells. The new design entails scaling down the space shuttle fuel
cells, and increasing the fuel cell lifetime. This will reduce the weight of Freebird, as well as reducing replace-
ment costs. Development costs are also required for immature technology, such as the MAPS software pack-
age.
Summary of Project Cost
Using the modified Lockheed OTV model, the total system costs were estimated. This cost includes program
management, complete space vehicle costs, launch segment costs, ground segment costs, and operations and
support costs. Table 12.3 shows the system costs for Freebird up to and including launch, which is $1.5 bil-
lion.
12.3 Total System Costs Using Modified Lockheed OTV Model (FY94).
Cost Estimate ($M)
Program Management 272
Space Vehicle 834
Launch Segment 135
Ground Segment 223
Operations and Support 36
Total 1,500
12.5 Special Producibility Cost/Problems
Producibility problems tend to involve the same items that are identified as cost drivers in the subsystems. The
exception centers around the final vehicle assembly and testing.
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The re-qualification of the RL-10A engines for 100 starts will be a major issue. This will require a very exten-
sive testing regime which could add significant cost and delays to the overall project. Despite these concerns,
re-qualification is absolutely necessary if Freebird is to have any basis as a cost effective system for servicing
existing orbital assets. Failure to re-qualify the engines will result in the need to replace the propulsion pack
after approximately 5 missions. This would add a cost of about $20 million to each of the missions, making a
financial return on each mission improbable. Additionally, the use of composite propellant tanks will require
additional testing in the space environment to insure their behavior.
The structures subsystem production problems are centered on the RMS. The RMS redesign vastly outweighs
the other producibility items that might be considered. There are several models of the RMS that could be used
for Freebird but none, with the exception of the shuttle RMS, has been flown. The testing and validation time
for these redesigned systems could be extensive. Additionally, conditions simulating the actual operating envi-
ronment will have to be maintained during testing to ensure an accurate representation of in flight pertbr-
mance. An alternative to ground testing might be accomplished by using the Shuttle as a test platform for any
new RMS design.
GNC and C3T subsystems are faced with a number of producibility problems. At issue are the LNS and MAPS
components. All three of these components are still under development and all exhibit serious operational
problems. It appears that there is a strong industry dedication to resolving these problems and producing work-
able units. However, an exact time frame is not available and it can only be presumed that engineers will
resolve their difficulties prior to the commencement of the final design stages of the Freebird project. Addition-
ally, software development for these systems presents a significant challenge. The software must be exhaus-
tively tested to insure that proposed autonomous missions can be guaranteed a high level of reliability and
safety.
In addition to subsystems problems there are significant problems regarding the final vehicle assembly. The
method of assembly, special assembly equipment and facility availability may present formidable obstacles to
the project in terms of cost and total project time.
Foremost is the method of assembly and the specialized equipment necessary to carry out that assembly. Since
the vehicle has no parallel in size and shape, all the assembly equipment must be fabricated, calibrated and
designed to accurately produce conditions similar to weightlessness.
The obstacles presented by the facilities revolve around availability and level of cleanliness needed for final
assembly and testing. Since the vehicle is intended to employ as much proto-flight equipment as possible, a
high degree of cleanliness will be needed to insure the integrity of these subsystems. The best parallel to this
task is that endured by the Hubble Space Telescope. The HST was a proto-flight system that was clean room
assembled, tested and then shipped to the launch site under conditions that would be similar to Project Free-
bird.
12.6 Production Schedule
A general schedule for the balance of the Freebird Project is as shown in Figure 12.3. The schedule was devel-
oped as a composite of several systems that appear equal in magnitude and complexity. Special consideration
is given to the current industry trend of integrating final design with tooling, procurement and manufacturing
in order to minimize total time and expense in production. The total project is estimated to take between 36-40
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months to complete. This time schedule does not reflect shortfalls in funding, political considerations or
changes in mission priorities.
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Assemble , ,
& Test : '
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FIGURE 12.3 General Schedule, Including Contingency Time.
In order to determine the approximate time involved with each area of the individual subsystems, a contin-
gency time chart, Figure 12.4, was developed. This chart shows the contingency assigned to each area of the
subsystem as an added percentage of time. The assignment of the contingency level is determined by analogy
to similar systems and then is adjusted for Freebird specifics. For example, many aspects of the GNC system
involve standard components, however, the software development time is expected to be significant. Conse-
quently a rating of high (30%) is added to the final design time.
The subsystem schedule, with adjusted contingency times, is located in Appendix E on page 325. The chart
also shows the final integration, verification and validation time as well as final testing and launch.
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TABLE 12.4 Contingencies Used for Master Schedule. a
Design
High
Procurement/Tool
Structures & Mechanisms Low
P&P Med High Med
Thermal Med Med Low
GNC High Low Low
C3T Low High Low
ECLSS High Med Med
Construct
Med
a. High corresponds to 30% contingency; Medium cor-
responds to 20% contingency; Low corresponds to 10%
contingency.
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System Interfaces
To accomplish the planned missions, Freebird must interface with the International Space Station Alpha
(ISSA), the Vehicle Storage Facility (VSF), the Space Shuttle, Soyuz, ground stations, tended assets, payloads,
and the environment. This chapter details the various mechanical, communication/data and power interfaces
between the vehicle and external factors; internal interfaces are discussed in individual system chapters. The
vehicle will be based in the VSF, will pick up crew and supplies at ISSA before every crewed mission, and will
be in communication with ISSA as well as ground stations throughout the mission. The vehicle will be
expected to perform crew rescues from Soyuz and the Shuttle. Freebird will be capable of maneuvering and
manipulating its payload and tended assets as necessary. Freebird will experience a wide range of environmen-
tal conditions over the course of its lifetime (see Section 1.4.2 on page 29), and the vehicle must provide a
means of dealing with the negative environmental effects.
13.1 Mechanical Interfaces
Freebird was designed to have mechanical interfaces with the VSF, ISSA, the Shuttle, Soyuz, tended assets, its
payload, and its environment, as illustrated in Figure 13.1. The vehicle will reside in the VSF, so it requires a
system of tethering, discussed in more detail in Section 4.4 on page 279. To enable docking with the Station,
the Shuttle, and Soyuz, the vehicle is equipped with a Common Berthing Adapter which holds the two space-
craft together, while forming an airtight seal to allow transfer of crew, cargo, and supplies. Payloads will be
secured to the front of the craft while in transit, and will be appropriately positioned in orbit by means of the
Remote Manipulator System (RMS). On crewed missions, the crew module acts as the payload and attaches to
the base unit by means of an intermodular interface. The modular coupling will be accomplished by teleoper-
ated use of the arms. Tended assets will also be grappled and manipulated as necessary with the RMS. The hull
provides protection from thermal, micrometeorite and radiation effects.
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13.2 Communication/Data Interfaces
Freebird requires communication interfaces with ISSA, ground stations, the Shuttle, Soyuz, and tended assets.
As shown in Figure 13.2, Freebird will be in constant communication with the ground station and ISSA, and
will communicate with the other systems as necessary. ISSA and ground act as Mission Control, monitoring
the progress of the mission and issuing commands. Teleoperation will be controlled from the ground, necessi-
tating a communication link capable of transmitting video with acceptable resolution. Communication with the
ground station will be routed through either the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) or the
Deep Space Network to achieve the necessary coverage and bandwidth. Soyuz and the Shuttle need to commu-
nicate with Freebird for position and condition updates during crew rescue. Tended assets may need adjust-
ments in attitude or configuration to facilitate servicing, so Freebird will communicate with them through the
ground station.
13.3 Power Interfaces
Freebird was designed to have power interfaces with its payload and the VSE Figure 13.3 shows this relation-
ship. The payload's power source may not function in transit (solar panels which deploy in orbit, for example),
so the vehicle allows its payload to draw power from Freebird's supply to maintain stand-by operations. On
crewed missions of course, the crew module will require a steady supply of power to maintain Environmental
Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) functions. While not on a mission, the vehicle will be stored in the
VSF, drawing a minimal amount of power from the facility's solar panels to maintain stand-by operations.
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Chapter
14
Vehicle Design Summary
This chapter summarizes the current Freebird design, both in terms of the vehicle configurations that can be
used as well as the overall mass, power, and data budgets.
14.1 Vehicle Configurations
Freebird has a total of four modes in which it can be operated. These four modes are the permutations of hav-
ing crewed versus teleoperated mission and whether or not auxiliary fuel packs are installed.
The other major configuration occurs during the boost phase, when additional support structure is temporarily
placed as "packing material" around the weakest links of the system.
14.1.1 Launch
Since orbital insertion of the Freebird actually involves two separate launches, both launch configurations are
shown in Figure 14.1. This configuration has the base unit launching in an Ariane V and the crew module
launching a Proton C.
Note that there will be additional structure surrounding the vehicle and reinforcing the structure, a necessity for
Freebird to withstand launch loads. This material is discarded in orbit and is not a constituent portion of the
vehicle. Depending on which launch vehicle is used, slight modifications can be made to the configuration, but
the basic mechanism will remain identical. The backup launch vehicles are both owned by the United States:
the Titan IV will be used as a backup on the launch of both the propulsion module and base unit and the "titan
III will be the backup for the launching of extra fuel and the crew module.
For refueling missions, Figure 14.2 shows the fuel tank configuration for a Proton launch. Note that the fuel
tanks occupy almost the entire capability of the Proton, filling it both in volume and in lifting capability. If a
Titan III is to be used, in emergency or backup situations, less fuel will have to be launched due to the reduced
lifting capability of this vehicle.
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FIGURE 14.1 Launch Configurations.
A launch of extra fuel tanks to be used in extended missions will look almost identical to an extra fuel launch;
however it will include additional structural support as with the launch of the base unit or the propulsion unit to
mitigate the effects of the launch loads.
To launch a replacement propulsion module, the configuration shown in Figure 14.3 will be used. To accom-
modate the propulsion pack, a vehicle the size of the Ariane V or the Titan IV will be required.
14.1.2 Crewed Mission
In a crewed mission scenario, the crew module will be mated to the base unit at the Vehicle Storage Facility
(VSF). In addition, extra fuel packs may be added to the vehicle to extend the range of the mission. Figure 14.4
shows a rendered figure of the configuration for a crewed mission with the extra fuel tanks added.
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FIGURE 14.2 Fuel Tank Launch Configuration.
Rescue missions as well as other nearby (Mass Ratio < 3.5) crewed missions will not require the extra fuel
tanks. The rendered image of a crewed configuration without extra fuel tanks is shown in Figure 14.5.
14.1.3 Teleoperated Missions
Before an uncrewed mission, the crew module will be detached from the base unit and stored in the VSF. If
necessary, a mission specific docking adapter will be attached to the front of the vehicle in order to mate prop-
erly with the target asset. It is expected that this configuration, shown in Figure 14.6, will be used for the bulk
of Freebird's missions.
For extended missions, or ones requiring large cargo transfer, extra fuel tanks will be added to the teleoperated
vehicle. If fuel cannot be launched directly into a polar orbit for Freebird to utilize on a return trip, extra fuel
tanks will be required for a polar mission. All GEO missions will require the extra tanks.
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FIGURE 14.4 Extended Crewed Mission Confi.guration (with Extra Fuel Tanks Added).
FIGURE 14.5 Crewed/Rescue Mission Configuration (without Extra Fuel Tanks Added).
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\
FIGURE 14.6 Teleoperated Mission Configuration (without Extra Fuel Tanks Added).
FIGURE 14.7 Teleoperated Mission Configuration (with Extra Fuel Tank Added).
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14.2
TABLE
TABLE
Freebird Dynamics
To understand the control dynamics of Freebird, its center of mass and moments of inertia were computed.
Once all of Freebird's components, masses, and volumes were known, the vehicle was configured for function-
ality and balance. Each component was modeled as a point mass. Whenever a component spanned a large vol-
ume, the center of mass was approximated by appropriately distributing the mass over the volume. The center
of mass was calculated using the following formula for a discretized system like this:
_ximi (Equation 14.1 )
where the index i ranges over all components. The center of mass was calculated for four different configura-
tions: crewed, wet and dry; and teleoperated, wet and dry. Also, calculations were not done for Freebird in its
extended mission configuration. Note that "dry" implies that main engine fuel was not included, but RCS and
fuel cell fuel was included. Table 14.1 summarizes the center of mass coordinates of each module, and
Table 14.2 summarizes the center of mass coordinates for the four configurations considered. Once the center
of mass coordinates were known for each vehicle configuration, rough moments and products of inertia around
that point were calculated for this discrete system. These values are summarized in Table 14.3. It is important
to observe that Ixz and Iy z are non-zero. This means that the body axis system is not the principle axis system.
However, these products of inertia are at least one order of magnitude smaller than the moments of inertia,
indicating that the difference between body and principle axes is not large, and therefore not detrimental to
vehicle control.
14.1 Approximate Coordinates for Module-Specific Centers of Mass.
Coordinates of the Center of Mass [m]
X
2.93
Y
0Crew Module
"Smartbox" -2.47 0 0
Propulsion Pack -7.19 0 0
14.2 Approximate Coordinates for Configuration-Specific Centers of Mass.
Coordinates of the Center of Mass [m]
Crewed, Dry
X
-2.5
Z
0
Crewed, Wet -3.9 0 0
Teleoperated, Dry -5. I 0 0
Teleoperated, Wet -4.7 0 0
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TABLE 14.3 Approximate Configuration-Specific Moments of hzertia About Respective Center of Masses.
Crewed, Dry
I F
13,710
lyy
196,000
Moments of Inertia [kg m 2]
IXZ
-758.2
In |_
206,300 0
258,800 0
72,210 0
109,600 0
Iyz
-92.98
Crewed, Wet 13,710 248,600 -863.7 -92.98
Teleoperated, 13,290 61,580 624.8 -92.98
Dry
Teleoperated, 13,290 99,000 552.6 -92.98
Wet
14.3
TABLE
Summary Budgets
The numbers for these budgets were derived by breaking down the vehicle into systems and components, and
developing mass, power and cost numbers for each individual component. A contingency factor between 5%
and 25% was included depending on technology maturity.
The total mass of the vehicle, with crew, is 8,731kg. Table 14.4 shows the mass distribution by system and
module. This includes a full load of fuel for the RCS thrusters and the fuel cells, as well as 3 astronauts and a
5% system contingency. Appendix A contains a more detailed mass breakdown.
14.4 Mass Breakdown By Subsystem and Module.
Base Unit Crew Module
Subsystem Mass [kg] Mass [kg]
Structures, Materials & Mechanisms 1,812 1,71 I
Thermal Control 47 72
Guidance, Navigation & Control 173 ---
Command, Communication, Control & Telemetry 78 ---
Propulsion 2,256 ---
Power 578 ---
Environmental Control & Life Support --- 1,588
Subtotal 4,944 3,371
Overall System Contingency (5%) 247 169
Total Mass 5,191 3,540
The cost to develop, produce, and test Freebird are broken down by subsystem in Table 14.5. This figure
includes hardware, integration and subsystem level verification and validation testing, but not system-level
tests. The total program cost is $1,472,415,000, which includes costs for hardware, testing and integration,
program management, launch, and operations and support. For a more detailed breakdown, see Chapter 12 and
Appendix D.
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TABLE 14.5 Cost Breakdown By Subsystem.
Subsystem
Structures, Materials & Mechanisms.
Hardware Cost
[Ski
Subsystem Cost
[$k]
115,725 336,432
Thermal Control 1,925 6,103
Guidance, Navigation & Control 18,903 81,125
Command, Communication, Control & Telemetry 8,781 28,865
Propulsion 29,525 125,312
Power 8,092 33,281
Environmental Control & Life Support 50,688 94,376
Total Component Costs 233,639 705,494
Power budgets are detailed in Chapter 4 (Power) and include stand-by power requirements, average power
consumption, and mission power profiles. Individual component power requirements can be found in Appen-
dix B.
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Operations

Chapter
1
Launch and Ground Support
The primary objectives set for the Freebird vehicle drove many of the considerations for selection of a launch
vehicle. Different launch vehicles were chosen for the different modules in the Freebird system, due to the dif-
ferent geometries and deliverable masses in the design of each module.
1.1
1.1.1
Propulsion Pack and "Smartbox" Launch
The combination of the propulsion pack and the "smartbox" is the largest configuration of modules which
must be launched. In addition to the initial launch of the propulsion pack and the "smartbox", an estimated four
identical replacement propulsion pack modules will need to be launched into orbit over the system lifetime of
ten years. Both the initial launch of the propulsion pack and "smartbox" combination, and the successive
launches of replacement propulsion packs, will be on the same vehicle.
The propulsion pack module volume and mass were set by the mission objectives and propulsion system selec-
tion. Since both the volume and mass were relatively large, the number of possible launch vehicles for this
configuration of modules was limited. The Ariane 5, the Titan IV, the space shuttle, and the Energia all met the
necessary minimum mass and volume requirements, and were considered as possible launch vehicle choices.
Vehicle Choice
The combined propulsion pack and "smartbox" modules, designed to be launched attached and fully fueled
with cryogenics, weigh approximately 20 000kg and have a volume of 171m 3. The Energia, which delivers
100 000kg to ISSA orbit, was ruled out as a prime or backup launch vehicle possibility due to a large, unusable
mass margin. The space shuttle was ruled out as a primary or backup vehicle due to the danger to the shuttle
crew from carrying cryogenic fuels as cargo in the payload bay.
The Ariane 5 and the Titan IV both have similar performance capabilities to the orbit of the International
Space Station Alpha (ISSA), and meet the necessary volume and mass requirements (see Table 1.1). Either
vehicle would be capable of placing the propulsion pack - "smartbox" combination or the propulsion pack
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module alone into the proper orbit. Since the performance capabilities are nearly equal, the Ariane 5 was cho-
sen as the prime vehicle over the Titan IV because of its inexpensive launch cost ($90-$100 million FY90).
The Titan IV was selected as a backup vehicle at a launch cost of $250-$300 million FY90. The use of a for-
eign launch vehicle produces significant cost savings. The Ariane 5 is currently in development, with a
planned first launch in 1996 [2]. In the event that this vehicle does not achieve operational status in time to
deliver the propulsion pack - "smartbox" combination or the propulsion pack module to orbit, the Titan IV will
be used.
TABLE 1.1 Parameters for Primary and Backup Vehicles.
Vehicle Titan III
Maximum Payload Volume a [m 3] 68
Titan IV
208
Ariane 5
197
Proton C
58
Maximum Mass to Orbit b [kg] 14,000 20,000 22,000 20,000
Maximum Axial Loads [g's] +2.5, -5.0 +3.3, -6.5 +4.5 +6.0
Maximum Lateral Loads [g's] +/- 1.7 +/- 1.5 N/A +/- 3
Launch Cost c [$M] 130- ! 60 250-300 90- 100 35
Reliability 0.930 0.930 0.875 0.877
Country of ownership U.S. U.S. ESA Russia
a. Primary cylindrical volume only.
b. Circular orbit at 390km, 51.6 ° inclination.
c. Fiscal year 1990 (FY90) dollars.
1.1.2 Scheduling
Nominal manifesting information was not available for the Ariane 5. Nominal manifesting for a Titan IV
launch occurs at least 33 months prior to the desired launch date. Approximately eight launches per year are
expected for both these vehicles [1][2]. For more information on issues which concern contracting for a for-
eign launch vehicle, see Section 8.2.3 on page 290.
1.2 Crew Module Launch
The volume needed for the crew module drove the launch vehicle selection for this module. Once the needed
volume was established at 60m 3, a list of candidate launch vehicles which matched the volume needed was
assembled which included the Proton C and the Titan III (see Table 1.1).
1.2.1 Vehicle Choice
Since both the Proton C and the Titan III have similar performance capabilities (see Table I. 1), the launch cost
became the deciding factor. The Russian-owned Proton C was chosen as the primary launch vehicle for its cost
of $35 million FY90 per launch. The Titan III was chosen as the backup launch vehicle with a cost of $130-
$160 million FY90.
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, concerns about the integrity of launch support facilities for the Pro-
ton series of vehicles arose. These reports were entirely unfounded, and recent delegations to the launch site at
Baikonour Cosmodrome have proved the facilities to be in satisfactory condition. However, concerns about the
degrading infrastructure in the community of Leninsk surrounding the Baikonour facilities are quite valid. If
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the standard of living around Baikonour does not improve, the current trend of skilled workers leaving the
region will continue. These workers maintain and operate the launch facility. A significant drop in the skilled
labor force at Baikonour will have dangerous effects on the operation of the Proton launch system. [3]
Scheduling
Nominal manifesting for a Proton C launch occurs at least 18 months prior to the desired launch date. 32 Pro-
ton launches are expected yearly. For more information on issues surrounding contracting for a foreign launch
vehicle, see Section 8.2.3 on page 290
1.3
1.3.1
1.3.2
Fuel Tank Launches
The drivers influencing selection of a launcher for the fuel tanks were cost and turnaround time for additional
launches. In order to keep mission costs down, the launch vehicle selected had to be the least expensive cost
option per unit of deliverable mass to orbit. In addition, several launches of fuel must occur within a few weeks
in order to perform missions requiring extra fuel tanks. Thus, the launch vehicle chosen for the fuel tanks must
be capable of a quick turnaround time for multiple launches.
Vehicle Choice
Taking into account of cost per unit of deliverable mass to orbit and turnaround time, the Proton C was selected
as the prime launch vehicle for fuel tanks. At a cost of $1750 FY90 per kg of payload, it was the least expen-
sive launch vehicle option. In addition, the Proton turnaround time of approximately one week is adequate for
Freebird mission requirements.
The Titan III was chosen as a backup launch vehicle for its similar performance capabilities and fairing geom-
etry as compared to the Proton C. However, the Titan cost per unit of deliverable mass to orbit is 400% more
than the Proton C cost per unit of deliverable mass. Should the Proton become unavailable for fuel tank
launches, the anticipated cost per mission will increase by at least 400%.
Scheduling
Nominal manifesting for a Proton C launch occurs at least 18 months prior to the desired launch date. The best
turnaround time for a second Proton launch is approximately one week. 32 Proton launches are expected
yearly, providing an ample supply for Freebird needs.
1.4 Crew Launches
Crew will be launched to Freebird aboard the space shuttle resupply and crew change-out missions to ISSA.
These ISSA resupply missions are expected to be on the order of four to five per year. This provides ample
opportunity to carry out the anticipated 1-4 crewed Freebird missions per year. For more information on the
crew, see Chapter 5 on page 281.
1.5 Transportation to Launch Site
Regardless of where Freebird will be manufactured, or which site each module will be launched from, trans-
portation will be required from the place of final component testing and evaluation to the launch site. Table 1.2
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sums up the modes of transportation required for each launch site. The table is based on manufacture of Free-
bird modules in the U.S.
TABLE 1.2 Transportation Modes from U.S. Manufacturers to Domestic and Foreign Launch Sites.
Launch Site
(Location)
Cape Canaveral
(Florida, U.S.A.)
Launch Vehicles
Supported at Site
Titan III
Titan IV
Preferred Payload
Transportation Modes
Rail and Barge
Guiana Space Center Ariane 5 Barge
(Kourou, French Guiana)
Baikonur Cosmodrome Proton C Airplane
(Leninsk, Kazahkstan)
1.6
1.6.1
Ground Support
All Freebird mission operatmns will be controlled and monitored from the ground.
Freebird Mission Control
Freebird will need several console control stations in the new combined Shuttle and Space Station Mission
Control Center at Johnson Space Center in order to handle mission operations. These console stations will be
"soft" terminals, consisting of computer terminals and displays, which are easily and quickly configurable for
each mission. At least one dedicated flight controller will be required for each Freebird mission.
For certain teleoperated missions in geostationary orbit where remote manipulator system (RMS) operations
might be intensive, a long lag time on video downlink is undesirable. In order to alleviate this lag, a portable
control console would be transported to a location directly under the geostationary asset. This would reduce
communication lag time between the controller and the Freebird vehicle, making control of intricate RMS
operations easier.
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Chapter
2
Failure Modes
This chapter covers the failure modes which Freebird may encounter throughout its lifetime, as well as the
recovery from these failures. Failures are occurrences which compromise any of the primary mission objec-
tives. By examining failure modes and recovery scenarios, missions can be completed successfully. This is
also an important part of assuring the reliability of the system [1 ].
2.1 Mission Failure Modes
Mission failure modes include all malfunctions of the Freebird vehicle or human error in operation which pre-
clude mission completion. They can occur during any of the following: launch, docking, stand-by mode, fuel-
ing and refueling, or mission operations. Unforeseen complications during launch may disable or destroy
Freebird. This possibility has been minimized by designing to the launch vehicle environment. Freebird will
dock autonomously using the laser navigation system. If this system fails, docking can be accomplished by the
manual or remote teleoperated system. If Freebird shuts down and cannot be restarted when in stand-by mode,
no missions can be started or accomplished. Sufficient redundancy to prevent this occurrence has been incor-
porated. If the fuel tanks cannot be fueled or refueled, Freebird cannot execute the proper orbital maneuvers.
During all mission operations, subsystem failures may make the primary objectives impossible. For this rea-
son, a detailed list of failure modes for each subsystem was developed.
2.2 Subsystem Failure Modes
A chart listing detailed failures of all critical components is located in the chapter for each subsystem in Part II.
Following is a list of references for all subsystem failure mode tables:
• Structures - Section 3.7
• Power - Section 4.5.3
• Propulsion - Section 5.4
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• Thermal - Section 6.5
• Guidance, Navigation, and Control - Section 7.9
• Command, Communications, Control, and Telemetry - Section 8.6
• Environmental Control and Life Support Systems - Section 9.10
Each failure mode table lists the component, its failure, the effect of the failure, the prevention for or response
to the failure, and the criticality of such a failure in each configuration of Freebird (crewed or teleoperated con-
figuration). The failures can fall into one of four criticality categories, based on the severity of the failure.
Table 2. ! lists the levels of mission criticality which can be assigned to failures.
TABLE 2.1 Level of Mission Criticality
Critical Level Definition
Life threatening
2 Mission critical (mission aborted)
3 Non-mission critical
4 Telemetry critical
If a failure
I. Places the lives of the crew in jeopardy, then it is considered life threatening;
2. Affects the mission to the point that it must be aborted, then it is considered mission critical;
3. Affects the mission such that it is compromised but may still be completed, then the failure is consid-
ered non-mission critical; and
4. Has no meaningful effect on the mission or crew but can be detected, then it is considered telemetry
critical.
This definition of failure criticality is the same as for Project Perseus [2]. An evaluation of each componenrs
criticality is listed in Appendix C on page 309.
2.3 Failure Recovery
Failure prevention methods or recovery scenarios have been developed for each failure mode which is mission
critical or life threatening. As mentioned above, these are listed in each subsystem's failure mode table. In
most cases failures are prevented using three methods: fault avoidance, fault tolerance, and functional redun-
dancy. Fault avoidance is designing a robust system, incorporating sizable safety margins, a rigorous testing
program, and proven components. Fault tolerance is the use of redundant components to take over for a failed
part and includes failure detection. Redundancy can be either full redundancy, partial redundancy, or internal
redundancy. Functional redundancy is the ability to switch to another system to complete the functions of a
failed component or system. All of these methods have been employed for Project Freebird.
In other situations, especially in the case of unexpected failures during mission operations, a recovery strategy
can be formulated from the ground station and then implemented.
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Chapter
3
Mission Timelines
The mission scenarios that Freebird is most likely to encounter may be divided into several mission phases. In
the pages that follow, various missions are described from the initial system power-up to the completion of the
mission and the final system power-down. For each scenario, the mission phases are categorized into Pre-Mis-
sion Activity, Mission Activity, and Post-Mission Activity.
3.1
3.1.1
Missions in Low Earth Orbit
Based on the primary objective for Freebird of tending and repairing assets in LEO, the most common mis-
sions that Freebird is likely to encounter are those missions to various inclinations in LEO where space-based
assets lie. Furthermore, the configuration for the mission (teleoperated or crewed) affects the type of activity
that the vehicle will undergo.
Teleoperated Mission in Low Earth Orbit
Figure 3.1 is a sample timeline for a mission to tend and/or repair a space-based asset in low earth orbit with
the vehicle in a teleoperated configuration. Should the vehicle not be in stand-by mode, the first phase of activ-
ity is to power-up to stand-by mode (Section 4.4.2 on page 279). For a teleoperated LEO mission, the vehicle
would be fully assembled at this point, (consisting only of the base unit), and, as a result, would be ready for
testing (Section 10.3 on page 208). Six hours is allotted for the Integrated Vehicle Test so that repairs may be
made if any of the tests should fail. Once the vehicle successfully undergoes the Integrated Vehicle Test, it
detaches from the VSF (where it is stored) and is refueled at ISSA if necessary. An estimated time of six hours
is required to refill the propellant tanks. If the specific mission requires payload, the payload is attached to the
base unit after refueling. This is the last phase of Pre-Mission Activity.
Mission Activity effectively begins when the RL10-A4 engines are fired. The length of time it would take to
reach the desired position will vary from mission to mission. The corrective maneuvers required to make a ren-
dezvous with the orbital asset possible (proximity operations) are included in the six-and-a-half hour estimate
for the approach. Rendezvous and docking with the orbital asset, accomplished with the help of the Remote
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FIGURE 3.1 Teleoperated LEO Mission Timeline
Manipulation Systems (RMS), requires about six hours because of the complexity of the maneuver. In
Figure 3. I, almost three days are designated for servicing the orbital asset. Clearly, the servicing time depends
heavily upon the type of service or the type of mission. An extended servicing time is possible, but limited by
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3.1.2
several factors, including the amount of fuel that the vehicle is equipped with for maneuvering purposes, the
available power, and the additional cost accumulated. The return trip completes the actual mission.
Once the mission is completed, the vehicle is refueled for the next mission. In the case that the refueling tanks
are in orbit, launched from the ground to a position nearby ISSA, an additional rendezvous is required, and the
refueling will therefore take over 12 hours. However, in the case that the fuel is obtainable at ISSA from the
VSF, no additional rendezvous is required, and refueling would be preceded by the attachment of the vehicle to
the VSE Figure 3.1 shows the situation in which a rendezvous with the fuel is required. The attachment of the
vehicle to the VSF follows the refueling. The final phase of Post-Mission Activity is power-down to stand-by
mode (or a full power-down, which is shown in Figure 3.1.
Crewed Mission in Low Earth Orbit
Figure 3.2 is a sample timeline of a crewed mission in LEO. The timeline for a crewed mission in LEO is sim-
ilar to the timeline for a teleoperated mission. The main constraint for this type of mission, however, is the 4-
day design limit of maintaining an operable cabin environment for astronauts, based on the mission require-
ments. The sample timeline for the crewed mission to LEO begins by powering-up to stand-by mode. Once
again, 6 hours is allowed for the Integrated Vehicle Test. After testing, the vehicle detaches itself from the VSF
with the crew capsule already mounted onto the "smart box". If extra fuel tanks are required for a specific mis-
sion, they are attached at this point in time. Figure 3.2 allows 24 hours to rendezvous and attach two sets of
fuel tanks. Up to this point, the procedure is teleoperated. A 12-hour period is designated for a rendezvous with
ISSA to board the astronauts who will perform EVA.
Mission Activity is initiated by the separation of the vehicle from ISSA after ingress. After cruising for a
length of time (which depends upon the destination position), Freebird accomplishes a rendezvous with the
orbital asset. The service and return phases of activity complete the core of the Mission Activity. The Mission
Activity is effectively the same for the two configurations (crewed and teleoperated). In a crewed configura-
tion, however, an astronaut would perform EVA to repair a satellite which, for example, is not technologically
advanced and cannot be repaired by the RMS.
In Figure 3.2, after returning to and undergoing a rendezvous with ISSA, the astronauts will have exhausted
the 4-day operating envelope of their life support system. (The timeline presents generous allocations of time
which allow for the limiting 4-day case to be met.) Note that almost three of the four days are allotted for the
servicing of the orbital asset. Once the astronauts return to ISSA, the vehicle is refueled (remotely). Again, if
the additional fuel is launched from the ground to a position slightly away from ISSA (case shown in
Figure 3.2), then the vehicle will rendezvous with the fuel tanker and refuel prior to its attachment to the VSF
and prior to power-down. If the vehicle is to be refueled at ISSA, then the vehicle would first attach itself to the
VSF--a 12-hour activity--and then refuel afterwards.
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FIGURE 3.2 Crewed Low Earth Orbit Mission Timeline.
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3.1.3 Teleoperated Mission to Polar Orbit
Figure 3.3 is a sample timeline of a teleoperated mission to service a space-based asset in LEO at a polar incli-
nation. The vehicle could be equipped with fuel for a one-way mission and refueled for the return mission on
orbit near the position of the orbital asset being serviced. This modified scenario, while increasing the mass
fraction, greatly increases the complexity and risk of the mission. In Figure 3.3, 12 hours are incorporated into
the Mission Activity segment of the timeline to allow for the additional rendezvous with the fuel tanker and
refueling prior to the return trip. Although a polar mission is not a very likely scenario for Freebird, it is an
option which shows the versatility of the system. A more typical representation of the teleoperated polar mis-
sion would simply omit the additional rendezvous in the Mission Activity segment of Figure 3.3 and would
require that Freebird carry sufficient fuel to make a round-trip mission.
3.2 Missions in Geosynchronous Orbit
A mission to deploy a satellite in GEO equatorial orbit is a more challenging endeavor, but would be divided
into mission phases similar to those given in Figure 3.4. Freebird must be prepared for a GEO mission in the
same manner as for a LEO mission: the vehicle must be powered-up, tested, and detached from the VSE From
the VSF, the vehicle will effectively perform two rendezvous maneuvers to attach extra propellant tanks for the
journey. Another 12 hours will be spent attaching the satellite to be deployed, or other cargo required. Then,
the Pre-Mission Activity will be complete.
The Mission and Post-Mission Activity phases for a GEO mission are essentially the same as those for a tele-
operated LEO mission, although the amount of time required for the approach and return depend on the mis-
sion and the specific mission destination.
3.3 Rescue Missions
One top-level requirement of Freebird is that it be capable of supporting a crew of 8 for 24 hours in an emer-
gency situation. Out of this requirement arises the scenario for a rescue mission in which Freebird detaches
from ISSA with the crew capsule and one crew member, performs a rendezvous with the Shuttle, for example,
taking its 7 crew members aboard, and returns to ISSA. Figure 3.4 outlines the basic phases of Pre-Mission,
Mission, and Post-Mission Activity which would be likely to be performed in a rescue mission. The first mat-
ter at hand is the declaration of the emergency. Once the emergency has been declared, the system would be
powered-up from stand-by mode (which is not shown in Figure 3.4), the vehicle would be tested, and the best
method of response to the emergency would be determined (e.g., route of travel). The astronaut would board
the capsule to complete the Pre-Mission Activity.
The most notable aspect of the timeline in Figure 3.4 is the fact that the period of time that lies between the
separation of Freebird from the VSF and the egress to ISSA is the maximum design limit of 24 hours. This
time constraint allows a rescue time, once at the appropriate location, of over 10 hours.
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On Orbit Assembly and Maintenance
Critical issues for Freebird include on-orbit assembly methods and regular maintenance.
4.1
4.1.1
On Orbit Assembly
There are four major on-orbit manipulations which will need to be completed at various times during the vehi-
cle lifetime: mating the crew module to the base unit, refueling the vehicle, attaching extra fuel packs, and
replacing the propulsion packs. Mating and refueling will be required for nearly every mission. Replacing the
propulsion packs will occur only once every twenty five missions.
Assembly will occur in a teleoperated manner. Instead of completely autonomous control, a ground-based
human operator will manipulate the arms and thrusters for each rendezvous, docking and manipulation neces-
sary.
Mating the Crew Module to the Base Unit
The crew module will be kept in storage at the Vehicle Storage Facility (VSF). The base unit will be remotely
maneuvered to the correct attitude in the vicinity of the crew module. In order to assemble the full crewed
vehicle, the crew module will be grappled by the base unit's Remote Manipulator System (RMS). In order to
affect the mating, the RMS will be used to grapple the crew module and pull it onto the base unit. The interface
is designed to allow for some error in the mating and to correct for minor misalignments. It is expected that the
required accuracy will be similar to the docking with the International Space Station Alpha (a positional accu-
racy of 0.01 m, velocity accuracy 0.01m/s, attitude to within 3"). Figure 4.1 shows the important steps of the
process.
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FIGURE
4.1.2
4.1 Mating of the Crew Module and the Base Unit.
Refueling the Freebird
Refueling will supply the Freebird with up to 18 000kg of fuel, enough for most nearby crewed and uncrewed
missions. The first step in the refueling process will insert a fuel tank into an orbit nearby the ISSA on and the
Freebird, or alternatively to wherever the Freebird needs to fuel.
Once the tank is in the orbit, Freebird will rendezvous with the tank and use the RMS for final docking maneu-
vers. The refueling pump will consist of a modification of the Thermal Venting System (TVS) that will
remotely insert four fluid locks into the main tanks and fill them with fuel. Figure 4.2 shows the specific steps
of this process.
FIGURE 4.2 Freebird Refueling Process.
4.1.3 Attaching Extra Fuel Tanks
In a situation that requires Freebird to travel distances further than those attainable with a single full fuel tank,
extra fuel tanks will be attached to Freebird. Unlike the refueling tanks, these are designed to travel with the
vehicle and provide fuel along the transfer.
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The Proton will be used to launch the fuel tanks. The specific launch configurations can be seen in
Section 14.1. ! on page 243, Figure 14.2. Once the tank is in the orbit, Freebird will rendezvous with the tanks
and use the RMS for final docking maneuvers. The fuel interface will be identical to the one used in refueling.
Note that the arm configuration simplifies this operation slightly.
When the fuel has been expended (usually in GEO or polar orbit), the tanks are removed in a similar manner
and moved clear of the vehicle with the RMS. The tanks can then be deorbited.
U
FIGURE 4.3 Attachment of Extra Fuel Tanks to Freebird.
4.1.4 Replacing the Propulsion Module
The most difficult on-orbit manipulation involves replacing the entire propulsion pack. The pack will need to
be replaced when either the engines or fuel tanks have outlived their design life time, and to restore the state of
the fuel tanks.
The Ariane V will be used to launch the fuel tanks. Launch configurations can be seen in section
Section 14.1.1 on page 243, Figure 14.3. Once the new propulsion module is in the orbit, Freebird will rendez-
vous with the new pack and use the RMS for final docking maneuvers. The two propulsion packs will latch to
each other as shown in Figure 4.4. The smartbox will then detach/unlatch from the expended propulsion mod-
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ule and use the RMS to move from the old module to the new module. Finally the "smartbox" will lower down
and latch onto the new propulsion pack.
After checkout and verification of the interfaces, the old propulsion pack can be deorbited.
FIGURE 4.4 Replacing the Propulsion Module.
4.2 Maintenance
4.2.1
The vehicle will be maintained on-orbit to ensure safe and efficient performance for the duration of its 10 year
lifetime. The maintenance needs of all components and subsystems must be met to enable the vehicle to per-
form under its intended mission scenarios. With proper maintenance, the vehicle will provide a safe environ-
ment for both the cargo and crew.
Maintenance Philosophy
The maintenance philosophy and approach is designed to maximize vehicle performance while minimizing
cost. A preventive maintenance plan will be used for the vehicle and its modules. Under this system, mainte-
nance is scheduled according to the results of failure analysis - therefore, components and subsystems will
receive maintenance prior to failure. Cost is minimized by cutting back on the number of emergency repairs.
The vehicle will be maintained for the duration of its on-orbit life. Continued maintenance will help keep all
subsystems functioning nominally, allowing the vehicle to be ready on a moments notice for rescue mission
scenarios.
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4.2.2
TABLE 3.1
Maintenance Schedule
A maintenance schedule has been developed to ensure safe and proper vehicle performance during all mis-
sions. The schedule will account for the specific maintenance needs of each subsystem and will incorporate
these needs in an orderly fashion to ensure efficient, low-cost maintenance.
Requirements
The vehicle's components and subsystems will be serviced or replaced according to their failure-analysis
requirements. However, emergency maintenance using spare tools and parts will be available should the need
arise.
The maintenance requirements of mature component and subsystem technologies are based upon the manufaco
turer's failure analysis. The requirements for less mature technologies have been developed during the design
stage of the project.
• Power & Propulsion Systems: As part of the Power Pack, the RLI0-A4 main engines must be replaced
after 100 starts, or approximately every 25 missions. Assuming 8 missions per year, the engines must be
changed evert 3 years. The main engine fuel tanks and the fuel cell tanks will be refilled following each
mission.
• Environmental Control & Life Support System: To allow the astronauts to complete extravehicular
activities (EVAs), the extravehicular mobility units (EMUs) will need to be serviced after each use.
Expendable items (food, water, LiOH cannisters, activated charcoal, waste containers, and 02) will be
restocked after each mission.
• Command, Communications, Control, & Telemetry System: Regular diagnostics will be pertbrmed on
the C3T subsystem to ensure that it is functioning properly.
• Structure System: Because this subsystem was designed to survive the vehicle's 10 year lifetime it does
not need traditional maintenance. However, regular visual inspections will be scheduled to verify that
the structural integrity of the vehicle has not been compromised and that the interface connections are
secure.
• Thermal System: This subsystem does not require traditional maintenance but will be visually inspected
on a regular basis to ensure its integrity.
• Guidance, Navigation, & Control System: As part of the Power Pack, the reaction control system (RCS)
maneuvering thrusters will be replaced after 25 missions, or approximately every 3 years.The RCS fuel
tanks will be refueled after each mission.
Table 3.1 summarizes all of the subsystem maintenance requirements.
Subsystem Maintenance Requirements.
Subsystem
P&P
Maintenance Requirements
RLI0-A4 engines replaced every 25 missions; main engine and fuel cell
tanks refueled after each mission
ECLSS EMUS serviced after each use; expendables replaced after each mission
C3T Regular diagnostics
STRUCTURES Regular visual inspection and interface verification
THERMAL Regular inspection
GNC RCS thrusters replaced every 25 missions; RCS tanks refueled after each
mission
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Schedule
Based on the individual subsystem requirements, a maintenance schedule has been developed and designed to
minimize cost and time. Maintenance duties are combined where possible to allow for the demanding sched-
ules of the crew and the Space Station personnel.
The inspections needed for the Thermal and Structures systems will be done in tandem - one maintenance team
will perform an EVA to visually inspect the outer structure of the vehicle, while another team will perform the
interface verifications. These inspections will occur before each mission. The RLI0-A4 main engines and the
RCS thrusters will be changed together with the vehicle's Power Pack. Refueling of the main engines, the
maneuvering thrusters, and the fuel cells will also be done concurrently at the conclusion of each mission.
While the refueling is taking place, another maintenance team will be removing waste items and replacing the
expendable items on board the crew module. Finally, a series of diagnostics will be run every 24 hours to keep
the C3T subsystem in working order.
4.3
4.3.1
Maintenance Equipment
Specific equipment will need to be available to allow for proper vehicle maintenance. This equipment will pri-
marily be stored at the Vehicle Storage Facility, and a small set will be stored on board the vehicle. The astro-
nauts can meet emergency maintenance needs during a mission should they arise, but the bulk of maintenance
will be performed at the Space Station.
Tools & Training
Astronauts will require the necessary tools and training to be able to meet the vehicle's maintenance needs.
The tools needed to service or replace components and subsystems must be available at the Vehicle Storage
Facility. A smaller set of tools must also be stored aboard the vehicle in case emergency repairs are required.
On-board maintenance equipment will be kept to a minimum in order to satisfy vehicle mass constraints.
Both crew members and ISSA personnel must be trained to use these tools and to perform all maintenance pro-
cedures. All EVA maintenance tasks will require a team of two astronauts working together to complete a task.
A team of two astronauts will not only decrease the time needed for maintenance duties, but will also provide
the redundancy needed to ensure that the duties are performed correctly.
Subsystem Replacement Parts
Spare parts, components, and subsystems, must be available for replacement maintenance. These spares
should be launched to orbit and kept in storage at the Vehicle Storage Facility. A few components will be kept
on board the vehicle should the need for emergency repairs arise.
The spare subsystem parts kept aboard the vehicle will be limited to those needed to ensure the safety of the
crew during manned missions. Should an emergency situation arise while the crew is on a mission, the astro-
nauts will be able to maintain power, life support, and structural integrity with the on-board supplies. If a fail-
ure mode of a subsystem does not present a life-threatening situation for the crew, spare replacement parts for
that subsystem will be stored at the Vehicle Storage Facility only. This maintenance arrangement guarantees
the safety of the crew while minimizing vehicle mass.
A summary of the maintenance parts needed for each subsystem and their storage arrangements may be found
in Table 3.2.
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TABLE 3.2 Spare Subsystem Parts.
Subsystem
P&P
Spare Parts Aboard the Vehicle
Battery
Spare Parts At the Vehicle Storage Facility
Fuel Tanks, Fuel, RL10-A4 engines (Power
Pack)
ECLSS Food, Water, Gas Storage Tanks Food, Water, Gas Storage Tanks
C3T None None
STRUCT. Interface Repair Equipment Interface Repair Equipment
THERMAL Radiation Tiles & Repair Equipment Radiation Tiles
GNC None RCS thrusters (Power Pack)
4.4
4.4.1
4.4.2
Vehicle Storage
In an effort to reduce the weight of the vehicle, a storage facility was specified for Freebird. Using a storage
facility enabled the shielding mass to be reduced by assuming that the vehicle will only need to endure the
radiation and micrometeorite environment when it is actually preforming a mission. When the vehicle is not in
use, it is stored inside the VSE In addition to providing thermal and micrometeorite shielding, this facility will
also provide the power consumed by Freebird in its stand-by mode.
Due to the limited docking space and power available on International Space Station Alpha (ISSA), it is rec-
ommended that the VSF also be designed to accommodate the thermal, and power needs of Freebird. A pre-
liminary design similar to the VSF has been carried out by Martin Marietta[I].
Vehicles Storage Facility Location
Two options regarding the location of the VSF were considered: placement at the ISSA or a completely
detached, free floating configuration. Locating the VSF at the station may be dangerous given the large amount
of cryogenic fuel in storage aboard the vehicle. However, as a separate, free-flying structure, the VSF would
require additional fuel to rendezvous with the station each time it had to perform a crewed mission. A free fly-
ing structure would also be more complicated since it would require its own thrusters to maintain orbit and atti-
tude, a communications system, and some ground control.
The common berthing adapter (CBA) on the crew module will be used for docking with the VSE This inter-
face will provide Freebird with the power and communications interfaces required in the stand-by mode.
Stand-by mode
The purpose of the stand-by mode is to keep the navigation equipment and computer powered so that it does
not have to be recalibrated every time the vehicle is to be used. This will allow quick response in an emergency
situation. In addition, power can be drawn from the VSF instead of depleting the fuel cells store of oxygen and
hydrogen. Most of the thermal control on-board Freebird will be passive, but the active temperature control
system must be operational if the temperature of the critical components falls outside of the permissible range.
Preliminary calculations have determined that approximately 1kW of power is required to maintain the critical
systems at 285°K. The computer and thermal venting system require less than 40W combined. Thus the driver
of power during the stand-by mode is the temperature of the critical components.
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Crew
Freebird can carry up to three crew on a nominal non-rescue mission. The most important issues surrounding
the crew are selection, mission assignment and training.
5.1 Selection
The US astronaut corp and the Russian astronaut corp were considered as possible sources from which to draw
Freebird crew. If crew were to be drawn from both countries, then two sets of new Freebird training facilities
would need to be developed at each country's training complex. This would be costly. Therefore, crew should
be drawn from only one country's pool of astronauts. Given the Russian discontent with making English the
sole operating language, and taking into account that Freebird will most likely be manufactured by a US firm
and thus having instruments most easily labeled for an English speaking crew, it was decided that the Freebird
crew will be selected from among the US astronaut corp.
5.2 Mission Assignment
Following a precedent established in International Space Station Alpha (ISSA) crew selection and mission
assignment, Freebird astronauts will be assigned to missions based on proven skill and past flight experience in
extravehicular activity (EVA) and remote manipulation systems (RMS) operations. This will decrease the
amount of training time necessary and increase the mission success probability.
5.3 Training
Crew training is important to the overall mission success. A skillfully trained crew with previous flight experi-
ence behind them can be the difference between meeting and falling short of a mission objective.
Part II1: Operations
282 Crew
5.3.1 Philosophy
Training will be divided into two types: Advanced training and Increment training.
Advanced training will occur after an astronaut has completed the astronaut candidate training period, and
become eligible for assignment to either a space shuttle or ISSA mission. Advanced training will be required
for all astronauts who will eventually become Freebird crew, and is focused on providing astronauts with gen-
eral skills necessary to operate the Freebird craft. These will include the following areas of instruction:
• Freebird housekeeping
• Maintenance procedures
• EVA procedures unique to Freebird
• RMS operations unique to Freebird
• Freebird rescue mission profiles for various spacecraft
Increment training will occur after an astronaut has been assigned to a specific Freebird mission. Increment
training will be focused on providing astronauts with skills unique to a particular Freebird mission. The major-
ity of increment training will include learning how to make specific repairs to a given satellite scheduled for
maintenance on the mission to which an astronaut is assigned.
5.3.2 Scheduling
All Freebird training will run concurrently with shuttle and ISSA astronaut training. Increment training will
commence at launch minus 14 (L-14) months, and will average 10 hours per week. This training will be inte-
grated into the overall training flow for shuttle and ISSA missions which will involve the use of Freebird.
Advanced training will commence at L-12 months, and will average an additional 10-20 hours per week
depending on the nature of the training needed for the specific mission.
5.3.3 Instructors
The task of training Freebird astronauts would fall to the Spaceflight Training Division at Johnson Space Cen-
ter. Instructors would be drawn from the current shuttle and ISSA instructor base. Freebird Basic Instructor
Training and Certification guidelines would need to be established, and a new instructor base created.
5.3.4 Facilities
Existing as well as new training facilities will be utilized in preparing crews for Freebird missions. New facili-
ties that would need to be constructed include:
• Full Freebird mock-up trainer
• Freebird RMS simulator (computer-simulated space environment)
• Part-task trainers
Existing facilities which would be utilized for Freebird training include:
• Weightless Environment Training Facility
• Precision Air-bearing Floor
• KC- 135 Parabolic Flight Trainer
• Other facilities associated with EVA training
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Contingency
Contingency must be provided for so that the mission requirements will be met in the case of unforeseen or
unpredictable occurrences. Contingency is added to the vehicle design, over and above the necessary margin of
safety. Contingency must be considered so that chance or unforeseen events are accounted for. In fact, any part
of the design process which uses some modeling technique will have inefficiencies in the conception.
Although providing contingency for every mishap is difficult, percentage contingencies for appropriate param-
eters (which will be discussed below) add coverage to the design margins which have been incorporated into
designs on the subsystem level.
6.1 Contingency Determination
The basis for contingency figures, like reliability data, is experience with existing or past systems. With more
experience in dealing with a component, the chance of encountering unforeseen occurrences is less likely. For
example, only a relatively small contingency would have to be provided for human systems on missions to
LEO because extensive studies and testing have been performed for Space Shuttle and other crewed missions.
Contingency data also relies on the criticality of the design component or subsystem. For example, a high con-
tingency should be provided for the link budget for Freebird, because if the system did not transmit the neces-
sary power, it would be a critical failure. Also, the criticality of the power budget drives up its contingency. In
the same manner, the mass budget will have a high contingency, because this is the first design stage for
Project Freebird. The maturity of the design factors into the contingency in this way.
When components are purchased from outside source accurate specifications should be given and are generally
more reliable than any predictions based on modeling or empirical equations. The propellant budget would
require less contingency than the mass budget because the engines and fuel tanks are bought from outside
sources. However, inefficiencies still need to be accounted for. Contingency must be provided for unexpected
maneuvers or unknown maneuver accuracy.
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6.2 Allocated Contingencies
Over and above all of the subsystem contingencies, which were applied at the component level, a system level
contingency was added to Freebird's design. Table 6.1 summarizes the percentage contingencies for various
budgets. The actual figures are based on the information presented above, as well as on previous space opera-
tions. Detailed summary budgets including contingencies are located in Appendix A on page 299, Appendix B
on page 305, and Table 8.3 on page 161.
TABLE 6.1 Allocated Budget Contingencies
Contingency
Mass Budget 5 to 25% a
Power Budget 5 to 25% a
Link Budget 4dB
Propellant Budget 5 to 17% b
System Budget 5%
a. Varies for specific component.
b. Depends on specific mission.
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Operations, Maintenance and Support Costs
Operations, maintenance and support can be a considerable portion of any system's budget, particularly so
when one considers the complicated nature of a space vehicle system. The budget can be broken down into two
phases: initial costs to produce the required hardware and continuing costs which are often allocated on a
yearly or per mission basis.
7.1 Delivery to Orbit
The space vehicle designed by the Freebird Project must be delivered to orbit. Because of the high cost of
launch vehicles, orbital delivery is a significant cost factor. Fortunately multiple launch systems are available
for use. The vehicle will be delivered in two separate launches. The crew module will be launched in the Pro-
ton C at a cost of $35 million; the base unit will be launched in the Titan IV at a cost of $300 million. Total
launch costs are therefore estimated at $335 million.
7.2 Refueling
For each Freebird mission fuel must be delivered to the Space Station. Between one and three deliveries will
be required depending on the mission. Each fuel delivery involves a single Proton C launch of approximately
20 000 kg of LH2 and LOX. Cost of delivery includes the launch cost, $35 million, and the estimated costs of
the fuel and fuel tanks, $12 million. Therefore the estimated cost per refueling mission, not including orbital
support, is approximately $50 million.
If Freebird is not utilized often it may become necessary to deliver an extra fuel tank to compensate for cryo-
genic fuel leakage/venting. If this is true, an additional refueling mission may be required at periodic intervals.
To address that possibility an additional $50 million will be added to the expected yearly budget.
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7.3
7.3.1
7.3.2
Maintenance and Repair
Throughout its lifetime, Freebird will require some degree of maintenance. Both scheduled and unscheduled
maintenance can be costly.
Engine Replacement
The main engines for Freebird are currently qualified for 20 starts and a burn time of 3000 seconds. Money has
been allocated to expand the qualification to 100 starts over 5.25 hours of burntime. Assuming Freebird will be
flying only GEO missions (four burns per mission) as a worst case scenario, the vehicle must be refitted every
25 missions. The engines will need to be replaced approximately once every three years based on an expected
eight missions per year. Therefore the entire booster pack will need to be replaced at least four times during
Project Freebird's lifetime.
Replacement costs will be appreciable and must be taken into account. The booster pack hardware totals
approximately $107 million including verification and validation. Delivery will most likely be carried out by
the Proton C at a cost of $35 million. Therefore an engine replacement mission will total approximately $142
million. This yields a per mission allocated cost of $5 million, not including depreciation or possible increas-
ing (or decreasing) cost of materials.
Unscheduled Repair
Additional maintenance and repairs may become necessary during the space vehicle's 10 year lifetime. While
this possibility is important to consider it is impossible to quantify it at this time. A set of maintenance and
repair materials will be kept at the station in the event preventative maintenance or repair is necessary and pos-
sible. Additional parts and modules may be delivered to the station should the need arise.
7.4
7.4.1
7.4.2
Support
Project Freebird will require extensive ground and orbital support. Some of this support will be continuous
while some will be mission specific. Support costs include everything associated with Freebird after it is
placed in orbit. Support costs can accumulate quickly and are usually a function of overall project complexity.
Ground Support
Ground Support includes the facilities, equipment, software, logistics, and management which keep Freebird
in touch with Earth. These costs can often be modelled as a function of software costs which are a potential
measure of system complexity. The estimated support budget for the ground includes communication access as
well. By utilizing this model and including a complexity factor to account for the possibility of ground-based
teleoperation a total up-front cost of approximately $160 million was derived. Continuation/operations cost
can be expected to add $30 million/year (approximately 15% of initial cost). [1 ]
Orbital Support
Orbital support includes communications equipment and access to and through Space Station Alpha as a result
of Project Freebird's existence. It also includes the estimated cost to train astronauts to perform Freebird mis-
sions (i.e. the cost to have experienced labor in orbit). This labor cost will exist independent of Project Free-
bird and must be carried by NASA.
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Orbital Support also includes the existence of a Vehicle Storage Facility. Such a facility must be designed, con-
structed and delivered to maintain the vehicle's usefulness. The VSF is beyond the scope of this report but
should not be ignored. For the purpose of a first cut cost estimation it can be expected to fall in the range of
other powered but unmanned modules contained in the design of ISSA.
7.5 Summary of Operations, Maintenance and Support Budget
The total expected up-front costs of Operations, Maintenance and Support is $300 million. Cost/mission is
approximately $58 million for a LEO mission and $162 million for GEO.Yearly prorated costs are estimated at
$845 million. This number is based on an assumed eight missions/year: five (5) LEO, one(l) Polar, two(2)
GEO. It also includes the possibility of an additional required refueling mission. (see Table 7.1 )
TABLE 7.1 Operations, Maintenance and Support Costs (All figures FY94 in millions)
Operation Initial Cost Cost/Operation Cost/Year
Vehicle Delivery to Orbit $135 N/A N/A
Refueling (LEO=l, GEO=3) N/A $50 $50
Engine Refit (once/25 missions) N/A $125 / 25 N/A
Ground Support $ i 60 N/A $30
Orbital Support unknown N/A N/A
Total LEO mission N/A $58 N/A
Total GEO/Polar mission N/A $162 N/A
Total Initial Cost $300
Total Yearly Cost:(8 missions/year) $845
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8
Funding and International Political
Concerns
A successful technical project must not only be backed with good engineering, but it must also contain innova-
tive approaches to funding and operating in the current international political environment.
8.1 Funding
Freebird costs can be broken down into two areas: up-front costs, which total $1.5 billion fiscal year 1994
(FY94), and yearly prorated operating costs of $845 million FY94.
8.1.1 Up-front Costs
Up-front costs for the total design, production, testing, and launch of Freebird account for $1.5 billion FY94
(see Section 12.4 on page 232). Since both commercial satellite manufacturers and the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) have vested interests in seeing Freebird built, these organizations will be
expected to finance these aspects of the project. Freebird would serve as a model joint venture between govern-
ment and industry, efficiently utilizing existing government research and testing facilities, and industry man-
agement and integration experience.
8.1.2 Operating Costs and Charges
Missions can be placed in three cost categories depending on the type of mission being contracted.
• Low Earth Orbit On-site Repair Mission
Costs for this type of mission include the procurement and launch of fuel and expendables, and a frac-
tion of yearly maintenance and operating costs for the Freebird system. These total approximately $60
million FY94. A user of Freebird repair services will be charged approximately 50% of the worth of the
asset being repaired. Only satellites with a net worth of greater than $120 million will be considered.
The user will be responsible for contracting with NASA for astronaut services.
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• Polar Teleoperated Repair Mission and Geostationary Orbit Teleoperated Repair Mission
Costs for this type of mission include the procurement and launch of fuel, as well as a fraction of yearly
maintenance and operating costs for the Freebird system. These total approximately $165 million FY94.
A user of Freebird repair services will be charged approximately 50% of the worth of the asset being
repaired. Only assets worth $330 million or greater will be considered.
• Rescue Mission
Costs for this type of mission include the procurement and launch of fuel and expendables, as well as a
fraction of yearly maintenance and operating costs for the Freebird system. The total of these costs, as
well as the respective additional charges that may be levied to users, will be determined as needed on a
case by case basis.
8.2 International Political Concerns
Since Freebird will be a U.S.-owned space vehicle, and the U.S. is a signatory to the United Nations Outer
Space Treaty (OST) of 1967, Freebird must conform to the provisions outlined in the OST. Relevant Treaty
sections pertaining most directly to Freebird operations include Articles V, VI, VIII, IX, XI, and XIII. These
Articles discuss the issues of astronaut protection, state responsibilities, benign motives, international coopera-
tion, and sovereignty over launched objects [ I ].
8.2.1 Repairing Foreign Satellites
International agreements must be drawn up on a case by case basis for the repair of non-U.S, assets, in accor-
dance with the OST; particularly Article VIII. Article VIII states that "A State party to the treaty on whose reg-
istry an object launched into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object, and
over any personnel thereof, while in outer space. Ownership of objects launched into outer space,...and of their
component parts, is not affected by their presence in outer space .... or by their return to earth" [1 ]. This implies
that any object launched into space remains the property of the "nation group" which launched it. Thus, the
U.S. would need to secure an official understanding between itself and the party owner of the satellite that will
be repaired by U.S. astronauts in a U.S. vehicle, in order to avoid breaches of the OST.
8.2.2 Rescuing Stranded Astronauts
Though understandings will need to be secured in order to have Freebird repair a foreign-owned space asset,
no such pro-arranged agreements would be necessary in the event of rescuing stranded foreign astronauts. Arti-
cle V of the OST paves the way for such missions: "States parties to the treaty shall regard astronauts as
envoys of mankind in outer space and shall render to them all possible assistance in the event of accident, dis-
tress, or emergency ... In carrying on activities in outer space .... the astronauts of one State party shall render
all possible assistance to the astronauts of other States parties" [1 ]. Hence, advance permission from state par-
ties is not necessary for a rescue mission to assist foreign astronauts in an emergency situation.
8.2.3 Contracting for Foreign Launch Services
Today, the problems and tedious procedures involved in launching on a foreign launch vehicle are waning with
the end of the Cold War. In order to contract a launch on a foreign launch vehicle, the appropriate joint venture
marketing organization must be contacted. For launching the crew module and the extra fuel supply, the Proton
C vehicle was chosen as the prime launch vehicle. Lockheed-Krunichev Enterprises (LKE) has marketing and
contracting rights for the Proton series of launch vehicles. For launching the propulsion module and replace-
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ment propulsion modules, the Ariane 5 was chosen as the prime launch vehicle (see Chapter 1 on page 255).
Arianespace, Inc. has the marketing and contracting rights for the Ariane series.
For launching U.S. space assets on foreign launch vehicles, it is first necessary to obtain an export license. This
request for an export license initially must be approved by the Department of Commerce (DoC) and the
Department of Defense (DoD). After DoC and DoD approval, the request goes to the Department of State,
which ultimately grants the export license. In addition, the space asset must pass all current technology export
regulations in order to secure the license.
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9
Limitations and Future Growth
At this step in the design process, Freebird has inherent limitations to vehicle and mission performance. Safety
considerations, the technology available, the space environment, and orbital dynamics are among the issues
that impose restrictions on the design. The results of these issues are vehicle restrictions and a range of mis-
sions which is more narrow than that implied by the primary mission objectives. To minimize or overcome
these limitations, the next level of design iterations should be performed. The future growth of Freebird
depends upon modifying or extending the current design to preclude these limitations.
9.1 Range of Missions
Various missions cannot be accomplished within the operating envelope established for the primary mission
objectives. The destination location, rescue mission considerations, the life support system design, and the
potential for radiation damage act to restrict the range of missions that Freebird is anticipated to accomplish.
9.1.1 Destination Location
The location of, say, the satellite to be deployed (or, simply, the desired destination) relative to the location of
International Space Station Alpha (ISSA), where the vehicle will be stored, can be a limitation to the range of
missions possible. Depending on the destination location, a mission could require a large Av, and, as a result,
require excess fuel. Missions which would require excess fuel--more fuel than the attachable fuel tanks can
provide--are generally not feasible. With this in mind, it has been determined that operations are limited to the
envelope of a 2.8 mass ratio (see Section II, Chapter 1). Examples of missions which are generally not feasible
are extended missions, missions to retrograde orbits, and equatorial missions in low earth orbit. One possibility
of widening the range of possible missions is to send additional fuel to the location of the space-based asset
being tended or repaired. In other words, an alternative option is to launch a fuel vessel from Earth to the des-
tination location so that the vehicle can be fueled for a one-way trip prior to separation and then be refueled on
orbit for the return trip. This approach, however, greatly increases the complexity of the mission because of the
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9.1.2
9.1.3
9.1.4
additional rendezvous with the fuel vessel. Certainly, modifications would have to be made in the current
design to incorporate the possibility of the missions described above.
Rescue Mission Considerations
The secondary mission objective of Freebird requires the vehicle to be capable of rescue missions. Rescue
operations, however, are restricted to inclinations between 34.6 ° and 78.6 ° because of mass ratio consider-
ations (Section II, Chapter !). Rescue operations would proceed with the standard fuel tanks and would
thereby be limited. In addition, if Freebird is already in use--on another mission--it cannot be called upon for a
rescue mission. To avoid such a situation, it might be advantageous to have two operating vehicles to increase
the likelihood of availability for rescue purposes.
Life Support System
In non-rescue scenarios, Freebird's life support system is equipped to sustain 3 astronauts for 4 days. This
design limit imposes restrictions on the types of missions that Freebird may accomplish. Within the scope of
the current design, for example, a crewed lunar mission would not be possible. The amount of time a lunar
mission would require would extend beyond the design limit established for maintaining the life support sys-
tem. The most reasonable alternative to this limitation is to consider autonomous or teleoperated lunar mis-
sions, depending on the various tasks required.
Radiation
Carrying humans, a top level requirement of the system, has implications beyond the design limit for the life
support system. Specifically, the potential for radiation damage to humans on Freebird missions is great (Sec-
tion I, Chapter 2). Because astronauts are more readily adaptable than the Remote Manipulation Systems
(RMS), say, or other robotic elements, Freebird repair missions would most often depend on astronauts to con-
duct repairs during EVA. While engaged in EVA, however, an astronaut would be exposed to levels of radia-
tion dependent upon the inclination and altitude of orbit. Conducting an EVA on a mission to geosynchronous
orbit, for instance, is simply not feasible because of the radiation environment. Astronauts in low earth orbit at
polar inclinations would likewise be unable to withstand the radiation. Due to the harsh radiation environment
that Freebird is likely to encounter, ECLSS, the environmental control and life support system, has set a maxi-
mum safe altitude of 600 km for EVA or crewed operations.
9.2 Vehicle Restrictions
Certain restrictions apply to the vehicle itself, rather than to the missions that the vehicle is capable of accom-
plishing. Specifically, the size of the payload that Freebird can carry is limited. While it is possible for Freebird
to carry cargo, such as a small satellite to be deployed, the mass that Freebird can carry is heavily dependent
upon the orbit that the satellite is to be transported to. Similarly, it is unlikely that Freebird will be conducting
missions in which it retrieves satellites from orbit and ferries them back to ISSA for repairs. However, mis-
sions such as this are possible but are clearly limited by the mass of the asset and the inclination and altitude of
its orbit. An alternative to this scenario would be for Freebird to attach a booster pack to the satellite to trans-
port it to the desired destination.
The need to protect Freebird against micrometeorite debris and radiation damage has led to the incorporation
of a Vehicle Storage Facility (VSF) into the design operations environment. Without the shielding of the VSF
while not in operation, the lifetime of the vehicle is estimated to be only 2 years. Therefore, the VSF is a sig-
nificant element of the design and should be further developed.
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Another issue which will not necessarily limit vehicle performance but which should be addressed is fuel boil-
off. The amount of cryogenic fuel that is expected to boil off is 2 - 5% per month (Section II, Chapter 5).
Although this disadvantage could be avoided by using another type of fuel, the high specific impulse that cryo-
genic fuel yields is worth the amount of boil-off anticipated. Most of the missions that Freebird is likely to
complete will not be severely limited by this effect. And, by maximizing the number of possible missions per
year, the effect can be minimized.
A rather obvious vehicle restriction is the fact that Freebird was designed for a lifetime of 10 years. Some com-
ponents were also designed to be replaced every 25 missions (approximately 3 years), such as the RLI0-A4
engines and the Reaction Control System (RCS) thrusters (Section III, Chapter 6). Technological advancement
and growth will most probably provide solutions or alternatives that will increase the efficiency and effective-
ness of current endeavors and perhaps extend vehicle lifetime limitations.
Further design iterations or operational techniques should be performed to minimize or overcome these limita-
tions. Alternatives which could make it possible to avoid many of these limitations are already available and
are discussed above. Clearly, future research should be conducted to modify or extend the current design to
preclude these limitations.
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A
Detailed Mass Budget
TABLE A.1 Component Contingencies and Masses
Component Subsystem Quantity
Mass
Each [kg] Contingency
Adjusted
Mass [kg]
Crew: Pressure Vessel Structures 1 480 20% 576
Crew: Internal Structure Structures I 125 0% 125
Crew: Rad/Debris Shield Structures 1 711.5 20% 853.8
Crew: Common Berthing Adaptor Structures 1 130 20% 156
SB: Intermodule Interface Structures 2 100 20% 240
SB: Remote Manipulator System Structures 2 275 20% 660
SB: Primary/Truss Structures I 93.5 20% 112.2
SB: Internal Structures ! 10 20% 12
SB: Rad/Debris Shield Structures 1 218.3 20% 262
PP: Primary/Truss Structures 1 216 20% 259.2
PP: Rad/Debris Shield Structures 1 222 20% 266.4
Base: Heat Pipes Thermal 1 15 10% 16.5
Base: Radiators Thermal 2 0 10% 0
Base: Insulation Thermal 1 3.3 10% 3.6
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TABLE A.1 Component Contingencies and Masses
Component Subsystem Quantity
Mass
Each [kg] Contingency
Adjusted
Mass [kg]
Base: Cold Plates Thermal I 1 0.5 10% 6.3
Base: Phase Change Devices Thermal I 2 10% 2.2
Base: Radiator Heaters Thermal 2 . I 10% 0.2
Base: RCS Propellant Heaters Thermal 64 0.1 10% 7
Base: Louvres Thermal 20 0. I 10% 2.2
Base: Louvre Mechanical System Thermal 4 2 10% 8.8
Crew: Insulation Thermal 1 2.2 10% 2.4
Crew: Cold Plates Thermal 7 0.5 10% 4.1
Crew: Coolant Pump Thermal 2 2 10% 4.4
Crew: Coolant Piping Thermal 1 10 10% 1 |
Crew: Radiator Heaters Thermal 4 0.1 10% 0.4
Crew: Louvres Thermal 20 0.1 10% 2.2
Crew: Louver Mechanical System Thermal 4 2 10% 8.8
Crew: Air Recycling Unit Thermal 1 35 10% 38.5
Crew: Radiator Thermal 2 0 10% 0
Thermometer Thermal 30 0 10% 0
DCS with Sun Fans GNC 4 4.5 15% 20.9
Rendezvous Radar Transponder GNC 2 10 25% 25
MIMU GNC 2 5. I 5% 10.8
MANS GNC 3 0 15% 0
MAPS GNC 3 0 20% 0
Star Tracker GNC 2 25 5% 52.5
LNS GNC 2 20 30% 52
Docking Camera GNC 2 5 20% 12
TDRSS Transponder CCCT 3 6.3 5% 20
EVA Transponder CCCT 2 3 20% 7.2
Power Amplifier CCCT 3 5 20% 18
Parabolic Antenna CCCT 2 2.5 20% 6
S-Band Omni Antenna CCCT 2 1 20% 2.4
EVA Omni Antenna CCCT 2 I 20% 2.4
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TABLE A.1 Component Contingencies and Masses
Component Subsystem Quantity
Mass
Each [kg] Contingency
Adjusted
Mass [kg]
Internal Communication Network CCCT 2 1 20% 2.4
Harness CCCT I 10 20% 12
Processors (Harris) CCCT 3 1.5 5% 4.7
Data Recording Unit CCCT
LOX Propellant Tank Propulsion
LH2 Propellant Tank Propulsion
Plumbing - Valves & Pipes Propulsion
Propellant Management Device Propulsion
Interfaces Propulsion
RL 10A-4 Engine Propulsion
I 2 20% 2.4
1 79 20% 94.8
1 107 20% 128.4
1 230 10% 253
2 20 10% 44
2 30 10% 66
4 ! 68 5% 705.6
2 30 20% 72Thermal Venting System Propulsion
RCS Tanks, Valves, Pipes Propulsion I 150 10% 165
RCS Fuel Propulsion I 550 10% 605
Orbital Maneuvering Thrusters Propulsion
Primary RCS Thrusters Propulsion
Fuel Cell Powerplant Power
Power Conditioner Power
EPS Wire Harness Power
Fuel Cell Tank (H) Power
Hydrogen for Fuel Cells Power
Fuel Cell Tank (O) Power
Oxygen for Fuel Cells Power
EVA Tools ECLSS
Misc. Other Cargo ECLSS
Extravehicular Mobility Unit ECLSS
EMU Batteries ECLSS
Atmosphere Control System ECLSS
- Cabin Air Storage System ECLSS
-Pressurized Oxygen Tank ECLSS
2 10.3 5% 21.5
26 3.7 5% 101
2 77.1 20% 185.1
2 25 20% 60
2 50 10% 110
1 34 10% 37.4
1 14.6 10% 16
1 31.8 10% 34.9
1 122.3 10% 134.6
1 100 10% I10
1 200 0 200
3 123.3 5% 388.4
10 4.4 5% 45.7
1 -- 10% 0
1 68 10% 74.8
2 17.5 10% 38.5
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TABLE A.1 Component Contingencies and Masses
Component Subsystem Quantity
Mass
Each [kg]
19
- Oxygen In Tanks ECLSS 2
- CO2 Removal System ECLSS 1 10
- LiOH Cannister ECLSS 5 5
- Sensors ECLSS 11 0.5
- Flow Valves ECLSS 6 1
Contingency
Adjusted
Mass [kg]
10% 41.8
20% 12
10% 27.5
10% 6.6
10% 6.6
-Cabin Fans ECLSS 2 3 20% 7.2
Pressure Suit ECLSS 1 10 20% 12
20% 6
10% 88
Waste Disposal System ECLSS 1 5
Food, Water, Containment System ECLSS 1 80
Portable 02 System ECLSS 8 2 20% 19.2
Fire Detection Sensors ECLSS 6 0.5 20% 3.6
Fire Extinguishers ECLSS 4 4 20% 19.2
Medical Kit ECLSS I 2 20% 2.4
20% 24Human Interlace Controls ECLSS I 20
Internal Lights ECLSS 4 1.3 20% 6
Cargo Bay Lighting ECLSS 2 20 20% 48
Restraints, Seats ECLSS 8 18.8 20% 180
Astronaut ECLSS 3 70 5% 220.5
Total 8,314.3
TABLE A.2 Subsystem Totals by Module
Total Mass Percentage of Base Unit Crew Module
Subsystem [kg] Total Mass [kg] Mass [kg]
Structures 3,522.6 42.3% 1,811.8 1,710.8
Thermal 118.8 1.4% 46.9 71.9
GNC 173.2 2.1% 173.2 --
CCCT 77.5 0.9% 77.5 --
Propulsion 2,256.3 27.1% 2,256.3 --
Power 578 7.0% 578 --
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TABLE A.2 Subsystem Totals by Module
Total Mass Percentage of Base Unit Crew Module
Subsystem [kg] Total Mass [kg] Mass [kg]
ECLSS 19.1% --
Total
1,588
8,314.4 4,943.7
i,588
3,370.7
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Appendix
B
Detailed Power Budget
TABLE B.1 Component Average & Peak Power
Component Subsystem Quantity
Average
Power
Each
[Watts]
Average
Power
[Watts]
Peak
Power
Each
[Watts]
Crew: Pressure Vessel Structures I 0 0 0
Crew: Internal Structure Structures 1 0 0 0
Crew: Rad/Debris Shield Structures ! 0 0 0
Crew: Common Berthing Adaptor Structures 1 ? 0 ?
SB: Intermodular Interface Structures 2 10 24 200
SB: Remote Manipulator System Structures 2 800 1920 1200
SB: Primary/Truss Structures 1 0 0 0
SB: Internal Structures 1 0 0 0
SB: Rad/Debris Shield Structures 1 0 0 0
PP: Primary/Truss Structures 1 0 0 0
PP: Rad/Debris Shield Structures I 0 0 0
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TABLE B.1 Component Average & Peak Power
Component Subsystem Quantity
Average
Power
Each
[Watts]
Average
Base: Heat Pipes Thermal 1 0
Base: Radiators Thermal 2 0
Base: Insulation Thermal 1 0
Power
[Watts]
Peak
Power
Each
[Watts]
0 0
0 0
0 0
Base: Cold Plates Thermal 11 0 0 0
Base: Phase Change Devices Thermal 1 0 0 0
0 0
0 "'
0 0
0 I0
Base: Radiator Heaters Thermal 2 0
Base: RCS Propellant Heaters Thermal 64 ?
Base: Louvres Thermal 20 0
Thermal 4 0Base: Louvre Mechanical System
Crew: Insulation Thermal 1 0 0 0
Crew: Cold Plates Thermal 7 0 0 0
38.5 25
0 0
0 11.3
0 0
Crew: Coolant Pump Thermal 2 17.5
Crew: Coolant Piping Thermal 1 0
Crew: Radiator Heaters Thermal 4 0
Crew: Louvres Thermal 20 0
Crew: Louver Mechanical System Thermal 4 0 0 2.5
Crew: Air Recycling Unit Thermal I 50 55 75
Crew: Radiator Thermal 2 0 0 0
Thermometer Thermal 30 0 0 0
23 5
75 75
37.8 18
DCS with Sun Fans GNC 4 5
Rendezvous Radar Transponder GNC 2 30
MIMU GNC 2 18
MANS GNC 3 0 0 0
MAPS GNC 3 0 0 0
Star Tracker GNC 2 I 2. I 7.5
TDRSS Transponder
52 55
60 50
29.4 135
LNS GNC 2 20
Docking Camera GNC 2 25
CCCT 3 9.3
EVA Transponder CCCT 2 9 0 [ 20
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TABLE B.1 Component Average & Peak Power
SubsystemComponent Quantity
Power Amplifier CCCT
Parabolic Antenna CCCT
S-Band Omni Antenna CCCT
EVA Omni Antenna CCCT
Internal Communication Network CCCT
Harness CCCT
Processors (Harris) CCCT
Data Recording Unit CCCT
LOX Propellant Tank Propulsion
LH2 Propellant Tank Propulsion
Plumbing - Valves & Pipes Propulsion
Propellant Management Device Propulsion
Interfaces Propulsion
RL 10A-4 Engine Propulsion
Thermal Venting System Propulsion
Average
Power
Each
[Watts]
Average
Power
[Watts]
Peak
Power
Each
[Watts]
3 9 0 106
2 0 0 0
2 0 0 0
2 0 0 0
2 '_ 0 10
I 0 0 0
3 9 0 36
! ? 0 2
1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
1 '_ 0 '_
2 0 0 0
2 q 0 '_
4 ? 0 ')
2 9 0 40
1 ') 0 o
0I o
RCS Tanks, Valves, Pipes Propulsion
RCS Fuel Propulsion 1 0 0 0
Orbital Maneuvering Thrusters Propulsion 2 9 0 "_
Primary RCS Thrusters Propulsion 26 0 0 58
Fuel Cell Powerplant Power 2 0 0 0
Power Conditioner Power 2 '_ 0
EPS Wire Harness Power 2 0 0 0
Fuel Cell Tank (H) Power 1 ? 0
Hydrogen for Fuel Cells Power 1 0 0 0
Fuel Cell Tank (O) Power 1 ? 0 1000
Oxygen for Fuel Cells Power 1 0 0 0
EVA TooLs ECLSS 1 0 0
ECLSS 1 0 0Misc. Other Cargo
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TABLE B.1 Component Average & Peak Power
Component Subsystem Quantity
Average
Power
Each
[Watts]
Average
Power
[Watts]
Peak
Power
Each
[Watts]
Extravehicular Mobility Unit ECLSS 3 0 0 0
EMU Batteries ECLSS 10 0 0 20
Atmosphere Control System ECLSS 1 -- 0 0
-Cabin Air Storage System ECLSS 1 9 0 '_
- Pressurized Oxygen Tank ECLSS 2 '_ 0 9
- Oxygen In Tanks ECLSS 2 0 0 0
- CO2 Removal System ECLSS 1 9 0 30
- LiOH Cannister ECLSS 5 0 0 0
- Sensors ECLSS 11 0.5 6 1
- Flow Valves ECLSS 6 0 0 0
-Cabin Fans ECLSS 2 30 72 60
Pressure Suit ECLSS 1 0 0 ?
Waste Disposal System ECLSS 1 0 0 0
Food, Water, Containment System ECLSS 1 0 0 0
Portable 02 System ECLSS 8 0 0 0
Fire Detection Sensors ECLSS 6 0.3 1.8 0.3
Fire Extinguishers ECLSS 4 0 0 0
Medical Kit ECLSS 1 0 0 0
Human Interface Controls ECLSS 1 100 120 200
Internal Lights ECLSS 4 7.5 36 50
Cargo Bay Lighting ECLSS 2 0 0 250
Restraints, Seats ECLSS 8 0 0 0
Astronaut ECLSS 3 0 0 0
Total 2552.7
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Component Maturity and Criticality
TABLE C.1 Component Maturity and Criticality
Component
Crew: Pressure Vessel
Subsystem
Structures
Quantity
l
Maturity
Level
Level of
Criticality
1
Crew: Internal Structure Structures I 4 3
Crew: Rad/Debris Shield Structures I 3 1
Crew: Common Berthing Adaptor Structures 1 4 1
SB: Intermodular Interface Structures 2 4 1
SB: Remote Manipulator System Structures 2 4 3
SB: Primary/Truss Structures 1 4 2
SB: Internal Structures I 4 2
SB: Rad/Debris Shield Structures ! 3 2
PP: Primary/Truss Structures 1 4 1
PP: Rad/Debris Shield Structures 1 3 1
Base: Heat Pipes Thermal 1 8 1
Base: Radiators Thermal 2 8
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TABLE C.1 Component Maturity and Criticality.
Component
Insulation
Subsystem
Thermal
Quantity
1
Maturity
Level
I
7
Level of
Criticality
Base:
Base: Cold Plates Thermal 11 8
Base: Phase Change Devices Thermal 1 8 3
Base: Radiator Heaters Thermal 2 8 3
Base: RCS Propellant Heaters Thermal 64 8 1
Base: Louvres Thermal 20 4 2
Base: Louvre Mechanical System Thermal 4 7 1
Crew: Insulation Thermal I 8
Crew: Cold Plates Thermal 7 8
Crew: Coolant Pump Thermal 2 7 I
Crew: Coolant Piping Thermal i 7 2
Crew: Radiator Heaters Thermal 4 8 I
Crew: Louvres Thermal 20 4 2
Crew: Louver Mechanical System Thermal 4 7 I
Crew: Air Recycling Unit Thermal 1 7 I
Crew: Radiator Thermal 2 8 I
Thermometer Thermal 30 8 2
DCS with Sun Fans GNC 4 7 2
Rendezvous Radar Transponder GNC 2 4 2
MIMU GNC 2 8 2
MANS GNC 3 7 2
MAPS GNC 3 2 2
Star Tracker GNC 2 8 2
LNS GNC 2 2 2
Docking Camera GNC 2 8 3
TDRSS Transponder CCCT 3 8 2
EVA Transponder CCCT 2 8 2
Power Amplifier CCCT 3 7 !
Parabolic Antenna CCCT 2 7 2
S-Band Omni Antenna CCCT 2 7 1
EVA Omni Antenna CCCT 2 7 2
Internal Communication Network CCCT 2 7 1
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TABLE C.1 Component Maturity and Criticalit):
Component
Harness
Subsystem
CCCT
Quantity
1
Maturity
Level
7
Level of
Criticality
1
Processors (Harris) CCCT 3 8 I
Data Recording Unit CCCT 1 8 4
1 4 1LOX Propellant Tank Propulsion
LH2 Propellant Tank Propulsion
Plumbing - Valves & Pipes Propulsion
Propellant Management Device Propulsion
Refueling Interfaces Propulsion
RL I 0A-4 Engine Propulsion
Thermal Venting System Propulsion
RCS Tanks, Valves, Pipes Propulsion
RCS Fuel Propulsion
Orbital Maneuvering Thrusters Propulsion
Primary RCS Thrusters Propulsion
Fuel Cell Powerplant Power
Power Conditioner Power
EPS Wire Harness Power
Fuel Cell Tank (H) Power
Hydrogen for Fuel Cells Power
Fuel Cell Tank (O) Power
Oxygen for Fuel Cells Power
EVA Tools ECLSS
Extravehicular Mobility Unit ECLSS
EMU Batteries ECLSS
Atmosphere Control System ECLSS
ECLSS
1 4
1 7
2 7
2 6 2
4 8 1
2 6 I
1 8 I
1 8
2 8 I
26 8 I
I2 4
2 7
2 7
I 4
1 8
1 4
1 8
1 8
3 8
10 8
1 7
1 7Cabin Air Storage System
Pressurized Oxygen Tank ECLSS 2 7
ECLSS 2 8
ECLSS 1 7
ECLSS 5 7
Oxygen In Tanks
CO2 Removal System
LiOH Cannister
Sensors ECLSS 11 8
2
1
3
1
2
1
I
I
I
2
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TABLE C.1 Component Maturity and Criticality.
Component
Flow Valves
Subsystem
ECLSS
Quantity
6
Maturity
Level
Level of
Criticality
1
Cabin Fans ECLSS 2 8 1
Pressure Suit ECLSS l 7 1
Waste Disposal System ECLSS 1 8 4
Food, Water, Containment System ECLSS ! 8 2
Portable 02 System ECLSS 8 8 1
Fire Detection Sensors ECLSS 6 8 3
Fire Extinguishers ECLSS 4 8 I
Medical Kit ECLSS 1 8 3
Human Interface Controls ECLSS 1 7 2
Internal Lights ECLSS 4 7 3
Cargo Bay Lighting ECLSS 2 7 3
Restraints, Seats ECLSS 8 8 1
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D
Detailed Costs and Cost Modelling
Top down and bottom up cost modelling were used to estimate costs for Project Freebird. Below is an example
of both models and the detailed cost approximations which were produced for Project Freebird.
D.1 Cost Models
Both cost models are based on a library of previous space missions both manned and unmanned. As with any
model, the results are subject to interpretation within certain degrees of accuracy. By utilizing both models, a
comparison was established to compensate for model inaccuracy.
D.1.1 Top Down Modelling Approach
The top down model is based heavily on the USAF Unmanned Space Craft Model, Fifth Edition [Fong, 1981 ].
This model was modified for inclusion in Space Mission Analysis and Design [Wertz & Larson, 1992] by
Robert Fong. It was further modified through consultation with Professor Stan Weiss at MIT to account for
increased costs of manned spaceflight and alterations in design methodology.
Initially a series of Cost Estimation Relationships were applied to the preliminary design to produce hardware
budgets for the subsystems. It was found Project level costs (RDT&E, Project Management, Ground Opera-
tions and Support, etc..) could be described with a relatively high degree of accuracy as a function of total
vehicle costs. As the vehicle design progressed the top down model was discarded with relation to the flight
vehicle. However, the primary relationships between vehicle cost and program level costs were maintained.
Table D. 1 presents the top down relationships which were developed to cost model Project Freebird.
The top down estimate has been modified as the design has progressed to reflect the changing vehicle cost esti-
mate produced by the Lockheed model.
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TABLE D.1 Cost Relationshiops Between Vehicle Cost and Program Level Costs
Program Level Group Cost Relationship
RDT&E (inc. V &V) equal to hardware cost
V & V - .50*(RDT&E)
Program Management - .25*(Hardware + RDT&E + Integration)
Ground Support - .33*(Hardware + RDT&E + Integration)
D.1.2 Bottom Up Modelling Approach
The bottom up modelling approach used for Project Freebird is based on the modelling approach used by
Lockheed to price the Orbital Transfer Vehicle (OTV) which is under design. It differs from the top down
approach in that it attempts to price individual sub-systems utilizing relationships between the hardware, pro-
totype construction and design and development. It is similar to the CER approach found in Wertz & Larson
but is designed specifically for manned missions. Most importantly it differs in that it allows for component
breakdown within the sub-systems. Each component can be listed seperately and priced out accordingly. When
a quoted price is available it is used instead of the cost/weight relationship for the subsystem. Table D.2 on
page 314 presents the Lockheed model and the Cost Relationships which use relationships between component
factors, such as weight, and cost.
TABLE D.2 Lockheed OTV Cost Model provided by Steve Moran of Lockheed
PROGRAM ELEMENT
ENG. HRS. DEV. UNIT, QUAL.
UNIT & PROGRAM
MANAGEMENT
Total Program
Program Management .04*Sum(Hardware + Software
Development)
System Engineering .08*Sum(Hardware + Software
Development)
PROTO-
TYPE
MANU-
FACTURE
PRODUCTION
FIRST UNIT (T1)
.04* Sum(Hardware
Production)
.08*Sum(Hardware
Production)
Flight Vehicle (FV)
Structure 3.3"T1 *(%New Design + 0.2)/1.2 1.5*T1 $4K/lb
Thermal Control 3.3"T1 *(%New Design + 0.2)/1.2
Avionics
Hardware 3.3*Tl*(%New Design + 0.2)/1.2
Flight Software $260K/1000 Source Lines of Code
Telemetry, Tracking & 3.3"T1 *(%New Design + 0.2)/1.2
Command
Power Gen. & Dist. 3.3*Tl*(%New Design + 0.2)/1.2
Propulsion
Axial 3.3"T1 *(%New Design + 0.2)/1.2
1.5*TI $8K/lb
! .5*T 1 $52K/I b
none none
1.5*T1 $33K/lb
1.5*TI $4K/lb
1.5*TI $9K/lb
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TABLE D.2 Lockheed OTV Cost Model provided by Steve Moran of Lockheed
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Attitude Control
ENG. HRS. DEV. UNIT, QUAL.
UNIT & PROGRAM
MANAGEMENT
3.3"TI *(%New Design + 0.2)/1.2
PROTO-
TYPE
MANU-
FACTURE
! .5*T1
PRODUCTION
FIRST UNIT (T1)
$7K/1 b
Environ. Control & Life 3.3*Tl*(%New Design + 0.2)/1.2 1.5*TI $32K/Ib
Support Systems
Crew Accomodations 3.3*Tl*(%New Design + 0.2)/1.2 i.5*T1 $6K/lb
Orbital Support Equip- 3.3*Ti*(%New Design + 0.2)/1.2 1.5*TI $13K/lb
ment (on FV)
Integration & Assembly .25*Sum(Hardware + Software .25*Sum(Hardware
Development) Production)
Orbital Support Equipment 3.3"T1 *(%New Design + 0.2)/I .2 1.5*TI $13K/lb
(on FV)
Flight Support Equipment 3.3*Tl*(%New Design + 0.2)/1.2 1.5*T1 $5K/Ib
Ground Support Equipment . I *Total FV T1 included
Verification Software
Ground Operations
Hardware
Structures
Included in Develop-
ment Cost
$35K/1000 Source Lines of Code none none
3.3*Tl*(%New Design + 0.2)/1.2 1.5*TI $5M/facility
3.3"TI *(%New Design + 0.2)/1.2 none $100/sq.ft.
$35K/1000 Source Lines of Code none noneSoftware
System Test •13*Sum(Hardware + Software
Development)
.13*Sum(Hardware
Production)
To further modify the cost model to represent price-control management strategies the possibility of compo-
nent protoflight was added where feasible. Protoflight components are prototype components which need not
be tested to failure. There is an additional cost equal to 30% of the hardware cost to facilitate the additional
non-intrusive testing and analysis as well as the additional integration costs which must be accomplished for
all protoflight materials. However, a new component need not be produced saving the cost of a new unit. The
net result is a savings equal to 70% of component hardware cost. This savings is represented in the protoflight
savings column.
D.2 Detailed Cost Estimate
Following is a detailed listing of costs for Project Freebird. To produce these estimates a combination of the
top down and the bottom up approaches was employed. The top down estimate influenced the treatment of
Program Level costs. The bottom up approach was relied upon to price the space vehicle hardware, develop-
ment, testing and integration.The estimate produces a final vehicle-only cost (including project management)
of approximately $1 billion.
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Note: Total Component Cost includes all cost of component involved in producing a single subsystem. Pro-
duction, RDT&E, and V&V are also included.
TABLE D.3 Program and Management Costs
Actual/
Quoted
1st Unit
Cost
[$K]
System
Factor
Qty. or
Units
[kg]
First
Unit
Cost [T1]
[SKI
Prototype
Cost
[$K]
Proto-
flight
Savings
[$K
Develop-
ment
Cost
[$K]Subsystem Component
Total Program 9,268 19,582
% New
Design
Total
Component
Cost
$K
Program Management 9,268 39,164
System Engineering 191,150 10%
Management Cost 18,536 249,896
Total Management Cost 268,432
TABLE D.4 Structures and Mechanisms Subsystem Components
Subsystem Component
Crew: Pressure Vessel
Crew: Internal Structure
Crew: Rad/debris Shield
Crew : Common Berthing
Adaptor
Actual/
Quoted
1st Unit
Cost
[$K]
System
Factor
Qty. or
Units
[kg]
576
125
853.8
156_
First
Unit
Cost [T1]
[$K]
7,619
1,653
11,294
3,439
Prototype
Cost
[$K]
11,429
2,480
16,941
5,159
Proto-
flight
Savings
[$K]
5,333
1,157
7,906
2,407
Develop-
ment
Cost
[SKI
6,286
1,364
15,529
2,837
% New
Design
10%
10%
30%
10%
Total
Component
Cost
[$K]
20,000
4,340
35,858
9,028
P&P Primary/Truss 259.2 2,286 3,429 1,600 1,886 10% 6,000
P&P: Rad/Debris Shield 266.4 3,524 5,286 4,845 30% 13,655
SB: Primary/Truss 112.2 989 1,484 i,088 20% 3,562
SB: Intermodular Interface 240 6,349 9,524 17,460 80% 33,334
SB: Rad/Debris Shield
SB: Internal
75,000
3,466
52,500
70,904
106
75,000
115,725
262
12
4,765
87
61,875
114,820
660
3522.6
SB: Rmt. Manip. System
5,198
159
30%
10%
10%112,500
173,588Structures Totals
13,429
352
196,875
336,432
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TABLE D.5 Thermal Control Subsystem Component Costs
Actual/
Quoted
1st Unit
Cost
[$K]
Proto-
flight
Develop-
ment
System
Factor
Qty. or
First
Unit Prototype
Savings Cost
% New
Total
Component
Units Cost T1] Cost
[$K] [$K]
Design Cost
[$K]Subsystem Component [kg] [$K] [$K]
Base: Heat Pipes 16.5 218 327 120 0% 666
Base: Insulation 3.6 35 0% 194
Base: Cold Plates 6.3 46 0% 254
Base: Phase Change Devices 2.2 16 0% 89
Base: Radiators Heaters 0.2 1 0% 8
Base: Louvers 2.2
8.8
70%
10%
0%6.4
96
128
47
Louver Mech. System
63 95
83 125
29 44
3 4
39 58
155 233
85 127
2 2
42 63
Base:
Base: RCS Heaters
193
516
258
Thermometer 2 0 ! I 0% 4
Crew: Insulation 2.4 23 0% 129
Crew: Cold Plates 4.1 54 8 43 0% 237
O% 108
Louver Mech. System
Crew: Coolant Pump 4.4 78 53 19
Crew: Coolant Piping I i 194 29 107 0% 592
Crew: Heat Pipes 5 88 132 49 0% 269
Crew: Heaters 0.4 5 8 3 0% 16
Crew: Louvers 2.2 39 58 96 70% 193
Crew: 8.8 155 233 128 10% 516
iCrew: Air Recycling Unit 38.5 679 1,019 373 0% 2,071
Thermometer I 0 1 2 1 1 0% 3
Thermal Totals 118 1.925 2,887 2 1,293 6,102
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TABLE D.6 ECLSS Subsystem Component Costs.
Actual/
Quoted
1st Unit
Cost
![$K]
-Oxygen in Tanks
System
Factor
Qty. or
Units
[kg]
First
Unit
Cost T1]
[$K]
Prototype
Cost
[$K]
Proto-
flight
Savings
[$K]
Develop-
ment
Cost
[$K]
% New
Design
Total
Component
Cost
[$K]Subsystem Component
EVA Tools 100 110 100 150 70 0% 180
Atm. Control Unit 10,000 0 10,000 15,000 0 13,750 30% 38,750
-Pressurized 02 Tank 38.5 included included included included 0% 0
41.8 included included included included 0% 0
-CO2 Removal System 12 included included included included 0% 0
-LiOHCanister 27.5 included included included included
-Sensors 6.6 included included included included
-Flow Valves included
included
included
-Cabin Air Storage System
included
included
included
-Cabin Fans
included
included
included
6.6 included
included
included
698
74.8 O%
O%
10%
7.2
2,222Pressure Suit 12 847 1,270 593
Waste Disposal System 6 423 635 296 233 0% 995
Extravehicular Mobil Unit 10,000 3 units 30,000 0 0 0% 30,000
-EMU Batteries 10 units 100 included included included. 0% 100
Food/Water Containment 88 776 1,164 543 427 20% 1,824
System
Portable 02 System 19.2 1,355 2,032 948 745 0% 3,183
Fire Detection System 200 0 200 30(] 140 11(3 0% 470
Fire Extinguishers 12 212 317 148 116i 0% 497
Medical Kit 1.2 21 32 15 12 0% 50
Emergency System 24 1,693 2,54(] 1,185 931 0% 3,979
Human Interface Controls 24 1,693 2,54(] 1,185 1,397 10% 4,444
Lighting 200 0 200 30(] 140 110! 0% 470
Restraints/Seats i 80 1,587 2,381 1,111 873 0% 3,730
lnternalLighting 6 423 635 296 233[ 0% 995
Cargo bay Lighting 48 1,058 1,587 741 582 0% 2,487
ECLSS Totals 632.4 50,688 30,882 7,412 20,217 94,376
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TABLE D.7 Guidance, Navigation & Control Subsystem Component Cost
Actual/
Quoted
1st Unit
Cost
[$K]
System
Factor
Qty. or
Units
First
Unit
Cost T1]
Prototype
Cost
Proto-
flight
Savings
Develop-
ment
Cost
% New
Design
Total
Componenl
Cost
[$K]Subsystem Component [kg] [SKI [SKI [$K] [SKI
DCS with Sun Fans 20.9 2,396 3,594 1,677 1,977 10% 6,289
Rendezvouz Radar Tran- 25 2,866 4,299 2,006 6,305 0% I 1,464
sponder
MIMU 10.8 1,238 1,857 867 681 0% 2,9113
Star Tracker 52.5 6,019 9,028 4,213 3,310 0% 14,144
LNS 52 5,961 8,942 4,173 16,393 80% 27,124
Docking Camera 12 423 635 296 233 0% 995
Flight Software: MAPS 40 Klines none none 10,400 40% 10,40C
Flight Software: MANS 30 Klines none none 7,800 10% 7,8(_
GNC Totals 173.2 18,903 28,355 13,232 47,099 81,125
TABLE D.8 Communications, Command, Control & Telemett3' Subsystem Component Cost
Subsystem Component
TDRSS Transponder
EVA Transponder
Power Amplifier
Parabolic Antenna
S-Band Omni Antenna
EVA Omni Antenna
Internal Communication Net-
work
Harness
Processors (Harris)
Data Recording Unit
Flight Software: Control
C3T Totals
Actual/
Quoted
1st Unit
Cost
[SKI
6,000
1,000
250
System
Factor
Qty. or
Units
[kg]
19.9
7.2
18
First
Unit
Cost[T1]
[$K]
6,000
1,000
250
Prototype
Cost
[SKI
9,000
1,500
375
655
Proto-
flight
Savings
[SKI
4,2013
7013
175
306
Develop-
ment
Cost
[$K]
3,300
55O
137
480
% New
Design
0%
O%
O%
20%
Total
Component
Cost
[SKI
14,100
2,350
587
1,2666 437
2.4 175 262 122 192 20% 506
2.4 175 262 122 192 20% 506
2.4 127 190 89 70 0% 298
100 12 100 150 70 55 0% 235
4.7 342 513 239 188 0% 804
2.4 175 262 122 96 0% 410
30 Klines none none 7,800 10% 7,800
77.4 8,781 13,169 6,145 13,061 28,865
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TABLE D.9 Power Subsystem Component Cost
Actual/
Quoted
1st Unit
Cost
[$K]
System
Factor
Qty. or
Units
First
Unit
Cost[T1]
Prototype
Cost
Proto-
flight
Savings
Develop-
ment
Cost
% New
Design
Total
Component
Cost
[$K]Subsystem Component [kg] [$K] [SKI [SKI [$K]
Fuel Cell Powerplant 185.1 4,897 7,345 3,428 13,466 80% 22,281
Power Conditioner 60 1,587 2,381 i, 111 4,365 80% 7,222
EPS Wire Harness 110 970 1,455 679 534 0% 2,280
Fuel Cell Tank (H) 37.4 330 495 231 18 ! 0% 775
Fuel Cell Tank (O) 34.9 308 462 215 169 0% 723
Power Totals 537.4 8,092 12,138 5,664 18,716 33,281
TABLE O.10 Propulsion Subsystem Component Cost
Subsystem Component
Actual/
Quoted
1st Unit
Cost
[$K]
LH2 Propellant Tank
System
Factor
Qty. or
Units
[kg]
First
Unit
Cost[T1]
[$K]
Prototype
Cost
[$K]
Proto-
flight
Savings
[SKI
Develop-
ment
Cost
[$K]
13,20G
% New
Design
20%
Total
Component
Cost
[$K]
43,200RL10A-4 Engines 12,000 705.6 12,000 18,00(3
Secondary RCS Thrusters 21.5 758 1,138 417 0% 2,313
Primary RCS Thrusters 101 3,563 5,344 3,919 20% 12,825
RCS Tanks, Valves, Pipes 165 1,455 2,1831 1,200 10% 4,838
Plumbing, Valves, Pipes 253 3,347 5,02(3 1,841 0% 10,207
Thermal Venting System 72 2,540 3,81(3 6,286 70% 12,635
LOX Propellant Tank 94.8 1,254 1,881 1,035 10% 4,169
128.4 1,698 2,548 1,401 10% 5,647
2,328
582
Refueling Interfaces 3,492
873
35,623
PMD
Engine Requalification
66 5,762
640
30,000
60,164
44
1363.8
70%
20%
Propulsion Totals 29,525
11,582
2,095
125,312
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TABLE D.11 Total Costs
Actual/
Quoted
1st Unit
Cost
($K)
System
Factor
Qty. or
Units
(kg)
First
Unit
Cost
[TI]
($K)
Prototype
Cost
($K)
Proto-
flight
Savings
($K)
Develop-
ment
Cost
($K)Subsystem Component
Orbital Support Eqt. (on FV) 0 0 0 O
Total Vehicle Hardware 233,639 293,641 103,359 278,573
Cost
Integration & Assembly 58,410 none 69,643
% New
Design
(%)
Total
Component
Cost
($K)
Theoretical First Unit [T1] Vehicle Only:
Development and Delivery of 1 Vehicle:
D&D of 1 Vehicle utilizing protoflight:
D&D of I Vehicle Including Mgt. Cost:
$292M
$936M
$833M
$1,105M
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TABLE D.12 Support Costs
Subsystem Component
Actual/
Quoted
1st Unit
Cost
($K)
System
Factor
Qty. or
First
Unit Prototype
Proto-
flight
Develop-
ment % New
Units
(kg)
Cost[T1]
($K)
Cost
($K)
Savings
($K)
Cost
($K)
Design
(%)
Total
Component
Cost
($K)
Support
Orbital Support Eq. (off FV) 0 0 0
Launch Costs (1 ArianneV & 135,000
I Proton-C)
Ground Support Equipment included included 29,664 10%
Verification Software 200 7,000 N/A
Klines
Total Support Cost 135,0_3 0 36,664
Ground Operations
Hardware 3 facili- 30,000 none 33,000 20%
ties
Structures 400,00(] 40,000 none 22,000 0%
sq. ft.
Software 100C none none 35,00C
Klines
Total Ground Cost 70,000 none 90,00G
System Test 30,3.73 32,297 666,639
cost not
vehicle
259,334
Ground
Operations
& Support
Total Development 507,178 222,670
round costs
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TABLE D.12 Support Costs
Subsystem Component
Total Protoype Mfr.
Actual/
Quoted
1st Unit
Cost
($K)
System
Factor
Qty. or
Units
(kg)
First
Unit
Cost[Tl]
($K)
Prototype
Cost
($K)
296,641
Proto-
flight
Savings
($K)
Develop-
ment
Cost
($K)
% New
Design
(%)
Total
Component
Cost
($K)
38,900
Ground
Ops Mainte-
nace/year
Total Theoretical First Unit 392,42 I
Total Management Cost 272,304
PROGRAM COST (Devel- 1,500,186
opment, Prototype, First
Unit, Support & Manage-
ment):
Refueling Cost/Tank 52,273 Total Cost up to $1,500M
Booster Pack 138,909 and including
launch
First Year Budget + $2,298M
vehicle cost
Cost/Mission LEO 57,829 10 Year Budget + $9,311M
Cost/Mission GEO 162,375 vehicle cost
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Appendix
E
Master Schedule
The framework for the master schedule was assembled by analyzing the design, procurement and construction
time for similar systems. These analogous times were then modified by a time contingency factor as outlined
in the chart below. Special consideration was given to new industry trends such as the coordination of design,
tooling and manufacturing. For example, the propulsion systems is designed to use the currently available RL-
10A engines but re-qualified for 100 starts. Consequently, the procurement category was rated with a high
(30%) time contingency to allow for the requalification process.
The master schedule shows the indicated subsystems times and includes the appropriate contingency time. The
scale across the top is in years till launch.
Low - 10% Med - 20% High - 30%
Design
High
Procurement/Tooling Construct
Structures Low Med
P & P Med High Med
Thermal Med Med Low
GNC High Low Low
C3T Low High Low
ECLSS High Med Med
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L-4 L-3
Structures
Design
Tooling & Procurement
Component Construction
P&P
Design
Tooling & Procurement
Component Construction
GNC
Design
Tooling & Procurement
Component Construction
CCCT
Design
Tooling & Procurement
Component Construction
ECLSS
Design
Tooling & Procurement
Component Construction
Thermal
Design
Tooling & Procurement
Component Construction
Vehicle Assembly and
V&V
Final V&V and Launch
L-2
_//4
l[
II -- _///_
_//,_
•m
i
@
i ii_,)2
-- 9"//_
lie
ll_
ll
L-1
/
"///11111,,_Contingency time
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Acronym List
TABLE F.1 Project Freebird Acronyms and Explanations.
Acronym
A Acceleration Test
AC Acoustic Test
ACRV Assured Crew Return Vehicle
ADCS Attitude Determination and Control System
BFO Blood Forming Organs
BI Burn-in Test
C3T Command, Communication, Control, and Telemetry
CBA Common Berthing Adapter
CCTV Closed Circuit Television
CES Conical Earth Sensor
CMG Control Moment Gyro
CO 2 Carbon Dioxide
C&P Cost and Producibility
DCS Dual-Cone Scanner
DOF Degrees of Freedom
DSN Deep Space Network
ECLSS Environmental Control and Life Support System
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TABLE F.1 Project Freebird Acronyms and Explanations.
Acronym
EER End Effector Retainer
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility Test
EMPT Extended Mission Propellant Tank
EMU Extravehicular Mobility Unit
EPS Electrical Power System
EVA Extravehicular Activity
F Functional Test
FCP Fuel Cell Powerplant
FDIE Failure Detection Isolation and Estimation
FSS Flight Support Station
g Acceleration due to gravity
GCR Galactic Cosmic Ray
GEO Geosynchronous Orbit
GNC Guidance, Navigation, and Control
GPS Global Positioning System
IMU Inertial Measurement Unit
IPS Image Processing System
IR Infrared
ISSA International Space Station Alpha
JPL Jet Propulsion Laboratory
L Leak Test
LC Life Cycle Test
LDS Laser Docking System
LEO Low Earth Orbit
LH 2 Liquid Hydrogen
LNS Laser Navigation System
LOX Liquid Oxygen
LSS Life Support System
LiOH Lithium Hydroxide
MANS Microcosm Autonomous Navigation System
MAPS Microcosm Autonomous Planning System
MDB Mesh Double Bumper
MF Mass Fraction
MIMU Miniature Inertial Measurement Unit
MIPS Millions of Instructions per Second
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TABLE F.1 Project Freebird Acronyms and Explanations.
Acronym
MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MLI Multi-Layer Insulation
MMH Monomethyl Hydrazine
MMU Manned Maneuvering Unit
MSS Multi-Shock Shield
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
N2H 4 Nitrogen Tetroxide
0 2 Oxygen
OST Outer Space Treaty
OTS Off the shelf
OTV Orbital Transfer Vehicle
P Burst Pressure Test
P&P Power and Propulsion
PCU Power Control Unit
PF Protoflight Test
PIT Process Improvement Team
PLSS Portable Life Support System
PRT Performance Refinement Team
PS Pyro Shock Test
PTU Pan and Tilt Unit
Prox Ops Proximity Area Operations
RCS Reaction Control System
RDT&E Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
RFC Regenerable Fuel Cell
RLG Ring Laser Gyroscope
RMS Remote Manipulation System
RRS Rendezvous Radar Set
RV Random Vibration Test
SSA Space Suit Assembly
STS Space Transportation System (Space Shuttle)
SV Sine Vibration Test
TB Thermal Balance Test
TC Thermal Cycling Test
TDRSS Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System
TQM Total Quality Management
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TABLE F.1 Project Freebird Acronyms attd Explanations.
Acronym
TRM Technology Risk Management
TV Thermal Vacuum Test
TVS Thermal Venting System
VSF Vehicle Storage Facility
WBS Work Breakdown Structure
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